Opinion
No. 2021-KK-00172
05-11-2021
STATE of Louisiana v. Terrence KING
Writ application granted. See per curiam.
Weimer, C.J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
Crichton, J., would grant and docket and assigns reasons.
Crain, J., dissents and assigns reasons.
McCallum, J., would grant and docket for reasons assigned by Justice Crichton.
PER CURIAM:
The State concedes that the consecutive sentences imposed on defendant violate the Eighth Amendment and Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). The State further concedes that the remedy is to resentence defendant to concurrent terms of imprisonment. Under the unusual circumstances presented here, we reverse the district court's ruling and we remand to the district court with instructions to resentence defendant to four concurrent 20-year terms of imprisonment at hard labor with parole eligibility, in accordance with the joint remedy proposed by the State and accepted by the defendant.
REVERSED AND REMANDED
WEIMER, C.J., additionally concurs.
I write separately to note the unique circumstances of this case. The four homicides of which defendant was convicted arose out of a single tragic automobile accident that occurred almost 23 years ago when defendant was a mentally-challenged 15-year old. He has remained incarcerated since his conviction. Most members of the victims’ families, as well as the State, concurred in the assessment that the consecutive sentences imposed on the defendant violate the Eight Amendment and Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010). The only alteration being effected is that the defendant's sentences become concurrent to avoid a constitutionally prohibited excessive sentence.
Crichton, J., would grant and docket and assign reasons:
As opposed to an order summarily reversing and remanding this case, I would grant and docket defendant's writ application for full examination of the issue presented. In this tragic case, defendant committed a single act that resulted in the death of multiple victims. Defendant was found guilty as charged of four counts of felony manslaughter and was sentenced to four consecutive 20 year terms at hard labor at age 15.
In my view, defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence highlights a question requiring further study and review by this Court: Whether this juvenile defendant's cumulative sentences for offenses arising out of a single action, where defendant was not found to have specific intent, can be distinguished from this Court's opinion in State v. Brown , 2012-0872 (La. 5/7/13), 118 So. 3d 332, 335, such that defendant's 80-year sentence would violate the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment. See Graham v. Fla. , 560 U.S. 48, 75, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010), as modified (July 6, 2010) ("[T]he Eighth Amendment prohibits a State from imposing a life without parole sentence on a juvenile nonhomicide offender."); see also State ex rel. Morgan v. State , 2015-0100 (La. 10/19/16), 217 So. 3d 266, 277 (Crichton, J., concurring) (noting the district attorney in that case took "the stunning position that this defendant does not face the functional equivalent of life imprisonment and that he would have—in the year 2082 and at age 101—a ‘meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.’ ") (quoting Graham , supra ).
While any Eighth Amendment violation here might be cured if defendant is deemed parole eligible by operation of La. R.S. 15:574.4(J)(1), that also is a matter of statutory interpretation that merits careful consideration. If applicable, the Court may also need to consider whether defendant's alleged intellectual disability (IQ of 60) prevents him from being able to comply with the conditions provided therein.
Accordingly, I would grant and docket this matter to thoroughly examine whether the district court erroneously denied defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence.
CRAIN, J., dissenting.
In 1999 a jury convicted the defendant of four homicides under Louisiana Revised Statute 14:31A(2)(a). He was sentenced to four consecutive 20-year sentences. On appeal, he challenged his sentences as excessive. The court of appeal disagreed and affirmed the convictions and sentences. See State v. King , 01-0092 (La. App. 5 Cir. 5/30/01), 796 So. 2d 941 (table). This court chose not to further review the sentences and denied defendant's writ application. See State v. King , 01-2026 (La. 5/31/02), 817 So. 2d 88.
Now, almost two decades after the sentences became final, the majority revisits them without authority cited for this action. The sentences were upheld on appeal; this court declined further review in a writ denial; and if post-conviction relief procedure permitted review of the sentences, which it does not, the delays for that relief have long since expired. See La. Code Crim. Pro. arts. 930.3 and 930.8A; State ex rel. Melinie v. State , 93-1380 (La. 1/12/96), 665 So. 2d 1172 ( per curiam ); State ex rel. Glover v. State , 93-2330 (La. 9/5/95), 660 So. 2d 1189, 1202. Nor is this a case where the sentence is fatally flawed for omitting a constitutionally required benefit, such as parole eligibility. See Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 2034, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) ; State ex rel. Morgan v. State , 15-0100 (La. 10/19/16), 217 So. 3d 266, 276. In fact, the trial court expressly ordered that defendant is parole eligible under Louisiana Revised Statute 15:574.4D. Finally, while defendant claims his sentences are illegal and thus can be corrected at any time, there is nothing "illegal" about consecutive sentences imposed for multiple convictions arising out of the same act, particularly where the defendant is parole eligible. See La. Code Crim. Pro. art. 883 ; State v. Thomas , 98-1144 (La. 10/9/98), 719 So. 2d 49 ( per curiam ).
The majority's decision rests entirely on the fact "the State concedes that the consecutive sentences imposed on defendant violate the Eighth Amendment." But our constitution vests judges, not district attorneys, with exclusive authority to determine whether a sentence is unconstitutionally excessive. See La. Const. Art. I, § 20 ; Art. V, §§ 1, 5 ; State v. Dorthey , 623 So. 2d 1276, 1280 (La. 1993). Absent a pardon, our constitutional authority cannot be usurped by the executive branch, nor should the court relinquish it simply to achieve a desired result in this case because defendant has allegedly progressed in his rehabilitation and some, not all, of his victims do not oppose his release. Given the indisputable finality of the sentences, rehabilitation is a relevant consideration only for a pardon or parole. Revisiting this sentence is for the legislative or executive branches, not the judiciary. I dissent and would deny the subject writ application.