Opinion
No. COA10-1006
Filed 7 June 2011 This case not for publication
Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 31 March 2010 by Judge Richard D. Boner in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 26 January 2011.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Kathleen M. Waylett, Special Deputy Attorney General, for the State. M. Alexander Charns for Defendant.
Mecklenburg County File No. 07 CRS 231422-24.
Defendant Quincy Teeyon Ketter appeals from judgments sentencing him to a minimum term of twenty-four months and a maximum term of thirty-eight months imprisonment based upon his conviction for discharging a weapon into an occupied vehicle; to a minimum term of 100 months and a maximum term of 129 months imprisonment based upon his conviction for assaulting Lashonda Forney with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, to be served at the expiration of his sentence for discharging a weapon into an occupied vehicle; and to a minimum term of 80 months and a maximum term of 105 months imprisonment based upon his conviction for assaulting LaKeisha Welch with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury, with that sentence to be served at the expiration of his sentence for feloniously assaulting Ms. Forney, with all sentences to be served in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Correction. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of assaulting LaKeisha Welch with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury and that the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and by failing to instruct the jury on the issue of self-defense. After careful consideration of Defendant's challenges to the trial court's judgments in light of the record and the applicable law, we conclude that no error occurred during the proceedings leading to the entry of the trial court's judgments and that Defendant is not entitled to any relief from the trial court's judgments on appeal.
I. Background A. Substantive Facts 1. Testimony of Ms. Forney
On 10 July 2007, Ms. Forney lived in a house that she rented in Charlotte with Defendant, with whom she had been in a romantic relationship for five years. Defendant was the father of three of Ms. Forney's children. On that date, Ms. Forney gave Defendant a ride to the Mecklenburg County Courthouse, where Defendant was required to appear in connection with a pending traffic citation. While Ms. Forney and Defendant travelled to the courthouse, Defendant threatened Ms. Forney, saying that he should hit her in the eye.
At the courthouse, Ms. Forney was told that she could not enter the courtroom. Ms. Forney and Defendant "had been back and forth with getting the law involved" in their relationship, so Ms. Forney decided to remove Defendant's possessions from her house while he was at the courthouse. In essence, Ms. Forney "took [her inability to enter the courtroom with Defendant] as an opportunity to leave [Defendant.]" After returning home to retrieve her 9 millimeter handgun, Ms. Forney went to the residence of her friend and neighbor, Ms. Welch. Ms. Forney asked Ms. Welch to hold her gun and requested Ms. Welch and her boyfriend, Shawn Boykin, to help her move Defendant's property out of the house. Mr. Boykin was a large man, standing about six feet, four inches in height and weighing more than 250 pounds. Ms. Forney, Ms. Welch, and Mr. Boykin returned to Ms. Forney's house in Ms. Welch's sports utility vehicle began loading Defendant's possessions into Ms. Welch's vehicle for the purpose of taking them to one of Defendant's relatives.
After Ms. Forney and Ms. Welch loaded two or three boxes of Defendant's property into Ms. Welch's vehicle, Defendant returned to Ms. Forney's residence in a cab. When Ms. Welch noticed Defendant's presence, she ran outside and got into the back seat of Ms. Welch's vehicle, which was backed into Ms. Forney's driveway and faced the street. Defendant removed his possessions from Ms. Welch's vehicle and entered the residence. As Defendant was attempting to enter the house, Ms. Forney ran out the back door and got into the driver's side rear seat. Defendant "jumped down the steps," ran over to the car, "grabbed [Ms. Forney] around [her] neck," choked Ms. Forney, and "tried to remove [her]" from the vehicle. As Defendant was choking Ms. Forney, Mr. Boykin came up behind Defendant and tried to pull him away from Ms. Forney. At that point, Defendant released Ms. Forney and began arguing with Mr. Boykin.
While Defendant and Mr. Boykin argued, Ms. Forney noticed that Mr. Boykin was holding her gun. Mr. Boykin never pointed the gun at Defendant. Defendant claimed that the gun belonged to him and demanded that Mr. Boykin return it. Mr. Boykin threw the gun back into the front passenger area, got in the vehicle, and attempted to shut the door. However, Defendant blocked the door and kept Mr. Boykin from closing it. After exchanging a few words with Mr. Boykin, Defendant reached into the vehicle, grabbed the gun, pointed it towards the back seat, and ordered Ms. Forney to get out. Ms. Forney did not comply with Defendant's instruction. Instead, Ms. Forney shouted at Mr. Boykin to drive away. Before Mr. Boykin started to pull out of the driveway into the street, Defendant began shooting at the car.
After Defendant started shooting at the car, Mr. Boykin drove away. Defendant fired approximately five shots while the vehicle was still in the driveway, fired "a lot" of shots as Mr. Boykin drove down the street, and continued shooting until the vehicle was "out of range." Ms. Forney heard windows breaking, felt a burning sensation, and observed that her left arm was bleeding.
Mr. Boykin drove to Carolinas Medical Center for the purpose of obtaining medical treatment for Ms. Forney. At the hospital, Ms. Forney had to undergo surgery because her humerus was shattered and had to be replaced with a metal rod. The surgery left scars on her arm. In the year following the incident, Ms. Forney underwent two additional procedures to remove two bullets from her left arm. Ms. Forney remained in the hospital for a week, after which she had to undergo months of physical therapy.
2. Testimony of Ms. Welch
Ms. Welch testified that Ms. Forney came to her house on 10 July 2007 and asked Ms. Welch and Mr. Boykin to help move Defendant's things out of her house. After Ms. Forney gave her gun to Ms. Welch, the three of them drove to Ms. Forney's house in Ms. Welch's sports utility vehicle and began loading Defendant's possessions into the vehicle. When Ms. Welch noticed Defendant's return, she exited Ms. Forney's residence by the front door, got into the passenger side rear seat of her vehicle, and gave Ms. Forney's gun to Mr. Boykin, who was sitting in the driver's seat. Defendant ran across the street, went to the opposite side of Ms. Welch's vehicle, removed his possessions, and tried to get in the front door of Ms. Forney's residence. After Ms. Forney left the residence using the back door and got into the driver's side rear seat, Defendant tried to pull her out of the vehicle. However, Mr. Boykin got out of the vehicle and stopped him. Ms. Welch specifically denied that Mr. Boykin pointed a gun at Defendant or that Defendant had said that Mr. Boykin would have to kill him. After Mr. Boykin got back into Ms. Welch's sports utility vehicle, Defendant grabbed the gun from the front seat, pointed it at Ms. Forney and told her to get out of the car. Although Ms. Forney told Mr. Boykin to drive away, Defendant started shooting before the vehicle could get out of the driveway. Ms. Welch was struck in the chest by a bullet; in addition, a bullet shattered the windshield of her car. At Carolinas Medical Center, Ms. Welch received treatment for her injuries. Ms. Welch, who was pregnant, found the incident traumatic, remained in a traumatized condition for a long time, and had to undergo counseling.
3. Testimony of Mr. Boykin Mr. Boykin
testified that he went to Ms. Forney's house to help her remove Defendant's property. Mr. Boykin backed Ms. Welch's vehicle into the driveway and remained in the driver's seat. When Defendant arrived, he ran toward the house, then came to Ms. Welch's vehicle and began removing his property. After Defendant attempted to enter Ms. Forney's house through the front door, Ms. Forney came out the back door. Mr. Boykin testified that, when Ms. Forney got into Ms. Welch's vehicle, Defendant "started punching [her] and hitting her and trying to get her out of the back seat." Mr. Boykin got out of the car, pulled Defendant off of Ms. Forney, and reentered the vehicle. Defendant told Mr. Boykin that Mr. Boykin would have to kill him. Before Mr. Boykin could drive away, Defendant "dove in through the driver side window[,] grabbed the pistol off the seat," and fired at the car as Mr. Boykin drove away. Mr. Boykin denied ever having had the gun in his possession. Despite the fact that the side passenger window and rear window of Ms. Welch's vehicle were shot out and the fact that there were holes throughout the vehicle, Mr. Boykin did not sustain any injuries.
4. Testimony of Investigating Officers
Investigating officers found a number of shell casings and lead fragments near the scene. In addition, the officers found automobile glass on the street near Ms. Forney's residence. An examination of Ms. Welch's vehicle revealed the presence of several bullet holes, including holes in the back and rear side areas.
B. Procedural History
On 10 July 2007, warrants for arrest were issued charging Defendant with assaulting Ms. Forney with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill, assaulting Ms. Welch with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill, and shooting into an occupied vehicle. On 30 July 2007, the Mecklenburg County grand jury returned bills of indictment charging Defendant with assaulting Ms. Forney with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury, assaulting Ms. Welch with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury, and discharging a weapon into an occupied vehicle.
The charges against Defendant came on for trial before the trial court and a jury at the 30 March 2010 criminal session of the Mecklenburg County Superior Court. After the presentation of the State's evidence, the announcement of Defendant's decision not to offer evidence, and the delivery of the court's jury instructions, the jury returned verdicts convicting Defendant as charged. At the ensuing sentencing hearing, the trial court determined that Defendant had accumulated four prior record points and should be sentenced as a Level II offender. Based upon these determinations, the trial court sentenced Defendant to a minimum term of twenty-four months and a maximum term of thirty-eight months imprisonment for discharging a weapon into occupied property; to a minimum term of 100 months and a maximum term of 129 months imprisonment for assaulting Ms. Forney with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury, with that sentence to be served at the expiration of Defendant's sentence for shooting into an occupied vehicle; and to a minimum term of 80 months and a maximum term of 105 months imprisonment for assaulting Ms. Welch with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury, with that sentence to be served at the expiration of Defendant's sentence for assaulting Ms. Forney, all to be served in the custody of the North Carolina Department of Correction. Defendant noted an appeal to this Court from the trial court's judgments.
II. Legal Analysis A. Failure to Instruct on Lesser Included Offense
On appeal, Defendant initially argues that, in the two cases in which he was charged with assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury, the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on the lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury. According to Defendant, the record contained sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror could have found that, although Defendant assaulted Ms. Forney and Ms. Welch with a deadly weapon and inflicted serious injury, he lacked the necessary intent to kill. This argument lacks merit.
"Since defendant failed to object to the jury charge or any omission thereto before the jury retired to consider its verdict, our review is limited to plain error." State v. Cromartie, 177 N.C. App. 73, 75-76, 627 S.E.2d 677, 680, disc. rev. denied, 360 N.C. 539, 634 S.E.2d 538 (2006) (citation omitted). In reviewing for plain error, this Court has stated that:
"[T]he plain error rule . . . is always to be applied cautiously and only in the exceptional case where, after reviewing the entire record, it can be said the claimed error is a fundamental error, something so basic, so prejudicial, so lacking in its elements that justice cannot have been done, or where [the error] is grave error which amounts to a denial of a fundamental right of the accused, or the error has resulted in a miscarriage of justice or in the denial to appellant of a fair trial or where the error is such as to seriously affect the fairness, integrity or public reputation of judicial proceedings or where it can be fairly said the instructional mistake had a probable impact on the jury's finding that the defendant was guilty."
State v. Odom, 307 N.C. 655, 660, 300 S.E.2d 375, 378 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. McCaskill, 676 F.2d 995, 1002 (4th Cir. 1982) (alternations in original), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1018, 74 L. Ed. 2d 513, 103 S. Ct. 381 (1982)). We do not believe that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the issue of Defendant's guilt of the lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury was error, much less plain error.
"A defendant `is entitled to an instruction on lesser included offenses if the evidence would permit a jury rationally to find him guilty of the lesser offense and acquit him of the greater.' However, `a lesser offense should not be submitted to the jury if the evidence is sufficient to support a finding of all the elements of the greater offense, and there is no evidence to support a finding of the lesser offense.'" State v. Uvalle, 151 N.C. App. 446, 452-53, 565 S.E.2d 727, 731 (2002) (quoting State v. Leazer, 353 N.C. 234, 237, 539 S.E.2d 922, 924 (2000), and State v. Nelson, 341 N.C. 695, 697, 462 S.E.2d 225, 226 (1995) (other citations omitted), disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 692, 579 S.E.2d 95 (2003). "To determine whether [the] evidence is sufficient for submission of the lesser offense to the jury, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to defendant." State v. Barlowe, 337 N.C. 371, 378, 446 S.E.2d 352, 357 (1994).
"`The elements of this charge [of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury] are (1) an assault, (2) with a deadly weapon, (3) an intent to kill, and (4) infliction of a serious injury not resulting in death.'" State v. Grigsby, 351 N.C. 454, 456, 526 S.E.2d 460, 462 (2000) (quoting State v. James, 321 N.C. 676, 687, 365 S.E.2d 579, 586 (1988)). Assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury is a lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury. State v. Riddick, 315 N.C. 749, 759, 340 S.E.2d 55, 61 (1986). "The only difference in what the State must prove for the offense of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury and assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill inflicting serious injury is the element of intent to kill." Cromartie, 177 N.C. App. at 76, 627 S.E.2d at 680 (citing Grigsby, 351 at 456, 526 S.E.2d at 462).
"The defendant's intent to kill may be inferred from the nature of the assault, the manner in which it was made, the conduct of the parties, and other relevant circumstances." James, 321 N.C. at 688, 365 S.E.2d at 586 (citation omitted). "Where the defendant points a gun at the victim and pulls the trigger, this constitutes evidence from which intent to kill may be inferred. . . . `[A]n assailant must be held to intend the natural consequences of his deliberate act.'" Cromartie, 177 N.C. App. at 77, 627 S.E.2d at 680 (quoting Grigsby, 351 N.C. at 457, 526 S.E.2d at 462 (internal citation omitted), and citing James at 688, 365 S.E.2d at 586, and State v. Reives, 29 N.C. App. 11, 12-13, 222 S.E.2d 727, 728, disc. rev. denied, 289 N.C. 728, 224 S.E.2d 675 (1976)).
Although Defendant does not contend that the State failed to present sufficient evidence of assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury to support a conviction for that offense, he does argue that there was evidence from which the jury might find that, when he fired repeatedly into Ms. Welch's car, he had no intent to kill any of the passengers. In an effort to persuade us of the validity of this argument, Defendant directs our attention to evidence which he asserts tends to show that Defendant never threatened to kill anyone, that he ended up with the gun after a struggle, that Ms. Forney and her compatriots came to the residence for the purpose of unlawfully evicting him, and that he did not have a gun in his possession when the incident began. More particularly, Defendant argues that:
Ms. Forney brought her gun, her girlfriend, and a man who was 6'4" and weighed over 250 pounds, when she decided to unlawfully remove her children's father's property from their house. Ms. Forney made statements to the effect that she wanted to kill Mr. Ketter. In the light most favorable to the accused, the evidence shows that Mr. Ketter was threatened with a gun and an SUV before he wrestled the gun away and started firing.
We do not find this argument persuasive.
As a preliminary matter, we have not found any evidence in the present record tending to show that Ms. Forney threatened to kill Defendant or that she "made statements to the effect that she wanted to kill" Defendant at any time on 10 July 2007. In addition, the record does not contain any evidence tending to show that a "struggle" for the gun occurred or that Defendant "wrestled" the gun away from anyone. Instead, the undisputed evidence tends to show that, after Mr. Boykin got into Ms. Welch's sports utility vehicle, Defendant reached inside, grabbed the weapon, pointed it at Ms. Forney, and began firing. As a result, Defendant's suggestion that he obtained the handgun in the course of a "struggle" lacks record support. Finally, there is no evidence that anyone ever "threatened" Defendant with either the handgun or the sports utility vehicle. No one testified that Mr. Boykin ever threatened Defendant, and Ms. Forney and Mr. Boykin both expressly denied that Mr. Boykin pointed the gun at Defendant. Thus, much of Defendant's argument simply lacks adequate record support.
Moreover, a considerable portion of the evidence upon which Defendant relies, such as the allegedly "unlawful" behavior of Ms. Forney; the fact that she brought two friends, including a large man, to help her remove Defendant's possessions from her residence; and the fact that Mr. Boykin was holding a gun when he tried to rescue Ms. Forney from Defendant, simply does not tend to show that Defendant lacked an intent to kill. On the contrary, much of this evidence cuts the other way by establishing a motive for Defendant to be angry at Ms. Forney. Simply put, Defendant has not identified any logical basis for believing that the testimony upon which he relies tends to prove that he did not intend to kill when he repeatedly fired into Ms. Welch's sports utility vehicle. As a result, we conclude that Defendant's challenge to the trial court's failure to submit the issue of his guilt of the lesser included offense of assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury lacks merit.
B. Self Defense
Secondly, Defendant argues that the trial court committed plain error by failing to instruct the jury on self-defense. According to Defendant, the record contains evidence from which a rational juror could find that, at the time he shot into Ms. Welch's vehicle, Defendant reasonably believed that he was at risk of suffering death or great bodily injury. Defendant's argument lacks merit.
"This Court long ago explained that `[t]he first law of nature is that of self-defense.'" State v. Moore, 363 N.C. 793, 796, 688 S.E.2d 447, 449 (2010) (quoting State v. Holland, 193 N.C. 713, 718, 138 S.E. 8, 10 (1927)). "Thus, an accused is not guilty of a crime when he shows the existence of perfect self-defense." Id. (citing State v. Bush, 307 N.C. 152, 158, 297 S.E.2d 563, 568 (1982)).
[B]efore the defendant is entitled to an instruction on self-defense, two questions must be answered in the affirmative: (1) Is there evidence that the defendant in fact formed a belief that it was necessary to kill his adversary in order to protect himself from death or great bodily harm, and (2) if so, was that belief reasonable? If both queries are answered in the affirmative, then an instruction on self-defense must be given. If, however, the evidence requires a negative response to either question, a self-defense instruction should not be given.
Moore, 363 N.C. at 796, 688 S.E.2d at 449 (citing Bush at 160-61, 297 S.E.2d at 569). In determining whether the jury should be instructed on the issue of self-defense, the trial court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. State v. Watkins, 283 N.C. 504, 509, 196 S.E.2d 750, 754 (1973) (citing State v. Finch, 177 N.C. 599, 99 S.E. 409 (1919)).
Although Defendant argues that the evidence, "taken in the light most favorable to [Defendant,] shows that he was threatened with great bodily harm or death by the 6'4", 250 pound, Mr. Boykin who was armed with a handgun," the record does not, as we have already noted, contain any evidence tending to show that Mr. Boykin pointed the gun at or threatened to shoot Defendant. In apparent recognition of the absence of any direct evidence to that effect, Defendant points to testimony that, when told to stop attacking Ms. Forney, he said that "you're going to have to kill me." Despite the fact that Defendant claims that this testimony constitutes "some evidence that [Mr. Boykin] was pointing the gun at the accused," we are unable to read the record in this manner. Moreover, Defendant's challenge to the credibility of the State's evidence that he reached across Mr. Boykin to obtain Ms. Forney's handgun has no relevance to this issue. Simply put, the testimony upon which Defendant relies does not support the inference that Defendant has attempted to draw.
Moreover, even if Mr. Boykin's possession of a handgun exposed Defendant to a risk that he would suffer great bodily harm or death, this fact would not, standing alone, support the submission of a perfect or imperfect self-defense instruction to the jury. According to the undisputed evidence, after Mr. Boykin entered Ms. Welch's sports utility vehicle, Defendant reached inside the vehicle and obtained possession of the gun. The record is completely devoid of any evidence tending to indicate that, at the time he began firing at Ms. Welch's vehicle, anyone other than Defendant was armed. As a result, all of the record evidence demonstrates that, at the time Defendant fired at the car, any threat posed to him by Mr. Boykin's possession of the handgun had ended.
A trial judge does not err by failing to instruct on perfect or imperfect self-defense if "there was no evidence of necessity — real or apparent — for the defendant to kill in order to protect himself from death or great bodily harm" and "no evidence tend[ing] to show that the defendant in fact formed a belief that it was necessary to kill the victim to protect himself from death or great bodily harm." State v. Gappins, 320 N.C. 64, 73, 357 S.E.2d 654, 660 (1987) . Defendant has not, in the course of his challenge to the trial court's decision, pointed to any evidence tending to show that he formed a belief, reasonable or otherwise, that he needed to use deadly force to protect himself from Ms. Welch's vehicle or from any of the individuals who were present. We conclude that the record contains no evidence that Defendant formed the belief that it was necessary to use deadly force or that, if he had formed such a belief, it would have been a reasonable one. As a result, the trial court did not err by declining to instruct the jury on the issue of self-defense.
C. Denial of Dismissal Motion
Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss the charge of assaulting Ms. Welch with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury on the grounds that the State failed to present sufficient evidence that Ms. Welch sustained a serious injury. We do not agree.
When reviewing a defendant's motion to dismiss a charge on the basis of insufficiency of the evidence, this Court determines "whether the State presented `substantial evidence' in support of each element of the charged offense." "`Substantial evidence' is relevant evidence that a reasonable person might accept as adequate, or would consider necessary to support a particular conclusion.'" In this determination, all evidence is considered "`in the light most favorable to the State, and the State receives the benefit of every reasonable inference supported by that evidence.'"
State v. Abshire, 363 N.C. 322, 327-28, 677 S.E.2d 444, 449 (2009) (quoting State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328, 374, 611 S.E.2d 794, 827 (2005), and State v. McNeil, 359 N.C. 800, 803-804, 617 S.E.2d 271, 273-74 (2005) (citations omitted) (quoting State v. Garcia, 358 N.C. 382, 412-13, 597 S.E.2d 724, 746 (2004), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1156, 161 L. Ed. 2d 122, 125 S. Ct. 1301, (2005)).
According to the undisputed record evidence, Ms. Welch suffered two gunshot wounds at the time of this incident. In addition to requiring treatment for those wounds, Ms. Welch testified that she found the series of events that led to the present charges to be traumatic and had to undergo counseling as part of her recovery from this incident. Although Defendant does not dispute the nature of the injuries that Ms. Welch sustained, he points to Ms. Welch's testimony that her injuries consisted of a grazing bullet wound to the head and a flesh wound and argues that such wounds cannot, by definition, constitute a serious injury.
"This Court has not defined `serious injury' for purposes of assault prosecutions, other than stating that `the injury must be serious but it must fall short of causing death' and that `further definition seems neither wise nor desirable.'" Whether `serious injury' has been inflicted must be decided on the facts of each case." State v. Ramseur, 338 N.C. 502, 507, 450 S.E.2d 467, 471 (1994) (quoting State v. Jones, 258 N.C. 89, 91, 128 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1962)). "Cases that have addressed the issue of the sufficiency of evidence of serious injury appear to stand for the proposition that as long as the State presents evidence that the victim sustained a physical injury as a result of an assault by the defendant, it is for the jury to determine the question of whether the injury was serious." State v. Alexander, 337 N.C. 182, 189, 446 S.E.2d 83, 87 (1994) (citing State v. Joyner, 295 N.C. 55, 65, 243 S.E.2d 367, 374 (1978)). Moreover, "serious injury, within the meaning and intent of that term as used in N.C. [Gen. Stat. ] § 14-32, includes serious mental injury caused by an assault with a deadly weapon." State v. Everhardt, 326 N.C. 777, 780, 392 S.E.2d 391, 393 (1990).
As discussed above, the extent to which the State has presented sufficient evidence to allow a jury to find that a victim experienced serious injury is evaluated on a case-by-case basis. At trial, the evidence showed that (1) Ms. Welch was pregnant at the time of the assault, (2) she sustained two bullet wounds, (3) she received treatment for her injuries at the hospital, and (4) she was traumatized by the incident and required counseling. A careful examination of the prior decisions of the Supreme Court and this Court satisfies us that the trial court properly submitted the issue of Defendant's guilt of assaulting Ms. Welch with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury and that Defendant's argument to the contrary addresses the weight that should be afforded to the State's evidence rather than its sufficiency. As a result, the trial court did not err by failing to dismiss the charge that Defendant assaulted Ms. Welch with a deadly weapon with the intent to kill inflicting serious injury.
III. Conclusion
Thus, for the reasons set forth above, we conclude that Defendant received a fair trial, free of reversible error and that none of his challenges to the trial court's judgments have merit. As a result, Defendant is not entitled to any relief from the trial court's judgments on appeal.
NO ERROR.
Judges ELMORE and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).