Opinion
ID No. 9911000194
Submitted: January 18, 2001
Decided: May 31, 2001
Appeal from Decision of the Court of Common Pleas in and for New Castle County.
On Appeal from a Decision of the Court of Common Pleas — Reversed.
Allison L. Peters, Esquire, Attorney for State — Appellant.
Michael P. Freebery, Esquire Attorney for Appellee.
OPINION
On June 20, 2000, the Court of Common Pleas granted defendant Donald J. Karg's Motion to Suppress evidence at the beginning of defendant's Driving Under the Influence trial, ruling that a State trooper's initial stop of the defendant's vehicle was pretextual. The State of Delaware has appealed the decision to the Superior Court. This is the Court's decision on the State's appeal, filed pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 9902(b).
10 Del. C. § 9902(b) provides for a dismissal by the State of any complaint or indictment when a court suppresses or excludes substantial and material evidence essential to the State's case. 10 Del. C. § 9902(c) provides an absolute right of appeal by the State to an appellate court from an order entered pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 9902(b).
I. FACTS
Shortly after 1 a.m. on October 30, 1999, Trooper Todd D. Hennon of the Delaware State Police observed the defendant turn left from Duncan Road onto westbound Delaware Route 2 without using a turn signal. After turning left, the defendant activated his right turn signal and kept the signal on for about a mile, while driving in the left hand lane. As Trooper Hennon followed the defendant on Route 2, he observed the defendant's vehicle drive to the right of the center lane marking by about a foot, twice sway across the left lane markings by about two feet, and twice sway across the right lane markings by about two feet. Trooper Hennon decided to stop the defendant's vehicle as the defendant turned left onto southbound Red Mill Road. Trooper Hennon observed the defendant's vehicle travel on the right shoulder line of Red Mill Road. Trooper Hennon decided that the narrow two-lane Red Mill Road was an unsafe area to pull over defendant's vehicle. The defendant reached the intersection of Route 273 and Route 4, and proceeded down Route 4 at Salem Church Road, when Trooper Hennon activated his emergency lights and stopped the defendant in the parking lot of a restaurant. Trooper Hennon had followed the defendant for about 5 miles in a 10 to 15 minute time span before pulling him over.At the suppression hearing before trial in the Court of Common Pleas, additional testimony beyond the initial stop was given by Trooper Hennon; however, the Court suppressed all evidence in the case when it found that the trooper's stop of the defendant's vehicle was a pretextual stop.
The State argues that the trial court ruling is erroneous as a matter of law and is not supported by the factual record. The defendant filed an answering brief opposing the State's appeal and supporting the decision of the trial court.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
On an appeal from the Court of Common Pleas to the Superior Court, the standard of review pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 9902(b) (c) is de novo for legal determinations, and "clearly erroneous" for findings of fact. When the factual findings of the court below are sufficiently supported by the record and are the product of an orderly and logical deductive process, they must be accepted notwithstanding the fact that the Superior Court may have reached opposite conclusions. After having reviewed the record, the authorities, and the arguments of the parties, the decision below can not stand.
State of Delaware v. High, Del. Super., C.A. No. 90-09-0243, 1995 WL 314494, at *2, Toliver, J. (March 7, 1995) ( citing Levitt v. Bouvier, Del. Supr., 287 A.2d 671 (1972); State v. Cagle, Del. Supr., 332 A.2d 140 (1974)).
Id.
III. DISCUSSION
A. TRIAL COURT'S LEGAL DETERMINATION
The trial court cited the case of State v. Caldwell to support its finding of a pretextual stop. In Caldwell, a police officer initially pulled over the defendant because the officer saw him stopped illegally in a fire lane. The Caldwell court relied on Whren v. United States and Delaware case law to rule that although the police officer admitted that stopping the defendant was a pretext for investigating the defendant's vehicle for criminal activity, the officer's actual, subjective motivations were irrelevant because he had a legitimate, objective reason for stopping the defendant — namely, a traffic violation that was committed in the officer's presence. The Caldwell court also rejected the defendant's suggestion to follow the State of Washington's view that whether a stop is pretextual depends on a consideration of "the totality of the circumstances, including both the subjective intent of the officer as well as the objective reasonableness of the officer's behavior."
Del. Super., Nos. 9807006121, 9807006069, 1999 WL 1240828, Witham, J. (Oct. 22, 1999).
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); State v. Banther, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IK 97-05-0094, Ridgely, P.J. at 5 (Sept. 24, 1998) (ORDER); State v. Minaya, Del. Super., Cr. A. No. IK 92-06-029, Terry, J. at 2 (Dec. 13, 1997) (ORDER).
Caldwell at 3 ( citing State v. Ladson, Wash. Supr., 979 P.2d 833, 843 (1999)).
In this case, when discussing the holding in Caldwell, the trial judge below noted:
[W]hile the Court denied the right or the Motion to Suppress by the defense, it did comment with respect to the issue of a pretextual stop. And the Court, when pointing to a Washington Supreme Court decision, indicated that the standard which the court is to use in measuring a motion when the defense raised the issue of a pretextual stop, indicates that the inquiry surrounding the pretextual stop should take into account objective factors. And when making a determination whether a stop is pretextual, the Court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including both the subjective intent of the officer, as well as the objective reasonableness of the officer's behavior.
This recitation by the trial judge of the Caldwell standard wrongly included the already-rejected notion that "the Court should consider the totality of the circumstances, including both the subjective intent of the officer, as well as the objective reasonableness of the officer's behavior."
Significantly, the trial judge next noted in his ruling:
In this context, it appears that if the officer intended to stop this individual for the violation of the signal or for crossing the lines, the dividing lines on Route 2, there was sufficient time and sufficient space for that stop to take place. The officer did not, in fact, initiate the stop on Route 2 for some five miles, and followed the vehicle.
The trial court continued:
A fair reading of the above paragraph indicates that the trial judge, in the context of a mistaken view of the Caldwell standard, improperly considered the officer's subjective intent "to stop this individual for the [traffic] violation." In other words, because in the trial court's view there was sufficient time and space to stop the defendant for traffic violations, the officer did not actually intend to stop the defendant for the violations, but intended to follow him for other reasons.
In Delaware the constitutional reasonableness of a traffic stop does not depend on the police officer's actual, subjective motives. Therefore, because the trial judge cited a standard which included an inquiry of the officer's subjective intent, and then in the bench ruling considered the officer's subjective intent, the court below erred as a matter of law.
Minya at 2.
B. TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT
The testimony at the suppression hearing established that Trooper Hennon observed multiple traffic violations of 21 Del. C. § 4122 (driving within traffic lanes) and § 4155 (proper use of turn signals): (1) defendant failed to signal upon turning left on westbound Delaware 2;(2) defendant engaged his right turn signal after turning left on Delaware 2 and left it on for about a mile; (3) defendant drove on the center lane marking, then twice swayed left and twice swayed right across the lane markings by two feet on Delaware 2;(4) defendant traveled on the right shoulder line on Red Mill Road. The officer testified that after watching the defendant sway back and forth across the lines he decided to stop the vehicle, as it turned down Red Mill Road. The officer further testified that the narrow Red Mill Road was not a safe area to pull over the defendant. The trial court, with no additional testimony on the subject, reached the conclusion that "there was sufficient time and sufficient space for that stop to take place" on Red Mill Road.
In Delaware, a police officer must have at least a reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop and detain a vehicle. And, as a general rule in Delaware, the stop of an automobile, although a "seizure" under the Fourth Amendment, is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic violation has occurred. Once probable cause or reasonable suspicion has been established by a police officer, there is no set time after a traffic offense is observed that an officer must act to stop the violator. A court must balance the citizen's right to be pulled over in a timely fashion for an alleged traffic violation with an officer's judgment that safety concerns counsel against immediately pulling a vehicle over on a particular stretch of road.
Caldwell at 3 ( citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)).
Banther at 5 ( citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996); Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659).
The defendant cites State v. Murray, Del. Super., Cr. A. Nos. N94-0301721AC to N94-03-1723AC, 1995 WL 338706, Carpenter, J. (April 28, 1995) for its alleged factual similarity to the present case. There, the Court affirmed a decision of the Court of Common Pleas that found a police officer was unable to articulate "an reason" for stopping the defendant for DUI and simply tried to justify the stop after the fact because the defendant had been speeding four miles earlier. The Superior Court on appeal correctly noted that the issue was not "squarely addressed by treating it as a pretextual stop," but rather the relevant inquiry was whether under the facts presented the police officer could articulate a reasonable suspicion to stop the defendant. As stated above, in the present case, Trooper Hennon not only had reasonable suspicion that the defendant violated traffic laws, but also had probable cause to perform an investigatory traffic stop based on multiple contemporaneous observations of the defendant's erratic driving.
Objectively, any one of the multiple traffic infractions observed in this case provided Trooper Hennon with the probable cause needed to execute a constitutionally-permissible vehicle stop. Further, notwithstanding the conclusion reached by the trial court to the contrary, the record is devoid of any evidence contradicting the officer's assessment that there was not a safe place to perform a traffic stop once the officer made the decision to do so. After committing a continuous string of traffic offenses along a five-mile stretch, the defendant was pulled over in a reasonable amount of time by the officer.
Therefore, the decision of the Court of Common Pleas is not sufficiently supported by the factual record.
IV. CONCLUSION
The decision by the Court of Common Pleas granting the Appellee's motion and suppressing all relevant evidence obtained as a result of the stop cannot be sustained. The court erred as a matter of law, and the factual record does not support the decision. Accordingly, the decision is REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion and order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Therefore, I conclude, based on all the factors in the record, that at the time that the officer made the stop on Route 273 and Salem Church Road, it constituted a pretextual stop, that in fact, that he lacked a reasonable articulable suspicion, and the motion is hereby granted.