Opinion
ID No. 0211004325.
Submitted: May 14, 2007.
Decided: August 28, 2007.
On Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief. DENIED.
Mark Conner, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Delaware.
Phillip Jones, Delaware Correctional Center, Delaware.
ORDERS
On this 28th day of August 2007, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief it appears to the Court that:
The following facts were abstracted from this Court's opinion issued on January 30, 2004 denying the Defendant's motion for sentence reduction, which the Court also treated as a motion for postconviction relief.
On August 4, 2006 Phillip Jones ("Defendant") filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 ("Rule 61"). At the request of the Court, Defendant's trial attorney, Robert M. Goff, Esquire ("Counsel"), filed an affidavit refuting the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
After being charged with Murder First Degree, the Defendant pled guilty to Murder Second Degree on February 5, 2004, and he was sentenced for that crime on April 2, 2004 to eighteen years of incarceration. Thereafter, the Defendant filed a motion to modify his sentence, which was denied. Consequently, the Defendant filed a second request to modify his sentence, which the Court also treated as his first motion for postconviction relief, wherein he asserted ineffective assistance of counsel and self-defense. The motion was denied, and thereafter, the Defendant filed this Motion for Postconviction Relief currently before the Court. Mr. Jones now asserts what appears to be three claims for postconviction relief: 1) ineffective assistance of counsel resulting in the Defendant accepting a plea offer; 2) punishment greater than that which was explained to Mr. Jones by his counsel and 3) miscarriage of justice due to violations of discovery.
Prior to delving into the merits of a postconviction relief claim, the Court must first determine that the motion meets the procedural requirements of Rule 61(I). Pursuant to Rule 61(I)(4) any ground previously adjudicated is barred unless "reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice." Here, Mr. Jones previously filed a Motion for Reduction/Modification of Sentence which the Court also treated as a postconviction relief motion due to the claims asserted. Because it appears Mr. Jones did not intend for the Motion for Reduction/Modification of Sentence to be a comprehensive postconviction relief motion, this Court will review the motion currently before it in full. Mr. Jones first sets forth numerous claims that center around the assertion that he involuntarily entered a guilty plea due to his ineffective assistance of counsel. To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must meet the two-part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington. First, Mr. Jones must establish that Mr. Goff's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and second, even if Mr. Goff was somehow deficient, Mr. Jones must show that he was prejudiced or that he would not have pled guilty but for his trial counsel's error.
Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991); Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990) (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989)).
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(I)(4).
Mr. Jones asserted within his Motion for Sentence Modification four reasons his sentence should be modified: 1) he acted in self-defense; 2) he had ineffective assistance of counsel; 3) he had employment upon his release and 4) he was studying to obtain a high school diploma. See Docket No. 21.
Mr. Jones's first postconviction relief motion was titled "Motion for Sentence Reduction/Modification" and was not on the prescribed form, causing the Court to indicate that subsequent motions for postconviction relief would not be addressed unless on the appropriate form. The motion currently before the Court is the first postconviction relief motion filed on the prescribed form, and the Court will address the motion on the merits.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
Wright v. State, 608 A.2d 731 (Del. 1992), citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del.Super.Ct. 1988).
Because Mr. Jones must meet both standards to establish ineffective assistance of counsel, the Court will address the second prong of prejudice first as it is clear Mr. Jones was not prejudiced by Mr. Goff's actions even if they were deficient. Mr. Jones asserts he was forced to plead guilty because of ineffective assistance of counsel, but prior to entering a guilty plea, Mr. Jones did two things which negates this claim. First, Mr. Jones executed a "Truth-in-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form" (the "TIS Form"), which indicated that Mr. Jones "voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charge listed in [the] written plea agreement" and that Mr. Jones was not "threatened or forced to enter this plea." The TIS Form further indicates that Murder Second carries a minimum mandatory ten years of incarceration and a twenty year maximum sentence. Lastly, Mr. Jones indicated on the TIS Form that he was "satisfied with [his] lawyer's representation of [him] and that [his] lawyer has fully advised [him] of [his] rights and of [his] guilty plea."
Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, February 5, 2004 (hereinafter "TIS Form").
TIS Form.
7. Second, again to ensure the plea was voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and to ensure Mr. Jones's satisfaction of his representation, the Court conducted a colloquy prior to accepting the plea. During the plea colloquy, Mr. Jones again reiterated to the Court that he was voluntarily entering a guilty plea to the charge of Murder Second, th at he was satisfied wit h his counsel's assistance, that he understood the maximum and minimum sentence he was facing and that he knew what rights he was waiving.
Tr. Feb. 5, 2004.
8. Mr. Jones is bound by both the statements he made on the TIS Form and by the statements he made to the Court unless he presents clear and convincing evidence otherwise. Mr. Jones has failed to meet this burden, and the Court has nothing to refute its previous finding that Mr. Jones entered a guilty plea voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently. Mr. Jones perhaps in retrospect wished he had gotten a better plea agreement, or having now been sentenced by the Court, wished he had not pled. However, this does not equate to ineffective assistance of counsel. It appears that counsel was able to negotiate a plea that significantly limited the defendant `s possible sentence to a crime he admitted committing when questioned by the Court. His assertions now are simply remorse or a second guessing of the decision he previously made. Mr. Jones's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is without merit.
State v. Wilson, 2001 WL 392357, at *3-4 (Del.Super.Ct.) (citations omitted).
In addition, based on the TIS Form and colloquy, it is clear that Mr. Jones was fully aware of the potential sentence he was facing by pleading guilty to Murder Second.
Finally, by knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily entering a plea of guilt y, Mr. Jones forfeits any trial rights, including the right to challenge the evidence against him and the opportunity to present evidence on his behalf. Thus Mr. Jones's remaining claims of discovery violations and incomplete investigations are matters he cannot complain about.
State v. Brown, 1999 WL 1568397 (Del.Super.Ct.) (citations omitted).
Smith v. State, 1996 WL 21050, *1 (Del.Super.Ct.), citing Shepard v. State, 367 A.2d 992, 994 (Del. 1976).
For the foregoing reasons, Mr. Jones's Motion for Postconviction Relief is hereby denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.