Opinion
No. 3-738 / 02-1972
Filed November 17, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cedar County, Nancy S. Tabor, Judge.
Jones appeals the district court's denial of his motion to suppress certain drug-related evidence. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, Lee Beine, County Attorney, and Sterling Benz, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Huitink, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Tipton police handcuffed and arrested Chad Jones on an outstanding warrant. Before placing him in the squad car, they removed a backpack he was wearing and searched it. The search revealed marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a wallet with Jones' driver's license, and other papers.
The officers later discovered this warrant had been recalled, but Jones concedes the officers had probable cause for his arrest.
The State charged Jones with possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to deliver, and failure to affix a drug tax stamp. See Iowa Code §§ 124.401(1)(d), 453B.1, .3, .12 (2001). Jones moved to suppress the drug-related evidence, contending it was obtained pursuant to an unconstitutional search of his backpack. See U.S. Const. amend. IV. The district court denied the motion and, on the minutes of testimony, found Jones guilty as charged. Jones appealed.
In Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 2040, 23 L.Ed.2d 685, 694 (1969), the United States Supreme Court validated "a search of the arrestee's person and the area `within his immediate control' — construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." The sole issue we address on appeal is whether the officers' search of Jones' backpack fell within this "search incident to arrest" exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. Our review of this issue is de novo. See State v. Turner, 630 N.W.2d 601, 606 (Iowa 2001).
Jones also raises this claim under an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel rubric, assuming we find error was not preserved, but the State concedes error was preserved. The State also justifies the search under an inventory exception to the warrant requirement. We find it unnecessary to address this argument.
When Jones was arrested on the outstanding warrant, the pack was on his back. Shortly after the arrest, Jones began physically resisting the officers and the backpack was removed. The officers then placed Jones in a squad car and immediately searched the backpack. We conclude this search fell within the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. See State v. Shane, 255 N.W.2d 324, 327 (Iowa 1977), Northrop v. Triplett, 265 F.3d 372, 378 (6th Cir. 2001) (upholding warrantless search of duffel bag under search incident to arrest exception); United States v. Nelson, 102 F.3d 1344, 1347 (4th Cir. 1996) (upholding warrantless search of shoulder bag under search incident to arrest exception); cf. State v. Canas, 597 N.W.2d 488, 493 (Iowa 1999), overruled on other grounds by Turner, 630 N.W.2d at 606 n. 2 (declining to uphold search pursuant to search incident to arrest exception where arrested defendant was not in room at time of search).
In reaching this conclusion, we have considered the following facts cited by Jones: 1) at least four police officers were at the scene of the arrest, 2) Jones was handcuffed, and 3) Jones was in the squad car at the time of the search. These facts do not mandate a different result. See Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763, 89 S.Ct. at 2040, 23 L. Ed.2d at 694 (stating "[a] gun on a table or in a drawer in front of one who is arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in the clothing of the person arrested."); Northrup, 265 F.3d at 379 (stating "the right to search an item incident to arrest exists even if that item is no longer accessible to the defendant at the time of the search. So long as the defendant had the item within his immediate control near the time of his arrest, the item remains subject to a search incident to arrest."); Nelson, 102 F.3d at 1347 (stating "[p]ragmatic necessity requires that we uphold the validity and reasonableness of a search incident to arrest if the search is part of the specific law enforcement operation during which the search occurs"); Canas, 597 N.W.2d at 493 (stating, "[w]e have previously upheld searches incident to an arrest when the arrestees remained within the immediate vicinity of the area to be searched."); Shane, 255 N.W.2d at 328 (stating "police may see to the safe custody and security of suspects first and then make the limited search which the circumstances of the particular case permit").
We affirm the district court's denial of Jones' motion to suppress.