Opinion
No. 25335-0-III.
December 27, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Okanogan County, No. 06-8-00082-3, David S. Edwards, J. Pro Tem., entered June 7, 2006.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Kulik, J., concurred in by Sweeney, C.J., and Stephens, J.
J.H. appeals his conviction for harassment, a gross misdemeanor, for making a threatening remark to his teacher. On appeal, J.H. argues that the State failed to prove the elements of the crime charged. We review whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings support the conclusions of law. J.H. stated to his teacher, "[i]f you send me back to juvey, I will make your life hell." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 25. J.H. was very agitated, angry, and forceful. A rational trier of fact could find beyond a reasonable doubt that this threat constituted harassment. We affirm.
FACTS
J.H., a juvenile, was charged by information with gross misdemeanor harassment, a violation of RCW 9A.46.020(1). At the time of the incident, J.H. was approximately 16½ years old, and was a student attending Tonasket High School.
On January 20, 2006, J.H. left the school for a 10-minute scheduled break, but returned 30 minutes later. Upon J.H.'s return, his teacher, Scott Olson, immediately met with J.H. to address his tardiness. The meeting was held in a small conference room. Another teacher, John Jones, was also present. Mr. Olson testified that, when he asked J.H. why he was late, J.H. became "very agitated and quite angry" and "forceful." RP at 23. Mr. Olson testified that, after he informed J.H. that his behavior did not fit into the school program, J.H. told Mr. Olson "[i]f you send me back to juvey, I will make your life hell." RP at 25. After making that statement, J.H. attempted to explain what he said and to give the statement a different context.
Mr. Olson considered the remark to be a serious threat of suffering personal injury or harm because of J.H.'s body language. Mr. Olson also had knowledge of prior altercations involving J.H. which Mr. Olson described as "brutal." RP at 26. Mr. Jones witnessed J.H.'s behavior toward Mr. Olson and testified that he considered the statement to be threatening and became concerned for Mr. Olson's safety. The school principal and law enforcement were notified of J.H.'s threat. Officer David Marrs of the Tonasket Police Department responded, and J.H. admitted making the statement.
J.H. appeared for a disposition hearing before the Okanogan County Superior Court on June 7, 2006. At the end of the State's case, the court denied J.H.'s motion to dismiss.
Before closing arguments, the court, on its own motion, amended the pleadings to conform to the evidence by including RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(iv) as an alternative means of harassment. The court explained that it was "not substituting the language, it's alternative language because there's still certainly an argument on the other sections." RP at 45. The court was informed that RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(iv) was found unconstitutional in State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197, 207-08, 26 P.3d 890 (2001). Consequently, the hearing proceeded under RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i).
The court found J.H. guilty. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
J.H. challenges the trial court's findings, directly quoting language from the findings of fact and conclusions of law signed by the commissioner on July 19, 2006. J.H. assigns error to conclusions of law 2 and 3, but mischaracterizes them as findings of fact.
This court reviews de novo J.H.'s challenges to the trial court's conclusions of law. Robel v. Roundup Corp., 148 Wn.2d 35, 42, 59 P.3d 611 (2002). In addition, "any conclusion of law erroneously denominated a finding of fact will be subject to de novo review." Id. at 43.
Sufficiency of the Evidence. Evidence is sufficient if any rational trier of fact could find the elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Green, 94 Wn.2d 216, 221, 616 P.2d 628 (1980) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). Importantly, "when the sufficiency of the evidence is challenged in a criminal case, all reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant." State v. Partin, 88 Wn.2d 899, 906-07, 567 P.2d 1136 (1977) "A challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence admits the truth of the State's evidence." State v. Luther, 157 Wn.2d 63, 77-78, 134 P.3d 205, cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 440 (2006). Here, this court reviews whether substantial evidence exists to support the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings support the conclusions of law. See State v. B.J.S., 140 Wn. App. 91, 97, 169 P.3d 34 (2007).
A person is guilty of harassment when:
(a) Without lawful authority, the person knowingly threatens:
(i) To cause bodily injury immediately or in the future to the person threatened . . . or. . . .
(b) The person by words or conduct places the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out.
In State v. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d 36, 43, 84 P.3d 1215 (2004), the Washington Supreme Court held that, to avoid infringing on the freedom of speech, RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i) must be read as prohibiting only "true threats." The term "true threat" is defined as "`a statement made in a context or under such circumstances wherein a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be interpreted . . . as a serious expression of intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life'" of another. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 43 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Williams, 144 Wn.2d at 208-09).
The requirements of RCW 9A.46.020 are described as follows:
[T]he defendant must subjectively know that he or she is communicating a threat, and must know that the communication he or she imparts directly or indirectly is a threat of intent to cause bodily injury to the person threatened or to another person. . . . [T]he statute as a whole requires that the perpetrator knowingly threaten to inflict bodily injury by communicating directly or indirectly the intent to inflict bodily injury; the person threatened must find out about the threat although the perpetrator need not know nor should know that the threat will be communicated to the victim; and words or conduct of the perpetrator must place the person threatened in reasonable fear that the threat will be carried out.
State v. J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472, 481-82, 28 P.3d 720 (2001).
The court applies an objective standard when determining whether a statement constitutes a true threat, which focuses on the speaker. State v. Johnston, 156 Wn.2d 355, 361, 127 P.3d 707 (2006) (quoting Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d at 44). Importantly, while the statute requires that the defendant be aware that he is communicating a threat, whether he intends to carry out the threat is irrelevant. J.M., 144 Wn.2d at 481-82.
J.H. contends the evidence presented was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was guilty of harassment. In J.H.'s view, his statement to his teacher that "[i]f you send me back to juvey, I will make your life hell" did not rise to the level of harassment because it was not a direct threat of bodily harm and it would not have placed a reasonable person in fear of bodily harm.
J.H. argues the evidence did not support a finding that he threatened to cause bodily injury to another. However, a "literal threat" is not required, but rather "the nature of a threat depends on all the facts and circumstances." State v. C.G., 150 Wn.2d 604, 610-11, 80 P.3d 594 (2003).
Here, the testimony by Mr. Olson and Mr. Jones provides sufficient evidence of the context and circumstances in which the statement was made. And this evidence supports the court's determination that J.H. knowingly communicated a threat of intent to cause bodily injury to Mr. Olson. Specifically, the threat was made in a small conference room with two adults present. J.H. made the statement while in an agitated and angry state, a context which establishes that the statement was not made in jest but, rather, was a serious threat. Mr. Olson described J.H.'s behavior on that day as "much more violent and threatening" than he previously observed. J.H.'s body language was described as "[f]orward, tight, moving forward" and "forceful." Mr. Olson testified that the encounter "was a very scary situation." The threat was treated as serious at the time. Both the principal and law enforcement were notified.
RP at 27.
RP at 26.
RP at 23.
RP at 34.
Based on J.H.'s tone, body language, and posture — and the context in which the statement was made — the court properly found that the statement was a serious expression of J.H.'s intention to inflict bodily harm on Mr. Olson.
We must now determine whether the statement placed Mr. Olson in reasonable fear of bodily injury considering the nature of the threat and surrounding circumstances. RCW 9A.46.020(1)(a)(i). J.H. argues that because no threat was made to cause bodily injury, Mr. Olson could not have been placed in reasonable fear that the threat would be carried out. This argument is without merit.
Sufficient evidence exists for the court to determine that J.H.'s statement placed Mr. Olson in reasonable fear that J.H. would cause him bodily injury. Mr. Olson recounted that the statement sent shivers up his spine. Further, Mr. Olson provided testimony that he "was shook up at the time." In addition, Mr. Olson had knowledge of prior "brutal" altercations involving J.H. Mr. Olson stated that he had thoughts of "being afraid to walk around town," "[t]hat I would be walking down the street some day and someone would jump on my back and start hitting me," and that "if he was going to make my life hell, it was not going to be a pleasant place to be in Tonasket." Mr. Jones also testified he took the threats seriously and was concerned for Mr. Olson's safety. The teachers' testimony provides sufficient evidence for the court to find Mr. Olson was placed in reasonable fear of bodily injury.
RP at 28.
RP at 26.
RP at 28.
RP at 33.
RP at 26.
Based on the evidence presented, a rational trier of fact could find the essential elements of harassment beyond a reasonable doubt. The record provides sufficient evidence of J.H.'s history of physical violence and his threatening behaviors at the time the statement was made. Viewing this evidence, a trier of fact could determine that each element of the offense was proved. Thus, the court in this case did not err by denying J.H.'s motion to dismiss, and sufficient evidence exists to support the court's findings and adjudication of guilt for the crime of harassment.
Accordingly, we affirm.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
STEPHENS, J. and SWEENEY, C.J., concur.