Opinion
02-05-1903
STATE v. IANNUCCT.
Herbert H. Ward, Atty. Gen., for the State. John F. Lynn, for defendant.
Nicholas Iannuccl was indicted for carrying concealed a deadly weapon. Verdict, "Guilty."
The defendant was indicted at this term for carrying concealed a deadly weapon. At the trial the state proved that on the 1st day of January, 1903, the defendant was found by a police officer with a deadly weapon, to wit, a razor, concealed upon his person. The defendant testified that, although he had the razor concealed upon his person, he was not carrying it for an unlawful purpose; that he was sharpening it, and getting ready to shave himself with the razor, when notified that his brother was in a fight three or four squares away from defendant's home; that he ran down to the scene of the supposed fight with the razor in his hand, but just before getting there put it up his sleeve, where it was found by the police officer who arrested him.
Argued before PENNEWILL and BOYCE, JJ.
Herbert H. Ward, Atty. Gen., for the State.
John F. Lynn, for defendant.
PENNEWILL, j. (charging the jury). Nicholas Iannuccl, the prisoner at the bar, is charged in this indictment with, on the 1st day of January, 1903, having unlawfully carried a concealed deadly weapon upon and about his person, other than an ordinary pocketknife, viz., a razor. The Indictment is based upon the following statute of this state, being chapter 548, p. 716, vol. 16, Laws Del., entitled "An act providing for the punishment of persons carrying concealed deadly weapons," which provides "that if any person shall carry concealed a deadly weapon upon or about his person other than an ordinary pocket knife, or shall knowingly sell a deadly weapon to a minor other than an ordinary pocket knife," he shall, upon conviction, be punished as the statute prescribes; "provided, that the provisions of this section shall not apply to the carrying of the usual weapons by policemen and other peace officers." There is no contention, as we understand, that this defendant was a policeman or other peace officer, and therefore the case does not fall within the exception or proviso of the statute. It has been repeatedly decided in this court that a razor is a deadly weapon within the meaning and contemplation of this act. Quoting the language employed by this court in the case of State v. Costen, 1 Pennewill, 19, 39 Atl. 456—a case similar to this in many respects: "This court has held that, where a jury is satisfied, beyond a reasonable doubt, from the facts before them, that the accused has upon or about his person a deadly weapon other than an ordinary pocketknife, put there by him out of view, he is prima facie guilty under the law of carrying concealed a deadly weapon upon or about his person. But we have also held and instructed juries that, although the accused is to be presumed guilty from the mere fact of having upon his person a deadly weapon out of sight, yet that he may nevertheless show to the jury that he had put that weapon there and carried it there for a lawful purpose. So that, although youmay find that he had a deadly weapon upon his person out of sight, you should not find him guilty if he has satisfied you by the evidence that he had it there for a lawful purpose. If you are satisfied, however, that he had it there out of sight upon his person, and the accused has not shown to your satisfaction that it was so carried for a lawful purpose, your verdict should be 'Guilty,' because, as already said, in the absence of such proof he is presumed in law to be guilty, no matter what may have been his real intent."
We think it is proper for us to say to you that by the use of the words "lawful purpose" in the case above referred to the court meant a lawful purpose that was specific, and, in a sense, temporary. For example, if a person should buy a deadly weapon at a store, and put it in his pocket for the purpose of taking it home; or if a person should find a deadly weapon, and place it in his pocket for the purpose of keeping it only till he could restore it to the owner, or make some other proper disposition of it—such person would not be carrying a deadly weapon concealed within the meaning of said act. And, to further illustrate, if a person takes shch weapon from a drunken man, or a man laboring under great excitement, and in a dangerous condition, and places it in his pocket for the purpose of keeping it till the person from whom it is taken is in a fit condition to receive it; or if such weapon is placed in the pocket of another accidentally, without his knowledge, and he is unconscious of carrying it concealed upon his person— In none of these cases would he be guilty under said act. Many other illustrations might be used, but those we have given are sufficient to indicate to your minds what is meant by the words "lawful purpose." If you are satisfied from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the accused was, at the time of his arrest, carrying concealed a deadly weapon upon or about his person, other than an ordinary pockotknife, and he has not shown to your satisfaction, by the evidence, that his purpose was a lawful one, your verdict should be "Guilty." It matters not what may have been his intent or purpose, unless he has satisfied you that it was lawful in the sense we have indicated; and in order to convict it is not necessary for the state to prove that the purpose was unlawful. The burden is upon the prisoner to prove that it was lawful.
Verdict, "Guilty."