Opinion
No. 5-434 / 04-0664
Filed November 9, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Paul W. Riffel, Judge.
Defendant appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his convictions for involuntary manslaughter and child endangerment. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Darrel Mullins, Assistant Attorney General, Paul L. Martin, County Attorney, and Gregg R. Rosenbladt, Assistant County Attorney, for plaintiff-appellee.
Heard by Huitink, P.J., and Zimmer, J., and Brown, S.J.
Senior Judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2005).
Christopher Holmes appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his convictions for involuntary manslaughter, in violation of Iowa Code section 717.5(1) (2001), and child endangerment resulting in serious injury, in violation of sections 726.6(1)(a) and 726.6(4). We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings.
Jevon Littleton was born to Jessica Putney on June 14, 2000. Jevon suffered complications following delivery, which resulted in brain damage, seizures, and bleeding in his eyes. Jevon was prescribed a medication which was intended to prevent seizures.
In January of 2001, Jessica began dating Christopher Holmes, and he eventually moved into her apartment. Jessica made Holmes aware of Jevon's potential for seizures. Although Jevon spent a considerable amount of time in Jessica's mother's care, on February 26, 2001, Jessica decided she would like to have Jevon home with her after she finished work. Jessica asked Holmes to watch Jevon at her home while she worked. Holmes agreed.
While Jessica was at work, Holmes called her two times. In the first call, Holmes informed Jessica that Jevon was crying and had been fussy. Jessica recommended bathing, rocking, or feeding him. Later that evening, Holmes placed a second call to Jessica in which he informed her Jevon was hyperventilating and that something was wrong with him. Jessica told Holmes to call 911.
Jessica then left work and drove home, where she found Holmes holding Jevon who was by then limp, without a pulse, and not breathing. Jessica placed Jevon on the floor and performed CPR on him. Shortly after that, a male placed a 911 call and informed police that their baby was not breathing. Within minutes police and paramedics arrived and took over the CPR from Jessica. Although Jevon briefly regained a heartbeat, he later died at the hospital. Upon questioning, Holmes informed Officer Michael Cookman that Jevon started gasping for breath after being placed in a car seat in the apartment. Holmes also told Jevon's grandmother and aunt that Jevon suddenly threw his head back and took a deep breath, after which his eyes rolled in the back of his head and blood came out of his mouth and nose.
On May 15, 2003, the State charged Holmes with child endangerment and first-degree murder. At trial, the parties presented voluminous expert testimony. The State argued that Jevon was the victim of "shaken baby syndrome." Following trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Holmes guilty of involuntary manslaughter resulting from a public offense and child endangerment resulting in serious injury. The court later sentenced Holmes to a term of incarceration not to exceed five years on the manslaughter charge and ten years on the child endangerment. It also ordered the sentences to be served consecutively. Holmes appeals.
Shaken Baby Animation.
At trial, during the testimony of Dr. Randall Alexander, the State showed the jury a brief computerized animated presentation purporting to show a "shaken baby." The animation showed the expressionless face and upper torso of an infant, who is being shaken by a pair of adult hands. On appeal, Holmes contends the court abused its discretion in allowing the animation to be admitted as a demonstrative exhibit.
"Admission or exclusion of demonstrative evidence rests largely within the trial court's discretion." State v. Thornton, 498 N.W.2d 670, 674 (Iowa 1993). Therefore, our review is for an abuse of discretion. Hutchison v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882, 885 (Iowa 1994). An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court exercises its discretion on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Iowa 2001). A ground or reason is untenable when it is not supported by substantial evidence or when it is based on an erroneous application of the law. Id. "Even if an abuse of discretion is found, reversal is not required unless prejudice is shown." State v. Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 50 (Iowa 2003).
Holmes apparently concedes the presentation was relevant evidence, and thus limits his challenge to the evidence on the basis that it was unfairly prejudicial. Under our rules of evidence, relevant evidence may be excluded "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury. . . ." Iowa R. Evid. 5.403. Probative value gauges the strength and force of the evidence to make a consequential fact more or less probable. Rodriquez, 636 N.W.2d at 240. Unfairly prejudicial evidence is evidence that "appeals to the jury's sympathies, arouses its sense of horror, provokes its instinct to punish, or triggers other mainsprings of human action [that] may cause a jury to base its decision on something other than the established propositions in the case." Id.
In State v. Sayles, 662 N.W.2d 1 (Iowa 2003), also a shaken baby case, our supreme court addressed the claim that the same animation used here was unfairly prejudicial. The court concluded the unquestionably relevant evidence was not unfairly prejudicial. Id. at 11. The court also found the presentation to have probative value, as it observed the animated slides would be helpful to the jury in understanding the witness's explanation of how shaking could cause such severe injuries to an infant. Id. Accordingly, it affirmed the trial court's admission of the evidence.
Like our supreme court in Sayles, we believe the animation played here "was not overly dramatic. It was clinical in nature and the computer-generated infant showed no facial expression and emitted no sound during the shaking." These factors tended to limit any potential for unfair prejudice.
In addition, immediately preceding playing the animation, the court instructed the jury as follows:
We're going to watch this animated exhibit and I want you to understand that it is not meant to be a recreation of any events in this case. It's merely a computer picture which is designed to help you understand this witness' opinions and to illustrate his point. I want you to understand that the computer generated animation here is not an exact recreation of what may or may not have happened to Jevon Littleton. It is merely an illustration so that you may better understand the concepts we are discussing here and the testimony of the witness.
This admonition minimized any prejudice by cautioning the jury not to make more of the evidence than what it professed to be — a mere illustration of the witness's testimony.
Here, prior to his introduction of the animation, Dr. Alexander testified extensively as to the mechanisms involved with, the force typically involved in, and the effects of a shaken baby. He described the amount of force necessary to cause injuries with shaken baby syndrome as follows: "It's a lot of force. It's not jiggle baby syndrome or even somebody being rough with their child syndrome. . . . If it was a pillow, to shake the stuffing out of a pillow. Repeatedly and violent." In addition, Dr. Alexander noted that an animation of the shaken baby process would be helpful "as far as showing the nature of the forces involved. . . ." Thus, the animation was clearly probative and illustrated a key portion of the State's case. See generally State v. Stewart, 643 N.W.2d 281, 294 (Minn. 2002) ("Visual aids are relevant if they assist the jury in understanding a witness's testimony.").
Holmes attempts to distinguish Sayles by noting that, here, whether Jevon was a shaken baby was a hotly contested issue, whereas in Sayles it was not contested that the mechanism by which the infant was killed was the shaken baby syndrome. We recognize the distinction, but we do not consider this factor to control the result here.
Other jurisdictions have permitted demonstrative animations when the issue illustrated was a contested one. In Clark v. Cantrell, 529 S.E.2d 528, 537 (S.C. 2000), cited in Sayles, 652 N.W.2d at 10, the South Carolina court stated, "The fact the animation is inconsistent with testimony or evidence presented by the opposing party should not necessarily lead to its exclusion, provided it fairly and accurately portrays the proponent's version of events."
In Sayles the court observed the animation in Cantrell was found more prejudicial than probative because of inaccuracies in the video when compared to the proponent's testimony. Sayles, 662 N.W.2d at 10.
Also, in People v. Cauley, 32 P.3d 602, 608 (Colo.Ct.App. 2001), the court concluded a three-and-one-half-minute computer generated animation of a shaken baby was admissible even though the defendant disputed how the injury to the child occurred, maintaining he tripped and accidentally fell on his daughter. This case was also cited in Sayles, 652 N.W.2d at 11, in support of its prejudice analysis.
As we previously indicated, it is important to recognize that the animation was admitted to illustrate the testimony of one of the State's expert witnesses. It did not purport to be a reenactment of how the child's death occurred. This distinction was made clear in the district court's cautionary admonition to the jury. See generally Kurtis A. Kemper, Admissibility of Computer-generated Animation, 111 A.L.R.5th 529, §§ 5(a), 8(a) (2003). So limited, we conclude the fact the cause of death was a disputed issue in this case did not mandate the trial court, in exercising its discretion, to exclude the animation. Accordingly, we hold the trial court reasonably concluded that any prejudice from the six-to-eight second long animation of the shaken baby was only that inherent in any unfavorable evidence and, consequently, such prejudice was not unfair. See Sayles, 662 N.W.2d at 11.
Jury Instruction.
In order to prove Holmes guilty of child endangerment, the State had to establish that he knowingly acted in a manner creating a substantial risk to Jevon Littleton's health or safety. See Iowa Crim. Jury Instruction 2610.1 (1995). Holmes requested that the court instruct the jury on the meaning of the word "substantial." He offered the following proposed instruction: "`substantial' means real, actual, true, not illusory. The defendant must have knowing[ly] acted in a matter creating a real, true, not illusory risk to the child's physical, mental or emotional health or safety." The court refused to give this instruction.
We review a court's refusal to give an instruction for an abuse of discretion. Anderson v. State, 692 N.W.2d 360, 363 (Iowa 2005). The court is required to instruct the jury on the definition of the crime. State v. Hoffer, 383 N.W.2d 543, 548 (Iowa 1986). Generally understood words of ordinary usage need not be defined; however, technical terms or legal terms of art must be explained. Henderson v. Scurr, 313 N.W.2d 522, 523 (Iowa 1981). Error in giving or refusing jury instructions does not merit reversal unless it results in prejudice to the defendant. State v. Kellogg, 542 N.W.2d 514, 516 (Iowa 1996). Jury instructions are designed to explain the applicable law to the jurors so the law may be applied to the facts proven at trial. State v. Freeman, 267 N.W.2d 69, 71 (Iowa 1978).
We believe the court did not err in refusing to give the proposed instruction. In the context of the child endangerment statute, "substantial" is clearly used in its ordinary usage and its generally understood manner. Holmes's argument does not persuade us that his proposed definition is anything more than surplussage or that it would add to the jury's understanding of its task. See State v. Thompson, 570 N.W.2d 765, 769 (Iowa 1997) (concluding the phrase "extreme indifference to human life" is not so vague that the jury required extra instruction to understand it); Thongvanh v. State, 494 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa 1993) (stating "[a] definition of the term `participation' as used in the instruction `while participating in a robbery,' is not necessary. The term `participating' is a term of common usage and readily understandable.").
Consecutive Sentences.
Holmes generally maintains the court abused its discretion in ordering consecutive sentences. We review sentencing challenges for errors at law. State v. Liddell, 672 N.W.2d 805, 815 (Iowa 2003). A sentence will not be upset on appellate review unless the defendant demonstrates an abuse of trial court discretion or a defect in the sentencing procedure, such as trial court consideration of impermissible factors. Id.
In particular, Holmes claims the court's statement of reasons behind the sentence "reveals a fixed policy of consecutive prison sentences without exercising the court's discretion based upon the specific circumstances of the particular defendant." Prior to announcing its sentencing decision, the court made the following statement:
Given the circumstances of this case and your criminal history and the background as reflected in the presentence report, I feel that consecutive sentences are appropriate and will impose these sentences consecutively. You violated the trust that was placed in you by Jevon's mother and her family. As a result of your actions and no one else's, Jevon Littleton is dead and I think that's deserving of the maximum penalties that I can impose.
We disagree that this statement expresses any fixed policy. This short explanation reveals that the court considered the statutorily required matters necessary for the imposition of consecutive sentences. See Iowa Code § 901.5. In particular, it appears the court not only considered the nature and circumstances of the crime, but also his criminal history and other matters reflected in the presentence investigation report. It cannot be said the district court abrogated its responsibility to exercise discretion in sentencing.