Opinion
No. 1 CA-CR 19-0117
08-27-2020
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. JESUS F. HOLGUIN, Appellant.
COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix By Brian Coffman Counsel for Appellee The Stavris Law Firm PLLC, Scottsdale By Alison Stavris Counsel for Appellant
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE. Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. CR2015-005456-001
The Honorable John R. Hannah, Jr., Judge
The Honorable Michael D. Gordon, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Arizona Attorney General's Office, Phoenix
By Brian Coffman
Counsel for Appellee The Stavris Law Firm PLLC, Scottsdale
By Alison Stavris
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell joined. CATTANI, Judge:
¶1 Jesus Holguin appeals his convictions and sentences for four counts of child molestation and one count of sexual conduct with a minor. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
¶2 During her freshman year of high school, Holguin's adopted sister, A.L., disclosed to a school guidance counselor and then to law enforcement officers that Holguin had sexual intercourse with her several years earlier at their grandmother's house. Law enforcement officers were unable to interview other family members, and the investigation remained pending until approximately four years later, when A.C., the daughter of Holguin's longtime girlfriend, told authorities that Holguin had inappropriately touched her on two occasions. Approximately one year later, Holguin's cousin, M.T., reported that when she was eight years old and A.L. was nine, Holguin sexually assaulted them at their grandmother's house.
¶3 The State charged Holguin with three counts of child molestation as to A.C., one count of sexual conduct with a minor as to A.L., and one count each of child molestation and sexual conduct with a minor as to M.T. Holguin was subsequently tried, and the superior court directed a verdict for Holguin on the single count involving A.L. The jury was unable to reach an agreement on the remaining counts, and the court declared a mistrial.
The State also charged Holguin with sexual offenses involving a fourth victim, but those charges were later dismissed.
¶4 Holguin was retried on the three counts of child molestation as to A.C. and one count each of child molestation and sexual conduct with a minor as to M.T. Although Holguin no longer faced charges related to A.L., she testified during his retrial pursuant to Arizona Rule of Evidence ("Rule") 404(c) (permitting discretionary admission of character evidence in sexual misconduct cases). The jury found Holguin guilty of all five counts.
¶5 The superior court sentenced Holguin to concurrent and consecutive prison terms totaling 54 years. Holguin appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. § 13-4033(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
I. Motion for Judgment of Acquittal.
¶6 After the State presented its case on retrial, Holguin moved for judgment of acquittal on all five counts. The superior court denied the motion. Holguin now argues that ruling was erroneous. "We review the denial of a motion for a judgment of acquittal de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict." State v. Hardy, 230 Ariz. 281, 286, ¶ 17 (2012).
¶7 The superior court must enter a judgment of acquittal "if there is no substantial evidence to support a conviction." Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20(a)(1). "Substantial evidence is that which reasonable persons could accept as sufficient to support a guilty verdict beyond a reasonable doubt." Hardy, 230 Ariz. at 286, ¶ 17 (quoting State v. Davolt, 207 Ariz. 191, 212, ¶ 87 (2004)). The relevant inquiry is whether any rational factfinder "could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt," when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, 562, ¶ 16 (2011) (citation omitted).
¶8 To prove child molestation, the State must show that the defendant "intentionally or knowingly engag[ed] in or caus[ed] a person to engage in sexual contact, except sexual contact with the female breast, with a child who is under fifteen years of age." A.R.S. § 13-1410(A). To obtain a conviction for sexual conduct with a minor, the State must prove that the defendant "intentionally or knowingly engag[ed] in sexual intercourse or oral sexual contact with any person . . . under eighteen years of age." A.R.S. § 13-1405(A).
¶9 Holguin does not dispute that A.C. and M.T. testified to facts that establish the elements of child molestation and sexual conduct with a minor. A.C. testified that on two occasions—once when she was eight and again when she was ten—Holguin touched her vagina and pressed his penis against her back while she was lying in her mother and Holguin's bed. M.T. testified that when she was eight, Holguin pulled down her pants, touched her vagina, and had sexual intercourse with her. Both girls were under the age of 15 during the time frames alleged in the indictment. And other evidence corroborated A.C. and M.T.'s testimony. A.L. testified that Holguin had also sexually assaulted her when she was around the same age A.C. and M.T. had been when Holguin assaulted them. A.C.'s mother testified she walked into her bedroom during one of the incidents A.C. later reported, saw Holguin moving in the bed while A.C. lay there, and "felt something was not right."
¶10 Holguin contends that discrepancies and inconsistencies in the victims' testimony should have prevented the case from being submitted to the jury. But such discrepancies can be addressed through cross-examination and here, to the extent there was conflicting evidence, it did not establish a basis for dismissing the case against Holguin. See State v. Lee, 151 Ariz. 428, 429 (App. 1986) (conflicting witness testimony goes not to the sufficiency of the evidence but to the witnesses' credibility, which is committed to the jury); see also State v. Reynolds, 108 Ariz. 541, 543 (1972) (noting that jurors determine the credibility of contradictory testimony). Because the testimony of A.C. and M.T. provided substantial evidence to support the convictions, and jurors could resolve conflicts and discrepancies in the testimony consistent with finding Holguin guilty, the superior court correctly denied Holguin's motion for judgment of acquittal. See State v. Lee, 189 Ariz. 590, 603 (1997) ("When reasonable minds may differ on inferences drawn from the facts, the case must be submitted to the jury, and the trial judge has no discretion to enter a judgment of acquittal."); State v. Burrell, 106 Ariz. 100, 101 (1970) (stating that even where the evidence shows "substantial contradictions and discrepancies, we will not disturb the verdict if there is substantial evidence to support it").
The testimonial inconsistencies and conflicts raised by Holguin pertain to matters collateral to the conduct underlying the charges against him. Recollections differed, for example, with respect to who was present when Holguin assaulted M.T., but there was no conflict about what Holguin did to M.T. during that assault. Likewise, even though A.C.'s trial testimony diverged from her previous statements about why she was in her mother and Holguin's bed before one of the assaults, there was no conflict in her testimony regarding Holguin's conduct.
II. Rule 404(c) Sexual Propensity Evidence.
¶11 In sex crime prosecutions, under Rule 404(c) of the Arizona Rules of Evidence, the State may offer evidence that the defendant committed other crimes or acts "if relevant to show that the defendant had a character trait giving rise to an aberrant sexual propensity to commit the offense charged." If the court admits such evidence, it may also admit "evidence to rebut the proof of other crimes, wrongs, or acts, or an inference therefrom." Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c).
¶12 The indictment alleged that Holguin committed sexual conduct with a minor as to A.L. "on or between June 1, 2009 and April 1, 2010." Holguin could not have committed the offense as charged, however, because he was incarcerated at that time. During Holguin's first trial, the State moved to amend the indictment to allege he committed the offense against A.L. during the same time frame that he committed the offenses against M.T. The superior court denied the motion and directed a verdict for Holguin on the count involving A.L. based on the impossibility that Holguin could have committed the offense during the charged time frame. The jurors were unable to reach a verdict on the remaining charges, and the superior court declared a mistrial.
¶13 On retrial, Holguin moved to preclude the State from offering A.L.'s testimony. Holguin argued in the alternative that if the court admitted A.L.'s testimony under Rule 404(c), it should allow him to offer evidence that he was acquitted of the charge pertaining to her allegations. See id.; State v. Speers, 209 Ariz. 125, 130, ¶ 16 (App. 2004) (noting that if sexual propensity evidence is admitted under Rule 404(c), "then the defendant has the right, as a matter of due process, to present relevant evidence challenging its validity and reliability").
¶14 The superior court denied Holguin's motion. The court ruled that A.L.'s testimony was admissible because there was clear and convincing evidence Holguin committed sexual misconduct against her, the evidence showed he had a propensity to commit the charged offenses against A.C. and M.T., and admitting the evidence did not, on balance, unfairly prejudice Holguin. See Ariz. R. Evid. 404(c)(1). The court further ruled that there was no justification to admit evidence of the directed verdict because the directed verdict was based solely on the mistaken time frame alleged in the indictment, and Holguin could "vigorously cross examine [A.L.] about the circumstances underlying the allegation including her apparent inability to more accurately pinpoint a time frame."
¶15 Holguin now argues that the superior court deprived him of a fair trial as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments by preventing him from informing the jury of his prior acquittal. He contends the court's ruling unduly impeded him from cross-examining A.L. and from revealing her possible motivation to offer more damaging testimony against him to secure a conviction. While we generally review the superior court's preclusion of evidence for an abuse of discretion, State v. Romero, 239 Ariz. 6, 9, ¶ 11 (2016), we review rulings implicating the Confrontation Clause de novo. State v. Ellison, 213 Ariz. 116, 129, ¶ 42 (2006).
¶16 Constitutional rights to due process and to confront adverse witnesses guarantee a criminal defendant "a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense," Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986) (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984)), which includes the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, both to test the substance of their testimony and to expose "possible biases, prejudices, or ulterior motives." Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18 (1974). These rights are not limitless, however. States have "broad latitude under the Constitution to establish rules excluding evidence from criminal trials," United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998), and "trial judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to impose reasonable limits on . . . cross-examination based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness' safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant." Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 (1986). The "Confrontation Clause guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense might wish." Id. (citation omitted).
¶17 We review the reasonableness of restrictions on cross-examination on a case-by-case basis, considering "whether the defendant has been denied the opportunity of presenting to the trier of fact information which bears either on the issues in the case or on the credibility of the witness." State v. Riggs, 189 Ariz. 327, 331 (1997) (citation omitted); see also Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 680 (noting that a criminal defendant states a Confrontation Clause violation "by showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate cross-examination designed to show . . . bias on the part of the witness, and thereby 'to expose to the jury the facts from which jurors . . . could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness'") (quoting Davis, 415 U.S. at 318).
¶18 Here, the superior court's ruling did not deprive Holguin of a meaningful opportunity to present a complete defense or to cross-examine A.L. First, Rule 404(c) evidence is admitted under a "clear and convincing" evidentiary burden, see State v. Terrazas, 189 Ariz. 580, 584 (1997), whereas an acquittal reflects only that the State did not satisfy the "beyond a reasonable doubt" burden necessary for a criminal conviction. See West, 226 Ariz. at 562, ¶ 16. Thus, the acquittal was not dispositive as to whether the evidence was admissible under Rule 404(c).
¶19 Moreover, the superior court correctly determined that the reason for the acquittal was not relevant to the substance of A.L.'s testimony offered at Holguin's retrial. See State v. Yonkman, 233 Ariz. 369, 375, ¶ 21 (App. 2013) (explaining that acquittal evidence is subject to admissibility standards set forth in Rules 401 and 403). The acquittal was based on the State's allegation of when Holguin assaulted A.L.—not on a lack of evidence that Holguin committed the assault. Thus, the fact of the acquittal did not tend to disprove A.L.'s testimony about Holguin's misconduct. And, as the superior court noted, Holguin had an opportunity to cross-examine A.L. on her recollection of when Holguin assaulted her.
¶20 Contrary to Holguin's assertion on appeal, evidence of the acquittal was not necessary to dispel an inference that he was previously convicted of a crime against A.L. Although the parties referred to witnesses having testified under oath at a "prior proceeding," none of the testimony or questioning necessarily implied that the prior proceeding was a trial. Cf. id. at ¶ 22. Nor did any evidence or argument suggest Holguin had been previously convicted of a crime against A.L. And jurors were instructed to consider A.L.'s testimony for the limited purpose of determining whether Holguin was predisposed to commit the charged acts.
¶21 The superior court also acted within its discretion by precluding Holguin from offering evidence of the acquittal to show that A.L. was motivated to change her testimony during the retrial to ensure Holguin was convicted. The acquittal of charges involving A.L. was not a "prototypical form of [witness] bias." Cf. State v. Almaguer, 232 Ariz. 190, 198, ¶¶ 23-24 (App. 2013) (observing that evidence of a victim's civil suit for monetary damages against the defendant might reveal a prototypical reason for the victim to provide biased testimony against the defendant in a related criminal proceeding) (citation omitted). And jurors could presume that A.L., as an asserted victim of Holguin's assault, was antagonistic toward Holguin. Accordingly, Holguin has not established reversible error.
Furthermore, A.L.'s testimony on retrial was not necessarily more prejudicial to Holguin than her testimony at the first trial. A.L. testified at the first trial that her brother was present when Holguin raped her, but she testified on retrial that her brother was in another room. A.L.'s prior testimony was consistent with M.T.'s testimony but conflicted with her brother's testimony, whereas her testimony on retrial was consistent with her brother's but conflicted with M.T.'s testimony.
CONCLUSION
¶22 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm Holguin's convictions and sentences.