BAKES, Justice.

I. FACTS

Appellant appeals his convictions for two counts of rape and one count of an infamous crime against nature. One count of rape and the count of an infamous crime against nature were perpetrated against the same victim and occurred as part of one attack. The appellant was tried on both counts in one trial. The second count of rape arose from an attack on a different victim at a different time and place. Judgments on all three convictions, however, were entered at the same time before the same judge and are all the subject of this one appeal. Since the facts surrounding the three convictions are related, we present the facts in combined fashion, but discuss the merits of each case separately.

On June 5, 1977, Linda O'Connor was accosted and raped at approximately 2:30 a.m. in her apartment in Lewiston, Idaho. At the time of the attack, she awoke to find a pillow over her face. She did not see her attacker, but felt a wavy type curly hair that was about collar length. The investigating police officer, Sgt. Saleen, inspected the downstairs bathroom, which contained a sliding window to the outside. Saleen found dust or dirt on the right portion of the toilet seat. He also observed a dirt or scuff mark on top of the small telephone box below the bathroom window. In addition, candle holders which Linda O'Connor had placed on the windowsill were located outside on the patio. Saleen also found two latent fingerprints on the outside of the bathroom window sill.

On July 4, 1977, Tracy Boyd was accosted in her apartment in Lewiston, Idaho, at approximately 6:00 a.m. Boyd testified that there was enough natural light to allow her to see clearly. She testified that the assailant, whom she identified as appellant, had a knife and just stood and stared at her for a few seconds. During this time Boyd said that she saw the appellant's face. Thereafter, he walked around Boyd's bed and stopped just a few inches from it. Boyd then screamed twice and the assailant grabbed her shoulder and ordered her to roll over onto her stomach. He then put a pillow over the back of her head and ordered her to get up without looking at him. The assailant then placed the knifepoint near Boyd's throat and pushed her out of her room and into her roommate's room. Following their entry into the room, the assailant ordered both Boyd and her roommate to place pillows over their heads. The roommate testified, however, that prior to that time she clearly saw the assailant's full face for a few seconds, and that such observation was made with the intent of remembering his appearance. Thereafter, she saw the assailant's face once again when she looked out from under the pillow. It was during this time in the roommate's room that the rape and unnatural act were committed on Boyd. The assailant then left, telling the women to stay in the room for five minutes. Boyd and her roommate assisted the police in making a composite drawing of the assailant; however, no arrest was made in either the Boyd or the O'Connor incidents.

On December 6, 1977, appellant Monte Hoisington was contacted at his place of employment by Lewiston police officer Spears, who said he was investigating a prowling incident. At the suggestion of Spears, Hoisington accompanied the officer to the police station. Within a few minutes of arriving at the police station, Hoisington was recognized as bearing a resemblance to the rape suspect being sought. He was given his Miranda rights, but was not arrested. Detective Spears asked whether appellant understood those rights, and he indicated that he did and agreed to talk to Spears. Appellant was told by Spears that appellant fit the description of the suspect of a series of rapes. Spears also informed him that he fit the description of a composite that had been done of the rapist, with the exception of his hair length. (Hoisington's hair was cut short at the time of the questioning; however, the composite had been run in a local newspaper on November 15, 1977.)

After questioning, Spears requested permission to take Hoisington's photograph. Spears explained that the photo would be shown to victims of the rapes in question. Thereafter, the photograph was taken. Appellant was also administered a polygraph examination, the results of which were inconclusive. Then, Spears told appellant that latent fingerprints had been taken from one of the rape scenes, and that the police department wished to compare his prints with the latents. Appellant was then fingerprinted. The state and appellant disagree on whether there was consent to the fingerprinting. Appellant asserts that he was not asked about nor did he consent to the fingerprinting. Rather, he argues that he merely acquiesced to asserted authority of the police to take the fingerprints.

On the 8th and 9th of December, 1977, Sharon Fuller, who was Boyd's roommate, and Boyd were separately shown a six-photo lineup containing Hoisington's picture. Both selected Hoisington's picture as resembling the rapist. On the 9th of December, at 6:00 p.m., Detective Spears was notified by the FBI that the latent prints taken from Linda O'Connor's windowsill matched Hoisington's military service prints. On December 10, 1977, the police arrested Hoisington for the alleged rape of Linda O'Connor. Incident to the arrest, Hoisington was refingerprinted. On December 11, 1977, police presented two 8 x 10 photos of Hoisington obtained from the Lewiston Tribune files to Sharon Fuller, who identified the person in the pictures as Tracy Boyd's attacker. The photos showed Hoisington next to a large elk which he had shot. One photo had appeared in the newspaper earlier in the fall, and both showed Hoisington with almost shoulder length wavy hair. On December 12, 1977, police presented the same 8 x 10 photos to Tracy Boyd, again obtaining a positive identification. On December 14, 1977, Hoisington was charged with the rape and crime against nature in the Boyd case. Also, on December 14, 1977, both Fuller and Boyd identified the appellant in a corporeal lineup. Linda O'Connor failed, however, to identify Hoisington's voice in a voice lineup.

On March 22, 1978, a hearing was held before the district court concerning a motion to suppress both the in-court identification of Hoisington by Boyd and Fuller, and to suppress Hoisington's prints obtained on December 6 and 10. In regard to the identification question, the court found that Boyd's and Fuller's identifications of Hoisington were based on their own recollection and were not the result of suggestive identification procedures. In particular, the court noted that a composite drawing was made shortly after the attack on Boyd, and that "there is a striking resemblance to the defendant in that picture." In addition, the court concluded in reference to the six-picture lineup that "there is not real great difference in the general appearance of each of the pictures." As to the fingerprints, the court found that the December 6 fingerprints were taken by consent of Hoisington, and impliedly concluded that the December 10 fingerprints were taken pursuant to Hoisington's arrest. The motion to suppress was therefore denied.

At trial in the Boyd case, the court refused to permit expert testimony as to the reliability of eye witness identification in general. Also, in the trial of the Boyd case, the court permitted a court reporter to testify to an incriminating comment which she heard the defendant make to his counsel during the preliminary hearing. Appellant was convicted in the Boyd case of both rape and an infamous crime against nature. After a separate trial, appellant was also convicted of the rape of Linda O'Connor. All three convictions are the subject of this appeal.

II. O'CONNOR CASE

The primary issue which appellant raises in the O'Connor case is with regard to the admission of the fingerprint evidence at trial. The fingerprint evidence admitted at trial consisted of the latent prints obtained at the O'Connor residence, the December 10, 1977 prints taken upon appellant's arrest, and photographic negatives and enlargements of the same. In particular, Hoisington argues that the court erred in admitting the December 10 fingerprints, because they were obtained as a result of the December 6, 1977 fingerprinting which appellant asserts was unlawful, and which therefore constituted "fruit of the poisonous tree." Since we conclude that the December 6 fingerprinting itself was not unlawful, we do not address the "fruit of the poisonous tree" argument.

The state argues, and the trial court found, that the December 6, 1977 fingerprinting of Hoisington was done pursuant to Hoisington's consent. Consent is one of the specifically established exceptions to the search warrant requirement under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2043, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). In Schneckloth it was held that while the state bears the burden of proving that consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given, 412 U.S. at 222, 93 S.Ct. at 2045, the question of "whether a consent to a search was in fact `voluntary' or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be determined from the totality of all the circumstances." 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2047. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 557-58, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1878-79, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980). We recently recognized and applied the totality of the circumstances test in State v. Christofferson, 101 Idaho 156, 610 P.2d 515 (1980), and are called upon to do so again in the present case.

There is no dispute between the state and Hoisington that Hoisington consented to accompant officer Spears to the police station. Rather, the controversy centers on whether Hoisington, after having voluntarily gone to the police station, thereafter consented to the taking of his fingerprints. It is undisputed that Hoisington, after arriving at the police station, was given a Miranda warning, was informed that he fit the description of the suspect in a series of rapes, and consented both to being photographed and to the administration of a polygraph examination which proved inconclusive. Following the administration of the polygraph examination, Hoisington fingerprints were taken by officer Spears. There is some dispute as to what occurred with regard to the fingerprinting. Hoisington testified at a pre-trial hearing that just before he went to the place of the polygraph examination, officer Saleen told officer Spears, who was accompanying Hoisington, that Spears should take Hoisington's fingerprints. Then, Saleen also told Hoisington words to the effect that while Hoisington had to be asked whether he would take a polygraph examination, or would allow his photograph to be taken, he did not have to be asked whether the police could take his fingerprints, and that he had to give them. Hoisington's reply, in his own words, was "fine, whatever." Hoisington then testified that after the polygraph examination, officer Spears said, "I think we're going to take your fingerprints now." Hoisington's answer was, "all right."

In rebuttal, officer Saleen contradicted much of Hoisington's statement. Saleen stated that while he had asked Spears to obtain some fingerprints, he had not made any statements to Hoisington to the effect that he had to give the fingerprints. Officer Spears, on rebuttal, also testified that Hoisington's statement was inaccurate. Spears added that after the polygraph examination, he asked Hoisington if he could take a set of fingerprints. Spears showed Hoisington the fingerprint card and explained why the prints were wanted. Hoisington then said, "okay." The appellant, in light of the foregoing, does not argue that there was no consent given, rather, he argues that any consent that was given was no more than "acquiescence to perceived police authority." Appellant relies in particular upon Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 88 S.Ct. 1788, 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968), which held that "[w]here there is coercion there cannot be consent." 391 U.S. at 550, 88 S.Ct. at 1792. Application of Bumper to this case, however, is subject to the "totality of circumstances" test set forth in the subsequent case of Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973), as discussed above. With reference to Bumper, the following was stated in Schneckloth:

"[I]f under all the circumstances it has appeared that the consent was not given voluntarily — that it was coerced by threats or force, or granted only in submission to a claim of lawful authority — then we have found the consent invalid and the search unreasonable. See, e.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. at 548-549 [ 88 S.Ct. at 1791-92]." 412 U.S. at 233, 93 S.Ct. at 2050. (Emphasis added.)

Under the "totality of the circumstances" standard, it was for the trial court to determine, as questions of fact, whether the alleged statement was made, and whether the statement was the motivating factor in the granting of consent by Hoisington. Hoisington had voluntarily come to the police station, had voluntarily allowed photographing, and had voluntarily submitted to a polygraph examination, all of which were intrusions of equivalent or greater severity than fingerprinting, see United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 14-15, 93 S.Ct. 764, 771-72, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973). In our view, the evidence is sufficient to support the finding by the trial court that Hoisington's consent was voluntary, and that the state has met its burden of proof. Consequently, since we cannot say that the trial court's finding of voluntary consent was clearly erroneous, we will not disturb it on appeal. E.g., United States v. Wasserteil, 641 F.2d 704, 707 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Sanchez-Jaramillo, 637 F.2d 1094, 1098 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 862, 101 S.Ct. 166, 66 L.Ed.2d 79 (1980); United States v. Berd, 634 F.2d 979, 986 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Williams, 604 F.2d 1102, 1125-26 (8th Cir. 1979); United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117, 1130 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958, 99 S.Ct. 1499, 59 L.Ed.2d 771 (1979); United States v. Amos, 566 F.2d 899, 901 (4th Cir. 1979).

Hoisington also argues that the taking of his fingerprints is prohibited under Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 89 S.Ct. 1394, 22 L.Ed.2d 676 (1969). In Davis, police rounded up at least 24 black youths and took them to police headquarters where they were questioned briefly, fingerprinted and released without charge. Fingerprints obtained from the defendant in the roundup led to his conviction for rape. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction in Davis, holding that detentions for the sole purpose of obtaining fingerprints are no less subject to the constraints of the fourth amendment, than are arrests or investigative detentions. 391 U.S. at 727, 89 S.Ct. at 1397.

In the present case, however, the appellant was not "detained," but rather was voluntarily present at the police station, and voluntarily consented to the fingerprinting. The Court in Davis pointed out that the case did not involve a situation where the defendant had voluntarily consented to accompany officers to the police station and willingly submitted to fingerprinting. 394 U.S. at 726, 89 S.Ct. at 1397. Subsequently, in United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 764, 35 L.Ed.2d 67 (1973), the United States Supreme Court pointed out that "in Davis it was the initial seizure — the lawless dragnet detention — that violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, not the taking of the fingerprints," 410 U.S. at 11, 93 S.Ct. at 770, because there can be no reasonable expectation of privacy in physical characteristics, such as fingerprints, which are exposed to the public. Cf. State v. Curry, 103 Idaho 332, 647 P.2d 788 (Idaho App. 1982) (no expectation of privacy in shoes being worn). Consequently, since Hoisington's presence at the police station was voluntary, and he in no way limited or conditioned his voluntary appearance, or protested the fingerprinting, and was not forcefully or coercively intimidated from doing so, it cannot be said that Hoisington's fingerprinting was the result of an illegal detention, and therefore violative of the Fourth Amendment and Davis v. Mississippi, supra. See State v. Dillon, 93 Idaho 698, 705 n. 7, 471 P.2d 553, 560 n. 7 (1970).

Although not assigned as error, or briefed, appellant at oral argument also asserted that the trial court erred in denying admission of evidence concerning a voice identification proceeding in which Linda O'Connor misidentified the voice of a police officer as the voice of her assailant. The trial court denied admission of the evidence on the basis that there was nothing in the record "that could lead the jury to believe that the complaining witness ever thought she could identify the voice." Since neither party has raised or argued this issue in their briefs, we do not review the issue. I.A.R. 35 requires that issues and arguments thereon be presented in the parties' briefs. "This Court has consistently followed the rule that it will not review the actions of a district court which have not been specifically assigned as error[,] [e]specially where there are no authorities cited nor argument contained in the briefs upon the question." Bolen v. Baker, 69 Idaho 93, 99, 203 P.2d 376, 379 (1949) (citations omitted); e.g., State v. Dennard, 102 Idaho 824, 825 n. 2, 642 P.2d 61, 62 n. 2 (1982). The appellant's conviction in the O'Connor case is affirmed.

III. BOYD CASE

A. Court reporter's testimony.

With regard to the Boyd case, Hoisington first argues that allowing the court reporter to testify concerning an incriminating statement which she heard the appellant make to his counsel at the preliminary hearing violated appellant's right to counsel under the sixth and fourteenth amendments. At the preliminary hearing, Tracy Boyd testified concerning a pillow that was placed over her head by the assailant. At trial, as a witness in the state's rebuttal, the court reporter was subpoenaed and testified that during the above described testimony at the preliminary hearing, she heard the appellant say to his attorney words to the effect that "he had not placed the pillow that way, or that was not how the pillow was placed." Generally, if the client chooses to make or receive a communication to or from his attorney in the presence and hearing of a third person the communication is not confidential, and the third party may be compelled to disclose the statements which he heard. State v. Perry, 4 Idaho 224, 236-7, 38 P. 655, 659 (1894); 81 Am.Jur.2d, Witnesses § 187 (1976). Thus, in Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 97 S.Ct. 837, 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977), the Supreme Court held that a defendant's right to counsel had not been violated due to the presence of an undercover agent during an attorney/client meeting. At one point, the court noted the differences between interception of attorney/client communication by electronic surveillance as opposed to interception by undercover agents. The court stated the following:

"One threat to the effective assistance of counsel posed by government interception of attorney-client communications lies in the inhibition of free exchanges between defendant and counsel because of the fear of being overheard. However, a fear that some third party may turn out to be a government agent will inhibit attorney-client communication to a lesser degree than the fear that the government is monitoring those communications through electronic eavesdropping, because the former intrusion may be avoided by excluding third parties from defense meetings or refraining from divulging defense strategy when third parties are present at those meetings." 429 U.S. at 554-5 n. 4, 97 S.Ct. at 843 n. 4 (emphasis added).

On the one hand, the above quotation shows that the interception of an attorney/client communication by a court reporter has some similarity to interception by means of electronic surveillance. While a defendant can exclude third parties, such as an undercover agent, from defense meetings, he cannot exclude the court reporter from a judicial proceeding. From that standpoint, this case is distinguishable from People v. Castiel, 153 Cal.App.2d 653, 315 P.2d 79 (1957), where a court reporter was permitted to testify concerning a conversation between counsel and defendant which occurred during recess. In that situation, the defendant and his counsel were not compelled to be in the presence of the court reporter. On the other hand, the great danger flowing from electronic surveillance is that client and counsel are unaware of the access of others to their conversation. However, "[i]n the courtroom both client and attorney are conscious of the presence of third persons and necessarily must know from the location of such persons as to whether or not their conversations may be overheard." United States v. Denno, 221 F.2d 626, 629 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 349 U.S. 968, 75 S.Ct. 906, 99 L.Ed. 1289 (1955). Thus, while it may be inconvenient for client and counsel to have to converse in whispers, the existence of such a burden by itself does not trespass upon the fair and reliable determination of guilt or innocence, or infringe any federal constitutional right. United States v. Denno, supra; United States v. Fay, 230 F. Supp. 942, 947 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); State v. Grant, 135 Vt. 222, 373 A.2d 847 (1977); cf. Dobbins v. State, 483 P.2d 255, 260 (Wyo. 1971) (conversation heard by court spectator not privileged). In the courtroom the attorney and client are quite aware of the adversarial circumstances in which they find themselves, and the presence of security officers and court personnel.

There appear to be two lines of cases that have particular relevance to the issue presented. One line concerns the ability of a defendant to communicate freely with counsel in the presence of a guard. The general view is that a defendant's right to counsel precludes a guard from testifying concerning conversations that he has overheard between defendant and his attorney. E.g., People v. Harris, 84 A.D.2d 63, 445 N.Y.S.2d 520, 547-48 (1981). Another line of cases dictates that although it may be an inconvenience, a defendant is not denied his right to counsel if circumstances require that he communicate in whispers. United States v. Denno, supra; United States v. Fay, supra; State v. Grant, supra. In Fay and Grant, the courts found no violation of defendant's right to counsel where the defendant and counsel were seated in close proximity to the jury. In Denno no violation was found even though a police officer was seated for security reasons in the first spectator's row, only a few feet behind the defendant. Thus, even though defendant and counsel were required to sit in close proximity to others, they were nevertheless obligated to keep their communications discreet by whispering. Such a requirement is certainly a reasonable one considering the nature of judicial proceedings where the court reporter, jury and even spectators must be seated so as to be able to hear the course of the proceedings.

Assuming without deciding that allowing the court reporter to testify would have violated either the appellant's constitutionally protected right to counsel, or would otherwise have been inadmissible, we nevertheless conclude that admission of that testimony was harmless error in this case. State v. Perry, 4 Idaho 224, 38 P. 655 (1894); 81 Am.Jur.2d Witnesses, § 187 (1976). As this Court recently stated in State v. LePage, 102 Idaho 387, 630 P.2d 674 (1981), "This Court has held, however, in applying the `harmless error' rule that where the admissible evidence provides, beyond a reasonable doubt, `overwhelming and conclusive' proof of a defendant's guilt, the admission of tainted evidence will be held to be harmless error." 102 Idaho at 395, 630 P.2d at 682. In the present case there is an abundance of other evidence upon which a conviction could be based. The victim and her roommate gave police a description of the rapist immediately following the crime. The appellant fit that description (with the exception of his hair length). Both witnesses picked appellant's picture out of a photo lineup. Both positively identified the rapist from another picture of appellant. Both victims identified appellant in a corporeal lineup. Both witnesses positively identified the defendant at trial as the attacker.

We hold that because there is, beyond a reasonable doubt, overwhelming and conclusive proof of this defendant's guilt, the admission of the court reporter's testimony, if erroneous, was harmless. State v. LePage, supra.

B. Identification.

The next issue raised by appellant is whether the trial court erred in admitting identification testimony by Tracy Boyd and Sharon Fuller. Appellant's primary argument in this respect is that the photographic lineups and single subject photo showups presented to Boyd and Fuller were so suggestive as to deny him due process of law under the fourteenth amendment. Secondarily in appellant's argument, it is also suggested that he may have been denied his right to counsel in that the photo lineups and showups were not conducted in the presence of defense counsel. Both of these arguments were recently the subject of review by this Court in State v. Crawford, 99 Idaho 87, 102-04, 577 P.2d 1135, 1150-52 (1978). With regard to the question of whether a defendant has the right to have counsel present during a photographic lineup or showup, we held in Crawford, following the United States Supreme Court ruling in United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 93 S.Ct. 2568, 37 L.Ed.2d 619 (1973), that the answer is clearly no. 99 Idaho at 102, 577 P.2d at 1151. The reasoning behind that rule is as follows:

"A photographic showing, unlike a corporeal identification, is not a `trial-like adversary confrontation' between an accused and agents of the government; hence, `no possibility arises that the accused might be misled by his lack of familiarity with the law or overpowered by his professional adversary.' Moreover, even without attending the prosecution's photographic showing, defense counsel has an equal chance to prepare for trial by presenting his own photographic displays to witnesses before trial . . . . `[D]uplication by defense counsel is a safeguard that normally is not available when a formal confrontation occurs.'" Moore v. Illinois, 434 U.S. 220, 227 n. 3, 98 S.Ct. 458, 464 n. 3, 54 L.Ed.2d 424 (1977) (citations to United States v. Ash, supra, omitted); see United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. at 317-19, 93 S.Ct. at 2577-78.

Thus, Hoisington was not entitled to have counsel present at the photographic lineups and showups.

Appellant's due process argument is more substantial. In Crawford, we recognized that under Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140 (1977), and Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 93 S.Ct. 375, 34 L.Ed.2d 401 (1972), "[t]he due process test for suppression of an in-court identification that is allegedly tainted by an impermissibly suggestive out-of-court identification is whether the out-of-court identification was so suggestive that there is a very substantial likelihood of misidentification." 99 Idaho at 103, 577 P.2d at 1151. Under the standards established in those cases, there will not be a "very substantial likelihood of misidentification" as long as "the identification possesses sufficient aspects of reliability." Id. As stated in Manson, "[R]eliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testimony." 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 2253. That rule applies to both in-court identification as well as evidence concerning out-of-court identifications. 432 U.S. at 106 n. 9, 97 S.Ct. at 2249 n. 9. Thus, as stated in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. at 382, the central question is "whether under `the totality of the circumstances' the identification was reliable even though the [identification] procedure was suggestive."

Factors to be considered under the totality of circumstances test in determining whether an identification is reliable include (1) the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, (2) the witness's degree of attention, (3) the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, (4) the level of certainty demonstrated at the identification, and (5) the length of time between the crime and the identification. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114, 97 S.Ct. at 2253; Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199, 93 S.Ct. at 382. If there are "aspects of reliability" evident from an evaluation of those factors which are sufficient to outweigh "the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification," then the admission of identification testimony or evidence will not violate due process. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 106, 114, 97 S.Ct. at 2249, 2253.

In the present case some of the identification procedures employed by the police may have been in some respects suggestive. In particular, single subject showups are inherently suspect and generally not condoned, Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383, 88 S.Ct. 967, 970, 19 L.Ed.2d 1247 (1968); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1972, 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967); State v. Sadler, 95 Idaho 524, 529, 511 P.2d 806, 811 (1973); see Manson v. Bra Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 109, 97 S.Ct. at 2250. Also, the danger of misidentification may increase where a witness is presented with several lineups or showups in which a single individual has a recurring presence. Simmons v. United States, supra; e.g., Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 89 S.Ct. 1127, 22 L.Ed.2d 402 (1969). In the present case, the initial six-photo lineup elicited a somewhat tentative identification, at least on the part of Tracy Boyd. It was followed by the single subject showup and then a corporeal lineup of six persons including the defendant, which resulted in strong positive identification of Hoisington by both witnesses. In light of the use of the single photo showups, and the several identification procedures in which Hoisington had a recurring presence, we conclude that there is at least sufficient indicia of suggestiveness in the identification procedures to require review under the Manson-Biggers balancing test. Thus, we turn to a review of the facts of the present case in light of the Manson-Biggers test.

1. The opportunity to view. The rape took place at approximately 6:00 a.m. on July 4, 1977. Testimony of defendant's witness, Kenneth Kenney, weather observer for the National Weather Service in Lewiston, indicated that although the sky at that time was 9/10ths overcast, the sun had risen at 5:01 a.m., and visibility at 5:57 a.m. was thirty surface miles. Tracy Boyd testified that her bed was about three feet from a window with white draperies and that there was "plenty of natural light" for her to see "very clearly." Boyd testified that she first saw the defendant standing at the foot of her bed and that they stared at each other for a few seconds. She stated that there was no obstruction to her view of the defendant. The defendant then moved around to the side of the bed and stopped. Boyd stated that she watched his face as he moved, and that when he stopped he was only two or three feet away. Boyd screamed once, and the defendant told her to "shut up." Boyd screamed again, and the defendant said, "Shut up or I'll kill you." Boyd then told the defendant that she was not trying to scream, but could not help it. The defendant then knelt down by the bed and told Boyd not to look at him. Boyd testified that up until that time she had been looking at the defendant's face and that the view was unobstructed. Thereafter, the defendant made Boyd roll over on the stomach, and he put a pillow over her head. Then they went to Sharon Fuller's room. After that point Boyd did not see the defendant's face. However, Tracy Boyd's testimony makes it clear that although she saw the defendant for perhaps a half a minute, she had a very good look at the defendant from close proximity and under good lighting conditions.

Sharon Fuller also testified that it was "fairly light" in her room at the time of the attack. She further testified that when Hoisington and Boyd entered her room she had an unobstructed view of Hoisington's face. He said, "Don't look at me," but Fuller kept looking. Hoisington repeated the command in a louder voice, but Fuller kept looking. She stated that she got "[a] clear took. I saw his whole face." Then Hoisington told Fuller to put a pillow over her head, and she complied. At one point thereafter, Fuller looked out from under the pillow. She was within arm's reach of Hoisington and stated that when she looked out their faces met. Then Hoisington again said, "Don't look at me," and Fuller put the pillow back up. While Sharon Fuller seems to have had a briefer period of time to observe the defendant than did Tracy Boyd, still Fuller had opportunity to obtain two good looks at defendant at close range with adequate lighting.

2. The degree of attention. Boyd was "no casual observer, but rather the victim of one of the most personally humiliating of all crimes." Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. at 200, 93 S.Ct. at 382. Her testimony indicates that during the time of her observations, she focused almost exclusively on the assailant's face. Likewise, Sharon Fuller testified that she looked at the assailant's face the second time in particular "because I wanted to remember it." Clearly both women were attentive observers during the time which they had to view the assailant.

3. The accuracy of the description. On July 4, 1977, the date of the rape, Boyd and Fuller provided the police with a general description of the assailant matching the appearance of the appellant. On that same date, Boyd and Fuller met with Officer Stucker of the Lewiston police department. The two women constructed a composite picture of the assailant from a kit. With reference to the composite, the district court later found, not unreasonably, that "there is a striking resemblance to the defendant in that picture."

4. The witness's level of certainty. Sharon Fuller on December 8, 1977, and Tracy Boyd on December 9, 1977, were separately shown the six-photo lineup containing Hoisington's picture. Both positively identified Hoisington as the rapist; however, Tracy Boyd's identification was slightly tentative in that she stated that she was "relatively certain," that Hoisington's photo was that of the rapist. The slight hesitance evidenced by the response may well be explained by the fact that the photo of Hoisington showed him with short hair, while the rapist had significantly longer and wavy hair. The existence of the 8 x 10 photos of Hoisington, in which he was shown with almost shoulder length curly hair was not discovered until December 10, during a search of appellant's house following his arrest. Officer Spears testified as follows:

"When we were in Mr. Hoisington's house serving a search warrant I observed this same picture in a frame on an end table. And I observed that the hair was much more close to that as given by the victims than what Mr. Hoisington was presently wearing. The present style that he had. This was the main reason that I took the — or went to the Tribune and obtained larger pictures because it did display a different style of hair."

Viewing the lineup photo of Hoisington and the 8 x 10 photo, it is clear that the different hair style made a significant difference in his appearance. Immediately upon being shown the 8 x 10's of Hoisington, Tracy Boyd turned red, pointed to it, and stated, "That's him." Under the circumstances, notwithstanding the suggestive nature of the single subject showup, Tracy Boyd's level of certainty was very high. It is evident that Sharon Fuller's level of certainty was high even from the time of the first photo lineup.

5. The length of time between the crime and the identification. Although Boyd and Fuller provided a description and completed the composite of the assailant on July 4, 1977, the day of the rape, they did not identify Hoisington as the rapist until five months later. This situation is similar to that which occurred in Neil v. Biggers, supra, where there was a seven month gap between the crime and the identification. In Biggers the following was stated:

"There was, to be sure, a lapse of seven months between the rape and the confrontation. This would be a seriously negative factor in most cases. Here, however, the testimony is undisputed that the victim made no previous identification [of another individual] at any of the showups, lineups, or photographic showings. Her record for reliability was thus a good one, and she had previously resisted whatever suggestiveness inures in a showup." 409 U.S. at 200, 93 S.Ct. at 382.

Likewise, in the present case, the record shows that the women had been previously presented with both single photo showups and lineups during the five month interval, and had not made any identification prior to identifying the defendant. A five month interval is also certainly less negative than a seven month interval. Consequently, we believe the reasoning of the Biggers court on this subject is equally applicable to the case at bar.

In light of the totality of the circumstances presented in this case, the aspects of reliability with regard to Boyd's and Fuller's identification of the defendant far outweigh any suggestiveness that may have been present in the identification procedures employed by the police. Consequently, we find that the admission of the identification testimony was not erroneous.

C. Expert testimony.

Finally, the appellant argues that the trial court erred in refusing to admit the expert testimony of a psychiatrist, Dr. Loftus, concerning the reliability of eye witness identification. It is a well known rule that "[t]he admissibility of expert testimony is discretionary with the trial court . . ., and [that] absent an abuse of discretion, a decision will not be disturbed on appeal." State v. Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163, 165, 610 P.2d 522, 524 (1980) (citations omitted).

Such testimony on the reliability of witness identification has been repeatedly proffered by defendants and rejected by the courts. E.g., United States v. Fosher, 590 F.2d 381 (1st Cir. 1979); United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Amaral, 488 F.2d 1148 (9th Cir. 1973); People v. Lawson, 37 Colo.App. 442, 551 P.2d 206 (1976); Dyas v. United States, 376 A.2d 827 (D.C.App. 1977); State v. Brown, 17 Wn. App. 587, 564 P.2d 342 (1977) (rejecting testimony by the same Dr. Loftus). We agree with the following conclusion reached by the Supreme Court of Rhode Island:

"We are persuaded that the subject matter of the proffered testimony in this case, the trustworthiness in general of eye witness observations, was not beyond the ken of the jurors, and therefore the trial justice did not abuse his discretion in excluding this evidence. Through cross examination, defense counsel was able to probe into the witness's capacity and opportunity for observation, her attention, interest and distraction. The jury was perfectly capable of assessing the witness's credibility by weighing the inconsistencies and deficiencies elicited in cross examination." State v. Porraro, 404 A.2d 465, 471 (R.I. 1979).

We therefore find no error in the court's refusal to admit the testimony of Dr. Loftus.

The defendant's conviction in the Boyd case is affirmed.

DONALDSON, C.J., SHEPARD, J., and McFADDEN, J. (Ret.), concur.