Opinion
The defendant, an unmarried seventeen-year-old girl who was charged with being in manifest danger of falling into habits of vice, in violation of statute (17-379), demurred to the information on constitutional grounds. The demurrer was overruled, and, when the defendant refused to plead over, the court ordered a plea of not guilty entered on her behalf. Without a trial, the court rendered a judgment of guilty. Held that, since the present action had the attributes of a criminal proceeding, entitling the defendant to the presumption of innocence, the state, on a not guilty plea, had the burden of proving its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and, since the court's departure from the foregoing fundamental law was apparent on the face of the record, the judgment must be set aside.
Argued March 8, 1967
Decided April 7, 1967
Information charging the defendant with a violation of General Statutes 17-379, brought to the Circuit Court in the first circuit, where, after a demurrer to the information was overruled and the defendant failed to plead over, a plea of not guilty was ordered by the court to be entered; thereafter the court, Reynolds, J., rendered judgment of guilty without a trial, and appeal by the defendant to the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court, which affirmed the judgment; from the judgment of the Appellate Division, the defendant, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court. Error; further proceedings.
Robert N. Grosby, public defender, for the appellant (defendant).
Robert J. Callahan, assistant prosecuting attorney, for the appellee (state).
The defendant, an unmarried, seventeen-year-old girl, was charged in the Circuit Court with being in manifest danger of falling into habits of vice. General Statutes 17-379. She was represented by a public defender, who demurred to the information on the ground that the language of 17-379 is so vague and uncertain as to render the statute unconstitutional on its face. The demurrer was overruled and, when the defendant refused to plead over, the court, suo motu, ordered a plea of not guilty entered on her behalf. Thereafter, the court, despite the entry of a not guilty plea, and without the benefit of a trial, found the defendant guilty and sentenced her to be committed for an indefinite term to the State Farm for Women. The defendant appealed to the Appellate Division of the Circuit Court, claiming error in the overruling of her demurrer. That court affirmed the conviction and, upon the defendant's petition for certification, we have decided, with the agreement of counsel, to review the case as presented by the record before the Appellate Division and in argument to this court on the defendant's request for certification. See Practice Book 742.
The cumulative effect of all the foregoing circumstances was to invest the action against this particular defendant with the attributes of a criminal proceeding. It is unnecessary to decide, however, whether or not the statute is a criminal statute.
Under the circumstances in the present case, in which a not guilty plea had been entered, the state could not obtain a conviction without the introduction of evidence proving the guilt of the accused. Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 163, 82 S.Ct. 248, 7 L.Ed.2d 207; Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 206, 80 S.Ct. 624, 4 L.Ed.2d 654; note, 80 A.L.R.2d 1362; 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law, 413. Our opinions in State v. Sul, 146 Conn. 78, 83, 147 A.2d 686, and State v. Tyrrell, 100 Conn. 101, 103, 122 A. 924, could not, and were not intended to, relieve the state of the burden of proving its case against a defendant for whom a not guilty plea has been entered. Every accused is legally presumed innocent of the criminal charges brought against him until he admits his guilt in a plea to the court or until the state proves him guilty of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt. See State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 554, 18 A.2d 895. The trial court's finding of guilty in this case and the judgment based thereon are such a departure from our fundamental law as to be voidable on review if apparent on the face of the record. See Thompson v. Louisville, supra, 204; Wojculewicz v. Cummings, 145 Conn. 11, 19, 138 A.2d 512. Any other rule would put us at the risk of affirming a judgment which, on the face of record before us, has no basis in law. This we do not deem it within our powers to do. See Crain v. United States, 162 U.S. 625, 645, 16 S.Ct. 952, 40 L.Ed. 1097.