Opinion
No. 4-037 / 03-0824
Filed February 27, 2004
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Cerro Gordo County, Jon Stuart Scoles, Judge.
Defendant appeals following her conviction for first-degree murder. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and David Adams, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik and Douglas Hammerand, Assistant Attorneys General, Paul Martin, County Attorney, and Carlyle Dalen, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Sackett, C.J., and Vaitheswaran and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Bennie Mae Harrington appeals following her conviction for first-degree murder in violation of Iowa Code section 707.1 (2001). She contends the evidence is insufficient to support her conviction. She further contends her counsel was ineffective in failing to plead and argue a diminished capacity defense. We affirm.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The body of Robert Crawford was discovered on the morning of March 12, 2001 lying in the alley behind his home. Crawford, who was eighty-one years old at the time of his death, died as the result of blunt force injuries to his head and neck. He was unclothed except for his underwear, and was partially covered by snow.
Officer Ewalt of the Mason City Police Department arrived at Crawford's home at 6:37 a.m. and noticed there were no footprints or tire prints in the snow near Crawford's body. Investigator Tyler arrived at the home and noticed footprints in the snow and slush under the carport. The back door of Crawford's home was ajar. Blood droplets and smears were discovered on the floors, walls, and appliances in the kitchen and in the stairway leading to the back door. Blood drops were also discovered on a plastic mat between the kitchen and living room. DNA tests confirmed the blood was that of the victim. Although the home was neat and tidy, a pill bottle and a right-handed mitten were on the floor between the kitchen and living room. Three condoms were discovered in the kitchen trash can.
Crawford had last been heard from around 10:30 p.m. on the night of March 11, when his daughter called to inform him it was snowing. Darick Wooldridge, who lived four houses away from Crawford, noticed it was snowing when he returned to his home around 11:15 or 11:20 p.m. on March 11. He commented to his girlfriend that there were no tracks on the snow in the alley.
Jaclyn Garza, who was staying in the home next to Crawford's, noticed Crawford's basement light was on when she went to bed around 2:30 a.m. on March 12. Crawford's garage light was not on at that time.
Nicole Winters, who was staying at her grandmother's home two doors down from Crawford's home, went to sleep around 10:00 or 10:30 p.m. on March 11. However, she was awakened around 3:00 a.m. by her dogs howling and barking. She let the dogs out and they ran toward the alley in the direction of Crawford's house. The dogs continued to bark and howl for five to ten minutes until Winters brought them inside, afraid they would awaken the neighbors. Winters noticed it was snowing quite a bit and Crawford's garage light was on.
Forty-four-year-old Bennie Mae Harrington knew Crawford. Harrington would go to Crawford's house once or twice a week and he would pay her $50 in exchange for sex. Harrington is of borderline intelligence with a measurable IQ of sixty-six. After seeking treatment from Dr. Mark Mahoney for a thumb injury in 1996, Harrington was diagnosed with various mental health problems, including schizophrenia and depression. Harrington informed Dr. Mahoney she heard voices and believed these voices were other personalities.
Harrington arrived for work at the HyVee deli at 2:58 p.m. on March 12. While washing dishes, a coworker, Jill Miller, noticed Harrington was only using one hand When the Miller inquired as to why, Harrington told her she did not want to get her Band-Aid wet. Harrington further explained she knew she had done something really bad the night before, but could not recall what she had done. Harrington asked Miller if she would say Harrington had not done anything if she got into trouble.
Prior to going to work on March 12, Harrington called Dr. Mahoney, informing him she was off her medication and hearing voices. She told Dr. Mahoney the police wanted to talk to her about a gun.
Officers investigating Crawford's death arrived at the HyVee deli that afternoon and asked Harrington to accompany them to the police department. Miller saw Harrington use the telephone before leaving and overheard her say, "Reverend, I need your help. I don't know what to do."
During her interview with police, Harrington admitted to the nature of her relationship with Crawford. She stated Crawford did not want his neighbors to know of their relationship, so Harrington always went to the house very late and did not park in front of the house or in the alley. Harrington stated she had not been to Crawford's house since the prior Thursday or Friday, but admitted she had talked with Crawford on the telephone the previous night. She claimed Crawford asked her to come over, but she declined because she was sleepy.
Harrington admitted having gone to the home of Morris Traub at approximately 7:00 p.m. the night before. She told the officers she wanted to repay Traub money she owed him, but that Traub closed the door without talking to her. For his part, Traub estimates Harrington arrived at his house at 8:30 or 9:00 p.m. Traub believed Harrington wanted money.
Harrington also admitted she had gone to Michael O'Gorman's home on the evening of March 11. She first arrived at O'Gorman's home in the early afternoon and asked O'Gorman for $20 to purchase medicine for her grandchildren. O'Gorman admits giving her the money. Harrington then returned to his house between 5:00 and 6:00 p.m. She stayed half an hour before they both went to Harrington's home. O'Gorman believes Harrington smoked marijuana with him. She then asked O'Gorman for an additional $20 to buy a rock of crack cocaine. O'Gorman obliged her request and Harrinton left for a short time. When she returned, she smoked marijuana and a rock of crack cocaine. Harrington left a short while later.
Jennifer Dunham testified Harrington came to her home around noon on March 11 and purchased a $20 rock of crack cocaine. Harrington had also purchased drugs from Dunham earlier that weekend. Harrington returned about dusk and Dunham said she had no more drugs to sell.
In her March 12 interview with police, Harrington told officers she has an alternate personality named Sally. She stated Sally is "mean" and "a fighter." Harrington denied having gone to Crawford's the night before, but could not remember if Sally had been to Crawford's house. She further stated, "If she did this, she took my whole life."
At the conclusion of the interview, Harrington agreed to let officers search her home. After Harrington collapsed in the hallway of the police station, it was decided that she would return to work and call officers when she arrived home. Harrington returned to work at 5:28 p.m. She told Annette Blias, a coworker, that she didn't know if she had committed a crime or not. She told Blias she took some medication and didn't remember anything after that. Harrington told Blias she was going to jail and would not see her grandbabies again. Harrington left work at 6:01 p.m.
Police decided to obtain a search warrant for Harrington's house and car. Investigators Tyler and Wellen drove past Harrington's house after Harrington returned to work to obtain a description of the house for the search warrant application. They noticed trash bags outside the home near the back door.
Harrington called her sister, Jeania Craddock, between 5:30 and 6:00 p.m. Harrington went to Craddock's house. Both women then went to Harrington's home and called the police at 7:55 p.m. When officers arrived, they smelled an odor of bleach and observed a bottle of Clorox next to the kitchen sink. Nothing of significance was found in the home. However, the garbage bags that were observed near the back door earlier were missing.
Officers searched Harrington's car, which had been purchased in January. A blood smear was discovered on the column between the windshield and the driver's door. When officers advised Harrington blood had been found in her car, she became hysterical and Craddock requested an ambulance be called. On the way to the hospital, Harrington said, "Look at what shit Sally got us in." DNA analysis confirmed the blood discovered in Harrington's car was Crawford's.
On April 6, 2001, Harrington had a second police interview. She discussed her extensive drug usage the weekend Crawford was killed. She estimated she spent $300 on crack cocaine on Saturday and Sunday. She smoked four or five rocks of crack cocaine on Sunday alone. Harrington again denied being at Crawford's house on Sunday night or Monday morning.
On June 11, 2001, Harrington was interviewed by officers a third time. Halfway through the interview, Harrington's voice and demeanor changed as she began answering questions as Sally. Harrington continued to maintain she was not at Crawford's house the night he died.
Additional DNA tests showed Harrington's DNA was present on the mitten found in Crawford's house along with other DNA. DNA tests were also conducted on the three used condoms discovered in Crawford's kitchen garbage. One condom contained DNA from both Crawford and Harrington. A second condom contained DNA from Crawford. No DNA was recovered from the third condom.
Harrington was charged with first-degree murder on October 11, 2001. She pled not guilty. On January 24, 2002, Harrington filed a motion for hearing to determine her competency. Following a March 16, 2002 hearing, the district court found Harrington was not competent to stand trial. Proceedings were suspended while Harrington was placed at the Iowa Medical and Classification Center.
On September 12, 2002, Harrington's competency was reviewed. The district court found her mental health had improved and she was competent. Harrington waived a jury trial and trial to the court began on April 15, 2003. On April 22, 2003, the district court found Harrington guilty of first-degree murder. The district court denied Harrington's motion in arrest of judgment and motion for new trial. The court sentenced Harrington to life imprisonment.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence.
Harrington first contends the evidence is insufficient to convict her of first-degree murder. She argues there is insufficient evidence she acted with malice aforethought.
We review claims of insufficient evidence for errors at law. State v. Rohm, 609 N.W.2d 504, 509 (Iowa 2000). We will uphold a finding of guilt if substantial evidence supports the verdict. Id. "Substantial evidence is evidence upon which a rational finder of fact could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
A person commits murder in the first degree when the person willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation kills another person. Iowa Code § 707.2. A person commits second-degree murder when the person commits murder that is not murder in the first degree. Iowa Code § 707.3. Malice is required for both degrees of murder. See Iowa Code § 707.1 ("A person who kills another person with malice aforethought either express or implied commits murder.").
Harrington concedes the evidence establishes she may have been present at the time of the attack upon Crawford. The following evidence places Harrington at the scene of the crime: the blood found in Harrington's car, the mitten found on the floor of Crawford's home, and the condom found in the kitchen garbage. Harrington's own statements incriminate her in Crawford's death: she told a coworker she had done something really bad and asked her to cover for her, she conceded "Sally" could have committed the murder, and in the ambulance she said, "Look at what shit Sally got us in." Additional evidence could lead a reasonable factfinder to conclude Harrington was responsible for Crawford's death: Harrington was heavily using drugs on the weekend of the murder, she had sought money from several people in order to purchase drugs on the day of the murder, and she had previously had sex with Crawford in exchange for money. Furthermore, the evidence supports the inference that Harrington, with the help of her sister, tried to conceal evidence implicating her in the murder.
Harrington argues the evidence does not establish the premeditative nature of the violence or the existence of malice aforethought. However, when viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude a reasonable factfinder could find Harrington acted both with the requisite malice aforethought and her actions were premeditated.
"Our first-degree murder cases have long held that the use of a deadly weapon supports an inference of malice, and when accompanied by an opportunity to deliberate, also supports an inference of deliberation and premeditation." State v. Reeves, 636 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 2001). A weapon is "deadly" if the manner in which it is used is likely to cause death. State v. Mart, 237 Iowa 181, 187, 20 N.W.2d 63, 66 (1945). Malice and intent to kill may also be inferred from the type and number of injures suffered by the victim. See State v. Poyner, 306 N.W.2d 716, 718 (Iowa 1981) (stating that multiple stab wounds supply strong evidence of malice and intent to kill).
To premeditate is to think or ponder upon a matter before action. State v. Talbbet, 590 N.W.2d 732, 733 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999). Like malice aforethought, premeditation and deliberation need not exist for any particular period of time prior to the act. State v. Gilroy, 199 N.W.2d 63, 66 (Iowa 1972). Also similar to malice, deliberation and premeditation may be shown through evidence regarding the nature of the killing. Talbbet, 590 N.W.2d at 734-35; State v. Wilkens, 346 N.W.2d 16, 20 (Iowa 1994).
Crawford was hit at least fourteen times with a blunt object. Although no murder weapon was recovered, the object that was used was heavy enough to cause numerous lacerations and at least two separate skull fractures. The evidence establishes that the altercation began in the kitchen and continued into the alley where Crawford received a blow to the right side of his head that would have left him unconscious and resulted in his death. Given the brutality of the nature of the killing, we conclude the district court could reasonably conclude Harrington possessed malice aforethought and acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation. Accordingly, sufficient evidence supports Harrington's conviction of first-degree murder and the district court did not err in denying her motion for acquittal.
The district court also found Harrington committed the crime of willful injury, thereby establishing the felony murder alternative found in section 707.2(2).
III. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel.
Harrington also contends her counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to plead and argue a diminished capacity defense.
We review claims of ineffective assistance of counsel de novo. State v. McBride, 625 N.W.2d 372, 373 (Iowa Ct. App. 2001). Ordinarily, we preserve ineffectiveness claims raised on direct appeal for postconviction relief to allow full development of the facts surrounding counsel's conduct. Berryhill v. State, 603 N.W.2d 243, 245 (Iowa 1999). Only in rare cases will the trial record alone be sufficient to resolve the claim. Id. "Even a lawyer is entitled to his day in court, especially when his professional reputation is impugned." State v. Kirchner, 600 N.W.2d 330, 335 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Coil, 264 N.W.2d 293, 296 (Iowa 1978)).
To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim a defendant must show (1) counsel failed to perform an essential duty, and (2) prejudice resulted therefrom. Wemark v. State, 602 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1999). The test of ineffective assistance of counsel focuses on whether counsel's performance was reasonably effective. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 693 (1984). The defendant must show counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness so that counsel failed to fulfill the adversarial role that the Sixth Amendment envisions. Id. A strong presumption exists that counsel's performance fell within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. Wemark, 602 N.W.2d at 814. The defendant has the burden of proving both elements of his ineffective assistance claim by a preponderance of the evidence. Ledezma v. State, 626 N.W.2d 134, 145 (Iowa 2001).
Additionally, our courts have ruled that trial strategy, miscalculated tactics, mistake or inexperience do not constitute ineffective assistance. Id. at 143. We may dispose of the defendant's ineffective assistance claims under either prong. Id. In order to prove the prejudice prong, the defendant must show a reasonable probability that but for counsel's alleged errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695, 104 S.Ct. at 2068, 80 L. Ed.2d at 698.
Diminished responsibility may be offered as a defense where an accused, because of a limited capacity to think, is unable to form a necessary criminal intent. State v. Collins, 305 N.W.2d 434, 436 (Iowa 1981). It differs from the usual insanity situation where illness confuses or distorts the thinking process. Id.
We conclude there is an inadequate record for us to adjudicate Harrington's claim without an explanation from counsel. We therefore preserve Harrington's ineffective assistance of counsel claim for postconviction proceedings.