Opinion
2 CA-CR 2023-0098
04-08-2024
The State of Arizona, Appellee, v. Carl David Hansen, Appellant.
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Emily Tyson-Jorgenson, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee Rosemary Gordon Panuco, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
Not for Publication - Rule 111(c), Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County No. S1100CR202001209 The Honorable Daniel A. Washburn, Judge
Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General Alice M. Jones, Deputy Solicitor General/Section Chief of Criminal Appeals By Emily Tyson-Jorgenson, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Appellee
Rosemary Gordon Panuco, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
Judge Gard authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Eppich and Chief Judge Vasquez concurred.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
GARD, JUDGE
¶1 Carl Hansen appeals his conviction and sentence for first-degree murder. He asserts there was insufficient evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict. For the following reasons, we affirm Hansen's conviction and sentence.
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against Hansen. See State v. Fierro, 254 Ariz. 35, ¶ 2 (2022). On May 13, 2020, Hansen called 9-1-1 to report that he thought someone had killed K.M., his wife. Police arrived at 7:31 a.m. and found K.M.'s body in her home's master bedroom, lying face up with a pillow over her face and a blanket covering her body. She had sustained at least eight blunt-force injuries to the head and had died six to twelve hours earlier. Hansen told police he had last seen K.M. before he left for work between 8:20 and 8:30 p.m. the night before and he had exchanged text messages with her when he arrived at work at 8:49 p.m. There were no signs of forced entry into the home.
¶3 Blood spatter on the wall behind the bed indicated that K.M. had been killed where she was found. A rubber stopper was next to her body, which officers believed may have fallen off a cane. The medical examiner later opined that a cylindrical object, such as a cane, could have caused K.M.'s injuries. But officers never found a cane, or anything else that might have been the murder weapon.
¶4 A neighbor's surveillance camera was pointed toward Hansen and K.M.'s home. Footage from that camera showed Hansen leaving home at 8:52 p.m. and returning at 7:16 a.m. the next day. The footage did not show any other person arriving at or leaving the home while Hansen was gone.
¶5 Officers also located two cellphones belonging to K.M. and Hansen and extracted data from them. Hansen had sent K.M. a text message at 8:48 p.m., stating he had arrived at work and was going to take a nap before beginning his shift. He sent a second message at 8:49 p.m., telling K.M. he loved her; she responded, stating she loved him, too. Based on the timestamps from the surveillance footage, officers concluded that the text message exchange had occurred before Hansen left the home.
¶6 In addition, officers obtained information from Hansen and K.M.'s Google accounts, including their online search histories. K.M.'s account history from the day before her murder included numerous searches for wedding dresses to wear to a vow renewal. However, Hansen's account history in the days preceding the murder included inquiries about what household chemicals or over-the-counter medications could cause death or overdose, whether a car battery could "kill a wet human," different types of cyanide poisoning, how to hire a contract killer, and how to slit a person's throat. On May 11, Hansen searched "how to smash someone in the head once to kill them[]" and visited an article about deaths that had occurred with one blow. After May 12, Hansen's account did not have any other searches about killing or death.
¶7 A grand jury indicted Hansen for first-degree murder; following a two-day trial, a jury found him guilty. The trial court sentenced Hansen to natural life in prison. This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A)(1).
Discussion
¶8 On appeal, Hansen contends the state did not produce sufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had killed K.M. because: (1) there were no witnesses to her murder; (2) he was at work during the time frame in which she was killed; (3) there was no physical evidence, such as blood, found on his person or in his car; (4) the murder weapon was not found; and (5) the time stamp on the video footage "wasn't compared to an atomic clock" or verified as accurate. We conclude, however, that sufficient evidence supported the verdict.
¶9 We review de novo whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction. State v. West, 226 Ariz. 559, ¶ 15 (2011). We will not reverse a conviction for insufficient evidence "unless there is no substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict." State v. Young, 223 Ariz. 447, ¶ 12 (App. 2010) (quoting State v. Scott, 187 Ariz. 474, 477 (App. 1996)). "Sufficient evidence on which a reasonable jury can convict may be direct or circumstantial and 'is such proof that reasonable persons could accept as adequate' to 'support a conclusion of defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.'" State v. Aguirre, 255 Ariz. 89, ¶ 8 (App. 2023) (quoting State v. Borquez, 232 Ariz. 484, ¶ 9 (App. 2013)).
¶10 We do not reweigh the evidence to decide if we would have reached the same conclusion as the trier of fact, but instead "test the evidence 'against the statutorily required elements of the offense.'" Id. (quoting State v. Pena, 209 Ariz. 503, ¶ 8 (App. 2005)). Thus, "[t]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Cox, 217 Ariz. 353, ¶ 22 (2007) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
¶11 For us to sustain the conviction, the record must contain substantial evidence that: (1) Hansen intended or knew his conduct would cause death; (2) he caused K.M.'s death; and (3) he acted with premeditation. See A.R.S. § 13-1105(A)(1). Premeditation, as defined by statute, "means that the defendant acts with either the intention or the knowledge that he will kill another human being, when such intention or knowledge precedes the killing by any length of time to permit reflection." A.R.S. § 13-1101(1).
¶12 Hansen does not dispute that K.M. was murdered; instead, he argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish he was the perpetrator. But the surveillance footage from Hansen's neighbor's camera revealed that Hansen had not left his home until 8:52 p.m., well within the period of time in which the medical examiner opined that K.M. was killed. The footage also demonstrated that no other person had arrived at or left the home between the time Hansen left for work and returned the next morning. Likewise, there were no signs of forced entry into the home.
¶13 Further, a jury could have found from the surveillance footage that Hansen had still been at home during his purported text message exchange with K.M., and that he, not K.M., had sent the messages from her phone. Finally, that Hansen searched for information about how to kill-and specifically how to kill through blunt force-supports not only the element of premeditation, but also serves as circumstantial evidence that he killed K.M.
¶14 Hansen's arguments to the contrary do not go to the sufficiency of the evidence; instead, they go to weight and credibility, which we do not reweigh on appeal. State v. Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, ¶ 6 (App. 2004). When "reasonable minds can differ on inferences to be drawn" from conflicting evidence, State v. Landrigan, 176 Ariz. 1, 4 (1993), the case must be submitted to the jury "to weigh [that] evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses," Williams, 209 Ariz. 228, ¶ 6. And we "must resolve [those] conflicts in favor of sustaining the verdict." State v. Fuentes, 247 Ariz. 516, ¶ 38 (App. 2019) (quoting State v. Salman, 182 Ariz. 359, 361 (App. 1994)).
¶15 Hansen specifically argues that because there were no witnesses to the crime and he was at work the evening K.M. was killed, there was insufficient evidence to prove he caused K.M.'s death. But as previously stated, the jurors could have found that Hansen killed K.M. before he left for work, as the state proposed. And the absence of a witness is not dispositive because "[a] conviction may be sustained on circumstantial evidence alone." State v. Green, 111 Ariz. 444, 446 (1975); see generally Aguirre, 255 Ariz. 89, ¶ 8; Borquez, 232 Ariz. 484, ¶ 11. Likewise, Hansen's argument that the timestamps on the neighbor's surveillance footage were not "compared to an atomic clock or otherwise verified to be accurate," is speculative. But in any event, the state presented evidence that the difference between the timestamps and law enforcement's documented arrival time was at most only one or two minutes.
¶16 Hansen also challenges the cellphone data. He contends that officers did not attempt to track his cellphone using cell towers and that his Google account was logged in on four different devices. Because multiple children lived in the home, he argues there was "no way to know" who actually conducted the various searches. Again, Hansen's arguments are speculative and relevant only to the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency. "[T]he State is not required to disprove 'every conceivable hypothesis of innocence when guilt has been established by circumstantial evidence.'" State v. Fischer, 219 Ariz. 408, ¶ 43 (App. 2008) (quoting State v. Nash, 143 Ariz. 392, 404 (1985)). Moreover, the state presented evidence that the children had been staying with Hansen's parents for four days leading up to the murder; the jurors could have concluded from this evidence that the children could not have performed all of the incriminating searches.
¶17 Hansen further highlights the lack of physical evidence that he killed K.M., including the missing murder weapon and the absence of blood on his person and in his car. At best, Hansen has established that there is no direct evidence that he killed K.M. But again, "we do not distinguish circumstantial from direct evidence," Borquez, 232 Ariz. 484, ¶ 11, and the circumstantial evidence summarized above was sufficient for a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Hansen caused K.M.'s death, see State v. Spears, 184 Ariz. 277, 290 (1996) (finding circumstantial evidence sufficient for murder and theft convictions); see generally Green, 111 Ariz. at 446; Aguirre, 255 Ariz. 89, ¶ 8; Borquez, 232 Ariz. 484, ¶ 9.
¶18 Finally, to the extent Hansen argues otherwise, the evidence was also sufficient for a jury to conclude he acted with premeditation. As discussed, Hansen's account history included numerous searches for various methods of killing a person. These searches continued for more than a week before K.M.'s murder, and stopped after her death. Based on this evidence, a reasonable juror could have concluded that Hansen had deliberately planned to kill K.M. for a "length of time" that permitted reflection and that he had actually reflected before killing her. See § 13-1101(1). Given the testimony and evidence discussed above, there is sufficient evidence to sustain Hansen's conviction for first-degree murder.
Disposition
¶19 Because sufficient evidence supports the jury's verdict, we affirm Hansen's conviction and sentence.