Opinion
Cr. ID No. 9809019760.
Submitted: March 12, 2010.
Decided: March 25, 2010.
COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION THAT DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF SHOULD BE SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
Donald R. Roberts, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
William J. Hammons, James T. Vaughn Correctional Center, Smyrna, Delaware, pro se.
This 25th day of March 2010, upon consideration of Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief, it appears to the Court that:
1. On September 22, 1998, a young woman was raped while walking near the University of Delaware campus in Newark, Delaware. On September 24, 1998, a second victim was attacked in Newark, Delaware as she was walking to her apartment from her parked car. Based on the second victim's identification of the attacker, and the ensuing police investigation, Defendant Hammons was arrested and subsequently indicted on eleven charges, including first degree rape, attempted first degree rape, and first degree kidnapping. On June 13, 2002, on the third day of trial, Defendant Hammons agreed to plead guilty to the lesser-included offenses of second degree rape, first degree unlawful imprisonment, and third degree assault. The State dismissed the remaining eight charges in exchange for Defendant Hammons' plea.
2. On June 13, 2002, the Superior Court engaged in an extensive colloquy to determine whether Defendant Hammons' plea was willful, knowing and voluntary, and satisfied that it was, accepted the guilty plea and sentenced Defendant Hammons to 23 years imprisonment, suspended after 20 years for decreasing levels of probation.
3. On June 10, 2003, the Delaware Supreme Court issued a mandate affirming Defendant's conviction.
4. On September 30, 2003, Defendant Hammons filed a Motion for Postconviction Relief. The Superior Court returned the motion as noncompliant, and instructed Hammons to file an amended motion that conformed to the court's procedural rules. Hammons filed an amended Rule 61 motion in April 2004. In Defendant Hammons' first motion for postconviction relief he raised various challenges, including ineffective assistance of counsel claims, in connection with his guilty plea and sentence. Defendant Hammons alleged that ineffective assistance of counsel deprived him of various constitutional rights and thus vitiated the required willful, knowing and voluntary quality of his guilty plea. Specifically, Hammons claimed that his counsel: 1) intentionally undermined his defense in order to coerce him to plead guilty; 2) defense counsel refused to properly communicate and advise Hammons of the consequences of his plea agreement; and 3) that Hammons can prove his innocence. By Order dated August 11, 2004, the Superior Court denied Defendant's motion after thoroughly and fully addressing Defendant's contentions on their merits. Specifically, the Superior Court found:
In summary, Hammons has failed to show any irregularity at all regarding his plea agreement, let alone establish ineffective assistance of counsel. Instead, all evidence suggests that Hammons made a knowing, intelligent and voluntary choice to plead guilty because he actually was guilty and he wanted some hope of ever leaving prison. Now, in hindsight, he regrets that he did not roll the dice. This procedure is not designed to provide a second chance for a defendant who has openly admitted his guilt and now regrets his predicament. Defendant's Motion for Post Conviction Relief his hereby DENIED.
State v. Hammons, 2004 WL 1874692 (Del.Super.), at *3.
5. Hammons asserted the same three claims on post-conviction appeal to the Delaware Supreme Court. On September 25, 2005, the Delaware Supreme Court determined that the claims were meritless and affirmed the decision of the Superior Court. In affirming the denial of Defendant's motion, the Delaware Supreme Court specifically stated:
The transcript of the guilty plea colloquy reflects that Hammons told the judge he had carefully reviewed the Truth-in-Sentencing guilty plea form and the plea agreement and that his attorney had explained everything he did not understand. He further stated that he had personally marked and signed the guilty plea form. Hammons denied that he had been threatened or forced to plead guilty. While Hammons initially stated that his attorney's representation had only been "adequate," he subsequently agreed that he was "satisfied" with his attorney's representation. He then stated that he had committed the offenses to which he was pleading guilty and reiterated that his guilty plea was voluntary. Finally, Hammons apologized to the rape victims, who were present in the courtroom, describing some details of one of the rapes.
Our review of the record in this case reflects no error on the part of Hammons' counsel that coerced Hammons into pleading guilty rather than continuing with his trial. Hammons' plea agreement with the State, which the judge accepted, provided him with a clear benefit, since it involved the dismissal of a number of serious felonies that could have resulted in his imprisonment for life. Moreover, the transcript of Hammons' guilty plea colloquy reflects that his guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. Absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, we find that Hammons is bound by all representations he made during his plea colloquy, including his representation that he was satisfied with his counsel's performance . . .
State v. Hammons, 2005 WL 2414271 (Del.).
Id. at *1.
6. Defendant then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus with the United States District Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, seeking federal habeas relief. Defendant essentially re-raised all the issues previously raised in his motion for post-conviction relief. On November 8, 2007, the United States District Court denied Defendant's petition for federal habeas relief. The United States District Court held that the Delaware Supreme Court correctly concluded that Hammons plea was entered voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently, that Hammons was bound by the statements he made during the plea colloquy since he failed to provide compelling evidence as to why those statements should not be presumptively accepted as true, that Defendant was not coerced into pleading guilty, and that Defendant otherwise failed to state any other claim warranting federal habeas relief.
Hammons v. Carroll and State of Delaware, 2007 WL 3326671 (D.Del.).
7. Defendant had a full and fair opportunity in his previous postconviction motion to exhaustively raise all allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel as well as any other claims that he desired to raise. Those allegations that he chose to raise were considered by the Court. After careful consideration of the issues raised by Defendant, the Court determined that Defendant failed to demonstrate that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that his guilty plea and sentence were proper, and that Defendant's motion lacked merit.
8. On March 8, 2010, Defendant filed another motion for postconviction relief. In the subject motion, Defendant contends that: 1) his decision to plead guilty and waive his rights was not knowing, intelligent and voluntary; 2) that the plea colloquy was improper in light of his "confusing and ambiguous answers"; and 3) that his counsel was ineffective.
9. Prior to addressing the substantive merits of any claim for postconviction relief, the Court must first determine whether the defendant has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. If a procedural bar exists, then the claim is barred, and the Court should not consider the merits of the postconviction claim. Moreover, if it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief that the movant is not entitled to relief, the Court may enter an order for its summary dismissal and cause the movant to be notified.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990).
Id.
Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(d)(4).
10. Rule 61 (i) imposes four procedural imperatives: (1) the motion must be filed within three years of a final order of conviction; (2) any basis for relief must have been asserted previously in a prior postconviction proceeding; (3) any basis for relief must have been asserted at trial or on direct appeal as required by the court rules unless the movant shows prejudice to his rights or cause for relief; and (4) any basis for relief must not have been formally adjudicated in any proceeding. The bars to relief under (1), (2), and (3), however, do not apply to a claim that the court lacked jurisdiction or to a colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice because of a constitutional violation that undermined the fundamental legality, reliability, integrity or fairness of the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction. Moreover, the procedural bars of (2) and (4) may be overcome if "reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice."
Since this final order of conviction occurred before July 1, 2005, the motion must be filed within three years. If the final order of conviction occurred on or after July 1, 2005, the motion must be filed within one year. See, Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(i)(1) (July 1, 2005) (amending Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(i)(1) (May 1, 1996)).
Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61(i)(5).
Super.Ct.Crim.R. 61 (i)(4).
11. In this case, Defendant's claims are all procedurally barred. Rule 61(i)(1) applies because Defendant filed this motion more than three years after his final order of conviction. Defendant's final order of conviction was in 2003, and this motion filed on March 8, 2010, was filed over 6 ½ years later, clearly outside the applicable three-year limit.
12. In addition, Rule 61(i) (4) also precludes this Court's consideration of the claims presented herein, since they have all already been formally adjudicated. All of Defendant's claims presented in the subject motion were previously raised and adjudicated in Defendant's first motion for postconviction relief, and in his prior federal habeas petition. The Superior Court has already determined, and the Delaware Supreme Court and United States District Court have already affirmed, that Hammons' decision to plead guilty was a knowing, intelligent and voluntary choice. That Defendant is bound by the statements he made during the plea colloquy since he failed to provide compelling evidence as to why those statements should not be presumptively accepted as true. That Defendant was not coerced into pleading guilty. That Defendant is bound by his representation during the plea colloquy that he was satisfied with his counsel. That the Superior Court judge engaged in a careful and thorough inquiry with Hammons while taking his plea, and that the plea colloquy was proper and binding on Hammons in all respects. Finally, the Superior Court already determined and the Delaware Supreme Court and United States District Court already affirmed that defense counsel was not ineffective in any regard.
By way of example, one specific contention that Defendant raises throughout the subject motion is that he was not aware that a no-contest plea was a viable option, and that if he was made aware that he had this option, he would have insisted upon it. The Superior Court already explained to Defendant, and already held, that there was no obligation to advise Defendant of the availability of no-contest pleas because no such plea was ever offered or available to Defendant. See, State v. Hammons, 2004 WL 1874692 (Del.Super.), at *2.
13. To the extent that Defendant has restated or refined his claims, the Superior Court is not required to re-examine any claim that has received "substantive resolution" at an earlier time simply because the claim is now refined or restated.
Johnson v. State, 1992 WL 183069, *1 (Del.Supr.).
14. Moreover, Rules 61(i) (2) and (3) would prevent this Court from considering any additional arguments or claims not previously raised. Defendant had time and opportunity to raise any issue in his prior, timely filed, postconviction motion and either did so, or neglected to do so. All of the issues raised in this motion for postconviction relief could have been raised in a timely filed motion. Indeed, the issues raised in this motion were all related to or were known at the time of Defendant's plea and sentencing in 2002. Defendant raises nothing new or recently discovered. Defendant was aware of, had time to, and the opportunity to raise any of the issues presented herein in a timely filed motion. Having already been provided with a full and fair opportunity to present any issues desired to be raised, any attempt at this late juncture to raise a new claim is barred.
15. Defendant Hammons contends that the Delaware Supreme Court's recent ruling in Cooke v. State, 977 A2d 803 (2009) creates some newly recognizable retroactive right which would somehow require a reconsideration of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Defendant's reliance on Cooke is inappropriate, misplaced, and inapplicable. Cooke differs from this case in all critical respects. Whether or not any "new rule" was announced in Cooke, it has no applicability to this case.
16. In Cooke, the defendant adamantly objected and never waivered in his strenuous objection, to his counsel's proposed trial strategy. In Cooke, trial counsel overrode defendant's express wishes, and conceded defendant's guilt over his strenuous objections. In Cooke, the Delaware Supreme Court held that defense counsel, by pleading guilty for defendant against defendant's express and strenuous opposition, effectively deprived defendant of his constitutional rights to decide personally whether to plead guilty, to testify in his own defense, and to have a trial.
Cooke v. State, 977 A.2d 803, 847 (2009)
17. The Cooke case is wholly inapposite here, where Defendant Hammons voluntarily, intelligently, and knowingly chose to accept a plea agreement, personally advised the court that he was guilty, personally apologized to his victims, personally represented to the court that his plea was voluntary and not coerced in any respect, and personally represented to the court that he was satisfied with his counsel's representation. In this action, Defendant's representations during his plea colloquy made it clear that he personally decided to plead guilty, that his decision was knowing, intelligent and voluntary, and that no actions were taken against his will. The Cooke case has no applicability here.
18. Since Defendant's claims are procedurally barred, Defendant must meet one of the exceptions to overcome the bars to relief. In this case, Defendant has failed to overcome any of the procedural bars by showing a "colorable claim that there was a miscarriage of justice" or that "reconsideration of the claim is warranted in the interest of justice." The "miscarriage of justice" exception is a "narrow one and has been applied only in limited circumstances." The Defendant bears the burden of proving that he has been deprived of a "substantial constitutional right." The Defendant has failed to provide any basis, and the record is devoid of, any evidence of manifest injustice. It is clear from Defendant's motion that Defendant's claims do not meet the high standard that the fundamental fairness exception requires. The Court does not find that the interests of justice require it to consider these otherwise procedurally barred claims for relief.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 555 (Del. 1990).
Id.
For all of the foregoing reasons, Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief should be denied.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.