Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3632-12T1
07-02-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. COREY HALLETT, Defendant-Appellant.
Alan Dexter Bowman argued the cause for appellant (Alan Dexter Bowman, P.A., attorney; Mr. Bowman, of counsel and on the brief). Daniel A. Matos, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Angelo J. Onofri, Acting Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney; Mr. Matos, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Guadagno and Gilson. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 11-07-0690. Alan Dexter Bowman argued the cause for appellant (Alan Dexter Bowman, P.A., attorney; Mr. Bowman, of counsel and on the brief). Daniel A. Matos, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Angelo J. Onofri, Acting Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney; Mr. Matos, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Corey Hallett appeals from his conviction after trial of fourth-degree possession of a controlled dangerous substance (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(3) (count one); third- degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(11) (count two); third-degree possession of CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count three); and second-degree possession of CDS with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(b)(2) (count four).
At sentencing on January 29, 2013, the trial court merged count one with count two and count three with count four. On count two, the trial court imposed a four-year term to run concurrently with the sentence imposed on count four. On count four, defendant was sentenced to fifteen years with seven and one-half years of parole ineligibility.
On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:
POINT I
MULTIPLE VIOLATIONS OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO COUNSEL AND TO REMAIN SILENT RESULTED IN AN UNFAIR TRIAL. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND.
II. APPLICABLE LAW.
A. CUSTODY.
III. THE RECORD DOES NOT DISPEL THE CLEAR VIOLATIONS OF APPELLANT'S RIGHTS TO COUNSEL AND TO REMAIN SILENT.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND DENIED APPELLANT A FAIR TRIAL IN ADMITTING IRRELEVANT AND INFLAMMATORY EVIDENCE. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT III
APPELLANT WAS DENIED EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
I. THE ROOTS OF THE RIGHT TO EFFECTIVE COUNSEL AND THE APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW.
A. THE STANDARDS SET FORTH IN CHRONIC AND STRICKLAND.
B. COUNSEL'S RESPONSIBILITY TO THE ACCUSED.
C. PREPAREDNESS OF COUNSEL IS THE LINCHPIN.
1. CONSULTATIONS WITH THE ACCUSED.
2. LEGAL RESEARCH.
II. COUNSEL WAS CLEARLY INEFFECTIVE.
I.
We glean the following facts from the trial record. In the early morning hours of February 11, 2011, investigators from the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office executed two search warrants, one for a premises located on Bryn Mawr Avenue in Trenton and one for a white GMC 350 pickup truck, with a temporary registration in defendant's name. Prior to executing the search warrants, investigators conducted visual surveillance of the premises and observed defendant leave the residence and enter his pickup. The investigators waited for defendant to arrive at the premises again before executing the warrants.
After detaining defendant, the investigators brought him inside the residence and seated him on a couch next to two other individuals found in the home. Lieutenant Frank LaBelle testified that he advised defendant of his constitutional rights and that defendant stated that he understood them. After LaBelle asked defendant if there were any drugs in the house, defendant said that there were none.
LaBelle and Sergeant Michael Novembre then searched a second-floor bedroom and seized a small amount of cash; several bags of marijuana; digital scales, one of which had cocaine residue on it; and plastic bags containing crack cocaine. In addition to the marijuana and cocaine, LaBelle and Novembre also found several personal and business documents belonging to defendant in the bedroom, including a credit report in his name. Novembre testified that he also found a mailed envelope from a prison addressed to defendant, although it was not addressed to the Bryn Mawr residence.
Detective Eric Hastings conducted a search of the kitchen and found a bag of cocaine and a metal sifter with suspected cocaine residue on it.
After concluding the search of the house, Novembre searched defendant's vehicle and found a set of keys, which he turned over to LaBelle. LaBelle discovered that one of the keys successfully operated the lock to the front door of the Bryn Mawr Avenue residence.
After completing the search, Novembre processed defendant and prepared an arrest report. Novembre testified that defendant provided him with his name, date of birth, social security number, and gave his address as the Bryn Mawr Avenue location.
An inventory log was prepared by Detective Kevin Searing. Searing reviewed the log with defendant and asked him if he had any questions about what was taken from his residence. Defendant then signed the first page, initialed each subsequent page, and confirmed that his address was the Bryn Mawr Avenue residence. When Hastings completed a search warrant inventory list, defendant again confirmed that his address was the Bryn Mawr Avenue address. According to Hastings, he explained to defendant that he did not have to sign the inventory list and that signing it was "not [an] admission of guilt."
At trial, Detective Brian Kiely testified as an expert on CDS usage and distribution. Kiely noted that the officers seized approximately a pound and a half of marijuana and more than half an ounce of cocaine from the Bryn Mawr premises. Based on the amount of CDS seized, and the packaging, Kiely opined that the CDS was possessed with the intent to distribute.
Kiely also explained how CDS users differed from distributors:
Individuals that I've arrested and individual users that were addicted to crack cocaine, the more you look at people that are addicted, often their fingers will be burnt because they use what's called a crack pipe and they apply heat to the pipe and the glass gets hot and their fingers get burned. Oftentimes . . . [there are] scars on the lips because again they're applying heat and their lips get burned.
. . . .
[O]ftentimes individuals that are addicted to crack will appear slight, sometimes dirty. That's not always the case but often in my experience that's what I've seen.
Kiely also testified as to how CDS distributors use "stash locations" to hide their drugs:
A stash location is any location that you use that isn't associated with you in any way. To give you an example . . . an individual on the street that was selling drugs on the street could stash drugs on their person. They could hide them in their pocket, they could put the drugs down their pants. That's harder to distance yourself from it.
. . . .
More sophisticated and higher level distributors will often use houses as stash
locations or a room in a house. An individual uses [a] stash location, a room in a house, let's say, will be a room that they have access to, a place to hide the narcotics. The most important part of a stash location in a house is that your name is not associated with it in any way. Your name does not come back to that house, your driver's license does not come back there. You're not on the lease. You don't pay the water bill. You don't pay the cable bill. So if law enforcement was to happen on that house, you could easily say they're not my drugs. Check my driver's license. I don't live here.
Defendant testified that he was a self-employed general contractor who had done work on the Bryn Mawr Avenue house, but he lived elsewhere. He arrived at the residence on the morning of February 11, 2011 to pick up an employee of his contracting business. He claimed that his brother, Chad Hallett, was the actual owner of the Bryn Mawr residence.
Defendant explained that he felt compelled to sign the inventory log because an investigator told him that he would be denied bail otherwise. Defendant denied that he was timely read his Miranda rights.
II.
We note initially that defendant failed to raise at trial any of the arguments he now presents. Consequently, we apply the plain error standard and defendant must demonstrate that any error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. Under that standard, reversal of defendant's conviction is required if there was error "sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached." State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971).
Our review of the record satisfies us that there was ample evidence supporting the jury verdict and that none of defendant's claims constitute plain error.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in admitting statements made by him to investigators. Specifically, defendant challenges the admission of three statements: (1) his statement to LaBelle that there were no drugs in the residence, (2) his statement to Searing identifying the Bryn Mawr Avenue premises as his residence, and (3) his statement to Hastings identifying the Bryn Mawr Avenue premises as his residence. Defendant also claims that the prejudice of admitting a letter addressed to him from prison far outweighs its probative value, thus it should have been excluded at trial.
A person subjected to police interrogation while in custody must be apprised of his or her rights. State v. O'Neill, 193 N.J. 148, 168 (2007). However, "[r]outine questions asked during the booking process or for bail purposes are generally held to be ministerial in nature and outside the privilege against self-incrimination." State v. Cunningham, 153 N.J. Super. 350, 352 (App. Div. 1977). "General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime" do not require Miranda warnings. Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S. Ct. at 1629, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 725.
The statements defendant made to Searing and Hastings were in response to routine, ministerial questions designed to complete an evidentiary log and a search warrant inventory list. There was no custodial interrogation, and thus no Miranda violation. See Cunningham, supra, 153 N.J. Super. at 354 (holding that information sought by detectives, such as the defendant's address, was ministerial in nature and did not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation even though the information was used for an investigation).
Here, defendant's response to LaBelle's question about whether there were drugs in the house does not rise to the level of a "custodial interrogation" envisioned by Miranda. In State v. Barnes, 54 N.J. 1, 4 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1029, 90 S. Ct. 580, 24 L. Ed. 2d 525 (1970), police stopped the defendant's car in search of stolen checks. During a cursory search of the car, an officer noticed checks on the floor and asked the defendant, "Whose stuff is this?" Id. at 5. The defendant answered that the checks were hers. Ibid. The Court held that the defendant was not subject to a custodial interrogation:
What was comprehended by Miranda was a process of "custodial interrogation" which the Supreme Court found to be inherently coercive. The single question asked in this case was not part of the investigation which led to the defendant's apprehension, nor was it one of a series of investigatory queries. Most important, it was not the type of question which centered blameworthiness on the defendant. She could have attributed possession to anyone, or no one, in answer to the question directed to her. After all, there were three other occupants in the car.
[Id. at 6.]
The facts in Barnes are similar to the facts here. The single question asked by LaBelle was not part of a series of investigative queries nor did it center blameworthiness on defendant. There were two other people in the house, and defendant could have attributed possession of the drugs and the home to anyone. LaBelle's question to defendant, therefore, was not a "custodial interrogation" requiring a Miranda warning.
Defendant also claims that the letter sent to him from prison should have been excluded at trial. Evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. N.J.R.E. 403. The letter is probative because it is addressed to defendant and was found at the Bryn Mawr Avenue premises, thus linking defendant to that residence. The letter's probative value is lessened somewhat because the letter is not actually addressed to the Bryn Mawr Avenue residence. While there may be some prejudicial effect because the letter was sent from a prison, and might imply that defendant has criminal associates, that prejudice does not substantially outweigh the letter's probative value. Moreover, defendant's counsel failed to object to the letter at trial, and given the amount of evidence linking defendant to the Bryn Mawr Avenue premises, the admission of the letter is not clearly capable of producing an unjust result. R. 2:10-2. We find no error in the decision by the trial judge to admit the statements and the letter.
Defendant next argues that Kiely's expert testimony describing the physical manifestations of addition to crack cocaine prejudiced defendant because "[t]he testimony inspired visualization of hordes of emaciated, zombie-like humans with burned lips and scarred hands." Defendant asserts that this testimony is irrelevant and should not have been admitted.
Relevant evidence is any evidence "having a tendency in reason to prove or disprove any fact of consequence to the determination of the action." N.J.R.E. 401. There is a generous standard for determining whether evidence is relevant: "if the evidence makes a desired inference more probable than it would be if the evidence were not admitted," then the evidence is relevant to determining a fact of consequence. State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 123 (2007). Relevant evidence, however, may still be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by undue prejudice. N.J.R.E. 403.
Expert testimony may be presented if it will assist the fact-finder in understanding the evidence and determining a fact in issue. State v. Odom, 116 N.J. 65, 70 (1989). Expert testimony on the quantity, packaging, and the addictive quality of drugs is permissible. Id. at 78-79. Likewise, expert opinions on whether the drugs possessed were for usage or distribution is also permissible. Ibid. In Odom, the Court held that "as long as the expert does not express his opinion of defendant's guilt but simply characterizes defendant's conduct based on the facts in evidence in light of his specialized knowledge, the opinion is not objectionable even though it embraces ultimate issues that the jury must decide." Id. at 79.
We are satisfied that Kiely's testimony was relevant in determining whether defendant possessed CDS with the intent to distribute. Given Kiely's qualifications, he was permitted to testify as to the quantity, packaging, and the addictive quality of crack cocaine. Kiely's description of a crack cocaine user was not offered as a means to prejudice defendant. It was designed to explain the difference between a CDS user and a distributor to the jury. Kiely's testimony described, in general, symptoms of crack cocaine addiction and did not speak to defendant in particular. Indeed, the prosecution attempted to show that defendant did not exhibit the signs of crack cocaine addiction because he was a distributor, not a user. Thus, we reject defendant's argument that the testimony was prejudicial and designed to inflame the jury.
Finally, defendant argues that he was denied effective assistance of his trial counsel because his attorney failed to object to various pieces of testimony and evidence, namely defendant's statements to investigators and Kiely's expert testimony.
To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant "must show that counsel's performance was deficient" and that "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 52 (1987) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984)).
Ineffective-assistance claims are more appropriately raised on a petition for post-conviction relief instead of direct appeal. State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 484 (1997). There is a general policy against entertaining ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims on direct appeal because they generally require examination of evidence outside the trial record. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 460 (1992). Here, defendant's ineffective assistance arguments are closely related to the arguments we have already rejected and do not requires examination of evidence outside the record for their resolution. Thus, we have considered defendant's ineffective assistance claims and find that they lack merit.
As we have noted, the testimony and evidence at issue would have likely been deemed admissible even if trial counsel had objected. Defendant argues that trial counsel should have requested a Miranda hearing. As there was no custodial interrogation, a Miranda hearing was not required. Furthermore, Kiely's expert testimony was permissible, and any objection to it would likely have been overruled. Thus, defendant has failed to show that trial counsel's performance was deficient.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).