Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2016-0377
11-02-2017
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. BRANDON JOHN GREEN, Appellant.
COUNSEL Harriette P. Levitt, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24. Appeal from the Superior Court in Pinal County
No. S1100CR201500230
The Honorable Kevin D. White, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL Harriette P. Levitt, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Chief Judge Eckerstrom authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Judge Eppich concurred. ECKERSTROM, Chief Judge:
¶1 After a jury trial, Brandon Green was convicted of theft of a means of transportation. The trial court suspended the imposition of sentence and placed Green on a three-year term of probation.
¶2 Counsel has filed a brief in compliance with Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 2 P.3d 89 (App. 1999), asserting she has reviewed the record but found no arguably meritorious issue to raise on appeal. Consistent with Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, ¶ 32, 2 P.3d at 97, she has provided "a detailed factual and procedural history of the case with citations to the record" and asks this court to search the record for error. Green has filed a supplemental brief arguing the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction, the prosecutor vouched for a testifying police officer, the officer was improperly permitted to testify about commendations he had received, and an "internal investigation report" concerning the officer should have been admitted into evidence.
¶3 Viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict, see State v. Tamplin, 195 Ariz. 246, ¶ 2, 986 P.2d 914, 914 (App. 1999), the evidence is sufficient to support the verdict here. See A.R.S. § 13-1814(A)(5). In July 2013, Green was in possession of a Jeep that had been stolen from the victim in February 2012. Some of the vehicle's VIN plates had been replaced with plates from an older Jeep of a different model; Green (an automobile mechanic) had registered the vehicle as the older Jeep despite it having the correct model name in several visible locations; and, although Green claimed he had purchased the vehicle, he stated he had paid far less for the vehicle than what he believed it was worth. See A.R.S. § 13-2305(2). We therefore reject Green's claim in his supplemental brief that the evidence was insufficient to support his conviction of theft of a means of transportation. The terms of his probation are authorized by statute and were imposed in a lawful manner. See A.R.S. §§ 13-901(A), (B); 13-902(A)(2); 13-1814(D).
Vehicle identification number. --------
¶4 In his supplemental brief, Green also argues the prosecutor improperly vouched for a police officer, apparently referring to the prosecutor's question during an evidentiary hearing whether the officer had been truthful in his testimony and the officer's reference to commendations he had received. Green is correct that a prosecutor is not permitted to vouch for a witness by "plac[ing] the prestige of the government behind its witness" or "suggest[ing] that information not presented to the jury supports the witness's testimony." State v. Vincent, 159 Ariz. 418, 423, 768 P.2d 150, 155 (1989). But Green has cited no authority, and we find none, suggesting that a prosecutor asking a witness whether that witness has been truthful constitutes improper vouching. Nor does a witness's own testimony constitute information not presented to the jury. In a related argument, Green contends an internal investigation report concerning a testifying police officer should have been admitted into evidence. But extrinsic evidence of a person's character for truthfulness—such as the report here—is inadmissible. Ariz. R. Evid. 405(a), 608(b). Thus, the court did not err in refusing to admit the report into evidence.
¶5 Pursuant to our obligation under Anders, we have searched the record for fundamental, reversible error and found none. See State v. Fuller, 143 Ariz. 571, 575, 694 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1985) (stating Anders requires court to search record for fundamental error). Accordingly, we affirm Green's conviction and term of probation.