Opinion
No. 42614.
November 12, 1951.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HARRISON COUNTY, V. C. ROSE, J.
John J. Robison, Harold Miller, Maysville, for appellants.
Charles A. Miller, Trenton, Robert L. Ross, J. F. Allebach, Albany, for respondents.
This is a proceeding in quo warranto to test the legality of the formation of reorganized School District R-6, Harrison County, Missouri. The trial court held that the formation was legal and relators appealed.
The school authorities of Harrison County, Missouri, in obedience to Senate Bill 307, Laws 1947, p. 370, now Sections 165.657 to 165.707, R.S. 1949, submitted to the State Board of Education a specific plan for the reorganization of the school districts of the county. The plan was rejected and the authorities of the county submitted a revised plan which was likewise rejected. The County Board of Education then submitted its own plan to the voters on the first Tuesday of November, 1949. See Sections 165.673, 165.677, R.S. 1949. A majority of the voters at the election favored the organization of District R-6.
All of the points briefed by relators, except the first, pertain to the sufficiency of the notices of the election. We shall dispose of relators' contentions in the order found in the brief.
The first point made is that the plan submitted to the voters did not include a plan for the entire county. The agreed statement of facts shows that the voters of Consolidated Districts R-4 and R-5 did not vote in the election; that these districts are now and were in 1949 consolidated school districts. The law, Sections 165.673, 165.677, supra, relied upon by relators, did not require the county authorities to submit a plan of reorganization which would disturb the boundaries of every school district in the county. The agreed statement of facts shows that the entire county was considered and changes deemed necessary were made and submitted to the voters. We rule the point against the relators.
Relators say that the election was void because the president and secretary of the County Board of Education did not manually affix their genuine signatures to the notices of election which were posted in the various school districts. Section 165.680, R.S. 1949, and State ex rel. Consolidated School District No. 2, Shelby County v. Curtright, Mo.App., 205 S.W. 248, 250, 251, and State ex rel. Thompson, Pros. Atty., ex rel. Pugh v. Bright, 298 Mo. 335, 250 S.W. 599, loc. cit. 602, were cited as authority. The agreed statement of facts disclosed that the names of the president and secretary of the board were printed on the notices posted in the school districts; that the officers authorized and directed that their names appear on the notices and were to be considered as their signatures. It is difficult to conceive how any voter's rights could have been prejudiced. The holding of the election was mandatory under the statute. The purpose and time of the election were fixed by Section 165.677, R.S. 1949. In State ex inf. Stipp v. Colliver, No. 42386, Division I of this court, 243 S.W.2d 344, the question of proper notices in cases of this nature was discussed at some length. It was there held that the law governing special elections was not applicable. We see no merit in relators' contention.
Under point three, relators urge four reasons for declaring the election void. They are: first, that the notices did not designate the polling places in each district; second, that the posted notices and the published notices did not advise the voters in the Martinsville Consolidated District No. 1 that the proposition would be voted upon in that area, except the last published notice on October 26, 1949; third, that the notices did not advise the voters in Solomon District that they would vote upon the question; fourth, that the voters in the Martinsville District No. 1 were not notified by two publications of said notices that they would participate in the election.
The notices published in the two newspapers of the county and the posted notices contained the following heading:
"School Meeting Notice to Form an Enlarged School District.
"In accordance with the provisions of Senate Bill 307, enacted by the 64th General Assembly, State of Missouri, notice is hereby given to the qualified voters of the proposed enlarged districts R-One, R-Two, R-Three, R-Six, R-Seven, R-Eight, R-Nine, R-Ten, R-Eleven, County of Harrison, State of Missouri, that a school election will be held at the following designated places:"
This was followed by designating the various school districts by their proper number and by the name by which they were known. For example: "Dist. No. 1. Hagan." It is well known that school meetings and school elections are generally held at the district school house. The notices properly designated the polling places. State ex rel. Marlowe, Collector v. Himmelberger-Harrison Lumber Company, 332 Mo. 379, 58 S.W.2d 750, loc. cit. 752(2).
There is no merit in the contention that the voters of the Martinsville Consolidated District No. 1 were not advised of the election by the notices. In the posted notices in the Martinsville District the polling place was designated. In addition thereto one published notice designated the polling place. Then, too, all of the notices, both published and posted, informed the voters that the Martinsville District was to be included in R-6. We hold that the omission of designating a polling place in the other published notices did not affect the validity of the election. A similar point was ruled in State ex inf. Stipp v. Colliver, supra, where the court said: "While there is some authority otherwise, the general rule seems to be that the designation of the time for the election, its purpose and the district in which it is to be held are the essential factors in determining the validity of the election, rather than the giving of notice of the polling place in the particular district."
It is claimed in the third point that the voters of the Solomon District were not advised that they would vote upon said proposition. This contention is based entirely upon the fact that the Solomon District was referred to as "Salmon." However, the legal designation for this district was District No. 32. In all of the notices this district was designated as "Dist. No. 32, Salmon." That portion of the notices advising the voters as to what territory was to be included in R-6 read as follows: "R-6: Martinsville Con. No. 1 plus 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 86." Since the district was referred to by its legal designation, the notices were sufficient. The misspelling of the name by which the district was generally known must be considered immaterial. Adding the name was surplusage.
The fourth and last contention, that the voters of the Martinsville District were not notified by two publications of said notice, has been answered above under the second contention briefed under point three.
We have been rather brief in disposing of the points relied upon by the relators in this case for the reason that in the case of State ex inf. Stipp v. Colliver, supra, the law with reference to notices of election in cases of this nature was fully discussed.
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
BOHLING and BARRETT, CC., concur.
The foregoing opinion by WESTHUES, C., is adopted as the opinion of the court.
All concur.