Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-2387-14T3 DOCKET NO. A-3213-14T4
02-02-2017
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. QUANTIS L. GOODE, Defendant-Appellant. STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. DARRYL DAVIS, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant Quantis Goode (William Welaj, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Joseph Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant Darryl Davis (David A. Gies, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Sara A. Friedman, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs). Appellant Quantis Goode filed a pro se supplemental brief. Appellant Darryl Davis filed a pro se supplemental brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R.1:36-3. Before Judges Reisner, Koblitz and Sumners. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 07-10-3549. Joseph Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant Quantis Goode (William Welaj, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Joseph Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant Darryl Davis (David A. Gies, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Carolyn A. Murray, Acting Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Sara A. Friedman, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs). Appellant Quantis Goode filed a pro se supplemental brief. Appellant Darryl Davis filed a pro se supplemental brief. PER CURIAM
We consolidate these back-to-back appeals of co-defendants for the purposes of this opinion. After a 2009 trial, a jury convicted both Quantis Goode and Darryl Davis of two first-degree murders, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2), involving two different victims, as well as other serious charges. Goode received an aggregate sentence of 100 years in prison with a sixty-year term of parole ineligibility. Davis was sentenced to sixty years in prison without parole. Prior to trial, upon the advice of counsel, both had also rejected a plea agreement involving a maximum sentence of fourteen years in prison subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. They unsuccessfully appealed from their convictions. State v. Davis, Nos. A-1176-09, A-1615-09 (App. Div. June 6, 2012) (slip op. at 32), certif. denied, 213 N.J. 567 (2013), certif. denied sub nom., State v. Goode, 213 N.J. 567 (2013).
In our consolidated opinion on direct appeal we outlined the trial evidence in detail. Id. at 2-7. We need not repeat here with such specificity the evidence against defendants. However, by way of background, trial testimony revealed that "defendants were drug dealers involved in a territorial dispute with the victims." Id. at 32.
They then both filed petitions for post-conviction relief (PCR), arguing that their respective privately-retained counsel were ineffective in failing to explain the ramifications of sentencing if they went to trial and lost, promising them they would be acquitted if they went to trial, and then mismanaging their trial. Davis appeals from the November 18, 2014 order denying his PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing. Goode appeals from the December 17, 2014 order similarly denying his PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing. Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to defendants, we reverse and remand both cases for a plenary hearing to allow defendants the opportunity to demonstrate the facts necessary to prove their allegations.
Goode submitted a certification in support of his PCR petition, which explained the interaction defendant had with his trial attorney. He contended he originally wished to take the State's fourteen-year plea offer. However, he claimed his attorney stated the sentence term was "too high" because the State lacked physical evidence and credible witnesses. His attorney told Goode he could negotiate for a ten-year prison term, but that deal never came to fruition. Goode claimed he told his attorney he wished to testify at trial, but his attorney stated there was no need to testify because he would call witnesses on Goode's behalf in his defense. Goode also alleged his attorney told him it was error for the trial judge to allow the jury unfettered access to two audio-taped witness statements.
Davis submitted an affidavit which explained his interaction with his retained counsel before trial. Davis also wished to take the State's fourteen-year plea offer. He claimed his attorney stated "[w]e're not gonna take it" because "[t]he State's chief witness made multiple contradictory statements. Ultimately the case is weak. We're going to get you home!" Davis stated he proceeded to trial solely on the assurances of his attorney. Davis further contended that if his attorney had informed him of the possible sentencing consequences of losing after trial, he would have accepted the plea deal.
Davis's attorney submitted a certification as well. The attorney confirmed Davis was interested in taking the plea offer. However, he advised Davis that the State's case was weak, and the jury would not return a guilty verdict because there was no weapon recovered, no DNA evidence, and the entire case rested on the word of two "convicted felons [who] were known drug addicts" and had made inconsistent statements. The attorney ultimately advised Davis not to accept the plea offer. He certified that in forty-three years of practice, "never before have I ever advised a client to not take a plea because I believed I would win the case and get him found not guilty." The attorney concluded that had he counseled Davis to accept the plea deal, Davis would have done so.
The State's eyewitnesses were Muhammad Holiday and his wife Amina. Another witness at the scene, Ronald Alston, was aligned with defendants. A Newark detective took an audiotaped statement from both Holiday and Alston. "Alston maintained [at trial], however, that he was drunk when he gave this statement, that the police told him what to say, and that he never saw Goode that morning." Id. at 33. Alston's statement to the police was played for the jury in open court and admitted into evidence in a redacted form. Upon admitting it into evidence, the trial judge mentioned, with no objection from counsel, that the audiotape of Alston's testimony would go back to the jury room. Holiday's audio statement was also admitted into evidence, but only at the end of the trial after an off-the-record discussion. All parties eventually agreed to admit the Holiday tape into evidence. Davis's counsel advocated for the statement's admission into evidence as he wished to use it in his summation to contradict Holiday's in-court statements.
On direct appeal, Davis argued that the trial court erred by allowing Alston to testify in court while intoxicated. Id. at 9, 32. --------
Based on the certifications submitted and without an evidentiary hearing, the PCR judge determined that defendants had not demonstrated a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Through counsel Goode raises the following issues on his PCR appeal:
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO FULLY ADDRESS HIS CONTENTION THAT HE FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL REPRESENTATION AT THE TRIAL LEVEL.
A. THE PREVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS AND PETITIONS FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF.
B. THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL REPRESENTATION FROM TRIAL COUNSEL SINCE, AS A RESULT OF HIS FAILURE TO PROPERLY ADVISE HIM WITH RESPECT TO THE STATE'S PLEA OFFER RECOMMENDING A 14 YEAR TERM WITH AN 85 PERCENT PAROLE DISQUALIFIER, HE REJECTED THE PLEA RECOMMENDATION AND INSTEAD PROCEEDED TO TRIAL, SUBSEQUENTLY RECEIVING AN AGGREGATE 100 YEAR TERM WITH A 60 YEAR PAROLE DISQUALIFIER AT SENTENCING.
C. TRIAL COUNSEL DID NOT ADEQUATELY REPRESENT THE DEFENDANT ARISING OUT OF HIS FAILURE TO THOROUGHLY DISCUSS WITH HIS CLIENT ALL RELEVANT RAMIFICATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO TESTIFY, AS A
RESULT OF WHICH THE DEFENDANT DID NOT TESTIFY IN HIS OWN DEFENSE.
D. THE DEFENDANT DID NOT RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL REPRESENTATION FROM TRIAL COUNSEL AS A RESULT OF COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT TO THE JURY HAVING UNFETTERED ACCESS TO THE RECORDED STATEMENTS OF MUHAMMED HOLIDAY AND RONALD ALSTON DURING DELIBERATIONS.
POINT II: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF, IN PART, ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS PURSUANT TO RULE 3:22-4.
Goode raises the following issue in his pro se supplemental brief:
POINT I: APPELLANT'S REPRESENTATION WAS INADEQUATE AND INEFFECTIVE WHEN TRIAL COUNSEL WITHDREW HIS OBJECTION ALLOWING DELIBERATING JURY UNFETTERED ACCESS TO PRE-TRIAL STATEMENTS IN JURY ROOM.
Through counsel Davis raises the following issues on his PCR appeal:
POINT I: THE PERFORMANCE OF THE DEFENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY WAS DEFICIENT WHERE HE DID NOT REVIEW WITH THE DEFENDANT THE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF THE CASE BEFORE THE DEFENDANT FORMALLY REJECTED THE PLEA OFFER. (U.S. CONST. AMEND. VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. Art. I, para. 10 (1947))
POINT II: THE DEFENDANT WAS PREJUDICIED WHERE, IN ADDITION TO A MORE SEVERE PRISON TERM BEING IMPOSED AFTER A TRIAL AT WHICH HE WAS FOUND GUILTY, IT APPEARS THE DEFENDANT WANTED TO AMICABLY RESOLVE THIS MATTER PRIOR TO TRIAL BY PLEADING GUILTY TO A LESSER TERM. (U.S. CONST. AMEND VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. Art. I, para. 10 (1947))
POINT III: THE DEFENDANT'S TRIAL ATTORNEY WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE WHEN HE FAILED TO OBJECT TO ALLOWING THE JURY TO HAVE UNFETTERED ACCESS TO TWO AUDIO RECORDINGS. (U.S. CONST. AMEND VI, XIV; N.J. CONST. Art. I, PARA 10 (1947))
POINT IV: IN SUMMARY FASHION, THE DEFENDANT INCORPORATES THE REMAINDER OF ARGUMENTS HE MADE TO THE PCR COURT.
Davis raises the following issues in his pro se supplemental brief:
POINT I: PCR COURT ERRED WHEN IT SUMMARILY REJECTED TRIAL COUNSEL AFFIDAVIT WITHOUT CONDUCTING AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AND WHEN IT FOUND TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE WHEN HE FAILED TO PROPERLY INFORM DEFENDANT OF THE ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF THE STATE'S PLEA OFFER.
POINT II: TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE WHEN IT FAILED TO OBJECT TO THE JURY HAVING UNFETTERED ACCESS TO TWO AUDIO-RECORDED PRETRIAL STATEMENTS WHICH WAS CONTRARY TO THE SIXTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONST ART. I PAR. 10 OF THE N.J. CONST.
POINT III: THE PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING, PURSUANT TO R. 3:22-10 BECAUSE HE HAS PRESENTED A PRIMA FACIE CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
New Jersey's PCR is analogous to the federal writ of habeas corpus. State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 310 (2014). When petitioning for PCR, the defendant must establish, by "a preponderance of the credible evidence," that he or she is entitled to the requested relief. State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 541 (2013) (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). To sustain that burden, the defendant must allege and articulate specific facts that "provide the court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision." State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992). The court must view the facts alleged in a light most favorable to the petitioner. State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 162 N.J. 199 (1999).
Both the United States Constitution and New Jersey Constitution guarantee the right of assistance of counsel to every person accused of a crime. U.S. Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 10. The right of counsel includes the right of effective counsel. State v. Cottle, 194 N.J. 449, 466 (2008). To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the defendant must satisfy the two-prong test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 693 (1984), as adopted by New Jersey in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). The test requires a showing that trial counsel's performance was deficient and, but for the deficient performance, the result would have been different. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. The standard "for attorney performance is that of reasonably effective assistance," and to show ineffective assistance of counsel, "the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687- 88, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693. There is a strong presumption counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id. at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 695.
The mere raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing, and the defendant "must do more than make bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel." Cummings, supra, 321 N.J. Super. at 170. To establish a prima facie claim, the defendant "must allege facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard performance." Ibid. As our Supreme Court has said, when a defendant presents "a close but credible prima facie case of ineffective assistance" he or she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. Jones, supra, 219 N.J. at 311.
Such a hearing is required if facts outside the trial record pertain to a material disputed fact. Porter, supra, 216 N.J. at 347 (reversing the affirmance of a PCR denial without an evidentiary hearing where defendant alleged a failure to investigate an alibi defense). Here, the issue involves what discussions took place between defense counsel and their clients. The certifications did not resolve the factual issues. A defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in the process of plea negotiation. Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 144, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407-08, 182 L. Ed. 2d 379, 390 (2012). "If a plea bargain has been offered, a defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel in considering whether to accept it." Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 168, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1387, 182 L. Ed. 2d 398, 410 (2012). Davis's defense counsel acknowledged that Davis rejected the generous plea offer based solely on the attorney's advice, which was based on the weakness of the State's case alone.
Particularly in these circumstances, where the difference between pleading guilty prior to trial and being found guilty at trial resulted in a real-time period of incarceration of approximately fifty years in prison — if defendants live so long — the PCR judge mistakenly exercised his discretion in not holding a hearing to allow defendants to delve further into the discussions between counsel and clients regarding the consequences and risks of proceeding to trial. Both defendants certified that their lawyer did not fully explain the ramifications of proceeding to trial. One lawyer lent some support to this claim by stating that his client had wanted to accept the plea agreement, but followed the attorney's advice. The State did not counter this argument with transcripts of explanations placed on the record or forms completed by defendants indicating that they knew the sentencing exposure they were facing by rejecting the plea offers.
In deciding this issue, the PCR court's only comments were as follows:
The complaint about the plea bargain is a complaint that is understandable after an unfavorable result. But, again, it's clear that the defendant did discuss with the defense attorney his case, and did review the options with respect to that. I believe there's an affidavit by [Davis's defense attorney] concerning that they had a discussion, both had a discussion together. So it's clear — that may not have been the only discussion, it is clear that those discussions did take place. Whether they turn out to be correct is certainly obviously something that had to await the outcome, and the outcome was that the plea bargain offered was not — was more desirable than . . . the jury verdict and sentence, but that's second guessing.
Given the disparity between the sentence offered by the State in the plea agreement, and the sentences defendants are now serving, defendants are entitled to further exploration of their claim that their counsel did not fully inform them of the consequences of rejecting the plea offer. We therefore remand for an evidentiary hearing as to this issue.
Defendants fail to offer any explanation as to how the jury's access to the audiotapes prejudiced them. They do not allege that any portion of the Holiday tape given to the jury was not previously played in front of the jury. Defense counsel specifically agreed to the submission of Holiday's audiotape for strategic reasons: to allow the jury to hear for itself the inconsistencies between Holiday's prior statement and his trial testimony. At the time the audiotape was given to the jury, videotapes were not allowed to go to into the jury room if read-back testimony was requested by the jury. State v. Burr, 195 N.J. 119, 134-35 (2008). The general prohibition against all recordings, including audiotapes, going into the jury room unsupervised had not yet been articulated. State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 560-61 (2013) (including audiotapes and finding harmless error when pretrial videotaped statements of the defendant and victim did go into jury room with consent of defense counsel).
The remaining issues raised by defendants, either directly or by reference, are of insufficient merit to require discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing in conformity with this opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION