From Casetext: Smarter Legal Research

State v. Geiser

Supreme Court of North Dakota
Apr 2, 2009
2009 N.D. 36 (N.D. 2009)

Summary

holding a fetus is not a child under the statutes criminalizing child endangerment where mother had over-dosed on prescription drugs while 29 weeks pregnant

Summary of this case from State v. Cervantes

Opinion

No. 20080120.

April 2, 2009.

Appeal from the District Court, McLean County, South Central Judicial District, Thomas J. Schneider, J.

Ladd R. Erickson (argued), State's Attorney, Washburn, ND, for plaintiff and appellee.

Thomas J. Glass (argued), Bismarck, ND, for defendant and appellant.

Thomas A. Dickson, Dickson Law Office, Bismarck, ND, and Tiloma Jayasinghe and Lynn M. Paltrow, National Advocates for Pregnant Women, New York, NY, on brief for amicus curiae defendant and appellant.


[¶ 23] I agree with the majority that the conviction must be set aside. Under our system of separation of powers, it is not the role of this Court to criminalize what the legislature has not clearly made criminal. State v. Mosbrucker, 2008 ND 219, ¶ 42, 758 N.W.2d 663 (Sandstrom, J., dissenting).

[¶ 24] I disagree with the majority that this Court can rely on N.D.C.C. § 14-10-01 for its definition of "a child." The introductory language of N.D.C.C. § 14-10-01 specifically provides that it applies only if no other definition is supplied: "In this code, unless otherwise specified, the term `child' means `minor.'" (Emphasis added.) The section 14-10-01 definition does not apply here because N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-22.2 specifically provides a definition of "a child":

1. For purposes of this section:

. . . .

b. "Child" means an individual who is under the age of eighteen years.

. . . .

In addition, the expansive application given by the majority to the N.D.C.C. § 14-10-01 definition of "a child" throughout the code would radically alter our probate laws, N.D.C.C. ch. 30.1, as well as other provisions of the code.

[¶ 25] Extensive review of the legislative history of N.D.C.C. § 19-03.1-22.2 reflects no discussion of application to the unborn. The legislative discussion focused primarily on the risk to children living where methamphetamine and other dangerous substances were being produced or were otherwise present. Hearing on H.B. 1351 Before the Joint Senate and House Judiciary Comm., 58th N.D. Legis. Sess. (Jan. 22, 2003) (testimony of Jonathan Byers, Assistant Attorney General). In addition, the North Dakota Legislative Assembly has specifically excluded the mother from the application of the statute relating to conduct causing the death of an unborn child. N.D.C.C. § 12.1-17.1-01(2).

[¶ 26] Although statutory language differs, the overwhelming majority of states that have looked at this question have concluded that it does not apply to the unborn. Reinesto v. Superior Ct. of the State of Arizona, 182 Ariz. 190, 894 P.2d 733 (App. 1995); Reyes v. Super. Ct. of the State of California, 75 Cal.App.3d 214, 141 Cal.Rptr. 912 (Cal.Ct.App. 1977); State v. Gethers, 585 So.2d 1140 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1991); State v. Luster, 204 Ga.App. 156, 419 S.E.2d 32 (1992); Com. v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993); Kilmon v. State, 394 Md. 168, 905 A.2d 306 (2006); Sheriff, Washoe County v. Encoe, 110 Nev. 1317, 885 P.2d 596 (1994); State v. Martinez, 139 N.M. 741, 137 P.3d 1195 (App. 2006); State v. Gray, 62 Ohio St.3d 514, 584 N.E.2d 710 (1992); Richards v. State, 2005 WL 2138244; Collins v. State, 890 S.W.2d 893 (Tex.Ct.App. 1994); State v. Dunn, 82 Wash.App. 122, 916 P.2d 952 (1996); State v. J.Z., 228 Wis.2d 468, 596 N.W.2d 490 (App. 1999). Only South Carolina, looking at the specific language of its statute in conjunction with its purpose and the policy of the law, reached a contrary result. Whitner v. State, 328 S.C. 1, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779-80 (1997) (acknowledging that South Carolina has long recognized that viable fetuses are persons holding certain legal rights and privileges, concluding "it would be absurd to recognize the viable fetus as a person for purposes of homicide laws and wrongful death statutes but not for the purposes of statutes proscribing child abuse").

[¶ 27] Lenity requires deference to the accused when the scope of a statute does not clearly apply. State v. Laib, 2002 ND 95, ¶ 15, 644 N.W.2d 878.

[¶ 28] I agree that the criminal judgment must be reversed.

[¶ 29] DANIEL J. CROTHERS, J., concurs.


Summaries of

State v. Geiser

Supreme Court of North Dakota
Apr 2, 2009
2009 N.D. 36 (N.D. 2009)

holding a fetus is not a child under the statutes criminalizing child endangerment where mother had over-dosed on prescription drugs while 29 weeks pregnant

Summary of this case from State v. Cervantes

reversing the conviction of a pregnant mother under a statute similar to the chemical-endangerment statute, relying in part on a North Dakota statute expressly providing that age is to be calculated from birth

Summary of this case from Ex parte Ankrom

reversing the conviction of a pregnant mother under a statute similar to the chemical-endangerment statute, relying in part on a North Dakota statute expressly providing that age is to be calculated from birth

Summary of this case from Ankrom v. State (Ex parte Ankrom)

reversing the conviction of a pregnant mother under a statute similar to the chemical-endangerment statute, relying in part on a North Dakota statute expressly providing that age is to be calculated from birth

Summary of this case from Ex parte Ankrom
Case details for

State v. Geiser

Case Details

Full title:STATE of North Dakota, Plaintiff and Appellee v. Michelle GEISER a/k/a…

Court:Supreme Court of North Dakota

Date published: Apr 2, 2009

Citations

2009 N.D. 36 (N.D. 2009)
2009 N.D. 36

Citing Cases

State v. Stegall

The State argues that a child is still “exposed” to the controlled substance following birth, even though the…

State v. Blunt

This Court has repeatedly cautioned that criminal statutes are to be strictly construed in favor of the…