Billings, J.

The defendant was charged with breaking and entering in the nighttime, in violation of 13 V.S.A. § 1201. The only defense presented was diminished capacity due to voluntary intoxication. The defendant alleged that he wished to testify at his trial about what he remembered and what he could not remember on the night in question. This testimony would have related to his defense of diminished capacity. The defendant made a motion in limine to prevent the State from using the defendant's prior convictions for impeachment if he chose to testify on his own behalf. The defendant specifically requested the exclusion of a previous conviction for breaking and entering in the nighttime. The trial court denied the motion, holding that under 12 V.S.A. § 1608, and this Court's decision in State v. Manning, 136 Vt. 436, 392 A.2d 409 (1978), the State as a matter of right could cross-examine the defendant about his earlier convictions. After the hearing on the motion in limine, the defendant chose not to testify. The defendant was convicted after a jury trial, and now appeals.

In State v. Manning, supra, this Court held that a witness may be impeached by cross-examination concerning any prior convictions for crimes involving moral turpitude within 15 years. The Court also held that the trial court has no discretion to exclude this form of impeachment. The defendant now asks this Court to overrule Manning, and hold that the impeachment of a witness by prior convictions is limited by the trial court's discretion. The State's position is that this case is controlled by 12 V.S.A. § 1608 and that section was correctly interpreted in Manning.

Upon reconsideration we conclude that Manning was decided incorrectly, and hold that the cross-examination of a witness concerning prior convictions is subject to the discretion of the trial court.

The fact that a witness has been convicted of certain crimes is generally thought to be relevant to the question of that witness's credibility, Gordon v. United States, 383 F.2d 936, 940 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1029 (1968); People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 314 N.E.2d 413, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849 (1974), although there is disagreement about which crimes are relevant. C. McCormick, Evidence § 43, at 85 (Cleary ed. 1972). When the defendant in a criminal case testifies, he may generally be impeached to the same extent as any other witness. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148 (1958). Impeachment by showing prior convictions, however, is generally recognized to be extremely prejudicial to the defendant in a criminal case. C. McCormick, supra, at 89. Despite limiting instructions a jury is likely to conclude that a defendant with a criminal record is a criminal by nature and likely to be guilty of the offense presently charged. Commonwealth v. Bighum, 452 Pa. 554, 307 A.2d 255 (1973); C. McCormick, supra. Or the jury may conclude that the defendant is a person who deserves punishment regardless of his guilt of the offense charged. People v. Fries, 24 Cal.3d 222, 594 P.2d 19, 155 Cal.Rptr. 194 (1979). C. McCormick, supra. If the defendant decides not to testify to prevent the jury from learning of his criminal record, the jury may take his silence as an indication of guilt. Id.

In deciding that the State may cross-examine any witness about prior criminal convictions the Court in Manning did not discuss this dilemma faced by an accused who wishes to testify in his own behalf. This Court relied on earlier cases that had stated that the impeachment of witnesses by showing prior convictions was a matter of right. Pond v. Carter, 126 Vt. 299, 229 A.2d 248 (1967); State v. Russ, 122 Vt. 236, 167 A.2d 528 (1961). This had been repeated in a number of Vermont cases dating back to McGovern v. Hays, 75 Vt. 104, 53 A. 326 (1902). In each of these cases, however, this language was dictum. None of these cases prior to Manning addressed the question of the court's discretion to exclude impeachment by a prior conviction, nor did any case attempt to analyze the language of 12 V.S.A. § 1608, the statute the State asserts is controlling in the case at hand.

12 V.S.A. § 1608 provides in relevant part: "The conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude within fifteen years shall be the only crime admissible in evidence given to affect the credibility of a witness." The State argues that because of the word "shall" in this section the use of prior convictions to impeach a witness is a matter of right. We believe the section has a different meaning, however. In stating that certain convictions "shall be the only crime admissible to affect the credibility of a witness," the statute is establishing the outer boundary of admissibility. Under this section, no crime may be admitted to impeach a witness unless it meets certain conditions; that is, it must involve moral turpitude, and the conviction must have been within 15 years. The effect is to remove from the trial court all discretion to admit crimes that do not meet these conditions. State v. Russ, supra, 122 Vt. at 238, 167 A.2d at 529. 12 V.S.A. § 1608, however, does not state that crimes that meet these conditions must always be admitted. To describe a certain category of evidence as admissible does not mean that the trial court is without discretion to exclude that evidence under some circumstances. Evidence which is otherwise admissible may be excluded if it is prejudicial, Quazzo v. Quazzo, 136 Vt. 107, 386 A.2d 638 (1978); State v. Davis, 132 Vt. 290, 318 A.2d 664 (1974), or because of delay, waste of time or cumulative effect. See Whitmore v. Mutual Life Insurance Co., 122 Vt. 328, 173 A.2d 584 (1961).

In Quazzo v. Quazzo, supra, this Court stated as a general rule: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded on the ground that its probative value is overwhelmed by its probable improper prejudicial effect." Id. at 110, 386 A.2d at 640. In the absence of a statute requiring the admission of prior convictions to impeach a witness, this general rule should apply. In other jurisdictions without such a statute, most courts have held that a trial court has the discretion to prohibit the impeachment of a witness by evidence of prior convictions. See, e.g., People v. Beagle, 6 Cal.3d 441, 492 P.2d 1, 99 Cal.Rptr. 313 (1972); State v. Bitting, 162 Conn. 1, 291 A.2d 240 (1971); Burrell v. State, 42 Md. App. 130, 399 A.2d 1354 (1979); People v. Sandoval, supra; Commonwealth v. Bighum, supra. Courts which have held that impeachment by prior conviction is a matter of right have generally done so because of statutes interpreted as requiring that result. See, e.g., State v. Ruzicka, 89 Wn.2d 217, 570 P.2d 1208 (1977); State v. O'Brien, 412 A.2d 231 (R.I. 1980); State v. Bennett, 30 Utah 2d 343, 517 P.2d 1029 (1973). We hold that the impeachment of a witness by prior convictions is subject to the discretion of the trial court.

In exercising this discretion the trial court may consider a number of factors. The most important consideration is the nature of the proceeding. There may be circumstances which require the exclusion of impeachment by prior crimes in a civil case, see, e.g., Boyd v. City of Wyandotte, 402 Mich. 98, 260 N.W.2d 439 (1977), or in a criminal case when the witness is not the defendant, see, e.g., State v. Rowe, 57 N.J. 293, 271 A.2d 897 (1970), but the greatest danger of prejudice exists when the witness to be impeached is the defendant in a criminal trial. It is then necessary for the trial court to exercise its discretion most carefully, and some of the factors mentioned below refer specifically to this situation.

The court must consider the nature of the crime to be used for impeachment. Sudden crimes of violence are less relevant to the credibility of a witness than crimes involving dishonesty or falsehood. Gordon v. United States, supra. See also Federal Rules of Evidence 609(a). Furthermore, crimes of violence are more likely to prejudice the defendant before the jury. People v. Sandoval, supra. An especially severe possibility of prejudice exists when the crime to be introduced for impeachment is similar to or the same as the crime for which the defendant is accused. United States v. Shapiro, 565 F.2d 479, 481 (7th Cir. 1977); Gordon v. United States, supra.

Another factor to be considered is the length of the defendant's criminal record. An extensive recitation of the crimes for which the defendant has been convicted is likely to be highly prejudicial. See Gordon v. United States, supra. In these situations a judge might consider limiting the number of convictions that may be shown to impeach a witness.

The length of time that has passed since the conviction should also be considered. Id. Older crimes are less relevant to the issue of the defendant's credibility. United States v. Shapiro, supra. Convictions more than fifteen years old are, of course, inadmissible by statute. 12 V.S.A. § 1608. The age and circumstances of the defendant should be considered. Gordon v. United States, supra.

The court above all will have to evaluate the relative importance of the defendant's testimony and the need for impeachment by prior conviction in each individual case. Id.; People v. Sandoval, supra; Commonwealth v. Bighum, supra. If the defendant has no means of defense other than his own testimony, and the fear of impeachment is likely to prevent him from testifying, a court may be reluctant to permit such impeachment. Gordon v. United States, supra; People v. Fires, supra. A court should more readily exclude evidence of prior convictions when there are other means of impeachment available. People v. Beagle, supra. This discussion is by no means exhaustive. Many other facts may well be important in different situations.

In the case at hand the trial court ruled that it had no discretion to exclude evidence of the defendant's prior convictions if he chose to testify. We now hold this to be incorrect as a matter of law. The failure of a trial court to exercise its discretion when properly called upon to do so is an abuse of discretion. Board of Medical Practice v. Perry-Hooker, 139 Vt. 264, 427 A.2d 1334 (1981); State v. Ahearn, 137 Vt. 253, 267, 403 A.2d 696, 705 (1979). This case must be remanded for a new hearing on the defendant's motion in limine.

Reversed. Judgment vacated. Remanded.