Opinion
No. 2 CA-CR 2014-0068
11-14-2014
THE STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. GLENN LEO GAGNON, Appellant.
COUNSEL Lori J. Lefferts, Pima County Public Defender By Lisa M. Hise, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson Counsel for Appellant
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. CR20120805001
The Honorable Casey F. McGinley, Judge Pro Tempore
AFFIRMED AS CORRECTED
COUNSEL
Lori J. Lefferts, Pima County Public Defender
By Lisa M. Hise, Assistant Public Defender, Tucson
Counsel for Appellant
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge Vásquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Kelly and Judge Howard concurred.
VÁSQUEZ, Judge:
¶1 A twelve-person jury found appellant Glenn Gagnon guilty of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, kidnapping, two counts of sexual assault, aggravated assault causing temporary but substantial loss or impairment to a body organ or part, and attempted first-degree murder. The jury found the kidnapping count and one aggravated assault count were dangerous offenses and, in addition, found aggravating circumstances relevant to each offense. The trial court sentenced Gagnon to aggravated, consecutive terms of imprisonment totaling 80.25 years. The court granted Gagnon's request to file a delayed appeal pursuant to Rule 32.1(f), Ariz. R. Crim. P.
¶2 Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), and State v. Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, 2 P.3d 89 (App. 1999), avowing she has reviewed the record and found no "arguably meritorious issues to raise on appeal." Consistent with Clark, 196 Ariz. 530, ¶ 32, 2 P.3d at 97, she has provided "a detailed factual and procedural history of the case with citations to the record," and she asks this court to search the record for error. Gagnon has not filed a supplemental brief.
¶3 We conclude substantial evidence supported the jury's verdicts. See A.R.S. §§ 13-1001, 13-1105, 13-1204, 13-1304, and 13-1406. In sum, evidence established that T.R. was making deliveries on an established work route on January 7, 2012, when Gagnon, T.R.'s ex-boyfriend, put a knife to her throat and forced her into the passenger seat of her car. Gagnon drove the vehicle to a remote location, beat T.R. about her face and body, and pushed the handle of a hairbrush down her throat, causing profuse bleeding. He then
forced T.R. into the trunk of her vehicle, bound her hands and gagged her, used the hairbrush to penetrate her vaginally and anally, closed the trunk, and left. T.R. eventually escaped from the trunk and flagged down a passing motorist who called 9-1-1. T.R. was diagnosed with subcutaneous emphysema caused by the injury to her throat; she was hospitalized and unable to eat for seven days.
¶4 We further conclude Gagnon's sentences are authorized by statute and were imposed in a lawful manner. See A.R.S. §§ 13-701, 13-702, 13-704, 13-1406. We have, however, identified what appear to be clerical errors in the trial court's sentencing minute entry. Although the court expressly ordered Gagnon's sentences to run consecutively, and its minute entry reflects the imposition of consecutive sentences, the minute entry also provides for all sentences to commence on the date of sentencing. Because "[i]t is . . . manifestly impossible for consecutive sentences to both begin on the same date," State v. Young, 106 Ariz. 589, 591, 480 P.2d 345, 347 (1971), we correct the sentencing minute entry to reflect that Gagnon's sentences for counts two through six will each begin upon his completion of the sentence imposed for the preceding count, cf. State v. Ovante, 231 Ariz. 180, ¶ 39, 291 P.3d 974, 982 (2013) (correcting similar error).
¶5 In our examination of the record, we have found no other error and no arguable issue warranting further appellate review. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Accordingly, we affirm Gagnon's convictions and sentences, as corrected by this decision.