Opinion
NO. 01-17-00160-CR
04-03-2018
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellant v. CARL RANKIN FRAZIER, Appellee
On Appeal from the 10th District Court Galveston County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 15-CR-0228
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's granting of appellee Carl Rankin Frazier's motion to suppress his videotaped statement to police. In two issues, the State argues that the trial court erred in holding that Frazier was in custody at the time that he made incriminating statements because the videotaped recording of Frazier's conversation with Detective Gaspard demonstrates that Frazier did not suffer the restraint associated with a formal arrest, and the trial court erred by failing to take into consideration the totality of the circumstances of the interview and instead focusing solely on Detective Gaspard's identification of Frazier as a suspect.
See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 44.01(a)(5) (West Supp. 2017).
We affirm.
Background
Detective D. Gaspard with the Galveston Police Department (GPD) was assigned to investigate a shooting that had occurred in December 2014. As part of his investigation, he interviewed Frazier and eventually arrested him, charging him with aggravated robbery in relation to the shooting. Frazier subsequently moved to suppress the videotaped statement he had made to Detective Gaspard during the investigation pursuant to Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22, arguing that he made a custodial statement without receiving the required warnings.
At the suppression hearing, Frazier, who had been nineteen years old at the time of the interview, testified that he first came into contact with the when two officers—whom Frazier identified as officers by "the badge and the guns"—knocked on the door of his mother's house "just [after he] woke up for school." The officers identified themselves as GPD officers and told Frazier that "they need[ed him] down at the station." Frazier told them that he had to work later that afternoon and that he could not leave his mother alone at the house due to her severe health and mobility issues. However, the officers "kept pressuring." Frazier stated that he did not feel like he had a choice, so he went with them because he "felt like [he] needed to."
Frazier testified that the officers transported him to the police station in the backseat of their unmarked police vehicle, that he was escorted to the interrogation room, and that he was "patted down" to check for weapons. He acknowledged that he was not handcuffed during this process. Frazier testified that he did not feel free to leave at that point and that officers told him, "Don't leave. Don't go nowhere."
Detective Gaspard questioned Frazier without providing Miranda warnings and without informing Frazier that he had the right to terminate the interview and leave. Frazier also testified that the police never let him know that his father had been trying to contact him during the time he was being interrogated by Detective Gaspard. Frazier testified that he "felt like [he] didn't have no freedom" and had to stay in the room until he gave Detective Gaspard the answer he was looking for. He further testified that, once he gave Gaspard his statement, they did not return him to his home but instead kept him in the interrogation room for seven hours and did not let him leave the room without a police officer escort. Frazier stated that he eventually fell asleep, and the police later "woke [him] up [and] took [him] down to booking."
Frazier's father also testified at the suppression hearing. He stated that he found out that Frazier had been taken to the GPD for questioning when Frazier's mother called him and "said the police came here and took him." Frazier's father called the station four times. He asked to talk to his son and was informed that Frazier "was in the back in a room with some detectives." Frazier's father asked the police to tell Frazier not to say anything and that he was "about to get him an attorney." The person he spoke to told him that she would relay his message, and Frazier's father went to the station to pick up his son, but "by the time [he] got down there, [Frazier] had already got booked in."
Detective H. Dominguez testified that Detective Gaspard had provided him with a list of people he wanted to speak to, including Frazier. Dominguez and a partner contacted Frazier at his home as part of a follow-up investigation in which he was contacting people of interest, possible witnesses, or anyone with information regarding the case. Detective Dominguez testified that Frazier opened the door to his apartment and invited the detectives inside. Detective Dominguez testified that he spoke with Frazier's mother, who asked why the officers wanted to meet with Frazier, and he told her "that a detective with the Galveston Police Department wanted to speak with him." She asked whether Frazier was under arrest, and the detective told her that he was not. Detective Dominguez asked whether Frazier could find a ride to the station, and Frazier said that he did not have a ride. Detective Dominguez testified that Frazier wanted to ride with him and the other detective to the station, and he told Frazier's mother that he would bring him back home. He testified that, "for safety reasons" of not wanting anyone sitting behind him, Frazier rode to the station in the front seat of the vehicle, which was unmarked and did not have a "cage" in the back.
The State offered, and the trial court admitted, the recording of Frazier's statement. The interview started with Detective Gaspard thanking Frazier for coming in to the interview, and Frazier responded, "It's all good." Detective Gaspard then spent the first several minutes of the interview on preliminary questions about Frazier, his family, and other general topics. Detective Gaspard then informed Frazier that there had been a shooting in December 2014 and that someone "put [Frazier's] name in [the case], saying you were a suspect." He told Frazier that if he "had anything to do with this shooting, now's the time to tell me." Frazier denied any knowledge of the shooting.
Detective Gaspard provided more information regarding the crime, including that he believed it started as drug deal that turned into a robbery. He also provided the complainant's name and stated that the complainant had eventually died. Frazier identified some people from the neighborhood who he believed might commit a crime like the one Detective Gaspard described. After discussing the type of evidence the police were looking for in the case, Detective Gaspard told Frazier that he had made himself a suspect in the case and that many of the things he had said during the interview let Gaspard know he was talking to the right person.
Detective Gaspard then began questioning Frazier about his cell phone. He told Frazier, "You had a phone that you used to call various people" to try to set up a drug deal. Detective Gaspard stated that the phone company gave him records of the texts from a phone he believed was related to shooting, and Frazier asked whether his name was mentioned in the texts. Detective Gaspard asked about Frazier's nickname, and Frazier responded, "Los." Detective Gaspard then stated that one of the messages identified the sender as "Los," and he again urged Frazier to tell what he knew about the shooting, saying, "Don't dig this hole." Frazier continued to deny knowledge of the shooting or the cell phone.
Detective Gaspard showed Frazier some of the text messages, and Frazier then acknowledged that the cell phone number identified by Gaspard belonged to his mother. Detective Gaspard told Frazier that the messages in fact stated that the cell phone number belonged to the sender's mother. He told Frazier that the investigation was complete and that he knew Frazier was involved in the shooting. Detective Gaspard also told Frazier that he had another person who had been involved "sitting in the other room right now." Frazier denied involvement, and Detective Gaspard told him that he could prove him wrong. Frazier then provided details regarding the shooting, stating that he had seen the shooting and could identify some of the other people involved. Frazier denied pulling the trigger himself. He also provided some details regarding what happened after the shooting. The entire interview took place over approximately two hours. Frazier remained in the interview room for several more hours. Detective Dominguez placed Frazier in handcuffs and removed him from the room.
Following a review of the videotaped statement, Detective Gaspard testified that Frazier was initially a person of interest in the case. Gaspard wanted to interview Frazier "to determine his story, to see if he can explain the incident, if he can put himself in the case or remove himself in the case." Detective Gaspard testified about some of the interview techniques he used in questioning Frazier. Specifically, he testified that although he told Frazier that his investigation was complete and that he had another person sitting in a different interview room, those statements were untrue. He said those things to "elicit a reaction from [Frazier]," and he did not believe he had probable cause to arrest Frazier at that time. He testified that Frazier was allowed to walk around the interview room during the questioning and that, at one point, Frazier had reached toward him to touch his hand, all indicating that Frazier was free to walk around and move freely. Detective Gaspard testified that, after a couple of hours, toward the end of the interview, he left the room to get Frazier some water with the intention of calling the District Attorney's Office to "explain the situation to that point." Detective Gaspard believed he had probable cause to arrest Frazier in connection with the shooting at that point in time, but he did not have an arrest warrant and no exigent circumstances existed that would have allowed him to place Frazier under arrest without a warrant. He testified that Frazier was not handcuffed and arrested until later in the afternoon.
Frazier's attorney questioned Detective Gaspard about his offense report, in which he identified Frazier as a suspect in the shooting prior to bringing him in for the interview. Detective Gaspard testified about the evidence he had collected prior to questioning Frazier, including a video of a park near the location of the shooting showing three unidentified individuals who were in the area and the phone records of the complainant's girlfriend, which eventually led him to Frazier. Detective Gaspard acknowledged that he never informed Frazier of his Miranda rights.
The trial court granted Frazier's motion to suppress the statement in part. It ruled that the interview did not begin as a custodial interview, but once Frazier admitted that the cell phone associated with the shooting belonged to his mother, Detective Gaspard had formed probable cause to arrest Frazier. Thus, it suppressed Frazier's statement from that point forward because he was not advised of his Miranda rights.
Specifically, the trial court made the following findings of fact:
1. On January 29, 2015, [Frazier] was approached by several officers of the Galveston Police Department, who asked him to go to the Galveston Police Department.
2. [Frazier] did not have a means to get there, so he was taken there by the officers.
3. [Frazier] was not taken into custody when given the ride to the Department.
4. At the Department, [Detective Gaspard] questioned [Frazier] about the facts of a pending case, which involved a shooting and subsequent death of a victim.
5. At no time was [Frazier] advised of his Miranda rights.
6. During the interview with Detective Gaspard, [Frazier] was informed he was a "suspect."
7. As the interview continued, Detective Gaspard discussed the evidence he had developed to that point.
8. Detective Gaspard confronted [Frazier] with a telephone number believed to have been involved in the incident, which [Frazier] admitted was the number for his mother.
9. The interview was videotaped.
10. At 11:13:44 on the videotape, Detective Gaspard informed [Frazier] his investigation was complete; he knew [Frazier] was there at the incident and he knew [Frazier] was involved in the shooting.
11. After that, [Frazier] began informing Detective Gaspard of his involvement in the crime in question.
The trial court concluded:
1. The interview began as a non-custodial interrogation.
2. Once [Frazier] was informed that Detective Gaspard knew he was involved in the crime, that created circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to conclude his freedom of movement was restricted to the extent associated with a formal arrest.The State then exercised its right to appeal the trial court's order granting Frazier's motion to suppress.
3. At that point, [Frazier] should have been advised of his rights under the Miranda decision and State law.
4. The failure to advise [Frazier] of his rights under Miranda required the suppression of the comments he made on the videotape from 11:13:44.
Motion to Suppress
In its first issue, the State argues that the trial court erred in holding that Frazier was in custody at the time that he made incriminating statements because the videotaped recording of Frazier's conversation with Detective Gaspard demonstrates that Frazier did not suffer the restraint associated with a formal arrest. In its second issue, the State argues that the trial court erred in holding that Frazier was in custody at the time he made incriminating statements by failing to take into consideration the totality of the circumstances of the interview and instead focusing solely on Detective Gaspard's identification of Frazier as a suspect.
A. Standard of Review
A statement "stemming from custodial interrogation" is only admissible as evidence if the accused was properly admonished of certain constitutional rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 1612 (1966). Likewise, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure article 38.22 provides that no statement of an accused made as a result of his custodial interrogation shall be admissible against him in criminal proceedings unless, among other requirements, the accused was properly warned of his constitutional rights. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22, § 3(a)(2) (West Supp. 2017).
It is undisputed that Frazier had not been warned of his rights pursuant to Miranda or article 38.22 at the time he made the statement in question. Rather, the State argues that Frazier was not in custody at the time he made his statement and thus the officers were not required to inform him of his Miranda rights.
"A person is in custody only if, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would believe that his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest." State v. Saenz, 411 S.W.3d 488, 496 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322, 114 S. Ct. 1526, 1528-29 (1994)); see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S. Ct. at 1612 (custodial interrogation is "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way"). The "reasonable person" standard presupposes an innocent person. Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 254 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). The subjective intent of an officer to arrest is irrelevant unless that intent is somehow communicated or otherwise manifested to the suspect. Id. (citing Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 324, 114 S. Ct. at 1530). At trial, the defendant has the initial burden of proving that a statement was the product of custodial interrogation. Herrera v. State, 241 S.W.3d 520, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
The Court of Criminal Appeals has identified "at least four general situations that may constitute custody," including:
(1) when the suspect is physically deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way, (2) when a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that he cannot leave, (3) when law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a reasonable person to believe that his freedom of movement has been significantly restricted, and (4) when there is probable cause to arrest and law enforcement officers do not tell the suspect that he is free to leave.Saenz, 411 S.W.3d at 496 (citing Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d. at 255). While "[t]he first three situations require that the restriction on a suspect's freedom of movement must reach 'the degree associated with an arrest,'" the fourth situation "requires an officer's knowledge of probable cause to be manifested to the suspect." Id. "Custody, however, is not established by the fourth situation unless the manifestation of probable cause 'combined with other circumstances' of the interview, such as duration or factors of 'the exercise of police control over [a suspect],' would lead a reasonable person to believe that he is under restraint to the degree associated with an arrest." Id. "Even a clear statement from an officer that the person under interrogation is a prime suspect is not, in itself, dispositive of the custody issue." Id. at 497 (citing Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 325, 114 S. Ct. at 1530). Rather, courts must examine the "totality of the circumstances to determine whether a reasonable person would have believed that he was under restraint to the degree associated with a formal arrest." Id.; Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255.
We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard of review. Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011); Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); see also Saenz, 411 S.W.3d at 494 (in reviewing trial court's determination of whether person was in custody for purposes of Miranda, we apply bifurcated standard of review). The trial judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the witnesses' credibility and the weight to be given to their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24-25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court's rulings on (1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court's determination of those facts was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923; Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108-09 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). This same deferential standard of review applies to a trial court's determination of historical facts, demeanor, and credibility even when that determination is based on a video recording. State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 570 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court's rulings on those questions de novo. Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923; Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
B. Analysis
Here, the trial court found that when Detective Dominguez and his partner picked up Frazier and gave him a ride to the GPD to answer some questions, he "was not taken into custody." See Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255 ("Stationhouse questioning does not, in and of itself, constitute custody."). The trial court concluded that "[t]he interview began as a non-custodial interview." However, the record demonstrates that Frazier was not permitted to leave the police station after completing his interview with Detective Gaspard. He was instead kept in the interview room for nearly seven hours and then formally arrested. Detective Gaspard testified that, by the end of his interview, he believed he had probable cause to arrest Frazier in connection with the shooting and left to contact the District Attorney's Office to "explain the situation to that point" and to obtain a warrant so that he could arrest Frazier. Thus, the record supports the trial court's conclusion that, regardless of how the interview began, Frazier was taken into custody by the time it ended. See id. ("[T]he mere fact that an interrogation begins as noncustodial does not prevent custody from arising later; police conduct during the encounter may cause a consensual inquiry to escalate into custodial interrogation.").
The State argues that the trial court erred in holding that Frazier was in custody at the time that he made statements incriminating himself in the shooting because Frazier did not suffer the level of restraint associated with a formal arrest. It points to the videotaped confession itself to indicate that Frazier was free to move around the interrogation room, that he was "talkative and comfortable with the officer," and that "the officer continued to allow [Frazier] to do his own talking" and even told Frazier that he had a choice to make regarding whether to talk about the shooting. The State also argues that the trial court failed to take into consideration the totality of the circumstances of the interview and instead focused solely on Detective Gaspard's identification of Frazier as a suspect.
The trial court found that Frazier was informed during the interview that he was a suspect and Detective Gaspard discussed with him the evidence GPD had developed to that point. Specifically, "Detective Gaspard confronted [Frazier] with a telephone number believed to have been involved in the incident, which [Frazier] admitted was the number for his mother." The trial court found that "[a]t 11:13:44 on the videotape, Detective Gaspard informed [Frazier] his investigation was complete; he knew [Frazier] was there at the incident and he knew [Frazier] was involved in the shooting." The trial court concluded that "[o]nce [Frazier] was informed that Detective Gaspard knew he was involved in the crime, that created circumstances which would lead a reasonable person to conclude his freedom of movement was restricted to the extent associated with formal arrest" and that Frazier should have been advised of his constitutional rights at that point.
Giving due deference to the trial court's rulings on questions of historical fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and reviewing the remaining legal conclusions de novo, we conclude that the record supports the trial court's findings and conclusions here. See Duran, 396 S.W.3d at 570; Martinez, 348 S.W.3d at 923; Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673. Looking at the totality of the circumstances, a reasonable person in Frazier's position would have believed that his freedom of movement was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest at the time that he admitted his connection with the phone number associated with the shooting. See Saenz, 411 S.W.3d at 496.
At the time of the interview, Frazier was nineteen years old. GPD detectives found him at home and asked him to come to the station for questioning. Frazier testified that he did not want to leave his mother alone and he had work later that day, but the officers "kept pressuring" and Frazier stated that he did not feel like he had a choice. They drove him to the station in an unmarked car, and he was not handcuffed at that time. However, Frazier testified that police escorted him to the interview room, patted him down for weapons, and told him, "Don't leave. Don't go nowhere." Frazier was allowed to walk around the interview room during his questioning, but when he needed to leave to visit the restroom, he was again escorted by officers.
Early in the interview, Detective Gaspard told Frazier that his name arose during the investigation and that he needed to talk to Frazier to find out what he knew about the shooting and to determine whether he was involved. As the interview continued, Detective Gaspard revealed details of the shooting to Frazier, stating that police believed it occurred during a drug deal that turned into a robbery. Detective Gaspard then informed Frazier that he was a suspect in the shooting and began discussing the evidence that had been collected by GPD. Detective Gaspard told Frazier that he had evidence regarding a cell phone used to set up a drug deal that he could connect to Frazier. Frazier told Detective Gaspard that one of his nicknames was "Los," and Detective Gaspard told him that, in one of the text messages recovered during the investigation, the sender identified himself as "Los." Frazier told Detective Gaspard that the cell phone evidence was a "big misunderstanding." However, Detective Gaspard told him that the investigation into the shooting was complete and that police knew Frazier was involved in the shooting. He showed Frazier the cell phone number used in setting up the drug deal associated with the shooting, and Frazier admitted that the number belonged to his mother.
We agree with the trial court that a reasonable person—who had been told that the investigation was complete and that the evidence implicated him in the commission of a shooting, who had admitted to having the same nickname mentioned in texts setting up the drug-deal-turned-robbery, and who had admitted to having access to the phone by which the deal was set up—would believe that he was no longer free to walk away from his encounter with police. See id. The conduct of both Detective Gaspard and Frazier constituted the manifestation of probable cause to arrest Frazier at that point, prior to Frazier's further statements regarding his knowledge of the shooting. See Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 257 (determining that defendant was in custody after he admitted to being present during murder because "a reasonable person would have realized the incriminating nature of the admission").
The impression created by this manifestation of probable cause is further supported by the other circumstances demonstrated in the record. See Saenz, 411 S.W.3d at 497 (holding that courts must examine "totality of the circumstances to determine whether a reasonable person would have believed that he was under restraint to the degree associated with a formal arrest"). Frazier's relatively young age, his testimony that he felt pressured to attend the interview, his dependence on the officers for transportation for the interview, his testimony that the officers told him not to leave the interview room, his testimony that he was never told that his father was trying to reach him or given the message that his father was trying to obtain an attorney for him, and the fact that he was actually detained in the interview room following his interview for several hours and then arrested without ever being permitted to leave all support the trial court's ruling.
It is undisputed that neither Detective Gaspard nor any other officer told Frazier—either at the start of the interrogation or at any point during it—that he had the right to terminate the interview at any time, that he was entitled to have a lawyer present, or that he had the right to remain silent. See Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255-57 (manifestation of probable cause to arrest combined with officers' failure to tell suspect that he was free to leave was established when suspect made damaging admission supporting probable cause in addition to "the length of interrogation [and] the existence of factors involving the exercise of police control").
We overrule the State's issues on appeal.
Conclusion
We affirm the order of the trial court.
Evelyn V. Keyes
Justice Panel consists of Justices Jennings, Keyes, and Higley. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).