Opinion
No. 5-177 / 04-1337.
March 31, 2005.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Webster County, Joel E. Swanson (guilty plea) and Ronald H. Schechtman (sentencing), Judges.
Earl Lee Foy appeals from the sentence imposed following his guilty pleas to the charges of second-degree burglary, operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent, two counts of domestic abuse assault, criminal mischief, and escape. AFFIRMED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Dennis Hendrickson, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Guddall, Assistant Attorney General, Timothy N. Schott, County Attorney, and Sarah Livingston, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Zimmer and Hecht, JJ.
Defendant Earl Lee Foy appeals from the judgment and sentence entered by the district court following his guilty pleas to six criminal offenses. Foy claims the sentencing court erred by failing to state sufficient reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. We affirm.
Foy pled guilty to the charges of second-degree burglary, in violation of Iowa Code section 713.5 (2003), operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent, in violation of Iowa Code section 714.7, two counts of domestic abuse assault, in violation of Iowa Code section 708.2A(2)(b), criminal mischief, in violation of Iowa Code sections 716.1 and 716.6, and escape, in violation of Iowa Code section 719.4(2). The district court accepted the guilty pleas and set a date for sentencing.
At Foy's sentencing hearing, the court sentenced Foy to ten years in prison for second-degree burglary, two years in prison for operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent, and one year in prison for each of the other four offenses. The court ordered that the second-degree burglary sentence and the two domestic abuse sentences would run consecutive to each other. The remaining sentences were ordered to run concurrently with each other and concurrently with sentences which were ordered to be served consecutively. On appeal, Foy claims the district court erred by failing to state sufficient reasons for the imposition of consecutive sentences.
We may address challenges to the legality of a sentence for the first time on appeal. State v. Dann, 591 N.W.2d 635, 637 (Iowa 1999). We review sentencing for correction of errors at law. Iowa R. App. P. 6.4. Where a challenged sentence does not fall outside statutory limits, we review the trial court's decision for abuse of discretion; reversal on this ground is warranted only if the court's discretion has been exercised "on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable." State v. Thomas, 547 N.W.2d 223, 225 (Iowa 1996).
The district court must "state on the record its reason for selecting the particular sentence." Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.23(3)( d). The court must provide specific reasoning regarding why consecutive sentences are warranted in the particular case. State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 679, 690 (Iowa 2000). "Although the reasons do not need to be detailed, they must be sufficient to allow appellate review of the discretionary action" of imposing consecutive sentences. Id. The reasons, however, are not required to be specifically tied to the imposition of consecutive sentences, but may be found from the particular reasons expressed for the overall sentencing plan. State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Iowa 1989). Thus, we look to all parts of the record to find the supporting reasons. Id.
Certain factors are to be considered by the district court in exercising its sentencing discretion. "[T]he district court is to weigh all pertinent matters in determining a proper sentence, including the nature of the offense, the attending circumstances, the defendant's age, character, and propensities or chances for reform." State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708 713 (Iowa 1995) (quoting State v. Johnson, 513 N.W.2d 717, 719 (Iowa 1994)).
In this case, the district court discussed a number of factors that it considered in fashioning Foy's sentence. The court cited Foy's age, educational background, employment history, family situation, criminal record, the character of the crime, protection of the community, and the opportunity to rehabilitate him as factors in sentencing. The court also mentioned that Foy had recently been discharged from parole. The court concluded that neither probation nor a halfway house was appropriate for Foy and then entered a sentence which provided for a combination of consecutive and concurrent sentences.
Foy argues the district court improperly limited its reasons for sentencing to the denial of probation. See State v. Uthe, 542 N.W.2d 810, 816 (Iowa 1996) (stating the district court gave reasons for refusal to grant probation but not for imposition of consecutive sentences). Upon review of the record, we disagree. Here, the sentencing judge systematically discussed the reasons for the defendant's sentence immediately before pronouncing a sentence which provided that some, but not all, of the sentences imposed would run consecutively. This method of sentencing by the district court clearly indicates that the sentencing factors it considered were part of an overall sentencing plan and were not limited to the court's reasons for refusing to grant probation. Therefore, we consider all of these factors in determining whether the district court provided sufficient reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. State v. Johnson, 445 N.W.2d 337, 343 (Iowa 1989). We conclude that the district court provided sufficient reasons for imposing consecutive sentences. See State v. Keopasaeuth, 645 N.W.2d 637, 641-642 (Iowa 2002); State v. Jacobs, 644 N.W.2d 695, 700 (Iowa 2002). Accordingly, we affirm.