Opinion
No. 24846-1-III
Filed: June 15, 2007 UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Joseph C. Fleury appeals his conviction for residential burglary. He contends the evidence was insufficient to infer intent to commit a crime within the dwelling. We disagree and affirm.
FACTS
On July 5, 2005, Geoal Barnard noticed an unfamiliar car parked in his parents' backyard when they were on vacation. Suspecting an intruder, he called police. Police officers first knocked on the back door, but received no response. They eventually entered the house with a key. Meanwhile, an officer stationed in the back of the house observed Mr. Fleury open a back door and peer out. He was arrested and removed from the house.
In the master bedroom, Mr. Barnard noticed that a few items were strewn on the floor, bedding was rumpled, and an unfamiliar pillow was on the bed. He also saw groceries on the kitchen counter, but could not recall whether they were previously there. While walking through the daylight basement, Mr. Barnard noticed a back door had minor exterior damage, a bed appeared to have been slept in, and the contents of file cabinets had been removed and placed on the floor. None of his parents' possessions appeared to be missing.
Mr. Fleury agreed to waive his Miranda rights and talk to police officers. He told them that he had noticed a for sale sign in front of the house, and believing that no one was home, he entered around 1:30 to 2:00 a.m. through an unlocked basement door. He stated his intent was simply to find a place to sleep for the night, not to take anything. He denied rifling through the file cabinets, but admitted moving some items off the upstairs bed, resting for awhile, and later moving to a basement bedroom. A search of Mr. Fleury and his car did not reveal burglary tools or any items belonging to the homeowners.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
Mr. Fleury was arrested and charged with residential burglary. He waived his right to a jury trial. At the close of the State's case, Mr. Fleury moved to dismiss, arguing that the State had failed to establish a prima facie case of residential burglary because of the absence of evidence establishing intent to commit a crime within the dwelling. Concluding the disarray of items in the bedrooms and file cabinets supported an intention to steal, the court found Mr. Fleury guilty of residential burglary.
The trial judge also supported his decision with a finding that Mr. Fleury's use of the home had value:
[S]ome value on the use of that space in the residence can be inferred, and that is instead of sleeping in one's vehicle one might choose to pay money to sleep in a hotel or somewhere else, and so there may be an inference . . . there was intent to receive value for use of that space for purposes of sleeping.
Report of Proceedings (RP) at 72-73. Mr. Fleury appeals the conviction.
ANALYSIS
The sole issue on appeal is whether there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Mr. Fleury entered the Barnard house with intent to commit a crime. Noting that no stolen items or burglary tools were found and there was no evidence that the items removed from the file cabinet were out of order, Mr. Fleury contends that the court improperly used a permissive inference to establish his intent to commit a crime inside the Barnard house. The State responds that the ransacking of the house was sufficient to support the court's inference of intent to commit a crime.
Evidence is sufficient if, viewed in the light most favorable to the State, any rational trier of fact could have found the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992). All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn in favor of the State and interpreted most strongly against the defendant. Id. A defendant claiming insufficiency of the evidence admits the truth of the State's evidence and all inferences that can reasonably be drawn therefrom. State v. Myers, 133 Wn.2d 26, 37, 941 P.2d 1102 (1997).
In order to establish that Mr. Fleury committed residential burglary, the State had to prove two elements: (1) that he unlawfully entered or remained in a dwelling, and (2) that he intended to commit a crime against a person or property in that dwelling. RCW 9A.52.025. Mr. Fleury does not dispute that he lacked permission to enter the Barnards' home, but contends evidence of criminal intent is insufficient. Intent to commit a crime may be inferred when a person enters or remains unlawfully. State v. Cantu, 156 Wn.2d 819, 826, 132 P.3d 725 (2006); see State v. Bishop, 90 Wn.2d 185, 189, 580 P.2d 259 (1978) ("noncriminal reasons for unlawfully entering a dwelling are few").
RCW 9A.52.040 defines the permissible inference of criminal intent as follows:
In any prosecution for burglary, any person who enters or remains unlawfully in a building may be inferred to have acted with intent to commit a crime against a person or property therein, unless such entering or remaining shall be explained by evidence satisfactory to the trier of fact to have been made without such criminal intent.
A permissive inference is constitutionally impermissible only when "`there is no rational way the trier could make the connection permitted by the inference.'" State v. Grayson, 48 Wn. App. 667, 670, 739 P.2d 1206 (1987) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Johnson, 100 Wn.2d 607, 616, 674 P.2d 145 (1983), overruled on other grounds by State v. Bergeron, 105 Wn.2d 1, 711 P.2d 1000 (1985)). Thus, for a trier of fact to draw inferences from proven facts, the inference must be "rationally related" to the proven facts. State v. Jeffries, 105 Wn.2d 398, 442, 717 P.2d 722 (1986). The State need only establish that criminal intent was "more likely than not." State v. Deal, 128 Wn.2d 693, 700, 911 P.2d 996 (1996) (citing State v. Brunson, 128 Wn.2d 98, 107, 905 P.2d 346 (1995)). The inference of criminal intent is "supported by common knowledge and experience." State v. Brunson, 76 Wn. App. 24, 27, 877 P.2d 1289 (1994), aff'd, 128 Wn.2d 98, 905 P.2d 346 (1995).
Little is required to support a finding of criminal intent once unlawful entry is established. See, e.g., State v. Couch, 44 Wn. App. 26, 720 P.2d 1387 (1986) (finding sufficient evidence to infer intent to commit a crime where the defendant entered surreptitiously and took flight upon discovery); Grayson, 48 Wn. App. 667 (allowing inference of intent to commit a crime where the defendant was aware the house was occupied by a person he did not know, he forced open the kitchen door, and fled upon being discovered); Bergeron, 105 Wn.2d at 20 (holding defendant's conduct "plainly" indicated his criminal intent where he broke a basement window at 3:15 a.m. and fled).
In this case, there was sufficient evidence for the trial judge to rationally infer Mr. Fleury entered the house with intent to commit a crime. Mr. Fleury surreptitiously entered the house through a back door between 1:30 to 2:00 a.m., and attempted to flee upon discovery. See State v. Thompson, 69 Wn. App. 436, 444, 848 P.2d 1317 (1993) (attempting to flee is circumstantial evidence of guilt). The contents of file cabinets had been removed and placed on the floor, supporting the court's inference that Mr. Fleury was looking for something of value to steal. Finally, by using the Barnard home to sleep, Mr. Fleury received some value for the use of the space. See State v. Kolisynk, 49 Wn. App. 890, 893-94, 746 P.2d 1224 (1987) (holding unauthorized use of facilities and utilities is sufficient to establish intent element of burglary). From these facts, we can infer intent to commit a crime in the home.
CONCLUSION
Because we conclude that sufficient evidence supports the residential burglary conviction, we affirm.
A majority of the panel has determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040.
BROWN, J. and KULIK, J., concur.