Opinion
A20-0345
05-10-2021
State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Adam John Flategraff, Appellant.
Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Dan McIntosh, Steele County Attorney, Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn . R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c). Affirmed
Worke, Judge Steele County District Court
File No. 74-CR-17-1736 Keith Ellison, Attorney General, Peter Magnuson, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and Dan McIntosh, Steele County Attorney, Owatonna, Minnesota (for respondent) Cathryn Middlebrook, Chief Appellate Public Defender, Julie Loftus Nelson, Assistant Public Defender, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)
NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION
WORKE, Judge
Appellant challenges his conviction for criminal vehicular operation, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by allowing a state trooper to testify as an expert witness. We affirm.
FACTS
The state charged appellant Adam John Flategraff with multiple counts of criminal vehicular operation and reckless driving after he crashed his semi-truck into a vehicle and created a chain reaction of crashing vehicles. The vehicles' occupants were transported to hospitals for injuries. One driver was airlifted from the scene with a significant head injury.
Following the accident, Flategraff gave a statement to law enforcement. He stated that visibility was good that day, but traffic conditions on Interstate 35 south were "spotty." Ice on the road was thicker the farther south he drove, and by Owatonna, the road was covered in ice. Flategraff was traveling approximately 40-45 miles per hour. He glanced at his GPS and then was startled by a "boom, boom, boom." Flategraff did not react and did not know why traffic was stopped. No other factor contributed to Flategraff's inaction—he was not under the influence and he was not tired.
At pretrial, Flategraff moved to prohibit Sergeant Kelley McGraw, who prepared the crash-reconstruction report, from testifying as an expert in heavy-truck accident reconstruction. During a hearing on the motion, Sergeant McGraw testified that he held himself out as an expert in crash reconstruction. He described his training, certification, and many years serving as a reconstructionist. Sergeant McGraw also testified about his training in heavy-truck accident reconstruction. He explained differences between motor vehicles and heavy trucks and how he accounted for those differences in his reconstruction. The district court denied Flategraff's motion, finding that Sergeant McGraw qualified as an expert under Minn. R. Evid. 702.
The accident victims testified at Flategraff's jury trial. They described the day of the accident as clear and sunny. Near Owatonna, the interstate was "treacherous" due to snow and ice. South of Owatonna, traffic stopped due to a separate incident. The accident victims noticed traffic slowing, saw a long line of cars with brake lights, and stopped safely.
T.Y. testified that after he stopped, his vehicle was hit from behind and "got mauled." T.Y.'s vehicle hit the vehicle in front of him, so the front of his vehicle was also damaged. T.Y. had lacerations behind his ear and bruising on his right foot. M.T. testified that her vehicle was hit from behind and pushed into the vehicle in front of her. She suffered a minor brain injury, cervical spine and lower-back issues, and post-concussive syndrome. D.S. testified that he heard a collision, looked in his rearview mirror, and saw the vehicle behind him strike him. D.S. suffered neck pain.
J.B. testified that her vehicle was pushed into a semi-truck in front of her, and a car skidded up beside her and hit her passenger side. J.B. suffered whiplash, a headache, and a cut on her chin. K.W. testified that her husband, N.W., was driving. K.W. was knocked unconscious when their vehicle was hit from behind; she suffered a fractured shoulder. N.W. testified that he remembered stopping, but has no memory of the accident. N.W. suffered fractured ribs, a fractured facial bone, a chip off of his spine, and a brain injury that caused him to be uncharacteristically angry for months.
Sergeant McGraw testified about his crash-reconstruction report. He testified that he reviewed information from officers at the scene, photographs, T.Y.'s vehicle (the other vehicles were unavailable to him), Flategraff's statement, witnesses' statements, and information on weather. Sergeant McGraw testified that Flategraff's "failure to drive like everybody else" that day caused the collision because everybody else appeared to have understood the road conditions, drove accordingly, saw the stopped traffic, and stopped. Flategraff did not testify.
The jury found Flategraff guilty of 21 charges: one count of criminal vehicular operation—great bodily harm; two counts of criminal vehicular operation—substantial bodily harm; six counts of criminal vehicular operation—bodily harm; one count of reckless driving—great bodily harm; five counts of reckless driving; and six counts of careless driving.
The district court sentenced Flategraff to concurrent sentences of 28 months in prison for his conviction of criminal vehicular operation—great bodily harm, and 17 months in prison for one conviction of criminal vehicular operation—substantial bodily harm. The district court stayed the sentences for five years and did not enter adjudications on the other offenses. This appeal followed.
DECISION
Flategraff argues that the district court abused its discretion by allowing Sergeant McGraw to testify as an expert in the field of heavy-truck accident reconstruction. This court reviews a district court's admission of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. State v. Ritt, 599 N.W.2d 802, 810 (Minn. 1999). If the district court abused its discretion, its admission of expert testimony is subject to a harmless-error analysis, requiring reversal only if the expert testimony substantially influenced the jury's decision. State v. Blanche, 696 N.W.2d 351, 372, 374 (Minn. 2005).
The district court determined that Sergeant McGraw satisfied the requirements of rule 702 to qualify as an expert witness.
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. The opinion must have foundational reliability.Minn. R. Evid. 702. Flategraff challenges the district court's conclusions on each of the three requirements.
Expert
Flategraff first argues that Sergeant McGraw is not an expert because he does not have experience in heavy-truck accidents. A witness qualifies as an expert based on "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." Id. District courts may allow a police officer to provide expert testimony about subjects that fall within their expertise. See State v. Thompson, 218 N.W.2d 760, 762 (Minn. 1974) (stating that police officer qualified as expert in fingerprint identification despite lack of formal training); State v. Valentine, 787 N.W.2d 630, 639 (Minn. App. 2010) (stating that police officer qualified as expert in battered-woman syndrome by virtue of law-enforcement experience, role as a probation officer, training in domestic-violence issues, and education), review denied (Minn. Nov. 16, 2010); State v. Carillo, 623 N.W.2d 922, 926-27 (Minn. App. 2001) (stating that police officer qualified as expert based on familiarity with certain criminal gangs), review denied (Minn. June 19, 2001); State v. Schaffer, 378 N.W.2d 115, 116 (Minn. App. 1985) (stating that trooper did not need certificate as an accident-reconstruction expert to give opinion).
The district court found that Sergeant McGraw qualified as an expert because he has been certified as an accident reconstructionist for 17 years, served as such in approximately 300 cases, trained in heavy-vehicle accident reconstruction, and received training in electronic data retrieval. The record supports the district court's determination.
In December 2002, Sergeant McGraw received certification after his work was evaluated, and he was determined to be knowledgeable in the field. He is a member of the International Association of Accident Reconstruction Specialists, is the senior reconstructionist in the district, coordinates regional training, and has trained troopers, police officers, and deputies in crash reconstruction. Sergeant McGraw has completed approximately 300 reconstructions, and although he has not testified as an expert, he has testified as a reconstructionist approximately eight times.
In 2010, Sergeant McGraw attended a conference that discussed heavy-truck data recorders. In 2015, he took a 40-hour course on heavy-truck accidents, which covered acceleration tests, brake tests, dynamics of crashes, and speed calculation.
Sergeant McGraw testified that he understands the differences between motor vehicles and heavy trucks, and he accounts for those differences in his work. For example, he explained differences between air brakes and hydraulic brakes, and the dynamics of an articulated vehicle versus a passenger vehicle. Sergeant McGraw's "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education" supports the district court's conclusion that he is an expert in the field of heavy-truck accident reconstruction. See Minn. R. Evid. 702.
Foundational reliability
Flategraff next argues that Sergeant McGraw's testimony had no foundational reliability because it is unclear as to what methodology Sergeant McGraw used to reach the conclusion that Flategraff's inattentiveness caused the crash. Flategraff also claims that Sergeant McGraw had no expert familiarity with the facts because he did not go to the accident site.
"[A]n essential element of reliability" is "expert familiarity with the facts of a case." Kedrowski v. Lycoming Engines, 933 N.W.2d 45, 56 (Minn. 2019) (quotation omitted). An expert's opinion need rely only on "enough facts to form a reasonable opinion that is not based on speculation or conjecture." Gianotti v. Indep. Sch. Dist. 152, 889 N.W.2d 796, 802 (Minn. 2017).
The district court found that Sergeant McGraw's opinion had sufficient foundational reliability because it was based on more than vague theorizing or unsupported speculation. The record supports the district court's determination.
Sergeant McGraw considered a substantial amount of information to create a 19-page report. He reviewed the totality of factors, including: weather, road conditions, T.Y.'s vehicle, Flategraff's statement, witnesses' statements, photographs, and reports from officers who were at the scene. Sergeant McGraw also relied on work prepared by other individuals. For example, although Sergeant McGraw testified that he knows how to read electronic control module (ECM) data, he is not trained to analyze it or perform calculations; instead, he read the ECM download that was imaged for him by a mechanic. See Minn. R. Evid. 703 cmt. (stating that expert "opinion [may] be based on data or facts presented to the witness prior to trial").
An ECM is the embedded system used to control the functions of electrical systems contained within a vehicle.
Sergeant McGraw testified that he reviewed the ECM data to identify any anomalies that would be inconsistent with the other accident information. Although the ECM data fit with Sergeant McGraw's conclusion that Flategraff's driving conduct caused the accident, he did not need it in his final analysis because Flategraff admitted to his speed and lack of awareness, and an eyewitness reported that Flategraff did not brake. The district court appropriately determined that Sergeant McGraw's opinion had foundational reliability.
Helpful to the fact-finder
Finally, Flategraff argues that Sergeant McGraw's testimony was not helpful to the jury because he concluded that Flategraff should have stopped when everyone else stopped, and a jury could figure this out on its own.
Expert testimony is helpful to the jury if it will "add precision or depth to the jury's ability to reach conclusions." State v. Ferguson, 804 N.W.2d 586, 604 (Minn. 2011) (quotation omitted); see also Carillo, 623 N.W.2d at 926 (stating that expert testimony must "assist the jury in resolving factual questions presented"). Expert testimony is not helpful if the testimony is within the knowledge and experience of a jury. State v. Sontoya, 788 N.W.2d 868, 872 (Minn. 2010). Thus, expert testimony is inadmissible if "the jury is in as good a position to reach a decision as the expert." Id. (quotation omitted).
Flategraff asserts that his case is similar to Dunshee v. Douglas, in which the district court did not allow an engineer to testify as an accident reconstructionist. 255 N.W.2d 42, 47 (Minn. 1977). In Dunshee, the expert would have testified that there was no collision between two vehicles relying on "Newton's Laws regarding the conservation of energy, the importance of elasticity and elastic limits in a collision between two bodies, and the mathematical basis or method to be used to determine the length of a side of a triangle." Id. at 48. The court noted that the expert did not consider anything more than photographs and blueprints, and the evidence at trial included "the observations of a qualified investigating officer." Id. Flategraff argues that Sergeant McGraw similarly relied only on second-hand material.
The district court concluded that Sergeant McGraw's testimony would be helpful to the jury because accident-reconstruction practices fall outside the ordinary knowledge of laypersons. We agree. Sergeant McGraw considered photographs, a crashed vehicle, police officer reports, statements, weather, road conditions, and electronic vehicle data. He applied his knowledge as a reconstructionist to all of this information to consider all possible reasons for the accident before concluding that Flategraff's failure to drive like everyone else on the road that day caused the collision. The district court appropriately concluded that Sergeant McGraw's expert testimony was helpful to the jury. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Sergeant McGraw's expert testimony, we need not review for harmless error.
Affirmed.