Opinion
Case No. 20010241-CA.
Filed November 7, 2002. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Third District, Silver Summit Department, The Honorable Robert K. Hilder.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Marian Decker, Salt Lake City, for Appellant.
Richard P. Mauro, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Bench, Orme, and Thorne.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
In State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 20 P.3d 300, our supreme court stated, "at both the arrest warrant and the preliminary hearing stages, the prosecution must present sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed and that the defendant committed it." Id. at ¶ 16. Additionally, "`[t]he magistrate must view all evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution and must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the prosecution.'" Id. at ¶ 10 (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Despite this very lenient standard at the preliminary hearing stage, "`[t]he magistrate's role in this process, while limited, is not that of a rubber stamp for the prosecution
. . . . Even with this limited role, the magistrate must attempt to ensure that all `groundless and improvident prosecutions' are ferreted out no later than the preliminary hearing.'" Id. (quoting State v. Hester, 2000 UT App 159,¶ 7, 3 P.3d 725) (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
At the preliminary hearing, the State presented evidence that Defendant occupied the home where meth-lab equipment, stolen four-wheelers, and drug paraphernalia were stored. Evidence showed that Defendant had given codefendant Hoppe permission to store the four-wheelers, later identified as stolen, inside the garage. Defendant had, on at least one occasion, ridden the four-wheelers "around the neighborhood." Later, Defendant authorized Hoppe to also store "camping equipment" in the garage.
Even when "[v]iewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the facts presented at the preliminary hearing were [not] sufficient to meet the reasonable belief standard." Id. at ¶ 19. There is nothing in the evidence to connect Defendant to the crimes except for his occupancy in the home and the permission he granted Hoppe to store goods in the garage. Without something more, these facts are insufficient to establish a nexus between Defendant and the alleged crimes. See, e.g., State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79,¶¶ 15-16, 985 P.2d 911.
Clark specifically states that "`the magistrate must attempt to ensure that all "groundless and improvident prosecutions" are ferreted out no later than the preliminary hearing.'" Clark, 2001 UT 9 at ¶ 10 (citation omitted). From this language, it is clear that the supreme court preserved the gate-keeping function of a magistrate. See id. The magistrate in this case properly quashed the bindover because the State failed to show that Defendant intentionally engaged in criminal activity.
We therefore affirm.
WE CONCUR: Gregory K. Orme, Judge, and William A. Thorne Jr., Judge.