Opinion
No. 1-651 / 00-1844.
Filed February 6, 2002.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, ARTIS REIS, Judge.
Daniel Fisher appeals the district court's order convicting him of commercial bribery in violation of Iowa Code section 722.10 (2001) and sentencing him to a term of incarceration not to exceed five years. REVERSED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Martha J. Lucey, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, John P. Sarcone, County Attorney, and Susan Cox, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by SACKETT, C.J., and ZIMMER and VAITHESWARAN, JJ.
Defendant appellant Daniel Fisher appeals the judgment and sentence following a jury trial in which he was found guilty of commercial bribery in violation of Iowa Code section 722.10 (1999). Defendant claims on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion for acquittal because the State had not presented sufficient evidence that defendant's conduct fell under section 722.10 to sustain a conviction by the jury; that the court erred in denying defendant's request that it include a jury instruction defining "business transactions"; and that the district court abused its discretion in the imposition of a consecutive sentence. We find that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to sustain the jury verdict convicting defendant of commercial bribery under section 722.10. Accordingly, we reverse.
At the time of the incident leading to the commercial bribery charge and conviction, defendant was an employee of Eagle Iron Works. On March 8, 2000 defendant was in the locker room at work with Roy Brewer, a supervisor at Eagle Iron Works who had worked "side-by-side" with defendant for about four months before becoming supervisor. Defendant approached Brewer and asked him if he would terminate the employment of Robert Thompson, a recently-hired employee whom defendant apparently did not get along with. When Brewer did not agree to terminate Thompson, defendant offered him fifty dollars to do it. Defendant did not tender any money with the offer. Brewer again refused to terminate Thompson. Defendant then warned Brewer that something would probably happen that would get both defendant and Thompson fired. Brewer later reported the incident.
Section 722.10 of the Iowa Code provides, in part, that
It is unlawful for a person to offer or deliver directly or indirectly for the personal benefit of an employee acting on behalf of the employee's employer in a business transaction or course of transactions with the person a gratuity in consideration of an act or omission which the person has reason to know is in conflict with the employment relation and duties of the employee to the employer.
The State argues, and the jury found, that defendant violated this code provision by offering his supervisor money to terminate Brewer's employment at Eagle Iron Works. Defendant's first claim on appeal disputes the sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury's finding him in violation of this section.
We review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence for errors at law. State v. Thomas, 561 N.W.2d 37, 39 (Iowa 1997); Iowa R. App. P. 4. The jury's findings of guilt are binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1998). Substantial evidence is such evidence as would convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. In deciding if there is substantial evidence, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, but we consider all the evidence presented at trial rather than just the evidence which supports the verdict. State v. Torres, 495 N.W.2d 678, 681 (Iowa 1993). The State bears the burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the crime charged. State v. McMullin, 421 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Iowa 1988); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 1073, 25 L.Ed.2d 368, 375 (1970).
In contesting the applicability of this section, defendant first argues that his offering Brewer a gratuity to terminate Thompson was not a "business transaction," nor did it occur in the course of "business transactions." The State responds that in fact defendant's actions did fall under the statutory language requiring involvement in a business transaction in that (1) he was offering money to Brewer in consideration for Brewer's action, and (2) both he and Brewer were on the clock and officially working for Eagle Iron Works at the time defendant made the offer.
In determining the sufficiency of the evidence, we note that the only context in which section 722.10 (or similar commercial bribery statutes, including its forerunner, Iowa Code section 741.1 (1977)) has been applied is in situations in which the offered gratuity is ultimately in the pecuniary or professional interest of the offering party; that is, the offeror's interest in the transaction can be defined ultimately in material terms. See State v. Prybil, 211 N.W.2d 308, 311 (Iowa 1973). American Distilling Company v. Wisconsin Liquor Co., 104 F.2d 582, 585 (7th Cir. 1939).
Further, dictionary definitions similarly indicate that "business," defined as "one's work occupation or profession," or "employment, occupation, profession or commercial activity engaged in for gain or livelihood," revolves around the notion that the individual engaging in it is seeking to advance his pecuniary or professional interest. See Webster's New World Dictionary 192(2d. college ed. 1974); Black's Law Dictionary 136(6th ed. 1991).
With this in mind, we turn to the record to determine whether the State offered substantial evidence to allow a jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that "business," as it is commonly or has been previously defined in the law, was involved here. Mr. Brewer testified that defendant was involved in a "business" transaction because defendant and he were "on the clock" and because defendant was "offering [him] . . . money to do something. . . ." This testimony, however, was contradicted by Mr. Brewer's own earlier testimony when he stated that the two of them were not involved in a commercial or business transaction. The record shows that the attorney for the State made some statements regarding contract law, that he reminded the jury defendant was on the clock when he made the offer, and that he stated to the jury that "commercial" bribery meant that the bribery "happened at the workplace" without any reasoning to support that statement.
We find this evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was involved in "business" as it is generally defined and as it has been defined in cases of commercial bribery. The facts of the case show defendant offered his supervisor fifty dollars to have a co-worker removed from the work environment. Other than that, the defendant did not stand to gain from his fifty-dollar offer.
Authority from other jurisdictions would seem to support our conclusion that the facts of this case are not covered by section 722.10. In determining, in Prybil, the meaning of section 741.1, which was the then-applicable code section on commercial bribery, the Iowa Supreme Court consulted other states' analyses of similar statutes. In People v. Davis, 33 N.Y. Crim. 460, 160 N.Y.S. 769, 776 (1915), the court found the purpose behind a New York commercial bribery statute was to make illegal that conduct which could be construed as a betrayal by a servant of his master, prejudicing his master's interests. In State v. Aldridge, 25 Conn. Sup. 257, 268, 202 A.2d 508, 514 (Super.Ct. 1964), the court explained the intention of the commercial bribery statute was to prohibit an agent with authority to transact business on behalf of his principal from accepting a gratuity from the person with whom he was transacting business for the principal. See Prybil, 211 N.W.2d at 311. The supreme court also examined in Prybil the interpretation of federal law 18 U.S.C. § 201(f) and (g) prohibiting such transactions and concluded that section 741.1 had similar scope. Id. at 132. In United States v. Irwin, 354 F.2d 192, 196 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied 383 U.S. 967, 86 S.Ct. 1272, 16 L.Ed.2d 308, the court found the evil in these sorts of transactions was the subtle (or overt) preferences offerors of gratuities would receive and the resulting impartiality of the administration of law which would occur as a consequence of such preferences.
In contrast with the above cases, defendant's offer did not necessarily implicate the integrity of the master-servant relationship in this case. Further, he clearly was not dealing with Eagle Iron Works in a separate transaction and trying to facilitate that transaction with a separate offer, nor was he trying to curry favor with Eagle Iron through his dealings with Brewer. The facts of this case simply do not align with previous findings of commercial bribery. Accordingly, we reverse the verdict against defendant as unsupported by substantial evidence. Having so decided, we do not address defendant's other claims on appeal.
REVERSED.