Opinion
No. 37154-5-II.
January 21, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Clark County, No. 07-1-01818-2, John F. Nichols, J., entered December 20, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Houghton, J., concurred in by Bridgewater and Armstrong, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
After a jury found Timothy Fisher guilty of two counts of second degree malicious mischief, he appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in admitting his confessions because the State failed to establish the corpus delicti of the crimes. Because the State established the corpus delicti of the crimes, we affirm.
A commissioner of this court initially considered Fisher's appeal as a motion on the merits, under RAP 18.14, but then referred it to a panel of judges.
FACTS
On October 12, 2007, around 9:00 p.m., Officer Lisa Ammerman responded to a call at Walgreen's in Vancouver about a possible malicious mischief. When she arrived, she recognized Fisher from an earlier contact and approached him. Without any questioning or prompting from the officer, Fisher stated, "`I damaged this one. Now take me to jail.'" Report of Proceedings (RP) at 67. Fisher stated that he had thrown a rock at a vehicle and pointed out a 1998 Honda Accord to Ammerman. He also informed Ammerman that the rock he used was in the parking lot.
Inspecting the vehicle, Ammerman discovered a dent in the driver's side door with a large scratch that went all the way through the paint. She also found a large rock about 10 feet away from the vehicle. Because Ammerman could not contact the owner of the vehicle, she did not arrest Fisher at that time. Ammerman did leave her card on the vehicle and William Huggins, the owner's son, later contacted her.
The next day, Officer Tina Smith responded to a call at the same Walgreen's from a person claiming they had thrown a rock at something. Upon arrival she was directed to Fisher, who was standing outside the store. Smith asked Fisher if he was the one involved, and he responded affirmatively. She also asked if he purposefully threw the rock at the car, and he again responded affirmatively. The victim, Victoria Chamberlain, pointed out the vehicle to Smith, who inspected it. Smith observed a dent and a four-inch scratch down to the metal. She also found a large rock in the general area of the vehicle.
The State charged Fisher with two counts of second degree malicious mischief. Before trial, he moved in limine to exclude evidence of his confessions, arguing that the State had not established the corpus delicti of the crimes. The trial court denied the motion.
Fisher also objected to each reference to his incriminating statements based on the corpus delicti rule, and the trial court eventually granted him a standing objection.
At trial, both Huggins and Chamberlain testified that their vehicles did not have any damage before parking their cars. Virginia Schmunk, the office manager at Cadell's Cascade Auto Body, where both victims took their vehicles for repairs, testified that the repairs to each vehicle cost more than $250.
The jury convicted Fisher of both counts of second degree malicious mischief. He appeals.
ANALYSIS
Fisher argues that the trial court erred in admitting his confessions because the State had not established the corpus delicti of the crimes. Under the corpus delicti rule, a trial court may not admit a defendant's extrajudicial confession unless there is independent prima facie proof that someone has committed the crime charged. State v. Corbelli, 56 Wn. App. 921, 924, 788 P.2d 1081 (1989). A prima facie showing requires evidence of sufficient circumstances supporting a logical and reasonable inference that the charged crime occurred. City of Bremerton v. Corbett, 106 Wn.2d 569, 578-79, 723 P.2d 1135 (1986). In determining whether there is sufficient corpus delicti evidence, we assume the truth of the State's evidence and all reasonable inferences from it in a light most favorable to the State. State v. Aten, 130 Wn.2d 640, 658, 927 P.2d 210 (1996).
Both victims testified that when they parked their vehicles, they did not have any damage. Both vehicles had dents and scratches that could have been caused by someone throwing a rock at them. The responding officers found a large rock near each vehicle. The repair costs for both vehicles exceeded $250 each. To commit second degree malicious mischief, someone must cause "physical damage to the property of another in an amount exceeding two hundred fifty dollars." RCW 9A.48.080(1)(a). The State presented prima facie evidence that someone committed second degree malicious mischief against Huggins's and Chamberlain's vehicles.
Fisher asserts that because no one saw him damage the vehicles or saw a criminal act causing the damage, there is no proof of a criminal act. But the corpus delicti rule generally does not require independent proof of criminal intent. State v. C.M.C., 110 Wn. App. 285, 288, 40 P.3d 690 (2002). Instead, the rule refers only to the objective proof that a crime was committed. C.M.C., 110 Wn. App. at 288. Proof of who committed a crime is also not part of the corpus delicti rule. C.M.C., 110 Wn. App. at 288; State v. Flowers, 99 Wn. App. 57, 60, 991 P.2d 1206 (2000). Thus, the State did not have to provide independent evidence that Fisher threw the rocks or that he acted with criminal intent. Sufficient independent evidence demonstrates that someone committed the crimes charged. The trial court did not err in admitting Fisher's confessions.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
BRIDGEWATER, J and ARMSTRONG, J. Concur.