Summary
finding that a defendant's disappointment in not having a plea agreement does not constitute detrimental reliance
Summary of this case from Weber v. StateOpinion
ID No. 0602023552.
August 14, 2006.
Upon Motion of Defendant to Compel Specific Performance of Plea Agreement — DENIED.
Brian J. Robertson, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General Department of Justice, Wilmington, DE.
Timothy J. We iler, Esquire, Assistant Public Defender, Public Defender's Office, Wilmington, DE.
Dear Counsel:
Defendant Patrick Everett has moved this Court for enforcement of a plea agreement. He has been indicted for possession of a deadly weapon by a person prohibited, possession of ammunition by a person prohibited, possession of weapon with a removed, obliterated or altered serial number and offensive touching.
Background
Everett was indicted on May 1, 2006. He had a first case review on June 19, 2006. Prior to that, however, he filed a motion to suppress. That was on May 3rd. On May 19th, in their submissions within this motion, he and the State inform the Court, that the prosecutor and his counsel discussed a plea. The State reports there was a brief discussion about the suppression motion and that the prosecutor asked if the defendant would be willing to plead to offensive touching. Defense counsel thought Everett would.
Defense counsel met with Everett later on the 19th. Everett told counsel he would accept that offer. Counsel then scheduled the matter for a plea by appointment and sent an e-mail to the Court and prosecutor to arrange it. But the prosecutor requested that it not be scheduled and indicated the State would file a response to the motion to suppress. The State did so and the motion denied after a hearing on June 23rd.
Just before that hearing, Everett appeared at his first case review on the 19th. On that occasion the State's written plea offer was to plead guilty to possession of a firearm by a person prohibited and offensive touching. The State's sentencing recommendation was for a 42 month level 5 sentence. Everett rejected the offer and has now filed this motion for enforcement of the earlier offer of offensive touching only. Final case review is set for August 28th.
If convicted of possession of a deadly weapon by person prohibited, Everett would have to receive a minimum, non-suspendable sentence of 36 months. He has a prior felony classified as violent, trafficking, and that conviction was within ten years of this weapons charge. 11. Del. C. § 1448(e)(2).
Discussion
The factual recitation above is not disputed and taken from Everett's motion and the State's response. The Court, therefore, sees no reason for a hearing to cover the factual context of this case.
Plea agreements are governed by contract principles. Those principles include the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. There is no indication or showing whatsoever of any breach of that covenant in this case. Arguably, the prosecutor's remark to defense counsel, under contract principles was not even an offer.
Washington v. State, 844 A.2d 293, 296 (Del. 2004).
Cole v. State, 2005 WL 2805562 (Del.Super.), at *5.
But the Court need not decide this matter on that basis because a more fundamental principle relating to plea negotiations and offers is implicated:
We hold that the State may withdraw from a plea bargain agreement at any time prior to, but not after, the actual entry of the guilty plea by the defendant or other action by him constituting detrimental reliance upon the agreem ent.
* * * * * *
By entering a guilty plea under a plea agreement, a defendant detrimentally relies on the promises of a prosecutor and often relinquishes substantial constitutional rights, including the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination. Upon such reliance, the State may not withdraw from a plea and must uphold its end of the relied-up on bargain during sentencing before the trial court.Zebroski involved a plea which had been entered but conditions attached to it were not yet fulfilled. A breach of those conditions could lead to the State requesting that the plea agreement be vacated. Shields, however, is dispositive. A formal — not a verbal casual one as here — had been tendered to plead to second degree murder. The defendant, charged with capital murder, accepted that offer and it was documented. But the State withdrew it before the plea could be entered. The defendant could not show what detrimental reliance he had taken as a result of the plea offer which was made. He went to trial and was convicted of first degree of murder.
Shields v. State, 374 A.2d 816, 820 (Del. 1977).
Zebroski v. State, 715 A.2d 75, 80 (Del. 1998).
Id.
Since Shields was unable to show detrimental reliance, the plea offer was not enforceable. Here, too, Everett cannot show nor had he suggested or implied detrimental reliance on the offer to plead to offensive touching. He can show disappointed hopes in not having a plea to a misdemeanor but that is not detrimental reliance.
The final case review will proceed as planned on August 28th and if not resolved then, the matter will proceed to trial on September 6th.
Conclusion
Defendant Patrick Everett's motion to compel specific performance of a plea agreement is DENIED for the reasons stated herein.