Opinion
No. 2021-KK-00630
05-08-2021
STATE of Louisiana v. John Joseph EDMOND, Jr. a/k/a John James Edmond, Jr. a/k/a John Edmond, Jr.
Writ application denied.
Hughes, J., would grant.
Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
Genovese, J., would grant and reinstate the trial court's ruling.
Griffin, J., would grant and reinstate the trial court's ruling and assigns reasons.
Crichton, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons.
I agree with the decision to deny this writ. I write separately to note that a district attorney has an awesome amount of power in our justice system, which encompasses the "entire charge and control of every criminal prosecution instituted or pending in his district," including the determination of "whom, when, and how he shall prosecute." La. C.Cr.P. art. 61. See State ex rel. Morgan v. State , 15-100 (La. 10/19/16), 217 So. 3d 266 (Crichton, J., additionally concurring). As such, a prosecutor's responsibility is as "a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate." Model Rules of Prof'l Conduct R. 3.8 cmt[1] (Am. Bar. Ass'n 1983). See State v. Tate , 185 La. 1006, 171 So. 108, 112 (1936) (noting that the district attorney "represents the State, and the State demands no victims. It seeks justice only, equal and impartial justice. ...").
In my view, the prosecutor's flippant and cavalier actions implicate several of the guidelines set forth in the Code of Professionalism. La. Sup. Ct. Rules Part G, sec. 11 ("We will speak and write civilly and respectfully in all communications with the court."; "We will not engage in any conduct that brings disorder or disruption to the courtroom."). In light of these violations, and given both the power and responsibility that a prosecutor wields, the prosecutor should be cautioned for undermining the seriousness of this criminal trial. See , e.g. , In re: Napoli , 17-0503 (La. 5/19/17), 219 So. 3d 1063 (Crichton, J., additionally concurring) (noting that the criminal justice system "should be less burdened by unprofessional actors and more supported by lawyers who uphold their oath to serve the people of Louisiana").
GRIFFIN, J., would grant and assigns reasons.
The contemporaneous objection rule of La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A) serves two purposes: 1) to put the trial court on notice of the alleged irregularity or error, so that the trial court can cure the error; and 2) to prevent a party from gambling to a favorable outcome and then appealing on errors that could have been addressed by an objection if the outcome is not as hoped. State v. Lanclos , 07-0082, p. 6 (La. 4/8/08), 980 So.2d 643, 648. By the plain language of La. C.Cr.P. art. 841(A), the rule only applies "after verdict." Because there has been no verdict, the defendant has not gained the benefit of a gamble for a favorable outcome.
The trial court determined the State's "chocolate cake" hypothetical, presented during voir dire , too closely mirrored its theory of the case and evidence adduced at the preliminary examination thus constituted a "legal defect in the proceedings which would make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of law." La. C.Cr.P. 775(3) ; see also State v. Holliday, 17-1921, p. 34 (La. 1/29/20), ––– So.3d ––––, 2020 WL 500475, cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 141 S.Ct. 1271, 209 L.Ed.2d 10 (2021). The trial court further determined this defect could not be cured by mere admonition.
The determination as to whether a mistrial should be granted is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. State v. Smith , 433 So.2d 688, 696 (La. 1983). Finding no such abuse of discretion, I would reverse the court of appeal and reinstate the trial court's declaration of a mistrial. See State v. Reimonenq, 19-0367 (La. 10/22/19), 286 So.3d 412, 421 (Hughes, J., concurring) ("[j]urors are the most precious resource of the legal system" whose "time and effort are not to be trifled with").