Opinion
No. MV08-225149
May 18, 2009
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The court finds the following facts:
Trooper Kevin Connolly, assigned to Troop B, was dispatched to a motor vehicle accident on February 18, 2008, in the vicinity of Water Street in Falls Village.
Upon arrival at the scene, and in the performance of a "scene assessment" (transcript p. 9), Trooper Connolly observed a mini-van hung up on a guardrail. There were a number of fire and emergency vehicle and personnel present. The ambulance personnel had advised the Trooper that the driver of the mini-van appeared intoxicated and was claiming that he wanted to commit suicide. Trooper Connolly was directed into the ambulance where an individual subsequently identified as the defendant was present, along with at least two EMS personnel.
The Trooper spoke with the defendant trying to ascertain what had happened. The defendant admitted to being the driver of the mini-van, but did not know what happened to cause the accident. Connolly asked the defendant for identification, noticing that the defendant had slow speed, was fumbling in his wallet for his license and the inability to stand straight. When the Trooper asked whether the defendant had anything to drink, the defendant replied in the affirmative. The defendant also repeatedly threatened to harm himself with a gun and requested that medical personnel overdose him.
As Trooper Connolly started to bring the defendant outside of the ambulance to start the "field sobriety" tests, dispatch advised the Trooper to postpone the tests and initiate an emergency committal form. The defendant was then placed back in the ambulance by EMS personnel and taken to the hospital. The Trooper did not go in the ambulance with the defendant and did not question defendant further. The defendant was placed in the ambulance without incident. The defendant was not placed under arrest; the Trooper testified he was free to leave at any time. Trooper Connolly further testified that he began the emergency committal form because of a concern for defendant's well-being, believing the defendant had suicidal ideations.
Decision
The defendant challenges the use of oral statements, admissions and confessions made by the defendant to Trooper Connolly as a product of illegal custodial interrogation in violation of Article 1, § 7, 8 of the Connecticut Constitution and the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
Defendant's brief and argument claim that the defendant was in custody without benefit of Miranda warnings during his entire contact with Trooper Connolly. The Defendant bears the initial burden of proof regarding the custodial interrogation.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) requires that a defendant be advised of certain constitutional rights before being questioned by police. Two conditions must be present for the Miranda warnings to apply. First, the defendant must be "in custody" and second, the defendant must have been subjected to police interrogation. State v. DesLaurier, 230 Conn. 572, 576 (1994). Case law dictates that police custody situations are not defined simply by physical restraints or a formal notification by police that an individual is "under arrest." Courts are required to use an objective person test: whether a reasonable man in that situation would have believed he was not free to leave. State v. Williams, 227 Conn. 101 (1993), State v. Oquendo, 223 Conn. 635 (1992), State v. DesLaurier, 230 Conn. 572 (1994). Not all contact with the police results in a custodial situation that requires a Miranda warning; police may ask routine administrative type of questions that are not designed to elicit incriminating evidence without providing a Miranda advisement. State v. Dixon, 25 Conn.App. 3 (1991), State v. Szabo, 166 Conn. 289 (1974). The Miranda court distinguished in-custody police interrogation in a police-dominated atmosphere from routine on-scene investigatory information gathering. Szabo at 293 "General on-the-scene questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process is not affected by our holding . . . In such situations the compelling atmosphere inherent in the process of in-custody interrogation is not necessarily present." Miranda v. Arizona, supra at, 477, 478.
Applying the law to the present case, the court finds that the defendant was not in custody during the time of his contact with Trooper Connolly. When the trooper arrived on the scene, the defendant was seated in an ambulance along with EMS personnel. The only inquiry made of the defendant was consistent with routine type questions that would have been asked by a police officer assigned to an accident investigation. The trooper further testified regarding a valid concern for the defendant's mental health status. The defendant was never alone with the trooper, fire and ambulance personnel were present. The entirety of the contact between the defendant and the trooper occurred on a public street. The defendant was never placed under arrest; in fact, there were no physical restraints placed on the defendant at all. The only arguable restraint was for medical purposes during the ride to the hospital in the ambulance. This factual situation falls far short of the inherently coercive setting proscribed by Miranda.
The defendant further argued that information provided to Trooper Connolly by EMS personnel, i.e. that the defendant was intoxicated, affected the custodial situation. The defense argument was that the trooper "knew" he was dealing with an intoxicated driver and therefore should have provided Miranda warnings before questioning defendant. Again, case law does not support defendant's argument. In State v. Brown, 199 Conn. 47 (1985), the court emphasized that the concern is what the defendant believed, not the particular intent of the officer. "The subjective intention of the police officer . . . to possibly detain the defendant, had he attempted to leave, is irrelevant . . . A policeman's unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was in custody at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." Brown, supra at 54.
Accordingly the defendant's motion to suppress is denied.