Summary
In Dunham the Iowa Court of Appeals noted that, in the statute's text, the word "knowingly" comes before the word "acts.
Summary of this case from State v. JamesOpinion
No. 2-830 / 02-0251
Filed January 29, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Sioux County, James D. Scott, Judge.
Defendant appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon her convictions for two counts of child endangerment. REVERSED.
Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and Shellie Knipfer, Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kevin Cmelik, Assistant Attorney General, Mark J. Schouten, County Attorney, and Coleman McAllister, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Zimmer and Hecht, JJ.
Defendant Debra Dunham appeals from the judgment and sentence entered following her convictions for two counts of child endangerment in violation of Iowa Code section 726.6 (1999). She contends the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions. She also claims several of the trial court's evidentiary rulings were in error and alternatively claims her trial counsel was ineffective. We reverse.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings.
A jury could have found the following facts from the evidence presented at Debra Dunham's trial.
The defendant married Russell Dunham in 1998. Mr. Dunham had been married twice previously. He has twin sons, C.D. and J.D., from his first marriage. His first wife abandoned the twins. His second wife also left. The defendant adopted the boys after marrying Russell.
C.D. and J.D. have significant behavioral problems. Their father testified they have been diagnosed with Reactive Attachment Disorder and Oppositional Defiance Disorder stemming, in part, from their biological mother's abandonment of them. The boys have a lengthy history of disturbing behavior. When the boys become upset, they often act out by destroying property. They have caused extensive damage to several of the homes they have occupied. Among other things, the boys have broken out windows, damaged walls, urinated in their rooms, and destroyed their bedroom furniture.
When the Dunhams married, they lived in Colorado. While living there they sought counseling and therapy for C.D. and J.D. Based on the advice they received, the couple attempted to have the boys take responsibility for their actions. If their sons damaged the furniture in their rooms, the Dunhams removed the damaged property and did not replace it. The couple also had the boys take responsibility for their personal hygiene, including washing their own clothes and bedding. The couple believed that peer pressure would eventually prompt the boys to take better care of themselves. Colorado authorities recommended the boys be placed in voluntary foster care, but the defendant and her husband decided they wanted to work at keeping the family together.
In the summer of 2000, Debra and the boys came to Iowa to live. The boys were eleven at the time. From August 5 through November 6, 2000, Debra and her sons lived with Debra's uncle and his wife, Michael and Lisa Murchie, in a farmhouse near Sheldon, Iowa. Russell remained in Colorado where he was working. He visited his family each month.
J.D. and C.D. were each given their own bedroom in the Murchies' farmhouse. The rooms were sparsely furnished because of the boys' prior destructive behavior.
The boys were assigned many chores. If Debra believed they completed a chore unsatisfactorily, she would direct them to do the task over again. On one occasion, she instructed the boys to pull weeds by hand and did not allow them to wear gloves. On another occasion, C.D. became sunburned and Debra would not allow Lisa Murchie to apply sunburn spray because she believed that C.D. would not have become sunburned had he completed his chores in a timely fashion. Other punishment for the boys included spankings, writing sentences, being sent to their respective rooms, or standing in a corner.
On August 30, 2000, J.D. broke out the windows and the window frames in his room. He also damaged a closet wall leading to C.D.'s room. The outburst occurred after Debra punished him by sending him to his room and making him write sentences. On the same date, C.D. broke a window in his room. Lisa Murchie called the sheriff's office. Deputy Jerry Holtrop arrived and found Debra holding J.D. by the arm as he screamed and cried. She told the deputy that she was at her wit's end and wanted the authorities to take J.D. into custody. After J.D. calmed down, the deputy left him in Debra's care and told her he would contact the Department of Human Services (DHS). On August 31, Debra contacted DHS employee Don Vander Wel in regards to services available for her family. He informed her that DHS needed copies of the reports made to the human services department of Colorado to see what had been done there.
Debra called Vander Wel again on November 6, 2000 and told him the boys were out of control. That same day, Lisa Murchie spoke with Sioux County Sheriff Jamison Van Voorst. She expressed concern over the increased intensity of the confrontations between the boys and Debra.
Van Voorst and DHS worker Chris Callahan met with the boys and Debra. Although the boys appeared unkept and dirty, they appeared happy and friendly. The sheriff and Ms. Callahan observed broken windows and light fixtures in each of the boys' rooms as well as plaster missing from the walls. Both rooms smelled of urine. Ms. Callahan and the sheriff testified that the boys' bedrooms were cold and drafty because of the absence of glass in the windows. Each room had only a mattress, a pillow, and a sleeping bag.
The defendant agreed to place the boys in voluntary foster care. The boys were transported to the Crittenton Center in Sioux City. They were examined and had no physical injuries. While the boys were at the center, Debra was cooperative and worked toward reunification of the family. She showed Vander Wel the parenting handbook she was given in Colorado, which guided her parenting philosophy.
On December 26, 2000, the State filed a trial information charging the defendant with two counts of child endangerment. When trial was held in December of 2001, the Dunhams were living in Wyoming. The record reveals the boys began receiving counseling the day they arrived in Wyoming. They were eventually removed from their Wyoming home after they destroyed their bedrooms.
After the State presented its case, the defendant moved for judgment of acquittal. The motion was overruled. She renewed her motion at the conclusion of all the evidence. The court again overruled her motion. The jury returned verdicts of guilty on both counts of child endangerment. Following trial Debra moved for a new trial arguing the verdicts were not supported by substantial evidence. The motion was denied. The court sentenced Debra to a term not to exceed two years for each count. The sentences were suspended except for sixty days and were ordered to be served concurrently. Debra appeals. Because we find the issue dispositive, we first address the defendant's insufficiency of the evidence claim.
II. Scope of Review.
We review challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a guilty verdict for correction of legal error. State v. Heard, 636 N.W.2d 227, 229 (Iowa 2001); State v. Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d 493, 502 (Iowa 1997). We will uphold a verdict if substantial record evidence supports it. Mitchell, 568 N.W.2d at 502. Evidence is substantial if it would convince a rational fact-finder that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, including legitimate inferences and presumptions that may fairly and reasonably be deduced from the evidence in the record. Id. We consider all of the evidence in the record — not just the evidence that supports the verdict. Id. Evidence that merely raises suspicion, speculation, or conjecture is insufficient. State v. Kirchner, 600 N.W.2d 330, 334 (Iowa Ct.App. 1999).
III. Discussion.
Debra claims the evidence is insufficient to support her convictions for child endangerment. The district court instructed the jury the State had to prove that the defendant "[k]nowingly acted in a manner creating a substantial risk to [J.D.'s or C.D.'s] physical, mental or emotional health or safety." In Instruction number 14A, the trial court further informed the jury that, "For the defendant to know something means she had a conscious awareness that she was creating a substantial risk to [the children's] physical, mental, or emotional health or safety." We conclude Instruction 14A was an incorrect statement of the law.
The statute at issue here prohibits knowingly acting in a manner that creates a substantial risk to the child or minor's physical, mental, or emotional health or safety. See Iowa Code § 726.6(1)(a). The modifier "knowingly" in this construction modifies the word "act" rather than the verb "creates" or the consequence of harm. See State v. Heacock, 521 N.W.2d 707, 711 (Iowa 1994). Contrary to the court's instruction, the statute does not require the State to show that the defendant had a conscious awareness that her acts were creating a substantial risk of harm to the children. Id.
When a record was made regarding the court's instructions before the case was submitted to the jury, the State objected to Instruction 14A as being confusing on the issue of knowledge, but did not specify anything more. We consider only those objections to instructions a party previously raised with the district court. State v. Hepperle, 530 N.W.2d 735, 738 (Iowa 1995). A party objecting to the court's instruction must specify the subject and grounds of the objection. Id. A party's objection must be sufficiently specific to alert the district court to the basis for the complaint so that if there is an error the court can correct it before submitting the case to the jury. Id. The State's objection on grounds of confusion was not sufficient to alert the court that Instruction 14A contained language not included in section 726.6(1)(a). Accordingly, we conclude the State waived any error in regards to Instruction 14A. Because neither the State nor the defendant objected properly to the instruction, right or wrong, it became the law of the case. Hoskinson v. City of Iowa City, 621 N.W.2d 425, 430 (Iowa 2001); State v. Maghee, 573 N.W.2d 1, 8 (Iowa 1997); State v. Taggart, 430 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Iowa 1988).
On appeal the State concedes Instruction 14A was erroneous, but argues the evidence is still sufficient to support the verdicts. The State asserts the defendant's boot camp style of parenting exceeded that which is permissible and entered the realm of criminality. Upon careful review of the record, we reach a different conclusion. As instructed by the trial court, the State was required to prove not only that the defendant knowingly acted in a manner creating a substantial risk to her children, but that she had a conscious awareness she was subjecting the children to a substantial risk to their physical, mental, or emotional health or safety.
When viewed in the light most favorable to the State, the record supports the conclusion that the defendant's disciplinary actions were very harsh and that some of her parenting techniques were questionable. However, we conclude the evidence fell short of establishing the criminal offense of child endangerment as that offense was defined in the court's instructions.
In the context of this case, we find it unnecessary to decide whether the evidence was insufficient to prove either conviction for child endangerment if Instruction 14A had been given in a different form.
There is little if any evidence in the record which suggests that the defendant had a conscious awareness that she was subjecting her children to a substantial risk to their health or safety. On the other hand, there is ample evidence in the record which suggests Debra believed her actions were necessary to help these obviously maladjusted children. The defendant and her husband sought counseling for their children in Colorado before moving to Iowa. She believed her harsh parenting techniques were consistent with advice received from therapists in Colorado and were necessary to deal with the boys' abnormal behavior. She affirmatively sought assistance in addressing the boys' behavioral problems after she moved to Iowa. When DHS took the children into custody, social workers found the children in good health and without any injuries. A DHS worker testified Debra shared the parenting handbooks she received in Colorado with him and that she "believed she was doing the right thing."
We recognize that a reasonable argument can be made that some of the defendant's parenting techniques were questionable, whether recommended to her or not; however, we find the evidence insufficient to show that the defendant had a conscious awareness she was creating a substantial risk to the children's physical, mental, or emotional health or safety.
Under the law of this case as set forth in the trial court's instructions, we conclude the record lacks evidence sufficient to convict the defendant of either count of child endangerment. As a result of this conclusion, we find it unnecessary to address the defendant's other assignments of error. We reverse the defendant's convictions for child endangerment.