Opinion
No. 2008 KA 0002.
May 2, 2008. NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
APPEALED FROM THE 19TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF EAST BATON ROUGE, LOUISIANA TRIAL COURT NO. 09-02-0168 HONORABLE ANTHONY MARABELLA, JUDGE.
HON. DOUG MOREAU, DISTRICT ATTORNEY, LORI NUNN, STACY L. WRIGHT, ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEYS, BATON ROUGE, LA, ATTORNEYS FOR STATE OF LOUISIANA.
KATHERINE M. FRANKS, ABITA SPRINGS, LA, ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT-APPELLANT, SHAWN DRAKE.
SHAWN DRAKE, WINNSBORO, LA, IN PROPER PERSON, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
BEFORE: CARTER, C J., PETTIGREW, AND WELCH, JJ.
Defendant, Shawn Drake, was charged by grand jury indictment with second degree murder, a violation of La. R.S. 14:30.1 (Count One), and felon in possession of a firearm, a violation of La. R.S. 14:95.1 (Count Two). Defendant entered a plea of not guilty and was tried before a jury. As to Count One, the jury determined that defendant was guilty of the responsive offense of manslaughter, a violation of La. R.S. 14:31. As to Count Two, the jury determined that defendant was guilty as charged.
The State instituted habitual offender proceedings against defendant, seeking to have him adjudicated a second felony habitual offender. Following a hearing, the trial court found defendant to be a second felony habitual offender and sentenced defendant to a term of twenty years at hard labor for his conviction of manslaughter (Count One). The trial court also sentenced defendant to a term of ten years at hard labor without the benefit of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence, and a $1,000.00 fine for his conviction of felon in possession of a firearm (Count Two) to be served consecutive to his manslaughter sentence.
Defendant appeals, citing the following assignments of error:
1. The trial judge erred in not finding a pattern of racially motivated peremptory challenges by the prosecutor when the prosecutor utilized eight of his peremptory challenges to excise blacks from the jury and exercised cause challenges only against black venire members. The use of race as the criterion for the selection of a jury deprived Shawn Drake of a jury representative of the racial makeup of the metropolitan area where the offense took place and of his right to Equal Protection of law.
2. The trial judge erred in providing the [S]tate with cause challenges against black venire members during jury selection and absenting himself from the jury selection process during the exercise of peremptory challenges against persons in the third jury panel. The actions of the judge in providing an unrequested cause challenge to the prosecutor as well as determining that the selection process was race-neutral without the prosecutor being required to provide reasons for the exercise of the challenges was error that casts doubt on the integrity of the selection process in addition to providing the [S]tate with an extra challenge. The absence of the judge during the exercise of peremptory challenges gave the defense no opportunity to complain and left a defective record on appeal.
3. Defense counsel was ineffective in:
a. Failing to object after each African-American was removed from the jury by the prosecutor, noting specifically that the challenged persons' responses were no different from responses given by white venire members who were chosen for the jury.
b. Failing to object to the accumulation of challenges against black venire members and asking for a reseating of all challenged jurors.
c. Failing to object to the trial judge's suggestion made to the prosecutor regarding a challenge for cause he would grant if made.
d. Failing to object to the absence of the trial judge and the conducting of the second portion of the third round of jury selection without the judge's presence or without a contemporaneous recording.
Defendant filed a pro se brief raising the following assignments of error: 1. Defendant's adjudication as a second felony habitual offender was invalid, where it was based on a count dismissed from the prior bill of information; 2. The trial court failed to advise defendant of his rights under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1); and 3. The bill of information from defendant's prior conviction was not amended to show the offense to which defendant pled guilty on May 12, 1998.
FACTS
On May 29, 2002, Ashley Lee and her boyfriend, Trey Brown, had an argument at the Suburban Apartments in Baton Rouge that escalated into a fight regarding Lee's activities with another man. Following this incident, Lee's brother, Lionel Douglas, arrived at the Suburban Apartments, and knocked on the door of an apartment where defendant was visiting an acquaintance. Douglas and defendant left, but returned a short time later. When the two men returned, there were a good number of people milling about in a common area near the parking lot of the complex.
Tanisha Brown, the sister of Trey Brown, called to Lee from outside her first-floor apartment. Tanisha accused Lee of calling her brother (Douglas) to come over and fight Trey. According to Tanisha, Lee was standing on a second-floor balcony when she responded by cursing and threatening her. At that time, Douglas and Trenton Payne began arguing in the parking area. Defendant was with Douglas.
The verbal argument escalated into a physical confrontation involving defendant and Marcus Ghoram, who had accompanied Payne to the complex. Lee and her sister, Nina, were also seen having some involvement in this confrontation. At the same time, Douglas and Payne were also fighting each other.
Soon thereafter shots were fired. Witnesses saw defendant pointing a gun at the crowd. More shots were fired and Ghoram fell to the ground, while defendant fled. As a result of receiving a gunshot wound to his chest, Ghoram died. Defendant was subsequently charged with second degree murder.
Defendant did not testify at trial.
JURY COMPOSITION
In his first assignment of error, defendant argues the trial judge erred in not finding a pattern of racially motivated peremptory challenges when the prosecutor utilized eight of his twelve peremptory challenges to excise blacks from the jury and exercised cause challenges only against black venire members.
In brief, defendant fails to provide any argument regarding the propriety of the trial court's granting of cause challenges to the State, other than prospective juror Frankie James.
The propriety of striking prospective minority jurors with peremptory challenges was addressed in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986). The proper reviewing process for a Batson claim was recently described by the Supreme Court as follows:
A defendant's Batson challenge to a peremptory strike requires a three-step inquiry. First, the trial court must determine whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge on the basis of race. Second, if the showing is made, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to present a race-neutral explanation for striking the juror in question. Although the prosecutor must present a comprehensible reason, "[t]he second step of this process does not demand an explanation that is persuasive, or even plausible"; so long as the reason is not inherently discriminatory, it suffices. Third, the court must then determine whether the defendant has carried his burden of proving purposeful discrimination. This final step involves evaluating "the persuasiveness of the justification" proffered by the prosecutor, but "the ultimate burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts from, the opponent of the strike."
Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338, 126 S.Ct., 969, 974, 973-974, 163 L.Ed.2d 824 (2006) (citations omitted). A reviewing court owes the district judge's evaluations of discriminatory intent great deference and should not reverse them unless they are clearly erroneous. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 364, 111 S.Ct. 1859, 1868, 114 L.Ed.2d 395 (1991); Batson, 476 U.S. at 98, n. 21, 106 S.Ct. at 1724;see State v. Dunn, 2001-1635 pp. 7-8 (La. 11/1/02), 831 So.2d 862, 869.See also State v. Draughn, 2005-1825, pp. 20-21 (La. 1/17/07), 950 So.2d 583, 600, cert. denied, ___ U.S.___, 128 S.Ct. 537, 169 L.Ed.2d 377 (2007).
In the present case, the voir dire record shows that a total of forty-five people were questioned in the selection process. The court called three panels consisting of fourteen prospective jurors. Following the completion of the questioning of the third panel, only two seats and an alternate remained unfilled, so only three more prospective jurors were called and questioned. These final three jurors completed the jury panel and alternate.
The voir dire shows that the first panel of prospective jurors was composed of ten Caucasians and four African-Americans. The trial judge granted the State's challenges for cause against Harry Robinson and Larry Spears, two African-Americans. The State then exercised peremptory challenges against Charlene Butler (African-American), Robert Riley (Caucasian), and Shawanda Sanders (African-American). The defense counsel exercised peremptory challenges against Charlene Dean, Karen Russell, Presley Frederick, Deborah Fuller, and Leslie Graham, who were all Caucasians.
The prosecutor then made a reverse Batson objection to the defense counsel's use of peremptory challenges. In response, defense counsel argued,
I think it's obvious the jury panel is predominantly white; and, once you take out the two who were excluded for cause which were black jurors, that only leaves one black juror who he's issued a peremptory challenge. So, I mean, I couldn't challenge anybody if I —
The trial court then stated that the Batson objection was "a little premature."
The second panel of fourteen prospective jurors was then called. This panel consisted of seven Caucasians and seven African-Americans. The State was granted challenges for cause on jurors Michelle Mullens, Norwood Booker, and Don Williams, who were all African-Americans. Defendant was not granted any challenges for cause.
The State then exercised peremptory challenges against Leonard Paige, Cleo Washington, and Joseph Sterling, all African-Americans. Defendant exercised peremptory challenges against Ada Michelli, Jimmy Stockton, and Hans Armstrong, all Caucasians.
Following these challenges, the prosecutor again urged his Batson objection and defense counsel also urged a Batson objection. In support of his Batson objection, defense counsel argued that the State had used five of six peremptory challenges against black jurors and that the City of Baton Rouge was predominantly black and the Parish of East Baton Rouge was forty to forty-five percent black. However, defense counsel acknowledged that the jury panels had been "overwhelmingly white."
The trial court again denied the Batson objections stating, "I think that both sides — I believe both sides are exercising their — their peremptory challenges cautiously and-and without, at least, on its surface, any racial prejudice because we do have a mix here. But I note both of [your opportunities] to argue that at the later point."
The third panel of fourteen prospective jurors was then called. This panel was comprised of eight Caucasians and six African-Americans. The State was granted two challenges for cause against Frankie James and Maxine Jefferson, both African-Americans. Defense counsel was granted a challenge for cause against Joseph Lejeune, a Caucasian.
The State then exercised peremptory challenges against Monica Atkins, an African-American, Jacqueline Bell, an African-American, Jerrold Grantham, a Caucasian, and Ernestine Wade, an African-American. The State later "backstruck" Stacey Terry and Herbert Riche, both Caucasians. Defense counsel exercised peremptory challenges against Theresa Hunter, Kip Leblanc, and Joseph Guidroz, all Caucasians, and Willie Matthews, an African-American.
At this point, only two seats and an alternate seat remained to be filled. The trial court called three more prospective jurors for questioning, Willie Bordelon, Jerry Bumpus, and Melvin Unkraut, all Caucasians. All three were selected to serve on the jury, with Melvin Unkraut being selected as the alternate juror.
The next morning, prior to the presentation of evidence, defense counsel made a Batson objection to the selection of the jury. Defense counsel also argued that the State used peremptory challenges to exclude all black members (with the exception of Donald Stewart, the sole African-American juror) from serving on the jury. Defense counsel maintained that after he had exhausted his peremptory challenges, there were only three Caucasian prospective jurors remaining, and the prosecutor used that opportunity to strike two more Caucasian prospective jurors to make it appear as if his use of peremptory challenges was not racial in nature. Defense counsel argued that the racial composition of the jury, eleven Caucasians and one African-American, was not reflective of the racial composition of the City or Parish of East Baton Rouge.
In denying the Batson objection, the trial court stated,
First off, let me say that the law does require a prima facie showing of some sort of prejudice in picking the jury. I want the record to reflect that this court perhaps at the objection of both sides participated actively in the voir dire selection of this jury. I believe that there were a lot of questions placed to this jury in terms of their ability to make decisions about certain elements of this case. I do recall frankly several — at least one, perhaps more than one, black juror that the State did not peremptorily except and you did peremptorily except them. The court, first off, does not believe that there's been a prima facie showing that there has been any racial discrimination. However, if there is, the court finds, as a result of my participation and observation of the jury selection, that whatever peremptory challenges were made on behalf of the State were done in a race neutral fashion.
At the outset, we note that the trial judge determined defendant did not bear his burden of proving the first step of Batson, i.e., that a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination existed. Thus, the burden never shifted to the prosecution in the second step of the Batson analysis, requiring the State to provide a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory strikes. Our inquiry becomes whether the trial court erred in finding that the defendant failed to present a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination.
The United States Supreme Court addressed what types of permissible inferences of discrimination were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of discrimination as required by the first step of Batson in Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005). In Johnson, the Supreme Court reiterated that a defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant's trial. To establish such a case, the defendant first must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, and that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire, members of the defendant's race. Second, the defendant is entitled to rely on the fact, as to which there can be no dispute, that peremptory challenges constitute a jury selection practice that permits those to discriminate who are of a mind to discriminate. Finally, the defendant must show that these facts and any other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor used that practice to exclude the veniremen from the petit jury on account of their race. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 169, 125 S.Ct. at 2416-2417.
On appeal, defendant asserts that as an African-American, he was a member of a cognizable racial group and that the prosecutor exercised peremptory challenges to remove from the venire eight other members of his racial group. As recognized by Johnson, the defendant may rely on the fact that the peremptory challenges, by reason of the fact that they may be subjectively based, constitute a jury selection practice that may allow those who intend to discriminate, to do so. However, the only evidence put forth during the Batson objection by defendant that would support an inference of discrimination was the defense counsel's contention that one African-American juror on the panel of twelve was not reflective of the African-American majority population of the City of Baton Rouge, nor the forty to forty-five percent African-American population of East Baton Rouge Parish.
Accordingly, we must examine what, if any, other relevant circumstances were present that could have raised an inference that the prosecution's use of peremptory challenges against the minority prospective jurors was discriminatory. This same issue was recently addressed by the Louisiana Supreme Court in Draughn, wherein the court held that "the mere invocation of Batson when minority prospective jurors are peremptorily challenged in the trial of a minority defendant does not present sufficient evidence in this case to lead to an inference of purposeful discrimination." Draughn, 2005-1825 at 25-26, 950 So.2d at 603-604.
The burden of production in the first step of Batson is squarely on the defendant. Johnson, 545 U.S. at 170-171, 125 S.Ct. at 2417. In the present case, defense counsel only argued that the one African-American juror was not reflective of the racial composition of the area. However, in Draughn, the supreme court, applying the factors used in Johnson, noted certain relevant circumstances, which were apparent to the trial court, negated a finding of discriminatory intent on the part of the prosecutor in exercising peremptory challenges. Draughn, 2005-1825 at 26, 950 So.2d at 603. These circumstances included the nature of the case, the timing of the defendant's Batson objection, the trial court's opportunity to take into account the tenor of the voir dire questioning, whether the prosecution used its peremptory challenges to strike all of the prospective African-American jurors from the pool of potential jurors, and the trial court's finding of whether or not it found discriminatory intent. Draughn, 2005-1825 at 26-28, 950 So.2d at 603-604.
In applying these considerations, we note that the nature of this case presents no overt racial overtones. Both the victim and the defendant were from the same cognizable racial group.
Second, the trial court considered defendant's general Batson objection. In order to preserve a complaint that the prosecutor's use of a peremptory exception was based on race, the defense must make an objection before the entire jury panel is sworn. State v. Williams, 524 So.2d 746 (La. 1988) (per curiam). Although the trial court stated that "this objection was not made yesterday while we were picking the jury," the record indicates defense counsel indeed raised a Batson objection following the exercise of peremptory challenges for the second panel of prospective jurors. However, the trial court still considered defendant's objection made prior to the presentation of evidence and issued a ruling.
Third, in denying the defendant's Batson challenge on the basis that defendant had failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination, the trial judge indicated he had actively participated in the voir dire questioning, and that he believed, "there were a lot of questions placed to this jury in terms of their ability to make decisions about certain elements of this case." Clearly, the trial judge took into consideration the tenor of the voir dire questioning.
On appeal, defendant alleges that the prosecutor directed multi-part questions to prospective black jurors more often than prospective white jurors. We note that in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 261-262, 125 S.Ct. 2317, 2337-2338, 162 L.Ed.2d 196 (2005), disparate questioning of prospective jurors or "trick" questions designed to allow prosecutors to manufacture race-neutral reasons for removing jurors are factors that would support a finding of purposeful discrimination. In Miller-El v. Dretke, prospective white jurors were not asked to explain their answers, while prospective minority jurors were questioned intensely, and prospective minority jurors were read a "graphic script" regarding imposition of the death penalty, while nonminority prospective jurors were given a general explanation of capital punishment.
In the present case, defense counsel cites no place in the record that would illustrate that the minority prospective jurors were "targeted" for more questioning or certain types of questions that nonminority jurors were not asked to answer. Moreover, we have thoroughly examined the voir dire record and note that the prosecutor questioned many of the jurors in the same manner, including the use of compound questions and answers based on certain hypothetical situations.
Specific examples of this include:
Charlene Butler, an African-American juror peremptorily challenged by the State, was provided a hypothetical situation of whether she could render a guilty verdict based on testimony of one witness. Ryan Empson, Thomas Desporte, and Samuel Hazlip, all Caucasians, and Donald Stewart, an African-American, who were all selected for jury service, were asked the same type of question, in much the same manner.
Shawanda Sanders, Leonard Paige, and Jacqueline Bell, African-American jurors peremptorily challenged by the State, were asked about how their determination of guilt would be affected by the State's failure to produce a weapon in much the same manner as Carolyn Seab, a Caucasian selected to serve, was questioned about the same issue.
Finally, the record indicated that the prosecutor asked a compound question regarding if anyone had a problem with the mandatory life sentence for second degree murder and their ability to render a guilty verdict in light of that sentence, This compound question was asked to Cleo Washington, Monica Atkins, and Ernestine Wade, African-Americans who were peremptorily excused by the State, and Ryan Empson, Laura Parnell, and John White, Caucasians selected to serve on the jury.
Fourth, we note that the State did not strike all of the African-American prospective jurors through use of its peremptory challenges. The record indicates that the State was granted challenges for cause on Harry Robinson, Larry Spears, Michelle Mullens, Norwood Booker, Don Williams, Frankie James, and Maxine Jefferson, all African-Americans, and the defense peremptorily challenged Willie Matthews, an African-American.
Finally, the trial court noted that based on its participation in voir dire, it did not believe there was any discriminatory intent in the prosecutor's use of his peremptory challenges. Like the court in Draughn, 2005-1825 at 28, 950 So.2d at 604, we note that the prosecution's use of a peremptory challenge cannot be separated from the context in which the challenge arises, a context which the trial judge is in the best position to evaluate. Our review of the voir dire as a whole shows no error in the trial court's finding that there was no prima facie showing of purposeful discrimination met by the defense in its Batson objection.
Further, we note that we have already determined that there was no disparate questioning of the jurors based on their race, nor does the voir dire record reveal any "trick" questions designed to elicit some race-neutral response for removing jurors. Moreover, there was no procedure utilized by which juror placement on panels could be manipulated in order to reach nonminority prospective jurors before minority prospective jurors. Finally, we note that there was no evidence presented indicating a historical practice of racial discrimination in the selection of juries in East Baton Rouge Parish, as was present in Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. at 263-266, 125 S.Ct. at 2338-2340.
Accordingly, this assignment of error is without merit.
ABSENCE OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
In this argument raised within the defendant's second assignment of error, he contends that the trial judge's absence from the bench permitted a defective record in the face of a challenge to the selection process.
The incident at issue occurred after completion of questioning of the third panel of prospective jurors. The attorneys had presented their respective challenges for cause, which were ruled upon by the trial judge. At this point, the trial judge and the attorneys began discussing completion of the final three seats on the jury.
Before the completion of the peremptory challenges to the remaining jurors and the determination of how many more prospective jurors would need to be questioned, the prosecutor requested a moment to study his final peremptory challenges. The transcript then reflects the following:
THE COURT: Take your time. Yeah. Go ahead. Go ahead. I'm going to slip out for a second and go to the bathroom.
THE COURT: It looks like you all might get to leave. We're not sure yet.
REPORTER'S NOTE: At this time, the court left the courtroom and then returned.
THE COURT: Are you ready?
At this point in time, the prosecutor questioned the trial judge about another issue unrelated to jury selection and there was an off-the-record discussion. When the parties resumed proceedings on the record, the trial court indicated which jurors from the third panel would be excused. Comparing the previous portion of the transcript regarding which jurors were being excused for cause, it is evident that the State used peremptory challenges to remove Monica Atkins, Jacqueline Bell, Ernestine Wade, all African-Americans, and Jerrold Grantham, a Caucasian. The defendant peremptorily challenged Theresa Hunter, Kip Leblanc, Joseph Guidroz, all Caucasians, and Willie Matthews, an African-American.
The State later used its final peremptory challenges to backstrike Herbert Riche and Stacey Terry, both Caucasians.
Clearly, the only thing that occurred during the trial judge's absence was the parties determined which jurors they would be peremptorily challenging. The trial court only granted these challenges when it returned from its break. The record does not reflect any objection to the exercise of these peremptory challenges by either the prosecutor or defense counsel. The jurisprudence of the supreme court indicates that such a failure to contemporaneously object to the use of peremptory challenges waives an equal protection complaint. See State v. Potter, 591 So.2d 1166, 1168-1169 (La. 1991). However, we further note that despite defense counsel's failure to object to these peremptory challenges, the trial judge heard defense counsel's general Batson objection the following morning prior to the presentation of evidence.
Defendant also contends that the trial judge's absence permitted a defective record in the face of a challenge to the selection process. In support of this contention, defendant cites to State v. Pinion, 2006-2346 (La. 10/26/07), 968 So.2d 131 (per curiam), wherein the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed a defendant's conviction because the record failed to include transcripts of the bench conferences during jury selection.
The instant case is not at all like the situation in Pinion. In the present case, the entire voir dire proceedings are transcribed. Although the trial court absented himself for a brief period, it is evident that the only thing occurring at that time was the respective attorneys' own procedures for determining how their final peremptory challenges would be used. The record is clear as to which jurors were excused based on what type of challenge.
This argument is without merit.
CHALLENGE OF FRANKIE JAMES FOR CAUSE
In this argument in defendant's second assignment of error, defendant maintains the trial judge specifically asked the prosecutor if he had any other challenges for cause following the State's challenge of Maxine Jefferson for cause, and the prosecutor responded, "No. I have no other challenges for cause." Defendant argues the trial court then joined in the selection process by asking the prosecutor, "You obviously challenge Mr. James?" The prosecutor then replied that he did.
On appeal, defense counsel maintains that this question equated to the "erroneous allowance" of a challenge for cause to the prosecution, and thereby gave the prosecution more challenges than it was entitled.
We disagree. Defense counsel takes the exchange between the trial court and the prosecutor completely out of context. It is clear that the system used by the trial court was to allow the prosecutor, then the defense counsel, to question prospective jurors. Sometimes, the trial court itself asked the prospective jurors specific questions regarding their qualifications for jury service. The trial court then held a conference with the attorneys and they indicated which prospective jurors they were requesting to be excused for cause. The trial court then allowed the parties to attempt to rehabilitate some of these specific prospective jurors by recalling them and allowing further questioning.
In this specific instance, the trial court had finished questioning Joseph Lejeune. The attorneys then approached the bench to inform the trial judge of their challenges for cause. The first juror challenged by the prosecutor during this conference was Maxine Jefferson. It was clear the trial judge intended to recall Jefferson for clarification of her opinion on whether she could convict, despite the State's failure to introduce the murder weapon, and her view of justifiable homicide (self-defense). The trial court then asked the prosecutor if he had any other challenges for cause, to which the prosecutor indicated he had no other challenges for cause. The trial court then asked the prosecutor, "You obviously challenge Mr. James?" and the prosecutor replied "Yes."
Defense counsel then indicated that he wished to challenge Lejeune and Guidroz for cause. Clearly the transcript indicates that the trial court was going to allow these prospective jurors to be recalled so the parties could further question them regarding their qualifications for jury service.
Based on our review of the record, it is clear neither the trial court, nor either attorney, saw any need to attempt to rehabilitate James. During voir dire questioning, James responded to the prosecutor's question of whether the mandatory life sentence for a second degree murder conviction was fair by stating, "I don't know. It's hard to say." James was asked to speak louder. The prosecutor then asked James, if after listening to all the evidence, he found beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was guilty of murder, could he return a guilty verdict knowing that defendant would be imprisoned for the rest of his life. James responded, "I really can't say." James continued to give a few more vague responses or no oral response to the prosecutor's further questions.
The prosecutor then acknowledged James's apparent reluctance and specifically asked James if there was something he wanted them to know. James responded that he had concerns about the issue of the lack of a weapon to be presented as evidence. When pressed, James stated, "I think you should have all the evidence before you can really find somebody guilty." The prosecutor then attempted to rehabilitate James by asking a hypothetical question about if other witnesses testified they saw a weapon but the actual weapon was never produced, if that would change his view. James then replied, "I really wouldn't want to say whether he was guilty or not guilty if all the evidence — if they don't have the weapon. . . ." Once again the prosecutor clarified by asking James directly if there was no weapon, could he not arrive at a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, to which James indicated he could not.
It is evident that James would not be able to apply the law in this case, which is clearly a ground for a cause challenge. La. Code Crim. P. art. 797(4). The State is not required to produce a murder weapon in a prosecution for second degree murder. Given the context of the trial court's inquiry, we find the trial court was merely trying to ascertain which prospective jurors would be recalled for further questioning concerning their qualifications. Because James made it evident that he could not apply the law as given, we do not find the trial court's question rose to the level of providing the prosecution with an "extra" challenge.
Despite defendant's assertion that the trial court improperly granted an additional challenge for cause to the prosecution regarding James, the record indicates that defense counsel had selected James to be peremptorily challenged. Once James was excused for cause, defense counsel did not have to use this peremptory challenge to remove James from the jury. Arguably, the trial court's action provided an additional peremptory challenge to the defense.
This assignment of error is without merit.
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
In defendant's third assignment of error, he maintains he received ineffective assistance of counsel, contending that his trial counsel failed to object after each African-American was removed from the jury by the prosecutor, noting specifically that the challenged persons' responses were no different from responses given by white venire members who were chosen for the jury and that the trial counsel failed to object to the accumulation of challenges against black venire members and ask for a reseating of all challenged jurors. Defendant also maintains that his trial counsel's failure to object to the trial judge's suggestion of a cause challenge to the prosecutor, and to the absence of the trial judge during a portion of the third round of jury selection, constituted ineffective assistance of counsel.
In Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 LEd.2d 674 (1984), the United States Supreme Court established a two-fold test to evaluate claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. First, the defendant must show that counsel committed errors so serious that he or she was not functioning as the "counsel" guaranteed a defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Second, the defendant must show that the errors were so serious as to deprive him of a fair trial, one with a reliable result.See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064. Defendant must make both showings in order to prove that counsel was so ineffective as to require reversal of the conviction.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is more properly raised by an application for post-conviction relief where a full evidentiary hearing may be conducted. Only where the record disclosed sufficient evidence to decide the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel when raised by an assignment of error on appeal, may it be addressed in the interest of judicial economy. State v. Lockhart, 629 So.2d 1195, 1207 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1993), writ denied, 94-0050 (La. 4/7/94), 635 So.2d 1132. The investigation of strategy decisions requires an evidentiary hearing and, therefore, cannot possibly be reviewed on appeal.See State v. Martin, 607 So.2d 775, 788 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1992).
We have previously determined that there was no error in the trial court's finding that defendant failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination by the prosecutor's use of his peremptory challenges. We have also determined the trial court's questioning of whether the prosecutor intended to challenge Frankie James for cause did not equate to unfairly allowing the prosecution another challenge. Finally, we also determined that the trial court's absence prior to ruling on the final peremptory challenges by either party was not an error. Trial counsel's failure to object to the actions enumerated by defendant on appeal in no way deprived defendant of a fair trial. Accordingly, we cannot say that trial counsel was ineffective.
This assignment of error is without merit.
PRO SE ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
Defendant filed a pro se brief raising several assignments of error with respect to his adjudication as a second felony habitual offender. First we note defendant's assignments of error regarding inaccuracies in the habitual offender bill of information and the bill of information regarding his prior conviction have no merit. The record in this matter clearly reflects defendant was originally charged with carjacking, but entered a plea to the offense of second degree battery. Moreover, the bill of information regarding defendant's habitual offender status clearly sets for the correct conviction concerning defendant's prior offense of second degree battery, which was entered on May 12, 1998, under docket number 10-97-618, in the Nineteenth Judicial District Court for East Baton Rouge Parish.
Finally, defendant argues the trial court failed to advise him of his rights under La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1). Although the record does not contain evidence that defendant was arraigned on the habitual offender bill, our jurisprudence holds that while a defendant may not be advised of the specific allegations in a habitual offender bill of information or of his right to be tried to the truth thereof, any such error was harmless, because the defendant did not plead guilty or stipulate to the charges in the habitual offender bill. Instead, a habitual offender hearing was conducted, wherein the State actually proved the truth of the allegations and the defendant's identity. Therefore, while the trial court may not have fully complied with La. R.S. 15:529.1(D)(1), by failing to inform the defendant of his rights, under the circumstances presented herein, we find that any such error is harmless. State v. Mickey, 604 So.2d 675, 678 (La.App. 1 Cir. 1992), writ denied, 610 So.2d 795 (La. 1993).
Accordingly, these assignments of error are without merit.
CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES AFFIRMED.
I respectfully disagree with the majority opinion in this case because the trial court erroneously denied the defendant's Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986) challenge to the selection of the jury. The defendant established a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination, and therefore, the trial court should have shifted the burden to the prosecutor to articulate race-neutral explanations for striking jurors in question. Since the trial court failed to do so, the defendant's convictions and sentences should be vacated and this matter remanded for a new trial.
As set forth by the majority, when a defendant makes a Batson challenge, claiming that the State has used peremptory challenges in a manner which violates the constitution, the defendant must first make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race. If the defendant fails to make a prima facie case, then the challenge fails. State v. Green, 94-0887, p. 24 (La. 5/22/95), 655 So.2d 272, 287-288. If a prima facie case is established, the burden then shifts to the State to come forward with a race-neutral explanation for its peremptory challenges. Green, 94-0887 at p. 25, 655 So.2d288.
A defendant satisfies the requirement of establishing a prima facie case by producing evidence sufficient to permit the trial court to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 125 S.Ct. 2410, 162 L.Ed.2d 129 (2005). The defendant may offer any facts relevant to the question of the prosecutor's discriminatory intent, including but not limited to a pattern of strikes by a prosecutor against members of a suspect class, statements, or actions of the prosecutor which support an inference that the exercise of peremptory strikes was motivated by impermissible considerations, the composition of the venire and of the jury finally empaneled, and any other disparate impact upon the suspect class which is alleged to be the victim of purposeful discrimination. Green, 94-0887 at p. 24, 655 So.2d at 288.
In this case, the minutes reflect that forty-seven prospective jurors were sent from the trial court's jury management office to the courtroom for the defendant's trial. The voir dire began with the trial court screening the panel to identify jurors who did not meet the legal requirements for jury service or who claimed that service on the jury would result in extreme hardship, and as a result of that questioning, two of the jurors were released by the trial court, without objection by the prosecutor or defendant. The record does not disclose the race of these two jurors.
Next, the trial court randomly selected a panel of fourteen potential jurors, four of which were African-Americans. The defense and the prosecutor addressed the panel and questioned the jurors as a group and individually. At the conclusion of this questioning, two of the African-American potential jurors were challenged by the prosecutor for cause, which the trial court granted, and the two remaining African-American potential jurors were peremptorily challenged by the prosecutor. Four Caucasians were selected for service on the jury.
The defense peremptorily challenged four Caucasians. Upon doing so, the prosecutor raised a reverse-Batson challenge. The trial court denied the reverse-Batson challenge as premature.
The trial court then randomly selected another panel of fourteen potential jurors, seven of which were African-American. At the conclusion of the questioning of this panel, three of the African-American potential jurors were challenged by the prosecutor for cause, which the trial court again granted, and the remaining three African-American potential jurors were peremptorily challenged by the prosecutor. One African-American and four Caucasians were selected for service on the jury.
At this point in the proceeding, counsel for the defendant made a Batson objection, and noted that, up to that point in the proceeding, the prosecutor had used all (or five out of five) peremptory challenges to exclude African-Americans from the jury, and further noted that of the nine jurors that had already been seated, only one was African-American and the other eight were Caucasians, and that such a ratio was not in proportion to the racial make-up of the City of Baton Rouge and/or Parish of East Baton Rouge. The trial court deferred ruling on the Batson challenge and reserved the rights of both the State and the defense to argue the merits of the challenge at a later time.
The defendant's Batson challenged was raised in conjunction with the prosecution's re-urging of its previous reverse- Batson challenge. The reverse- Batson challenge was denied by the trial court, and no issues have been raised on appeal with regard to the trial court's rulings in this regard.
The trial court then randomly selected another panel of fourteen potential jurors, six of which were African-American. At the conclusion of the questioning of this panel, two of the African-American potential jurors were challenged by the prosecutor for cause, which the trial court again granted, and the remaining three African-American potential jurors were peremptorily challenged by the prosecutor. One African-American was peremptorily challenged by the defense. Three Caucasians were selected for service on the jury.
The remaining three potential jurors from the potential jury pool — all Caucasians, were then questioned. The State then exercised two "backstrikes" — one to a Caucasian selected from the second panel and one to a Caucasian selected from the third panel, and the jury selection process was then concluded. The jury ultimately comprised of eleven Caucasians and one African-American and one alternate juror, a Caucasian.
The trial court then recessed the trial until the following morning. The next morning, prior to the commencement of the trial, counsel for the defense re-urged his previous Batson challenge to the selection of the jury that the trial court had previously deferred. The trial court denied the motion on the basis that the defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case that the prosecutor had exercised peremptory challenges on the basis of race, and therefore, never asked the State to provide race-neutral explanations for the exclusion of the eight African-Americans from the jury. This was erroneous.
According to the record, the jury venire consisted of forty-seven potential jurors, of which seventeen (or 36%) were African-American. Of the seventeen African-Americans, ten survived challenges for cause. The prosecution then used peremptory challenges to strike eight, and only one African-American was selected for service on the jury. When counsel for defense first raised the Batson challenge, the prosecutor had used five out of five of his peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors that were African-American. And by the conclusion of the third panel, the prosecutor had used eight out of eight of his peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors that were African-American. While our supreme court has recently questioned whether "numbers alone" is sufficient to establish a prima facie showing of discrimination,see State v. Juniors, 2003-2425 (La. 6/29/05), 915 So.2d 291, the numbers in this case clearly demonstrate a pattern of strikes by the prosecutor against African-Americans. Moreover, the fact that after all but one of the African-Americans had been excused from the jury pool, the prosecutor then choose to exercise "backstrikes" against Caucasians that the prosecutor had already accepted (thereby changing the prosecutor's ratio of peremptory strikes against African-Americans to eight out of ten) supports the inference that his previous exercise of peremptory strikes solely against African-Americans was motivated by impermissible racial considerations. Because this evidence is sufficient to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred, the defendant established a prima facie case that the prosecutor in this case was exercising peremptory challenges on the basis of the potential juror's race. The trial court erred in concluding otherwise.
Moreover, to the extent the trial court stated, in denying the Batson challenge, that even if there was a prima facie showing of racial discrimination, that it found that the peremptory challenges made by the State were "done in a race-neutral fashion" was also erroneous and inappropriate. If the trial court found that the defendant made a prima facie showing of discrimination, the trial court should have immediately moved to the second step in reviewing process for a Batson challenge and asked the prosecutor to justify his use of eight peremptory strikes against eight African-American prospective jurors with race-neutral reasons. The trial court failed to do so, and instead, concluded on its own and without reasons articulated by the prosecutor that the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges was race-neutral. Such a ruling was not a proper analysis of the defendant's Batson challenge.
Thus, I respectfully dissent.