Opinion
No. 4850.
Argued June 7, 1960.
Decided June 27, 1960.
1. In a complaint for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, the admission of the respondent that he was the operator, together with evidence that he was intoxicated immediately after the accident and that respondent's car had collided with a telephone pole beside a public highway and he was standing by, was sufficient to establish the corpus delicti of the offense charged and to warrant a finding that respondent was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
TRANSFER, of questions of law by the municipal court of Keene under RSA 502:24.
The complaint and warrant charges that the defendant, on March 27, 1960, operated a motor vehicle on Marlboro Street, a public way in Keene, while under the influence of intoxicating liquor. After hearing, the court found the defendant guilty.
A Keene police officer testified for the State that upon being informed of an accident he proceeded to Marlboro Street in the vicinity of Keene Teachers College, where he found a motor vehicle off the highway against a telephone pole. A number of people were standing around the scene, including the defendant and one Lachenal. Defendant Douglas, in response to a question from the officer, stated that he was driving the motor vehicle. Lachenal said nothing. The defendant was taken to the station where various tests as to his condition were made, including a blood test. The officer testified that in his opinion the defendant was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
A doctor who examined the defendant testified that in his opinion he was under the influence of intoxicating liquor and, over objection, was allowed to testify that the defendant told him he was operating the motor vehicle at the time of the accident.
Lachenal testified that he was the operator at the time of the accident. He admitted he was present at the scene when the officer inquired who was driving but remained silent because he had previously had two accidents on Marlboro Street.
During the trial, the defendant objected and excepted to the introduction of certain evidence and to the denial of his motion to dismiss at the end of the State's case.
The questions of law raised by the defendant's exceptions were reserved and transferred by Olson, justice of the Keene municipal court.
Louis C. Wyman, Attorney General, William J. O'Neil, Assistant to the Attorney General, and Arthur Olson, Jr., county attorney (Mr. O'Neil orally), for the State.
William D. Tribble (by brief and orally), for the defendant.
The principal contention of the defendant is that the State's evidence is insufficient to establish the corpus delicti of the offense charged because it must be considered independently of any extrajudicial admission of the defendant in determining whether the State's evidence is sufficient to establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
The defendant relies upon the great weight of authority which holds that an extrajudicial confession, standing alone, is insufficient to establish guilt. With this general rule the State does not disagree, but the State does contend that the admission of the defendant, taken in connection with other evidence, was sufficient here to establish the corpus delicti.
We are of the opinion that the authorities cited by the defendant do not support his contention that supporting evidence must be considered independently of the extrajudicial confession or admission in order to establish the corpus delicti of the offense charged. These authorities stand for no more than the proposition that in order to support a conviction the admission or confession must be "corroborated" by independent evidence. The great weight of authority supports the State's position. 127 A.L.R. 1130, 1138; State v. LaLouche, 116 Conn. 691.
When the officer arrived at the scene, the defendant's car was against a telephone pole with the defendant standing by. It was mute evidence, nothing to the contrary appearing, from which it could be found that immediately prior to the collision with the pole it had been operated upon Marlboro Street which was stipulated to be a public highway. The evidence warranted a finding that the defendant was intoxicated immediately after the accident. With the testimony of the officer and the doctor that the defendant admitted he was operating the motor vehicle at the time of the accident, there was sufficient evidence to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
Exceptions overruled.
All concurred.