Opinion
No. COA11–1416.
2012-05-15
STATE of North Carolina v. Jamie Lamonte DIXON.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Kathleen M. Waylett, for the State. Irving Joyner for defendant-appellant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 24 February 2011 by Judge W. Robert Bell in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 1 May 2012. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney General Kathleen M. Waylett, for the State. Irving Joyner for defendant-appellant.
STEELMAN, Judge.
The State submitted substantial evidence that defendant was the perpetrator of the breaking and entering and that he had the intent to commit larceny. The trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss.
I. Factual and Procedural History
On 3 May 2010, William Cook discovered that someone had broken into the office of the Mobile Crisis Unit in Charlotte, North Carolina. Mr. Cook is the Director of the Mobile Crisis Unit and owner of the Mobile Crisis Unit's parent company Matrix Mental Health. The perpetrator had entered the office by breaking the glass in the window next to the main office door. Inside the main office, a plate glass window had been broken, which allowed access to the supervisor's office. The office was in general disarray, with desk drawers opened and papers thrown about. Several pieces of equipment were missing, including computers, a printer, and a scanner. The fingerprints of Jamie Lamonte Dixon (defendant) were found on the interior and exterior of the window frame, two fragments of the window glass, and a drawer organizer found on the floor of the office.
Defendant was indicted for felonious breaking and entering, felonious larceny, and for being an habitual felon. On 24 February 2011, a jury found defendant guilty of felonious breaking and entering, but not guilty of felonious larceny. Defendant pled guilty to being an habitual felon. Defendant was sentenced to 182–228 months imprisonment, from the aggravated range.
Defendant appeals.
II. Denial of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
In his only argument on appeal, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of felonious breaking or entering. We disagree.
A. Standard of Review
“This Court reviews the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. ” State v. Smith, 186 N.C.App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). “Upon defendant's motion for dismissal, the question for the Court is whether there is substantial evidence (1) of each essential element of the offense charged, or of a lesser offense included therein, and (2) of defendant's being the perpetrator of such offense. If so, the motion is properly denied.” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000). “In order to be submitted to the jury for determination of defendant's guilt, the evidence need only give rise to a reasonable inference of guilt.” State v. Turnage, 362 N.C. 491, 494, 666 S.E.2d 753, 755 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In making its determination, the trial court must consider all evidence admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions in its favor.” State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994). “Any person who breaks or enters any building with intent to commit any felony or larceny therein” is guilty of felonious breaking or entering. N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–54(a) (2011).
B. Analysis
Defendant first contends the State's evidence fails to establish that his fingerprints found at the scene of the crime could only have been impressed at the time the crime was committed, and thus the State failed to show that defendant was the perpetrator of the crime. It is well established that “testimony by a qualified expert that fingerprints found at the scene of the crime correspond with the fingerprints of the accused, when accompanied by substantial evidence of circumstances from which the jury can find that the fingerprints could only have been impressed at the time the crime was committed” is sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss and carry the case to the jury. State v. Miller, 289 N.C. 1, 4, 220 S.E.2d 572, 574 (1975).
Megan Terry, an employee of the Mobile Crisis Unit, testified that she worked at the office the day of the break-in until 7:30 p.m. Ms. Terry stated that she left the office with her coworker, and that they left the office in normal condition. She further stated that the outermost door locked automatically. In addition, Mr. Cook testified that he did not know defendant and had not given anyone permission to be inside the supervisor's office other than his employees. Mr. Cook testified that only employees used the supervisor's office, that clients are not seen in the office, and that the office was not open to the public. Defendant's fingerprints were found at the entry point of the breaking into the office—on the broken glass and the interior and exterior of the window—and on a drawer organizer that had been removed from Mr. Cook's desk and thrown on the floor. These fingerprints were identified by a qualified fingerprint expert as matching those of defendant. Based upon this evidence, we hold that the State met its burden of showing facts to support a reasonable inference that defendant was the perpetrator of the break-in and for the case to be submitted to the jury. See State v. Bradley, 65 N.C.App. 359, 362, 309 S.E.2d 510, 512–13 (1983) (holding that fingerprints in nonpublic portion of building where defendant was not an employee support reasonable inference of guilt and submission of case to jury).
Defendant also argues the State's evidence failed to prove that he had the specific intent to commit a felony or larceny when he broke into the office. “Felonious intent usually cannot be proven by direct evidence, but rather must be inferred from the defendant's acts, conduct, and inferences fairly deducible from all the circumstances[.]” State v. Goldsmith, 187 N.C.App. 162, 165, 652 S.E.2d 336, 339–40 (2007) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). See also State v. Hamilton, 132 N.C.App. 316, 319, 512 S.E.2d 80, 83 (1999) (holding that if the evidence presents no other explanation for breaking into the building, and there is no showing of the owner's consent, intent to commit a felony inside may be inferred from the circumstances).
In State v. Reid, 230 N.C. 561, 53 S.E.2d 849 (1949), there was evidence that the defendant was never lawfully in the building, and the defendant's fingerprint was found on the inside of the window sill. “The conduct of the defendant in breaking and entering ... indicates the extent to which he was willing to go to accomplish his purpose.” Id., 230 N.C. at 565, 53 S.E.2d at 852. The Court held that this was sufficient evidence of felonious intent to carry the case to the jury, and that it was for the jury “to determine, under all the circumstances, whether or not the defendant had the ulterior criminal intent at the time of the breaking and entering, to commit the felony charged in the bill of indictment.” Id.
Defendant was not lawfully inside the supervisor's office, and defendant's fingerprints were found on the exterior and interior of the window. This evidence was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss and carry the case to the jury. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss.
NO ERROR. Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge THIGPEN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).