Opinion
No. 05-0869
Filed August 31, 2005
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Pottawattamie County, Jeffrey L. Larson, Judge.
Devaney appeals a judgment and sentence on his guilty plea to third-degree arson, arguing a violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. AFFIRMED.
Chad Primmer of Chad Douglas Primmer, P.C., Council Bluffs, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Sharon K. Hall, Assistant Attorney General, Matt Wilber, County Attorney, and Jeffrey R. TeKippe and Jon J. Jacobmeier, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by Mahan, P.J., and Hecht and Vaitheswaran, JJ.
This case raises an issue concerning a detainer, "which is a request filed by a criminal justice agency with the institution in which a prisoner is incarcerated, asking that the prisoner be held for the agency, or that the agency be advised when the prisoner's release is imminent." Fex v. Michigan, 507 U.S. 43, 44, 113 S. Ct. 1085, 1087, 122 L. Ed. 2d 406, 411 (1993).
The State of Iowa charged Devaney with second-degree arson. The district court issued a warrant for his arrest.
On August 5, 2004, Devaney notified the State of Iowa that he was incarcerated in Nebraska and wanted a "quick and speedy disposition" of the charges in Iowa. This notification triggered the speedy trial provision under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, adopted by most jurisdictions, including Iowa. See Iowa Code chapter 821 (2003). That provision states:
[T]he prisoner shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after the prisoner shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of the prisoner's imprisonment and the prisoner's request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint.
Iowa Code § 821.1, article III(a).
On receiving notice that Devaney was invoking this provision, the County Attorney's office in Iowa advised Nebraska of its agreement concerning the detainer process. Meanwhile, the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services notified Iowa that Devaney was awaiting disposition of charges in Nebraska and could not be transported to Iowa at that time. On the basis of this notice, an Iowa prosecutor moved to extend the speedy trial deadline. The motion was not served on Devaney or an attorney on his behalf. The district court granted the motion.
In January 2005, the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services notified Iowa that Devaney was now available for proceedings in this State. Devaney was returned to Iowa.
Following his return, Devaney's attorney moved to dismiss the criminal complaint. He contended Iowa Code section 821.1 required the presence of Devaney or his attorney at the hearing on the State's motion to extend the 180-day speedy trial deadline. In his view, their absence rendered the extension order fatally defective, requiring dismissal of the Iowa complaint with prejudice. The district court summarily denied the motion. Devaney subsequently pled guilty to third-degree arson and was sentenced accordingly.
On appeal, Devaney frames the issue as follows: "The State's failure to obtain an extension of time of their 180-day deadline to prosecute Devaney at hearing in open court with the presence of Devaney or his counsel was in violation of Article III of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and, pursuant to Article V of said Act, the District Court was required to dismiss the case with prejudice." The State counters that Devaney faces procedural barriers to consideration of this issue. We will begin with one of these procedural barriers.
I. Guilty Plea Waives Defenses
"With limited exceptions . . . a guilty plea taken in conformity with Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure [2.8(2)( b)] waives all defenses and objections." State v. Antenucci, 608 N.W.2d 19, 19 (Iowa 2000). Challenges based on statute of limitations or speedy indictment grounds are not exceptions to the general rule of waiver. State v. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d 564, 567 (Iowa 2001). See also State v. McGee, 211 N.W.2d 267, 268 (Iowa 1973).
Numerous jurisdictions have applied this waiver rule to the speedy trial provision in the detainer compact. See Donald M. Zupanec, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 98 A.L.R. 3d 160, 200 § 11, n. 91 (1980); R.P. Davis, Annotation, Waiver or Loss of Accused's Right to Speedy Trial, 57 A.L.R.2d 302, 343 § 13 (1958) (surveying opinions on topic). Those jurisdictions include the federal Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. See U.S. v. Hobson, 686 F.2d 628, 629 (8th Cir. 1982) ("The District Court correctly decided that Hobson is barred from raising this claim because his guilty plea constituted a waiver of his right to challenge his indictment under the IADA."); Camp v. U.S., 587 F.2d 397, 399-400 (8th Cir. 1978) (a valid guilty plea operates as a waiver of all non-jurisdictional defects or errors).
Iowa's position on whether a valid guilty plea waives a speedy trial defense under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act is somewhat unclear. In State v. Ristau, 305 N.W.2d 499, 499 (Iowa 1981), a defendant pled guilty to a crime and was sentenced. He appealed "on the ground he had not been brought to trial within the 180-day limit imposed by the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act." Id. at 499-500. This issue was not raised in the trial court. The Iowa Supreme Court nevertheless considered the question on the merits. Id. at 500.
Without citing this opinion, Devaney contends compliance with the speedy trial requirement contained in Iowa Code section 821.1 implicates the subject matter jurisdiction of the court and, accordingly, may be raised at this juncture, regardless of his plea. In Ristau, the Iowa Supreme Court suggested this was indeed the case but found it unnecessary "to resolve that issue." Id. The federal Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in contrast, addressed the question head on. In Camp, the court held that a challenge based on a provision of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers was a "non-jurisdictional error and, as such, is waivable by a criminal defendant." 587 F.2d at 400.
Based on recent opinions, including Burgess, we would be inclined to conclude that Devaney waived his challenge based on the speedy trial rule contained in Iowa Code section 821.1. Burgess, 639 N.W.2d at 567. However, in light of some ambiguity created by Ristau, we elect to proceed to the merits.
II. Merits
In Devaney's view, the district court was required to dismiss the charges against him with prejudice because the prosecutor did not notify him or his attorney of the motion for extension of the 180-day deadline. We agree with Devaney that Article III(a) of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act requires a person to present a motion for extension of the deadline in "open court" with "the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel being present." However, the prosecutor's motion in this case was not a motion pursuant to Article III(a). Instead, the motion was essentially a notification that Devaney was unable to stand trial in Iowa, given the pending charges in Nebraska. Such a notification implicates Article VI of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, which states:
In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.
In comparing this provision with the good cause continuance provision set forth in Article III(a), the Iowa Supreme Court stated, "Unlike Article III which requires the prosecutor to seek a continuance whenever a prisoner's trial will be delayed for reasons other than his inability to stand trial, Article VI automatically tolls the running of the statute . . . whenever and for so long as the prisoner is unable to stand trial . . ." State v. Wood, 241 N.W.2d 8, 13 (Iowa 1976). The court continued, "[t]here is therefore no requirement that the prosecution seek a continuance prior to the statute's running when inability to stand trial under Article VI is the reason for delay." Id. at 14.
Similarly, in Ristau, the Iowa Supreme Court noted that it was unnecessary to determine whether good cause for violating the speedy trial rule was shown "because even without a continuance, the proceedings were suspended by the transfer to juvenile court which tolled the running of the limitation period." 305 N.W.2d at 500. The court cited Article VI of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act and noted that the transfer rendered the defendant "unable to stand trial" within the meaning of that Article. Id. at 501.
We conclude Devaney was unable to stand trial in Iowa during the period that he was awaiting trial on pending charges in Nebraska. Therefore, the 180-day speedy trial deadline was tolled during that time period. Subtracting those days from the 180-day deadline, it is clear the speedy trial deadline was met even without the extension order. Accordingly, we affirm Devaney's judgment and sentence for third-degree arson.