Opinion
November 10, 1950 —
December 5, 1950.
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Dane county: HERMAN W. SACHTJEN, Circuit Judge. Affirmed.
For the appellant there was a brief by the Attorney General, Roy G. Tulane, assistant attorney general, and Robert W. Arthur, district attorney of Dane county, and oral argument by Mr. Tulane and Mr. Arthur.
For the respondent there was a brief by Walter J. Mattison, city attorney of Milwaukee, Omar T. McMahon, assistant city attorney, and Erbstoeszer, Cleary Decker and Vernon Erbstoeszer, all of Milwaukee, and oral argument by Harry G. Slater, assistant city attorney, and Vernon Erbstoeszer.
The action is one to procure the revocation of defendant's license as a lobbyist under sec. 345.21 (1), Stats. Defendant demurred to the complaint, and from the order of the court sustaining the demurrer, plaintiff appeals.
The specific charge is that defendant made false reports of expenditures and obligations incurred as a lobbyist. The material statute provides:
346.245 (1) "Every lobbyist required to have his name entered upon the docket shall, within ten days after the end of each calendar month of any regular or special session of the legislature, file with the secretary of state a sworn statement of expenses made and obligations incurred by himself or any agent in connection with or relative to his activities as such lobbyist for the preceding month or fraction thereof, except that he need not list his own personal living and travel expenses in such statement."
The facts alleged in the complaint, as amended, are that on or about January 11, 1949, the city and county of Milwaukee jointly rented rooms 717-719-721 of the Hotel Loraine at Madison; that on January 17, 1949, the defendant John A. Decker was retained by the city of Milwaukee as a special assistant city attorney and legislative counsel for the 1949 session of the state legislature; that on January 19, 1949, the defendant registered and received a license as a lobbyist for the city of Milwaukee, and on January 18th registered at said hotel in room 721 and occupied it until April 5, 1949; that the Milwaukee county lobbyist occupied room 717, and the room between, being a corner room furnished as a parlor and card room, was occupied and used by both for conferences and entertainment of guests, both members of the legislature and friends.
The city of Milwaukee assigned two stenographers, who are civil-service employees on the permanent pay roll, to do necessary work for defendant at Madison. These two employees were directed to Madison by Walter J. Mattison, city attorney, and Elsie Sutschek, head law clerk of the city attorney's office.
There was incurred for these items in addition to the rental for room 721: For living expenses, meals, and travel of the two stenographers, approximately $350; for hotel rooms for the stenographers at $5 per day, $113.50; the city's half of rent for room 719 (parlor), $400. All of these items were billed to the city of Milwaukee, audited by the chairman of the judiciary legislative committee, and paid directly out of city funds upon authority of the common council.
Defendant filed monthly reports of his expenditures and obligations incurred, but did not include any of the items listed above. At the end of the session the city of Milwaukee reported its expenditures and included all of such items.
The complaint alleged that defendant had a duty to report these items, and that his failure so to do constitutes the filing false reports for which his license as a lobbyist should be revoked.
The trial court sustained defendant's demurrer to the complaint upon the ground that the allegations made do not constitute a cause of action. The state has taken this appeal.
Sec. 346.25, Stats., requires the employer who is designated as principal to make but one report to the secretary of state within thirty days after sine die adjournment of the legislature.
Appellant contends that sec. 346.245 (1), Stats., which requires a lobbyist to file a sworn statement "of expenses made and obligations incurred by himself or any agent in connection with or relative to his activities as such lobbyist" is so broad as to require reporting of items which aid his work even though incurred by his principal, and that for purposes of interpretation the term "any agent" should include such lobbyist's principal.
We know of no law which sanctions such strained construction under any circumstances, and certainly not in the interpretation of a statute penal in its nature.
Sec. 346.205, Stats., defines a lobbyist and principal:
"(2) Lobbyist. Any person who engages in the practice of lobbying for hire except in the manner authorized by section 346.27. Lobbying for hire shall include activities of any officers, agents, attorneys, or employees of any principal who are paid a regular salary or retainer by such principal and whose duties include lobbying. . . .
"(4) Principal. (a) Any person, corporation, or association which engages a lobbyist or other person in connection with any legislation, pending before the legislature or to be proposed, affecting the pecuniary interest of such person, corporation, or association.
"(b) Any board, department, commission, or other agency of the state, or any county or municipal corporation, which engages a lobbyist or other person in connection with any legislation pending or to be proposed affecting the statutory powers, duties, or appropriation of such agency, county, or municipal corporation."
"It is fundamental that in construing a statute the words therein are to be given the meaning they commonly were understood to have at the time the statute was passed. 59 C.J., Statutes, p. 1137, sec. 673. . . ." International Union v. Wisconsin E. R. Board (1947), 250 Wis. 550, 558, 27 N.W.2d 875, 28 N.W.2d 254, 336 U.S. 245, 69 Sup. Ct. 516, 93 L.Ed. 651.
In this instance the statutes clearly indicate that the terms, as adopted, had the usual meaning and there is no room for other interpretation.
Counsel for the state argue that there is similarity between the Corrupt Practices Act and the Lobby Control Law, and that the language used by the court in State ex rel. La Follette v. Kohler (1930), 200 Wis. 518, 563, 228 N.W. 895, supports its position:
"In the act, particularly that part relating to the amount which may be spent and the filing of accounts, the phrase `by and on his behalf' is used. There is no difficulty in understanding what is meant by the term by; the phrase `on his behalf,' when it refers to a candidate, means by someone who acts for him in the sense that an agent acts for and on behalf of his principal. The authority may be express or implied but it must exist; otherwise the disbursement is not made on behalf of the person sought to be charged."
The fallacy of the state's analogy lies in the fact that there the principal is accountable for sums spent on his behalf — expenditures made by any agent are a part of that for which such principal is accountable. The lobby law, on the other hand, requires the principal to account at the end of the session for all expenditures made by it. The law under which defendant is here sued makes the lobbyist accountable monthly for sums expended by him or any subagent on behalf of the principal and does not go beyond that.
Counsel further argue that the purpose of the law is to make known during the session of the legislature what amounts are being expended in an effort to influence legislation. If that were true, the legislature could have accomplished its purpose easily by requiring monthly reports from the principal as well as from the lobbyist.
We are of the opinion that the trial court properly construed the statute and sustained the demurrer.
By the Court. — Order affirmed.