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holding that the defendant was not subject to custodial interrogation when he accompanied the police officers to the police station, was not told he was under arrest, was not handcuffed, was given breaks when requested, and was allowed to return home when he wanted
Summary of this case from State v. ScruggsOpinion
ID No. 9704012151
Submitted: July 9, 2002
Decided: October 30, 2002
On Defendant's Pro Se Motion for Postconviction Relief. Denied.
Cynthia Kelsey, Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.
Nathaniel Davis, pro se Defendant, Department of Correction, Smyrna, Delaware.
ORDER
On this 30th day of October, 2002, upon consideration of Defendant's pro se motion for postconviction relief it appears to the Court that:
1. Nathaniel Davis (hereinafter "Defendant"), has filed this pro se motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. After several requests from this Court, the State responded to the Defendant's motion for postconviction relief. Because the State's response was delayed, the Defendant filed a separate Motion for Sanctions, requesting that the Rule 61 petition be granted by default. For the reasons set forth below, Defendant's motion for postconviction relief and motion for sanctions are DENIED.
On April 17, 2001, this Court, consistent with Rule 61(f)(1), requested the State to file a response to Defendant's motion, attaching with this request a copy of the motion. Having received no response, this Court inquired on January 2, 2002 about the State's response via an e-mail in which this Court offered to accommodate the State by making copies of any necessary documents. Despite these requests, the State inexcusably failed to provide a response. Consequently, this Court once again on June 24, 2002 wrote a letter ordering the State to provide a response no later than July 9, 2002. On July 9, 2002 the State filed their response.
2. Defendant pled guilty to Possession of Heroin, Possession of Cocaine and to Conspiracy Second on August 21, 1997. The plea agreement required the State, in return for the Defendant's plea, to enter a nolle prosequi on all other charges contained in the indictment. Defendant was sentenced on this same date to six years incarceration followed by probation. Defendant subsequently filed a Motion for Sentence Reduction/Modification pursuant to Rule 35 of the Superior Court Criminal Rules. This motion was denied with the Court noting that the sentence was appropriate in light of the fact that the Defendant was facing thirty years of minimum mandatory incarceration if he had proceeded to trial and was found guilty of the charges. The Defendant has now filed the present motion pursuant to Rule 61.
3. In the instant motion, the Defendant has set forth three separate claims as grounds for postconviction relief. Defendant first alleges that probable cause did not exist for a search and seizure by the police, maintaining that his arrest and conviction were therefore a result of an illegal search. Second, Defendant asserts a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Finally, Defendant claims a Brady violation, alleging that the State withheld exculpatory evidence in the form of a report by Trooper Bunden of the Delaware State Police.
Defendant's August 18, 2000 Motion at 3, 5-7.
Defendant's August 18, 2000 Motion at 3, 8-9.
Defendant's August 18, 2000 Motion at 3, 10.
4. Before addressing the merits of any claim raised in a motion seeking postconviction relief, this Court must first apply the rules governing the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i). This is the Defendant's first motion for postconviction relief and it was filed within three years of his conviction becoming final. As such, the requirements under Rule 61(i)(1) and (2) are satisfied. However, Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i)(3) provides that any ground for relief that was not asserted in the proceedings leading to the judgment of conviction, as required by the rules of this Court, is thereafter barred, unless the movant shows both cause for relief and prejudice from violation of the movant's rights.
Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (Del. 1991); Younger v. State, 580 A.2d 552, 554 (Del. 1990) (citing Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 265 (1989)).
See Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736, 747 n. 6 (Del. 1990) (quoting SUPER.CT.CRIM.R. 61(i)(3)).
5. Not only did the Defendant not raise the suppression or Brady issues at the trial stage of this litigation, but it has been firmly established that when a defendant pleads guilty, he waives the right to subsequently assert alleged constitutional violations. Here, the Defendant filled out a Truth In Sentencing Guilty Plea Form which indicated that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charges listed in the plea agreement. As a result of this plea, the Defendant is barred from raising the claims of illegal search and Brady violations as grounds for postconviction relief.
Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 312-13 (Del. 1988). The only exception is a claim of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, which has not been asserted by the Defendant and for which there is no support found in the record.
State v. Wilson, 2001 WL 392357, at *3-4 (Del.Super.Ct.) (citing Hickman v. State, 1994 WL 590495 (Del.Supr.); Smith v. State, 1990 WL 1475 (Del.Supr.); Sullivan v. State, 636 A.2d 931, 938 (Del. 1994) (ruling the fact that defendant filled out Truth In Sentencing Guilty Plea Form in defendant's own handwriting supported the Superior Court's conclusion that defendant's decision to plead guilty was knowing and voluntary)).
See, e.g., State v. Brown, 1999 WL 1568397 (Del.Super.Ct.) (adopting the District Court's finding that when the defendant entered a guilty plea, he was not entitled to a review of alleged constitutional violations of suppression of Brady material that occurred prior to the plea).
6. The Defendant's final claim is based on ineffective assistance of counsel. In order for a movant to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel he must satisfy the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington. "In the context of a guilty plea challenge, Strickland requires that a defendant show: 1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and 2) that counsel's actions were prejudicial to him in that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial and that the result of a trial would have been his acquittal." Under the first prong of the Strickland test, there is a strong presumption that counsel's representation was professionally reasonable. Although this is not insurmountable, Strickland mandates that this Court must "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight" when reviewing counsel's representation. Delaware has additionally held that a defendant must make "concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal" in claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. Within the Defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, he makes four separate claims, each of which will be individually addressed.
See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
See State v. Wilson, 2001 WL 392357, at *2 (citing Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 59 (1985); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694; accord Larson v. State, 1995 WL 389718, at *3-4 (Del.Supr.); Blanchfield v. State, 1994 WL 590536 (Del.Supr.); Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (Del. 1992); Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53, 58 (Del. 1988)).
See Albury, 551 A.2d at 59 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see also Larson, 1995 WL 389718, at *4 (Del.Supr.); Flamer, 585 A.2d at 753.
See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689.
See State v. Wilson, 2001 WL 392357, at *2 (citing Younger, 580 A.2d at 556; Skinner v. State, 1994 WL 91138 (Del.Supr.)).
7. The Defendant first claims that his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file appropriate pretrial motions. Specifically, the Defendant claims that he noticed discrepancies with the search and desired his counsel to file a suppression motion, but his counsel had declined to pursue the request. As previously noted, the Defendant pled guilty to the charges thereby giving up his constitutional rights to challenge the evidence against him. Consequently, even if the Court accepted this allegation by the Defendant regarding his attorney's conduct as true, the Defendant has waived the presentation of such a motion and cannot establish that he was prejudiced by counsel's conduct. When a criminal defendant decides to resolve his charges in a particular way, the Court is not obligated to keep available possible constitutional challenges so that the defendant can open them simply because he does not like the end result. The Defendant's plea was entered knowingly, voluntarily and in full appreciation of the rights he was relinquishing. This argument is nothing more than an attempt by the Defendant to make a challenge through the back door when the front door has been closed.
See State v. Foster, 2001 WL 1628310 (Del.Super.Ct.).
8. The second claim by the Defendant is that his counsel failed to conduct an adequate investigation. The Defendant asserts that he and Mr. Weiler met only two times prior to the plea and that Mr. Weiler could not answer any questions that Defendant presented to him at those times. The Court agrees with the Defendant that counsel should spend sufficient time with a client to insure that he fully appreciates the charges against him and to discuss available options, and should respond to a client's questions. However, this does not mean that his counsel is obligated to be available at the client's whim or to respond to inquires that have no legal foundation. In addition, there is no magical number of conferences required to occur with one's client to meet the Strickland standard. Simply put, the Court does not find that greater access to counsel would have changed the outcome of the litigation, and that Defendant has failed to establish any prejudice from the limited interaction with counsel.
9. The Defendant's third claim is that, due to the lack of preparation of Mr. Weiler, and the state of mind that he was in from the conditions of the prison, that he did not knowingly and voluntarily enter the plea agreement. This Court, upon review of the guilty plea, cannot find that the Defendant entered into the guilty plea involuntarily. The Defendant indicated to the court that he was entering the plea freely and voluntarily and that no-one had threatened or promised him anything in return. Further, when asked whether he was satisfied with his counsel's representation in the case he responded "yes" both in court and on the guilty plea form he signed. The Defendant has failed to present clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Consequently, this Court finds that the Defendant understood the consequences of his plea and entered into that plea knowingly and voluntarily.
10. It appears the Defendant's final argument is that counsel was ineffective for failing to obtain the report of Trooper Bunden. This claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is also without merit. As described above, Defendant's voluntary guilty plea waives all defects allegedly occurring before the entering of the plea. However, even if the waiver was not present, the Court finds the Defendant's requests to be without merit. The obligations imposed by Brady places the burden upon the prosecutor to provide information in their possession that would be exculpatory or favorable to the defense. What the Defendant is seeking, even if it exists, is a report of the officer who initially detained him. How such a report would be exculpatory is not explained by the Defendant nor how its production would have affected the Defendant's decision. These conclusory statements by the Defendant are simply insufficient.
See Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 312-13 (Del. 1988).
11. Following a review of the record, it is clear that the Defendant has failed to allege any facts sufficient to substantiate his claim that his attorney was ineffective. The Defendant was facing a mandatory thirty-year term in prison if he was convicted of the offences. The Defendant's counsel was able to negotiate a plea bargain with the State which limited his sentence to six years. The Defendant and his attorney discussed the case prior to the entry of the plea and the Defendant was aware of the consequences of the charges. Further, the plea was clearly advantageous to the Defendant. This appears to be well above the standard of reasonableness that Strickland requires. In addition to this, when the Defendant entered his guilty plea, he stated he was satisfied with defense counsel's performance. He is bound by his statement unless he presents clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The Defendant has failed to establish that his counsel's representation was ineffective under the first prong of the Strickland test. Based on this, this Court finds that counsel's representation was well within the range required by Strickland.
See Blanchfield v. State, 1994 WL 590536 (Del.Supr.); Mapps v. State, Del.Supr., No. 3, 1994, Holland, J. (March 17, 1994) (ORDER) (citing Sullivan, 636 A.2d at 937-38).
12. Therefore, because the Court finds that it is plain from the motion for postconviction relief and the record in this case that the Defendant is not entitled to relief, the motion is hereby DENIED.
While the Court agrees with the Defendant that the State's lax attitude in responding to the Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is reprehensible, the Court will not impose sanctions having found the Defendant's petition to be without merit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.