Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4594-13T2
02-04-2016
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. ERIC DANIELS, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (NaSheena D. Porter, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Fisher and Espinosa. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 08-12-1096. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (NaSheena D. Porter, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant appeals from the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR), which was denied without an evidentiary hearing or oral argument, presenting the following arguments for our consideration:
POINT I
THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON MR. DANIELS'S CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
PART II
IN THE ALTERNATIVE, THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT. (Not raised below).
For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
Defendant was convicted of burglary in 2009 and sentenced to seven years, subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and penalties. His convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. In April 2013, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR that was supplemented by a brief filed by counsel. Defendant contended that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion for acquittal, arguing the evidence was insufficient to sustain a burglary conviction, and that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise this issue on appeal.
We have not been provided with a copy of the petition or supporting documents asserting these arguments and rely upon the description of the arguments set forth in the briefs of defendant and the State. --------
There was no issue here regarding the timeliness of defendant's petition or the application of a procedural bar to his claims. In a written opinion, the trial court reviewed the evidence presented at trial and concluded "[t]here was more than enough evidence introduced at trial to support the jury verdict and to defeat a motion for acquittal had it been made." As a result, the court determined trial counsel's failure to make such a motion could not meet the standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984), to support a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court denied defendant's petition and requests for oral argument and an evidentiary hearing, stating: "Based on the facts of this case and the nature of the issues raised, oral argument was not necessary and would not have aided the Court."
In State v. Mayron, 344 N.J. Super. 382 (App. Div. 2001), we noted that, despite the absence of a specific directive in Rule 3:22 regarding whether a PCR court should grant oral argument, "there should be a significant presumption in favor of oral argument." Id. at 386-87. We identified several factors a trial judge should weigh when deciding whether to hear oral argument: "the apparent merits and complexity of the issues raised, whether the petition is an initial application, whether argument of counsel will add to the written positions that have been submitted, and in general, whether the goals and purposes of the post-conviction procedure are furthered by oral argument." Id. at 387.
The Supreme Court not only agreed that such factors were relevant to a determination regarding oral argument, it stressed that such factors "should be approached with the view that oral argument should be granted." State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 282 (2012). The facts relevant to such a determination "should be 'view[ed] in the light most favorable to a defendant.'" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992)). The Court further instructed, when the trial judge determines that oral argument is not warranted, "the judge should provide a statement of reasons that is tailored to the particular application, stating why the judge considers oral argument unnecessary." Ibid. The Court cautioned, "[a] general reference to the issues not being particularly complex is not helpful to a reviewing court." Ibid.
In Parker, the thrust of the defendant's claim was that his counsel had been ineffective at the time of his guilty plea and at sentencing by failing to mention the defendant's "belief that he would be killed if he did not comply with [a drug dealer's] directions" to commit the crime. Id. at 274-75. The Court found reason to conclude the trial court had failed to "accord [the] defendant the benefit of the presumption in favor of oral argument." Id. at 283. Among the reasons for denial given by the PCR judge was the failure to include affidavits or certifications to support his assertion he acted under duress. Id. at 275-76. The Court found this deficiency ameliorated by the inclusion of sworn statements the defendant gave to police that supported the assertion. Id. at 283. The Court also noted the PCR judge's erroneous conclusion that evidence of duress could not have achieved a better result for the defendant, which was based on the court's mistaken belief the defendant had pled guilty to manslaughter when in fact he had entered a guilty plea to aggravated manslaughter. Id. at 283-84. The Court observed that the PCR judge relied upon another faulty premise in dismissing the defendant's claim that his attorney was ineffective in failing to negotiate a more favorable plea bargain and "took too narrow a view of [the] defendant's argument." Id. at 283.
In this case, the sole issue raised in defendant's petition relates to his contention that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for burglary in light of his assertion that he lacked the requisite intent to commit a crime when he entered the dwelling. The standard applicable to whether a motion for a judgment of acquittal should be granted is straightforward. The issue is not whether an acquittal is possible given the version of facts proffered by the defendant but "whether, viewing the State's evidence in its entirety . . . and giving the State the benefit of all its favorable testimony as well as all of the favorable inferences which reasonably could be drawn therefrom, a reasonable jury could find guilt of the charge beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454, 458-59 (1967); See R. 3:18. The PCR court identified the correct legal standard and applied it to the evidence presented at trial.
Although the court's statement of reasons for denying oral argument could have been more detailed, its analysis did not suffer from any telltale errors that signaled a failure to accord defendant the presumption of oral argument as occurred in Parker, supra, 212 N.J. at 283. Contrary to the argument by defendant that the issues raised required information outside the record, the issue required a review of the evidence at trial to determine the potential success of a motion for judgment of acquittal. See State v. Flores, 228 N.J. Super. 586, 589-90 (App. Div. 1988), certif. denied, 115 N.J. 78 (1989) (affirming the PCR court's disposition on the papers but emphasizing that resolution of the issues presented did not require taking oral testimony).
The decision to hear oral argument remains one that lies within the discretion of the trial court. Parker, supra, 212 N.J. at 281; Mayron, supra, 344 N.J. Super. at 386-87. Although we continue to stress the importance of according defendants oral argument on their PCR petitions, we conclude the failure to hear oral argument in this case was harmless error in light of the very straightforward issue raised.
We turn then to defendant's contention that he presented prima facie evidence of ineffective assistance of counsel, warranting an evidentiary hearing.
The standard for determining whether counsel's performance was ineffective for purposes of the Sixth Amendment was formulated in Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, and adopted by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987). In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must meet the two-prong test of establishing both that: (1) counsel's performance was deficient and he or she made errors that were so egregious that counsel was not functioning effectively as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution; and (2) the defect in performance prejudiced defendant's rights to a fair trial such that there exists a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 694, 104 S. Ct. at 2064, 2068, 80 L. Ed. 2d at 693, 698.
We agree with the PCR court that even if counsel had moved for a judgment of acquittal based upon an alleged insufficiency of the evidence, such a motion would have been unsuccessful. Therefore, the claims against both trial and appellate counsel cannot satisfy the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test. Accordingly, the PCR court correctly concluded that an evidentiary hearing was not warranted. See Preciose, supra, 129 N.J. at 462-63.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION