Opinion
NO. 2011-KA-0511
10-26-2011
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. STEVEN L. DAFFNER
Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr. District Attorney Matthew Caplan Assistant District Attorney COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT James Harper ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDERS COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
APPEAL FROM
CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT ORLEANS PARISH
NO. 501-149, SECTION "K"
Honorable Arthur Hunter, Judge
PAUL A. BONIN
JUDGE
(Court composed of Judge Dennis R. Bagneris, Sr., Judge Edwin A. Lombard, Judge Paul A. Bonin)
Leon A. Cannizzaro, Jr.
District Attorney
Matthew Caplan
Assistant District Attorney
COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT
James Harper
ORLEANS PUBLIC DEFENDERS
COUNSEL FOR DEFENDANT/APPELLEE
REVERSED AND REMANDED
Having been previously denied a continuance, the district attorney dismissed the formal charge of possession of hydrocodone against the defendant, Steven Daffner, and reinstituted the charge one month later. Mr. Daffner then filed a motion to quash the reinstituted bill of information on the grounds that the prosecution's actions violated his due process rights and the separation of powers doctrine. At the hearing on the motion, the trial judge agreed and sustained the motion, dismissing the prosecution with prejudice. The district attorney appeals. See LA. C.CR.P. ART. 912 B(1).
Mr. Daffner did not assert his motion to quash that his constitutional or statutory right to a speedy trial has been violated and he does not so contend. See State v. Reaves, 376 So. 2d 136 (La. 1979); see also LA. C.CR.P. ART. 532(7). He also does not contend that the prosecution was attempting to avoid the time limitations for the commencement of trial. See LA. C.CR.P. ART. 576. "The motion to quash on the ground of prosecutorial abuse of its dismissal-reinstitution authority may be raised independently of a claim that the defendant's speedy trial rights have been violated." State v. Hayes, 10-1538, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/1/11), --- So. 3d ---, ---, 2011 WL 3862971.
Because Mr. Daffner did not show the requisite specific prejudice to his defense occasioned by the prosecution's use of its dismissal-reinstitution authority, we find that the trial judge abused his discretion in sustaining the motion to quash and dismissing the prosecution with prejudice. Accordingly, we reverse the ruling and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.
We briefly explain our decision below.
I
In this Part we describe the history of the case and the standard by which we review a trial court's granting of a motion to quash.
A
On August 9, 2010, the state first filed a bill of information charging Mr. Daffner with possession on July 23, 2010 of a Schedule-II controlled dangerous substance, hydrocodone, a violation of La. R.S. 40:967 C(2). On September 10, 2010, the day set for trial, the state requested a continuance, which the trial judge denied. The state then dismissed the information the same day that its motion for a continuance was denied.
A violation of the statute is punishable by an imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than five years and by a fine of not more than five thousand dollars. See also La. R.S. 40:964, Schedule II, A(1)(1).
On October 15, 2010, the district attorney reinstituted the same charge, thus effectively granting himself a continuance. Before the case was set for trial, Mr. Daffner filed a motion to quash. Mr. Daffner, in his motion, raised the same two complaints he asserts now on appeal: first, that the district attorney's dismissal-reinstitution authority violated his due process rights because the prosecution was given a non-reciprocal procedural right similar to the one the Supreme Court struck down in Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470 (1973); and second, that the district attorney's dismissal-reinstitution practice violates the separation of powers doctrine by taking the ability to grant continuances away from the judiciary.
After a brief hearing, consisting only of argument of counsel, the trial judge sustained the motion and dismissed the prosecution with prejudice. The district attorney immediately filed for an appeal to this court.
B
At the outset, we note that Mr. Daffner's "filing of a motion to quash is the appropriate procedural vehicle to raise the issue of the district attorney's abuse of his considerable authority to dismiss and reinstitute prosecutions." State v. Hayes, 10-1538, p. 4 (La. App. 4 Cir. 9/1/11), --- So. 3d ---, ---, 2011 WL 3862971; see also LA. C.CR.P. ART. 531 ("All pleas or defenses raised before trial, other than mental incapacity to proceed, or pleas of 'not guilty' and of 'not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity,' shall be urged by motion to quash."). "[T]he trial court possesses the inherent discretion to grant a motion to quash and to order a prosecution dismissed with prejudice after the state has used its broad prosecutorial discretion by dismissing and then reinstituting a prosecution to force a continuance of trial." State v. King, 10-2638, p. 5 (La. 5/6/11), 60 So. 3d 615, 618 (per curiam).
Because the trial court makes a discretionary decision on a motion to quash, "an appellate court is allowed to reverse a trial court judgment on a motion to quash only if that finding represents an abuse of the trial court's discretion." State v. Love, 00-3347, pp. 9-10 (La. 5/23/03), 847 So. 2d 1198, 1206. In a case involving the use or abuse of the dismissal-reinstitution authority of the prosecutor, each case is to be decided on the facts and circumstances of the individual case. Id, p. 14, at 1209; State v. Batiste, 05-1571, p. 5 (La. 10/17/06), 939 So. 2d 1245, 1249.
Mr. Daffner argues that the Orleans Parish District Attorney routinely exercises his dismissal-reinstitution authority and furnished affidavits of defense counsel in other cases to support his argument. Because we look to the facts and circumstances of an individual case, the district attorney's actions in other cases is not relevant to a determination of the case-specific inquiry of this particular case.
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While the general standard of review for a motion to quash is abuse-of-discretion, "[a] trial court necessarily abuses its discretion if its ruling is based on an erroneous view of the law." State v. Hayes, p. 11, at ---, citing to Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990), and United States v. Taylor, 487 U.S. 326, 336 (1988) (noting that "discretionary choices are not left to a court's inclination, but to its judgment; and its judgment is to be guided by sound legal principles."). "Thus, if a trial court in exercising its discretion bases its ruling upon an erroneous view or application of the law, its ruling is not entitled to our deference." State v. Hayes, p. 11, at ---.
In the present case, the trial judge applied an incorrect legal principle to the case by failing to require a showing of specific prejudice by the defendant, so the trial court's decision is entitled to no deference by us.
II
In this Part we explain that Mr. Daffner's arguments concerning separation of powers and due process have already been authoritatively addressed by the Supreme Court in State v. King, supra, and by us in State v. Hayes, supra.
Mr. Daffner poignantly complains that in exercising its dismissal-reinstitution authority in the manner used in this case the prosecution displaces the trial judge's function and effectively grants itself a continuance, a prerogative not reciprocally available to the defense. Mr. Daffner characterizes the district attorney's exercise of his authority as a flaunting of his authority. But, as we explained in Hayes, even if we accepted arguendo such characterization, "the flaunting of the prosecutor's authority is merely a gateway consideration to granting a motion to quash on these grounds." State v. Hayes, p. 8, at ---. "Because of the severe remedy, a trial court may not quash the formal charges and dismiss them with prejudice when the prosecution's abusive exercise of its authority simply disrupts a trial court's conduct of the proceedings or challenges the court's authority to manage its docket, but does not significantly disadvantage the defense at any forthcoming trial." Id. pp. 8-9, at ---, referencing State v. King, p. 6, at 619. Consequently, a finding by the trial court that the prosecution abusively exercised its authority is necessary but not sufficient to the sustaining of a motion to quash. See State v. Hayes, p. 9, at ---.
In order to prevail on a motion to quash on the ground that the prosecution has flaunted its dismissal-reinstitution authority, "[t]he defendant must show that the district attorney's abusive exercise of its power actually violates the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial." Id. And the Louisiana Supreme Court requires the defendant "to make a showing of specific prejudice to his defense." State v. King, pp. 7-8, at 619, citing to State v. Love, supra, and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972).
Here, Mr. Daffner has not shown specific prejudice to his ability to compel the attendance of witnesses or to present a defense resulting from what he has characterized as the flaunting of the district attorney's authority. See LA. CONST. ART. I, § 16. Indeed, under the procedural posture of this case, Mr. Daffner's reinstituted case had not even been set for trial at the time his motion to quash was granted. Because the defendant did not seek to prove any resulting specific prejudice to his right to a fair trial, the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the motion to quash. See State v. Hayes, pp. 9-10, at ---.
DECREE
The ruling of the trial court sustaining the motion to quash filed by Steven Daffner is reversed. The matter is remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED