Opinion
No. CR 02-0557173
January 20, 2010
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION IN RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CORRECT AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE
On August 29, 2003, the defendant was convicted by way of a guilty plea of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c, robbery in the first degree in violation of § 53a-134(a)(2), and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of §§ 53a-48 and 53a-134(a)(2). The trial court (Solomon, J.) imposed a total effective sentence of twenty-eight years incarceration. It was noted on the sentencing mittimus for the felony murder charge that twenty-five years of the defendant's sentence constitutes "mandatory minimum" time.
To be precise, the mittimus expressly sets forth the defendant's sentence on the charge of felony murder as "28 years (25 yrs minimum mandatory)." It is undisputed that this language indicates that twenty-five years of the defendant's total effective twenty-eight year sentence is a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment.
By motion filed July 10, 2009, and amended by counsel on October 12, 2009, the defendant seeks to correct his sentence for felony murder. The defendant contends that it is improper to designate any portion of his sentence as a mandatory minimum sentence, and that any such designation amounts to an illegal sentence. As relief, the defendant requests that the court order deleted from the mittimus the language which provides that twenty-five years of his sentence is a "mandatory minimum" sentence. Because the court concludes that twenty-five years of the defendant's sentence is properly characterized as a mandatory minimum sentence, the court rejects the defendant's contention and denies his request that the language of his sentencing mittimus be amended.
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
As an initial matter, the court must determine whether it has jurisdiction to consider the defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence. "Jurisdiction involves the power in a court to hear and determine the cause of action presented to it . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted) State v. Lawrence, 281 Conn. 147, 153 (2007). "[T]he jurisdiction of the sentencing court terminates once a defendant's sentence has begun, and, therefore, that court may no longer take any action affecting a defendant's sentence unless it expressly has been authorized to act . . . Practice Book § 43-22, which provides the trial court with such authority, provides that `[t]he judicial authority may at any time correct an illegal sentence or other illegal disposition, or it may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner or any other disposition made in an illegal manner.'" (Citations omitted.) Cobham v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 30, 37-38 (2001). "An illegal sentence is essentially one which either exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits, violates a defendant's right against double jeopardy, is ambiguous, or is internally contradictory." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. McNellis, 15 Conn.App. 416, 443-44, cert. denied, 209 Conn. 809 (1988).
In asserting that it is improper to label a portion of his sentence as a mandatory minimum term, the defendant advances a claim that, broadly interpreted, could be characterized as one concerning a sentence which (at least as memorialized by the sentencing mittimus) allegedly "exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits . . . [or] is ambiguous." Important in this regard is that the defendant's claim pertains only to the terms of his sentence; it in no way attacks the sufficiency of his conviction. "In order for the court to have jurisdiction over a motion to correct an illegal sentence after the sentence has been executed, the sentencing proceeding, and not the trial leading to the conviction, must be the subject of the attack." State v. Lawrence, supra, 281 Conn. 158. Moreover, our Appellate Court has held that a challenge to the accuracy of the wording of a criminal judgment or a sentencing mittimus is properly raised by way of a motion to correct. State v. Gamble, 27 Conn.App. 1, 11-12, cert. denied, 222 Conn. 901 (1992). The court therefore finds that it has jurisdiction to consider the merits of the defendant's motion.
See State v. Lawrence, supra, 281 Conn. 156-57 (explaining that a sentence which "exceeds the relevant statutory maximum limits" may not be "within the permissible range for the crimes charged" and issues concerning a potentially "ambiguous" sentence pertain to "the computation of the length of the sentence").
DEFENDANT'S CLAIM
The defendant maintains that although the crime of felony murder is punishable by a period of incarceration of not less than twenty-five years; General Statutes §§ 53a-54c and 53a-35a; the twenty-five year term so imposed does not constitute, and cannot be characterized as, a mandatory minimum sentence. He contends that where the legislature intends a sentencing statute to carry with it a mandatory minimum term of imprisonment, the legislature does so explicitly by providing in the statute that such minimum term "may not be suspended or reduced." Because this language is absent from § 53a-35a, the defendant argues that no portion of a sentence imposed for felony murder can be classified as a mandatory minimum sentence. To the defendant, the claim he advances involves far more than an issue of mere semantics. In the defendant's view, because no portion of a felony murder sentence can be classified as a mandatory minimum, a sentencing court, although obligated initially to impose a sentence of not less than twenty-five years, nonetheless retains the authority pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-39(b) to modify and to reduce any such sentence in the future — even to a period of incarceration of less than twenty-five years. The court, however, does not agree.
Section 53a-54c provides in relevant part: "A person is guilty of murder when, acting either alone or with one or more persons, he commits . . . a robbery . . . and, in the course of and in furtherance of such crime or of flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if any, causes the death of a person other than one of the participants . . ."
Section 53a-35a provides in relevant part: "For any felony committed on or after July 1, 1981, the sentence of imprisonment shall be a definite sentence and the term shall be fixed by the court as follows . . . (2) for the class A felony of murder, a term not less than twenty-five years nor more than life . . ." See State v. Greco, 216 Conn. 282, 294-95 (1990) (recognizing that the penalty established for felony murder, as a type of murder, is set forth in § 53a-35a (2)).
Section 53a-39(b) provides in relevant part: "At any time during the period of a definite sentence of more than three years, upon agreement of the defendant and the state's attorney to seek review of the sentence, the sentencing court or judge may, after hearing good cause shown, reduce the sentence . . . for a period not to exceed that to which the defendant could have been originally sentenced." Under § 53a-39(c), however, a sentence reduction may not be applied "to any portion of a sentence imposed that is a mandatory minimum sentence for an offense which may not be suspended or reduced by the court."
The language of § 53a-35a is clear and unambiguous. See General Statutes § 1-2z. As noted above, it provides that a sentence for murder "shall be . . . not less than twenty-five years." Because this creates a minimum term of imprisonment that a sentencing court is obligated to impose, our state Supreme Court has recognized that § 53a-35a establishes a "mandatory minimum" twenty-five year sentence for the crime of murder. In State v. Carrasquillo, 290 Conn. 209, 211 (2009), the Court noted in its recitation of the procedural history of that case that "[a] jury found the defendant guilty of murder . . . which requires a mandatory minimum prison term of twenty-five years for the crime of murder." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, in State v. Lopez, 197 Conn. 337, 354-55 (1985), the Court interpreted § 53a-35a to require a " mandatory minimum sentence of twenty-five years imprisonment" and held, accordingly, that a court "lack[s] the authority to suspend a portion of the minimum twenty-five year sentence." (Emphasis added.)
Section 1-2z provides: "The meaning of a statute shall, in the first instance, be ascertained from the text of the statute itself and its relationship to other statutes. If, after examining such text and considering such relationship, the meaning of such text is plain and unambiguous and does not yield absurd or unworkable results, extratextual evidence of the meaning of the statute shall not be considered."
While the defendant is correct that § 53a-35a does not expressly provide that the sentence imposed "may not be suspended or reduced" — a phrase which the court recognizes often appears in statutes establishing a mandatory minimum sentence — the defendant cites to no case (and the court has found none) which holds that this phrase possesses some talismanic effect and therefore must be utilized by the legislature in order to establish a mandatory minimum sentence. Therefore, based upon the above-cited precedent and the plain language of the statute, this court concludes that § 53a-35a provides for a sentence which is properly characterized as a mandatory minimum sentence.
In reaching this conclusion, the court finds it ironic that one of the primary arguments advanced by the defendant serves to expose the weakness of — rather than to bolster — his overall contention. As noted earlier, the defendant concedes (as clearly he must) that under § 53a-35a the original sentencing court is compelled to impose a sentence of at least twenty-five years. The defendant goes on to argue, however, that because this twenty-five-year term is technically not a mandatory minimum sentence, a later court (notwithstanding the obligation imposed on the original sentencing court) would be free to modify and reduce such a sentence to a term less than twenty-five years. Simply stated, this court respectfully declines the defendant's invitation to interpret the applicable statutes in such a way as to bring about this absurd and unworkable result. See General Statutes § 1-2z, quoted in footnote 6 of this decision.
By the express language of § 53a-35a, the legislature has clearly indicated its intent that any person convicted of the crime of murder must be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of at least twenty-five years. The defendant's contention that § 53a-35a does not establish a sentence properly characterized as a "mandatory minimum" sentence, carried to its necessary conclusion, would allow a court to routinely circumvent the legislature's unambiguously expressed intent simply by imposing the mandatory minimum sentence as an initial matter, and then by reducing the sentence — presumably even within the same sentencing proceeding. Because such a tortured interpretation of the statutes at issue here is wholly unwarranted, the court rejects the defendant's novel claim.
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the court concludes that the language of the sentencing mittimus is legally correct in providing that twenty-five years of the defendant's total effective sentence is a mandatory minimum sentence. The defendant's motion to correct an illegal sentence, and to delete from the mittimus the reference to a mandatory minimum sentence, is therefore denied.