Opinion
1 CA-CR 12-0002
10-02-2012
STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee, v. GUADALUPE GARCIA CORRAL, Appellant.
Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General Kent E. Cattani, Division Chief Counsel Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief Counsel and Jeffrey L. Sparks, Assistant Attorney General Attorneys for Appellee James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender Jeffrey L. Force, Deputy Public Defender Attorneys for Appellant
NOTICE: THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED
EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
See Ariz. R. Supreme Court 111(c); ARCAP 28(c);
Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.24
MEMORANDUM DECISION
(Not for Publication -Rule 111, Rules of the Arizona Supreme Court)
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
Cause No. CR2011-114326-008
The Honorable Paul J. McMurdie, Judge
AFFIRMED
Thomas C. Horne, Attorney General
By Kent E. Cattani, Division Chief Counsel
Joseph T. Maziarz, Section Chief Counsel
and Jeffrey L. Sparks, Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellee
Phoenix
James J. Haas, Maricopa County Public Defender
By Jeffrey L. Force, Deputy Public Defender
Attorneys for Appellant
Phoenix
WINTHROP, Chief Judge ¶1 Guadalupe Garcia Corral ("Appellant") appeals his conviction for human smuggling. Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in denying (1) his pre-trial motion to suppress evidence resulting from his traffic stop and (2) his motion for judgment of acquittal on the basis that the State failed to offer independent evidence to corroborate his statements regarding transporting the occupants of his vehicle for profit, as required by the corpus delicti rule. For the following reasons, we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
We review the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining the verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against Appellant. See State v. Kiper, 181 Ariz. 62, 64, 887 P.2d 592, 594 (App. 1994).
¶2 On March 29, 2011, a grand jury issued an indictment, charging Appellant with smuggling, a class four felony, in violation of Arizona Revised Statutes ("A.R.S.") section 13-2319 (West 2012). In pertinent part, the indictment alleged that Appellant "on or about the 21st day of March, 2011, intentionally transported or procured the transportation of human beings, for profit or commercial purposes knowing or having reason to know that [the] human beings were not United States citizens, permanent resident aliens or persons otherwise lawfully in this state." ¶3 Before trial, Appellant filed a motion to suppress all evidence obtained by law enforcement as the product of an illegal search and seizure. Specifically, he argued that the deputy who conducted the traffic stop of his vehicle lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to do so. ¶4 The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Appellant's motions, including the motion to suppress. At the hearing, the following evidence was presented: ¶5 On the evening of March 21, 2011, detectives from the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office Human Smuggling Unit were conducting an interdiction patrol - looking for "load vehicles" transporting groups of persons illegally present in the United States - on Interstate 17 northbound out of Maricopa County. The area is the main corridor used by human smugglers, who profit from the transport of undocumented persons by taking them to their desired destination throughout the United States. ¶6 While on patrol, Deputy Ortega observed an older model Chevy passenger van bearing a temporary license tag traveling northbound on Interstate 17. Because the deputy could not immediately read the tag, he followed the van. As he followed, the deputy observed that the van appeared to be "loaded down," or heavy from the rear, and he was unable to readily see inside the van due to the dark tint on its windows. Despite multiple attempts to read the tag, the deputy could not do so; accordingly, he initiated a traffic stop. ¶7 In an interview with defense counsel before the suppression hearing, the deputy had indicated he believed the tag "was written in hand," and he recalled the reason he could not read the tag was that the numbers were too "small" and "light," and "it was pretty dark" outside. At the suppression hearing, however, Deputy Ortega stated that he could not read the tag because it was nighttime and the tag was moving or "flapping." When shown a photograph of the temporary tag at the hearing, the deputy acknowledged that the photograph showed the tag was not handwritten as he had previously believed, and although "a little faded," it generally looked "very new." He also acknowledged that neither he nor any of the other officers involved had actually photographed the tag or the van that night. ¶8 As he approached the van, the deputy observed numerous persons crammed inside the van. In total, there were nine passengers in the van, including the driver, and there did not appear to be any luggage on board. Because the persons inside the van kept looking forward and would not make eye contact with him, and some appeared to be shaking, the deputy surmised they were nervous. ¶9 The deputy asked the driver (Appellant) for his license, registration, and proof of insurance. Appellant, however, was unable to provide a driver's license; instead, he had "a Mexican ID of some kind." When asked where he was going, Appellant stated that he was driving from Phoenix to Flagstaff with his "friends." However, Appellant did not know the names of any of the other occupants of the van. He then admitted that he had picked the people up in a parking lot in Phoenix, and he had agreed to take them to other parts of the United States for a fee of approximately $120 per person. ¶10 The deputy asked Appellant to step out of the van and placed him in custody. Additional law enforcement vehicles arrived for backup. The van's other occupants were also taken into custody, and all of the occupants were transported to an Enforcement Support station for further investigation and interviews. The van was towed to an impound yard and eventually sold. While awaiting transport to the station, Appellant was asked by the deputy to reaffirm his previous statements made while in the van, and he did so. ¶11 At the station, Appellant was advised of his rights pursuant to Miranda, and he agreed to speak with officers. Appellant admitted that he was in the United States illegally and had most recently crossed the border from Mexico approximately five years earlier for the purpose of finding work. He stated that he had recently fallen on hard times and needed money to feed his family. Consequently, he drove to a parking lot near an intersection, where he met with the eight other individuals found in his van, and he agreed to take them where they wanted to go in the United States for a fee of approximately $120 each, which included $20 for gas. Appellant admitted he knew everyone in his vehicle was in the United States illegally and his agreement to transport them to different states within the United States was illegal. ¶12 Appellant testified at the suppression hearing that he had purchased the van as transportation for his wife and children approximately one month before he was stopped. He stated that, in that one month period, he had never been pulled over because the temporary license tag was unreadable. He also denied ever admitting that he was transporting people in exchange for money. Instead, he claimed he had told the deputy at the station that on the day at issue, he had withdrawn $540 from the bank, and then happened to meet a group of people in a parking lot who had heard of possible work in Oklahoma, and they simply agreed to travel together and share in the transportation costs. ¶13 At the end of the suppression hearing, the trial court ordered the parties to file supplemental memoranda and took the matter under advisement. After further supplemental briefing, the court granted in part and denied in part the motion to suppress, ruling in pertinent part as follows:
The Court finds, after determining weight and credibility, the following: On March 21, 2011, Deputy Ortega of the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office stopped a van because he could not read the temporary license plate. While there is a dispute regarding why the deputy could not read the temporary plate, the CourtAdditionally, the court found that the statements Appellant made while in the van did not violate Miranda because he was not in custody, but any statements made by Appellant after he was removed from the van and before he received Miranda warnings were in violation of Miranda and must be suppressed. The court also concluded, however, that Appellant's post-Miranda warning statements were consistent with his pre-arrest statements and were admissible. ¶14 At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Appellant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced Appellant to a partially mitigated (minimum) term of 1.5 years' imprisonment in the Arizona Department of Corrections and credited him for 261 days of presentence incarceration. We have jurisdiction over Appellant's timely appeal pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1), 13-4031, and 13-4033(A).
finds that the deputy could not read [the] plate. The Court finds that the deputy at that time had probable cause to stop the vehicle for a traffic infraction.
We cite the current Westlaw version of the statutes unless changes material to our analysis have since occurred. Subsection (A) of A.R.S. § 13-2319 provides as follows: "It is unlawful for a person to intentionally engage in the smuggling of human beings for profit or commercial purpose."
The State later alleged several aggravating circumstances, including the presence of an accomplice, Appellant had committed the offense with the expectation of pecuniary gain, and Appellant was in the United States illegally.
Appellant also moved for a probable cause determination as to the alleged aggravating circumstances and to suppress all statements he made to law enforcement officers on the basis they had been made in violation of his rights pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
In reviewing the trial court's denial of a motion to suppress, we consider only the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, viewing it in the light most favorable to sustaining the ruling. State v. Gay, 214 Ariz. 214, 217, ¶ 4, 150 P.3d 787, 790 (App. 2007). Although not bound by the trial court's legal determinations, we generally defer to the court's factual findings, including determinations of witnesses' credibility. See State v. Gonzalez-Gutierrez, 187 Ariz. 116, 118, 927 P.2d 776, 778 (1996); State v. Ossana, 199 Ariz. 459, 461, ¶ 7, 18 P.3d 1258, 1260 (App. 2001).
The photograph also showed that the tag had been fastened only at the top, and not at the bottom.
Because Appellant indicated that he spoke limited English, the conversation was conducted almost entirely in Spanish.
When questioned at the station, the van's passengers, who were from Mexico except for one adult female who was from China, denied knowing the driver. The passengers each stated they were traveling to a state east of Arizona to find work.
After Appellant was arrested, deputies discovered several hundred dollars on Appellant's person.
The court also found probable cause existed for the State to allege the presence of an accomplice and expectation of pecuniary gain as potential aggravators. At the close of trial, the State withdrew its allegation of aggravating circumstances.
ANALYSIS
I. Reasonable Suspicion for Traffic Stop ¶15 Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion and violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches when the court failed to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of his traffic stop. See U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 8. Appellant maintains the deputy who stopped him lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. ¶16 In general, we review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress for an abuse of discretion. State v. Dean, 206 Ariz. 158, 161, ¶ 9, 76 P.3d 429, 432 (2003). In making our determination, however, we review the court's legal conclusions de novo. State v. Blackmore, 186 Ariz. 630, 632, 925 P.2d 1347, 1349 (1996). ¶17 A police officer can justify a traffic stop in two ways: (1) if the officer has a reasonable suspicion that a traffic violation has occurred, even if the basis for the stop is pretextual, and (2) if the officer has reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot, in which case the officer may conduct an investigatory traffic stop. See United States v. Gonzales-Quinonez, 287 F. Supp. 2d 1032, 1035 (D. Ariz. 2003). Further, under A.R.S. § 28-1594, "[a] peace officer or duly authorized agent of a traffic enforcement agency may stop and detain a person as is reasonably necessary to investigate an actual or suspected violation of [Title 28] and to serve a copy of the traffic complaint for an alleged civil or criminal violation of [Title 28]." ¶18 Subsection (B) of A.R.S. § 28-2354 provides as follows:
Also, "[n]otwithstanding any other law, in the enforcement of [A.R.S. § 13-2319] a peace officer may lawfully stop any person who is operating a motor vehicle if the officer has reasonable suspicion to believe the person is in violation of any civil traffic law." A.R.S. § 13-2319(E).
B. A person shall display all license plates as required . . . until their lawful use expires or is canceled or revoked. A person shall maintain each license plate so it is clearly legible. A person shall securely fasten each license plate to the vehicle as follows:Additionally, A.R.S. § 28-2156(D) requires that a temporary registration be displayed "so that it is clearly visible from outside the vehicle." ¶19 In this case, facts presented at the suppression hearing support the conclusion that the deputy had at least a reasonable suspicion sufficient to initiate a traffic stop. Deputy Ortega testified that he stopped Appellant's van because, despite several attempts to do so, he could not read the vehicle's temporary license tag, which constituted a traffic offense. See A.R.S. § 28-2354(B)(1), (3), -2156(D). The trial court accepted the deputy's testimony, finding that even if a dispute existed regarding why the deputy could not read the tag, the deputy's testimony that he could not read it was credible, and therefore the deputy had "probable cause" to stop Appellant's van for an apparent traffic infraction. It was the trial court's duty, as the finder of fact, to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses. See State v. Fimbres, 222 Ariz. 293, 297, ¶ 4, 213 P.3d 1020, 1024 (App. 2009). In general, we defer to the court's assessment of each witness's credibility and the weight to be given evidence. See id. at 300, ¶ 21, 213 P.3d at 1027; accord State v. Martinez, 221 Ariz. 383, 387-88, ¶ 14, 212 P.3d 75, 79-80 (App. 2009) (stating that appellate courts "defer to the trial court's assessment of witness credibility because the trial court is in the best position to make that determination" (citations omitted)). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding the deputy's testimony credible and denying Appellant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop. See Gonzales-Quinonez, 287 F. Supp. 2d at 1036-37 (holding that the stop of a suspected stolen vehicle for having a temporary license plate that was not fastened at the bottom two corners and was flapping constituted sufficient reasonable suspicion that A.R.S. § 28-2354(B) had been violated to justify the stop).
1. To prevent the plate from swinging.
. . . .
3. In a position to be clearly visible.
See also State v. Paredes, 167 Ariz. 609, 610-11, 810 P.2d 607, 608-09 (App. 1991) (noting a traffic stop was legal where only a portion of the temporary paper registration was visible).
Because we conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding credible the deputy's testimony regarding his inability to read the temporary tag, we do not address Appellant's further argument that the deputy lacked reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to justify an investigatory stop of Appellant's van.
II. Application of the Corpus Delicti Doctrine ¶20 Appellant also argues that the trial court abused its discretion and violated the corpus delicti doctrine by denying his motion for judgment of acquittal, see Ariz. R. Crim. P. 20, on the ground the State failed to offer evidence independent of his incriminating statements that he agreed to smuggle the occupants of his van for profit. We review for an abuse of discretion a ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence to establish corpus delicti. State v. Morris, 215 Ariz. 324, 333, ¶ 33, 160 P.3d 203, 212 (2007). ¶21 "A defendant may not be convicted of a crime based on an uncorroborated confession without independent proof of the corpus delicti, or the 'body of the crime.'" State v. Morgan, 204 Ariz. 166, 170, ¶ 15, 61 P.3d 460, 464 (App. 2002) (citations omitted). The doctrine requires that, as a condition of the admissibility of a defendant's incriminating statements, "the State must show both proof of a crime and that someone is responsible for that crime." State v. Nieves, 207 Ariz. 438, 440, ¶ 7, 87 P.3d 851, 853 (App. 2004) (citing State v. Jones, 198 Ariz. 18, 21, ¶ 11, 6 P.3d 323, 326 (App. 2000)). The purpose of the doctrine is to ensure that a defendant's conviction is not based upon only an uncorroborated confession or incriminating statement, because such a confession or statement could be false and the conviction might therefore lack fundamental fairness. Id. (citations omitted). Although "[o]nly a reasonable inference of the corpus delicti need exist before a confession may be considered," State v. Gillies, 135 Ariz. 500, 506, 662 P.2d 1007, 1013 (1983) (citation omitted), all elements of the crime must be supported by independent evidence or corroborated admissions. State v. Flores, 202 Ariz. 221, 222, ¶ 5, 42 P.3d 1186, 1187 (App. 2002) (citations omitted). Nonetheless, the evidence supporting the inference may be circumstantial, State v. Hall, 204 Ariz. 442, 453, ¶ 43, 65 P.3d 90, 101 (2003), and the evidence offered to support the inference need not be admissible at trial. See State v. Gerlaugh, 134 Ariz. 164, 170, 654 P.2d 800, 806 (1982), supplemented by 135 Ariz. 89, 659 P.2d 642 (1983). The evidence, however, must support "a reasonable inference that the crime charged was actually committed by some person." State v. Hernandez, 83 Ariz. 279, 282, 320 P.2d 467, 469 (1958); accord Flores, 202 Ariz. at 224-25, ¶¶ 17-19, 42 P.3d at 1189-90. We will reverse Appellant's conviction "only if there is a complete absence of substantial evidence to support the charges." State v. Carlos, 199 Ariz. 273, 276, ¶ 7, 17 P.3d 118, 121 (App. 2001) (citation omitted). ¶22 The background on this issue is as follows: At the close of the State's case, in a motion for judgment of acquittal, Appellant argued that the State failed to offer evidence, independent of his incriminating statements, that he had engaged in human smuggling for the purpose of profit, as required by A.R.S. § 13-2319(A). The court asked the State to address the profit element of its burden, and the prosecutor argued that circumstantial evidence of a profit motive was supplied by Deputy Ortega's testimony, which explained in detail the human smuggling process, showing it is "not a charity operation," but is done at great expense and risk for a profit, and the circumstances of Appellant's arrest, from which the jury could infer that Appellant's actions were being done for commercial profit. The court denied Appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal, holding that even excluding Appellant's statements, sufficient evidence had been presented to submit the matter to the jury. ¶23 We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion. Appellant was charged with smuggling human beings for profit, and to establish the corpus delicti for the crime, the State had to establish the reasonable inference that someone (1) intentionally transported or procured the transport of a person knowing or having reason to know that person was not a United States citizen, permanent resident alien, or otherwise lawfully in Arizona, and (2) did so for profit or commercial purpose. See A.R.S. § 13-2319. Appellant challenges the trial court's ruling only with regard to the "for profit or commercial purpose" element of the offense. ¶24 In this instance, we, like the trial court, have no difficulty concluding that the circumstances of Appellant's arrest give rise to a reasonable inference, independent of his incriminating statements, that Appellant made an agreement to smuggle other persons for profit. Deputy Ortega testified in detail how the business of human smuggling operates in Arizona, as well as how the facts surrounding Appellant's arrest were consistent with a commercial smuggling operation. Further, the State presented evidence that at least some of the occupants of Appellant's van were not present legally in the United States. Also, unlike the other occupants, who apparently possessed a combined total of $5.25, Appellant was in possession of several hundred dollars, and although he offered an innocent explanation for his possession of that sum, the jury could reasonably infer that the money had been collected from the other occupants of the van in exchange for smuggling them. ¶25 Under these circumstances, a fact finder could conclude that a group of persons who were in this country illegally had entered an agreement with someone for their transportation within the United States as part of a for-profit or commercial arrangement. This is all that is required for satisfaction of the corpus delicti doctrine. See Morris, 215 Ariz. at 333, ¶¶ 34-35, 160 P.3d at 212. Further, given the independent and corroborative evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, the jury could reasonably infer that Appellant had received payment to smuggle the occupants of his van illegally within this country. We therefore find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Appellant's motion for judgment of acquittal for failure to establish corpus delicti independent of Appellant's admissions. Because we find no abuse of discretion in the court's application of the doctrine, we need not reach the issues raised by the State with respect to the doctrine's continued validity and constitutionality under Arizona law.
Additionally, the incident report, entered into evidence as an exhibit at the suppression hearing, contained summaries of detectives' interviews with seven of Appellant's eight passengers, each of whom admitted entering a financial agreement in which they paid a human smuggler for transportation to a location in the United States. They also each indicated that their transportation in Appellant's van was part of their smuggling agreement. The passenger's statements, although not admitted at trial, support the conclusion that Appellant was involved in smuggling for profit. Cf. Gerlaugh, 134 Ariz. at 170, 654 P.2d at 806 (allowing a codefendant's admission to be used to establish the corpus delicti for the defendant's crimes, despite the fact that the admission could not be considered by the jury to determine the defendant's guilt).
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CONCLUSION
¶26 The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his traffic stop and motion for judgment of acquittal. Appellant's conviction and sentence are affirmed.
______________________________
LAWRENCE F. WINTHROP, Chief Judge
CONCURRING: ______________________________
PHILIP HALL, Presiding Judge
____________________
PETER B. SWANN, Judge