Opinion
I.D. No. 0301012010.
Submitted: September 21, 2007.
Decided: October 1, 2007.
UPON CONSIDERATION OF DEFENDANT'S SECOND PRO SE MOTION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
This 1st day of October, 2007, it appears to the Court that:
1. On October 9, 2003, a jury found Johnny Collins ("Collins") guilty of rape in the first degree pursuant to DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 773(a)(6). He was sentenced to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court affirmed Collins's conviction and sentence on direct appeal. Collins filed his first pro se motion for postconviction on October 16, 2006. This Court denied in part and summarily dismissed in part Collins's first motion on August 28, 2007. Now before the Court, filed only three weeks since denial of the last motion, is Collins's second pro se motion for postconviction relief.
See Docket 19, 24, 38, 40, 46.
2. Superior Court Criminal Rule 61 permits the Court to summarily dismiss a claim "[i]f it plainly appears from the motion for postconviction relief and the record of prior proceedings in the case that the movant is not entitled to relief[.]" In this case, the Superior Court issued an order on August 28, 2007 addressing the merits of Collins's claims for postconviction relief and found them to be without merit. Collins appears to raise the same issues in his second motion, all of which have been addressed by the Court in its previous opinion.
Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(d)(4).
State v. Collins, Del. Super., ID No. 0301012010, Ableman, J. (August 28, 2007) (ORDER).
For example, Collins argues in his second pro se postconviction motion many of the same grounds that he argued in his first motion, such as: (1) the jury misconstrued his admission that he had sexual intercourse with the fourteen year-old victim because of her "bad seductive behaviours [sic] and her Out of Control teen Nature"; (2) counsel failed to inform him of his constitutional rights; (3) counsel failed to investigate potentially exculpatory evidence; (4) the victim was an habitual liar; (5) Collins never received notice of his trial date; and (6) Collins was denied his sixth Amendment right to proceed pro se at trial, among others. Compare Docket 40 with Docket 46. As noted herein, the Court addressed all of Collins's claims in its previous August 28, 2007 order. See State v. Collins, Del. Super., ID No. 0301012010, Ableman, J. (August 28, 2007) (ORDER).
4. Moreover, as noted in its August 28, 2007 order, the evidence against Collins was "overwhelming":
Collins testified during trial that he did, in fact, have sexual intercourse with the 14 year old victim. Collins' DNA was also matched to the "products of conception" which were obtained after the victim underwent an abortion. What is more, prior to trial, defense counsel and this Court made repeated attempts to explain to Collins that because the victim was a minor, her consent was not a viable defense. Despite these attempts, however, Collins continued to believe that he was innocent of the charges because, according to him, the victim seduced him into having sexual intercourse. Collins was unrelenting in this belief even after he was found guilty, and reiterated at sentencing that, even though he impregnated the victim, "[i]t was on her doing" because "[s]he forced us." To this day, Collins apparently continues to believe that he did not commit a crime since, in his mind, the minor victim consented to having sexual intercourse. Therefore, because of the uncontested and irrefutable evidence against Collins, counsel's alleged errors would have had no impact on the outcome of the trial.
Id. at p. 10 (citations omitted).
5. After reviewing Collins's motion, the Court finds that Collins's claims have been fully addressed in its August 28, 2007 order. As a result, it plainly appears to this Court that Collins's motion and the record of prior proceedings indicates he is not entitled to relief. Accordingly, Collins's motion for postconviction is SUMMARILY DISMISSED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.