Opinion
No. COA07-645.
Filed 4 November 2008.
1. Constitutional Law — competency to stand trial — due process — findings of fact incorporating factual summary from detailed psychiatric report
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder case by finding that defendant was competent to stand trial because: (1) there was no authority prohibiting the court from making findings of fact incorporating a factual summary from a detailed psychiatric report in lieu of listing the facts in the traditional manner; (2) evidence that a defendant suffers from mental illness is not dispositive on the issue of competency; (3) the record contained evidence that defendant possessed the capacity to comprehend his position, understand the nature of the proceedings against him, conduct his defense in a rational manner, and cooperate with his counsel; (4) although the defense produced evidence to the contrary, the trial court was presented with sufficient evidence at the competency hearing to sustain a conclusion that defendant was competent to stand trial; and (5) although two doctors differed as to the significance of defendant's rambling, the State's expert witness provided the trial court with sufficient evidence to suggest that defendant was capable of standing trial despite his tendency to ramble in response to questioning.
2. Jury — voir dire — inquiry into whether any jury members had prior unfavorable experiences with attorneys
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in a first-degree murder case by sustaining objections to questions posed by defense counsel to prospective jurors during the voir dire hearing as to whether any of the jury members had prior unfavorable experiences with attorneys because: (1) despite defendant's claims, he made no showing that the trial court's failure to allow defense counsel's question resulted in any undue prejudice to defendant; and (2) a review of the record revealed that the trial court's decision not to allow defense counsel's question did not deprive defendant of his right to an impartial jury.
3. Constitutional Law — right to remain silent — detective testified defendant invoked Fifth Amendment right
The trial court did not commit plain error in a first-degree murder case by allowing the prosecutor to elicit testimony indicating that defendant invoked his constitutional right to silence when questioned by police because: (1) although the detective erred by testifying defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence, the State did not elicit this testimony for the purpose of attacking defendant's guilt or credibility; (2) the detective provided the information to explain his subsequent actions regarding defendant; (3) although it may be true that defendant's credibility was at issue during trial, the trial court was presented with substantial evidence tending to support defendant's conviction; and (4) defendant failed to show that the introduction of the detective's statement amounted to a miscarriage of justice or that a different verdict probably would have been reached but for the introduction of this testimony.
4. Homicide — first-degree murder — request for instruction on lesser-included offense — voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense
The trial court did not err in a first-degree murder case by denying defendant's request for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense because: (1) viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, defendant's testimony was insufficient to demonstrate defendant reasonably believed it was necessary to kill his wife to save himself from great bodily harm; (2) although the wife victim threatened defendant and reached for a knife, defendant's own testimony revealed that defendant was able to secure the weapon before the wife could reach it; (3) once the weapon was secure, defendant was no longer in imminent danger from his wife; (4) even if defendant believed it was necessary to kill his wife to avoid great bodily harm, that belief was unreasonable; and (5) a review of the record revealed that defendant presented no evidence at trial to warrant a jury instruction of imperfect self-defense.
Judge GEER dissenting.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 2 August 2006 by Judge W. Russell Duke, Jr., in Edgecombe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 28 November 2007.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Joan M. Cunningham, for the State. Rudolf Widenhouse Fialko, by M. Gordon Widenhouse, Jr., for defendant appellant.
Defendant appeals judgment entered after a jury verdict of guilty of first-degree murder. We determine there was no prejudicial error.
FACTS
On 7 March 2005, Roger Earl Coley ("defendant") called 911 from his house at 410 Myrtle Avenue in Rocky Mount, North Carolina, and reported that he had stabbed his wife, Deborah Thompson Coley, with a butcher knife. When the operator inquired as to how many times he had stabbed his wife, defendant responded that he had stabbed her "about twenty times." Officer Brian Patrick Livecchi of the Rocky Mount Police Department arrived at defendant's house a short time later. At the time Officer Livecchi arrived, defendant was standing on the porch with blood on his clothes. Officer Livecchi then handcuffed defendant and asked him what happened. Defendant responded, "I stabbed her." After handcuffing defendant, Officer Livecchi entered the residence and found Mrs. Coley leaning against a sofa. She was bleeding from her chest. Officer Livecchi took her pulse, and after determining the scene was secure, called the dispatcher to alert the firemen and paramedics.
After other police officers arrived, Officer Livecchi placed defendant in the back of his police car and drove him to the Rocky Mount Police Department. On the way to the police department, defendant made several statements. Defendant stated that "he just simply couldn't take it anymore" and that "she never gave him any respect." At the police station, defendant was informed of his Miranda rights by Detective Thomas Seighman. Defendant responded that he wanted to speak to an attorney. Despite defendant's invocation of his right to silence, defendant continued to make statements. Defendant was then allowed to make several phone calls, which were recorded by a video camera set up inside the police station. During one of these phone calls, defendant described the circumstances surrounding Mrs. Coley's stabbing.
Kevin Bissette, a member of West Edgecombe Rescue Squad, arrived shortly after Officer Livecchi. Mr. Bissette examined Mrs. Coley and determined that she had no pulse. Mrs. Coley was then transported to the hospital as emergency personnel attempted to resuscitate her. These efforts proved unsuccessful, and Mrs. Coley died while being transported to the hospital.
A grand jury indicted defendant for first-degree murder on 23 May 2005. On 26 April 2006, a competency hearing was held before Judge Frank R. Brown in Edgecombe County Superior Court. After hearing the evidence, Judge Brown concluded defendant possessed sufficient capacity to proceed to trial. Defendant was tried before a jury for the murder of his wife, Deborah Coley, on 31 July 2006, in Edgecombe County Superior Court, Judge W. Russell Duke, Jr., presiding. On 2 August 2006, defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to a term of life in prison without the possibility of parole. Defendant now appeals.
I.
Defendant first argues the trial court erred by finding defendant competent to stand trial. We disagree.
"[T]he conviction of an accused person while he is legally incompetent violates due process[.]" State v. Taylor, 298 N.C. 405, 410, 259 S.E.2d 502, 505 (1979); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378, 15 L. Ed. 2d 815, 818 (1966). Our General Statutes expound on this notion, providing:
No person may be tried, convicted, sentenced, or punished for a crime when by reason of mental illness or defect he is unable to understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to comprehend his own situation in reference to the proceedings, or to assist in his defense in a rational or reasonable manner. This condition is hereinafter referred to as "incapacity to proceed."
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1001(a) (2007); see Taylor, 298 N.C. at 410-11, 259 S.E.2d at 505. The determination of whether a defendant is competent to stand trial rests within the trial court's discretion and the burden of persuasion falls upon the defendant. State v. Pratt, 152 N.C. App. 694, 697, 568 S.E.2d 276, 278 (2002), cert. denied, appeal dismissed, 357 N.C. 168, 581 S.E.2d 442 (2003). The trial court's findings of fact, as well as its final determination, will be upheld on appeal if supported by the evidence. Id. at 698, 568 S.E.2d at 279.
In the case at bar, an inquiry was held prior to trial to determine defendant's competency. During this hearing, the trial court, was presented with testimony from several expert witnesses. The State's expert witness, Dr. Charles Vance, an expert in forensic psychiatry, testified regarding his examination of defendant. According to Dr. Vance, defendant demonstrated an adequate knowledge of the nature and object of the proceedings against him, as well as of his position in relationship to these proceedings. Further, although Dr. Vance recognized that defendant suffered from dementia, which hindered him in his interactions with his lawyer, Dr. Vance opined that defendant's impairment was not so severe as to prevent him from working rationally and reasonably with his attorney. Thus, Dr. Vance was of the opinion that defendant was competent to stand trial. In response to the State's evidence, the defense proffered testimony from Dr. Katayoun Tabrizi, an expert in psychology. Dr. Tabrizi opined that in addition to suffering from dementia, defendant was also suffering from a psychotic mental illness that was not being treated. According to Dr. Tabrizi, these afflictions made defendant incapable of proceeding to trial.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court entered an order holding that defendant possessed the capacity to proceed to trial. In this order, the trial court adopted as its findings of fact defendant's Forensic Psychiatric History And Evaluation/Legal Assessment/ Discharge Summary and Aftercare plan of Dorothea Dix Hospital for Roger Earl Coley ("evaluation"). Based on these findings, the trial court concluded that although defendant's mental defects "may complicate his interaction with his attorney" these defects "[were] not of sufficient magnitude to negate his capacity to stand trial[.]"
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court's determination of defendant's competency was in error. In support of his argument, defendant contends: (1) the trial court incorrectly adopted as its findings of fact defendant's evaluation; (2) the trial court was presented with no evidence at the preliminary hearing to support a conclusion that defendant was competent to stand trial; and (3) the defendant's trial testimony indicated that defendant did not possess the capacity to stand trial, regardless of the court's determination during the preliminary hearing.
1.
As noted above, the trial court was presented with testimony that supported the court's conclusion, which was:
THE COURT CONCLUDES from all the evidence presented; that the Defendant was cooperative with forensic interviews; that he knew he was charged with 1st Degree Murder and has a clear recollection of the events associated with his criminal acts; that he showed an understanding of the nature of the legal proceedings as well as the court room personnel; that he was aware of pleas available and the significance of the pleas; that he suffers some degree of intellectual deficiency, but his I.Q. falls in the range of the upper 70s to the low 80s; that he has difficulty understanding hypothetical or abstract situations, but when language is simplified, he has the ability to grasp concepts and understand them; that the Defendant became excessively emotional when discussing his wife, but did not display similar problems with modulation in other contexts; that he has the ability to restrain himself and control his behavior when advised that such structure was needed to be imposed on the conversation; that his mental defects may complicate his interaction with his attorney, but are not of sufficient magnitude to negate his capacity to stand trial.
The question then becomes whether the trial court can adopt the facts as set forth in the psychiatric report in lieu of listing the facts in the traditional manner. We can find no authority prohibiting the court from making findings of fact by incorporating a factual summary from a detailed report.
We note that the court's findings of fact, if supported by competent evidence, are conclusive on appeal. State v. Clark, 300 N.C. 116, 265 S.E.2d 204 (1980). While the better practice is to make independent detailed findings of fact, see State v. Aytche, 98 N.C. App. 358, 363, 391 S.E.2d 43, 46 (1990), adopting facts set forth in the report was not prejudicial in this instance.
2.
"The test for capacity to stand trial is whether a defendant has capacity to comprehend his position, to understand the nature of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner and to cooperate with his counsel[.]" State v. Jackson, 302 N.C. 101, 104, 273 S.E.2d 666, 669 (1981). "Evidence that a defendant suffers from mental illness is not dispositive on the issue of competency." Pratt, 152 N.C. App. at 697, 568 S.E.2d at 278. Our Supreme Court has noted that
a defendant does not have to be at the highest stage of mental alertness to be competent to be tried. So long as a defendant can confer with his or her attorney so that the attorney may interpose any available defenses for him or her, the defendant is able to assist his or her defense in a rational manner. It is the attorney who must make the subtle distinctions as to the trial.
State v. Shytle, 323 N.C. 684, 689, 374 S.E.2d 573, 575 (1989).
Here, defendant, asserts the trial court was presented with no evidence to support a conclusion that defendant was competent to stand trial. To the contrary, as previously discussed, the record contains evidence that defendant possessed the capacity to (1) comprehend his position, (2) understand the nature of the proceedings against him, (3) conduct his defense in a rational manner, and (4) cooperate with his counsel. Although the defense produced evidence to the contrary, we hold the trial court was presented with sufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing to sustain a conclusion that defendant was competent to stand trial.
3.
"`[A] trial court has a constitutional duty to institute, sua sponte, a competency hearing if there is substantial, evidence before the court indicating that the accused may be mentally incompetent.'" State v. Young, 291 N.C. 562, 568, 231 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1977) (citation omitted).
Defendant further argues that regardless of his competency during the initial hearing, defendant's trial testimony provided evidence that defendant did not possess the capacity to stand trial. Thus, defendant contends the trial court; erred by not conducting an inquiry into defendant's competence at trial. Upon review, we hold defendant has produced insufficient evidence to support this contention. The record on appeal indicates that, at trial, defendant appeared to ramble in response to questions imposed by counsel. However, such behavior was not a new occurrence, and had been present during defendant's examinations prior to the preliminary hearing. Dr. Vance had previously noted that defendant often seemed to ramble when he was examined prior to trial. Although Dr. Vance and Dr. Tabrizi differed as to the significance of this rambling, Dr. Vance provided the trial court with sufficient evidence to suggest that defendant was capable of standing trial despite his tendency to ramble in response to questioning. The fact, by itself, that defendant continued this behavior at trial, did not amount to substantial evidence that defendant was mentally incompetent at trial. Therefore, the trial court did not err by failing to institute, sua. sponte, a second competency hearing. Accordingly, defendant's assignment of error is overruled.
II.
Defendant next argues the trial court incorrectly sustained objections to questions posed by defense counsel to prospective jurors during the voir dire hearing. Specifically, defendant argues the trial court erred by sustaining the State's objection to defense counsel's inquiry as to whether any of the jury members had prior unfavorable experiences with attorneys. We find defendant's argument to be without merit.
The trial court is responsible for ensuring that a competent, fair, and impartial jury is impaneled. State v. Anderson, 355 N.C. 136, 140, 558 S.E.2d 87, 91 (2002). "The nature and extent of the inquiry made of prospective jurors on voir dire ordinarily rests within the sound discretion of the trial court." State v. Hill, 331 N.C. 387, 404, 417 S.E.2d 765, 772 (1992), cert. denied, 507 U.S. 924, 122 L. Ed. 2d 684, reh'g denied, 507 U.S. 1046, 123 L. Ed. 2d 503 (1993). "The exercise of such discretion constitutes reversible error only upon a showing by the defendant of harmful prejudice and clear abuse of discretion by the trial court." State v. Jones, 347 N.C. 193, 203, 491 S.E.2d 641, 647 (1997).
In the case at bar, defense counsel sought to ask the jury, "Has anyone in the jury box had a bad experience with an attorney?" After the State's objection to this question was sustained, defendant attempted a reworded version of this question, asking: "Has anyone had a [sic] experience with an attorney that they believe would affect the way they hear the evidence in this case?" Once again, the State lodged an objection to defense counsel's question. After determining defendant in this case was not an attorney, the trial court again sustained the State's objection, preventing defense counsel from posing the aforementioned question to the jury. On appeal, defendant now contends that the trial court's action of sustaining the State's objection, and thus preventing defendant from posing this question to the jury, denied him the opportunity to have his case heard before a fair and impartial jury. Despite defendant's claims, he makes no showing that the trial court's failure to allow defense counsel's question resulted in any undue prejudice to defendant. Rather, defendant simply contends that the aforementioned question was proper and should have been allowed at trial. After reviewing the record, we hold the trial court's decision not to allow defense counsel's aforementioned question did not deprive defendant of his right to an impartial jury. Therefore, defendant's assignment of error is overruled.
III.
Defendant also argues the trial court committed plain error by allowing the prosecutor to elicit testimony indicating that defendant invoked his constitutional right to silence when questioned by police. We disagree.
It is well established "that the State may not introduce evidence that a defendant exercised his fifth amendment right to remain silent." State v. Ladd, 308 N.C. 272, 283, 302 S.E.2d 164, 171 (1983). If the defendant does not object at trial to the introduction of evidence regarding his silence, on appeal "the defendant has the burden of showing that the error constituted plain error, that is, (i) that a different result probably would have been reached but for the error or (ii) that the error was so fundamental as to result in a miscarriage of justice or denial of a fair trial." State v. Bishop, 346 N.C. 365, 385, 488 S.E.2d 769, 779 (1997). "Erroneous admission of evidence may be harmless where there is an abundance of other competent evidence to support the state's primary contentions!] or where there is overwhelming evidence of defendant's guilt. . . [or] where defendant elicits similar testimony on cross-examination." State v. Weldon, 314 N.C. 401, 411, 333 S.E.2d 701, 707 (1985) (citations omitted).
In the case sub judice, defendant argues the State inappropriately referenced defendant's decision to invoke his right, to silence. At trial, Detective Seighman testified that after defendant was informed of his Miranda rights, defendant invoked his right to silence and responded that, "he would like to speak to an attorney." Detective Seighman further testified that despite defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent, defendant continued to make statements to Detective Seighman regarding his relationship with Mrs. Coley. Although he made no objection to Detective Seighman's testimony at trial, on appeal defendant contends that the introduction of this testimony amounted to plain error. Defendant argues that Detective Seighman's testimony regarding defendant's decision to invoke his right to remain silent served as an improper attack on defendant's credibility at trial. His credibility was pivotal, defendant argues, because his testimony surrounding Mrs. Coley's stabbing did not mirror his previous description of these events as shown to the court on a videotape. Thus, defendant argues evidence that he invoked his right to remain silent and to seek counsel from an attorney served to prejudice the jury against him and ultimately resulted in a guilty verdict. After reviewing the record, we are unpersuaded by defendant's arguments. It is true that Detective Seighman erred by testifying defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment right to silence. However, the State did not elicit this testimony for the purpose of attacking defendant's guilt or credibility. Rather, Detective Seighman provided the information seemingly to explain his subsequent actions regarding defendant. Though it may be true that defendant's credibility was at issue during trial, the trial court was presented with substantial evidence tending to support defendant's conviction for the crime of first-degree murder. Defendant has failed to show that the introduction of Detective Seighman's statement amounted to a miscarriage of justice or that a different verdict probably would have been reached but for the introduction of this testimony. Therefore, we hold the trial court did not commit plain error by allowing Detective Seighman to testify regarding defendant's invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights.
IV.
Defendant concludes by arguing that the trial court erred by denying defendant's request for an instruction on voluntary manslaughter. We disagree.
Voluntary manslaughter is defined as "`an intentional killing without premeditation, deliberation or malice . . . [either] in the heat of passion . . . or in the exercise of imperfect self-defense where excessive force under the circumstances was used. . . .'" Slate v. Lyons, 340 N.C. 646, 663, 459 S.E.2d 770, 779 (1995) (citation omitted). Our Supreme Court, has held that
if defendant believed it was necessary to kill the deceased in order to save [himself] from death or great bodily harm, and if defendant's belief was reasonable in that the circumstances as they appeared to [him] at the time were sufficient to create such a belief in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness, but defendant, although without murderous intent, was the aggressor in bringing on the difficulty, or defendant used excessive force, the defendant under those circumstances has only the imperfect right of self-defense, having lost the benefit of perfect self-defense, and is guilty at least of voluntary manslaughter.
State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 530, 279 S.E.2d 570, 572-73 (1981). Although voluntary manslaughter is a lesser included offense of first-degree murder, an instruction regarding voluntary manslaughter, based on a theory of imperfect self-defense, is not required "`unless evidence was introduced tending to show that at the time of the killing, the defendant reasonably believed' it necessary to kill the victim in order to save himself from imminent death or great bodily harm." State v. Maynor, 331 N.C. 695, 700, 417 S.E.2d 453, 456 (1992) (citation omitted); see State v. Price, 344 N.C. 583, 589, 476 S.E.2d 317, 320 (1996). This Court will consider the facts in the light most favorable to defendant to determine if the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to warrant an instruction regarding voluntary manslaughter based on imperfect self-defense. See State v. Mize, 316 N.C. 48, 51, 340 S.E.2d 439, 441 (1986).
In the case sub judice, defendant argues he presented sufficient evidence at trial to warrant the inclusion of a jury instruction of voluntary manslaughter on the grounds that defendant's actions amounted to imperfect self-defense. We find defendant's argument to be without merit. At trial, defendant testified that on the night she was stabbed, Mrs. Coley began to curse and threaten him. To prevent others from overhearing Mrs. Coley's insults, defendant testified that he closed the door to the house they were occupying. When defendant turned back to face Mrs. Coley, she had picked up the phone and was searching for the telephone numbers of two local drug dealers. In response, defendant walked up to Mrs. Coley and "knocked the phone out of her hand." Angered by defendant's behavior, Mrs. Coley threatened to hurt him and reached for a knife. Before Mrs. Coley could retrieve the knife, defendant testified that he "grabbed it and just stabbed her." Viewed in the light most favorable to defendant, defendant's testimony is insufficient to demonstrate defendant reasonably believed it was necessary to kill Mrs. Coley to save himself from great bodily harm. Although Mrs. Coley threatened him and reached for the knife, defendant's own testimony reveals that defendant was able to secure the weapon before Mrs. Coley could reach it. Once the weapon was secure, defendant was no longer in imminent danger from Mrs. Coley. Thus, even if defendant believed it was necessary to kill Mrs. Coley to avoid great bodily harm, that belief was unreasonable. A review of the record reveals defendant presented no evidence at trial to warrant a jury instruction of imperfect self-defense. We therefore hold the trial court did not err by denying defendant's request to submit a jury instruction regarding voluntary manslaughter based on a theory of imperfect self-defense.
No error.
Judge STEELMAN concurs.
Judge GEER dissents by separate opinion.