Opinion
Docket No. 25631.
Filed: August 1, 2000.
Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District, State of Idaho, Twin Falls County. Hon. Roger S. Burdick, District Judge.
Order relinquishing jurisdiction, reversed and remanded.
University of Idaho, Legal Aid Clinic, Moscow, for appellant. Maureen E. Laflin, Supervising Attorney. Elaine H. Gruber, Legal Intern, argued.
Hon. Alan G. Lance, Attorney General; Rebekah A. Cude, Deputy Attorney General, Boise, for respondent. Rebekah A. Cude argued.
This case presents a challenge to the constitutionality of the legislature's 1995 amendment to I.C. § 19-2601, which purported to eliminate any requirement that an inmate be afforded due process in the Idaho retained jurisdiction program. For the reasons set forth below, we find the 1995 amendment unconstitutional.
I. BACKGROUND
John D. Coassolo was charged with aiding and abetting the delivery of a controlled substance. I.C. §§ 37-2732(a)(1)(A), -2707(d)(2), and 18-204. Pursuant to a plea agreement, the state agreed to dismiss an unrelated pending criminal case and Coassolo pled guilty. After considering a presentence investigation report (PSI), and other evidence presented at the sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a unified eight-year sentence, with four years fixed. The district court suspended execution of the judgment and retained jurisdiction pursuant to I.C. § 19-2601.
Near the end of the retained jurisdiction period, the jurisdictional review committee submitted its report to the district court, recommending that the court relinquish jurisdiction. According to that report, Coassolo was provided with "ample time and opportunity to submit comments to be considered by the district court[,] but he declined to do so." The district court, upon consideration of, among other things, the committee's report, relinquished jurisdiction. The district court did so without conducting a hearing or affording Coassolo the opportunity to rebut the committee's recommendations. Upon the relinquishment of jurisdiction, the district court ordered into execution the previously suspended sentence. Coassolo appeals.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Introduction
Coassolo contends that he has a substantial liberty interest in the fairness of the evaluation procedures used at the North Idaho Correctional Institution (NICI). Therefore, he asserts that due process requires that he be entitled to a hearing either at NICI or before the district court prior to the relinquishment of jurisdiction. Coassolo was not afforded such a hearing and, therefore, argues that the order relinquishing jurisdiction must be reversed.
Coassolo's claim that his rights to due process were violated by the procedure utilized at NICI is a matter of law. Therefore, this Court exercises free review over this issue. State v. Gilpin, 132 Idaho 643, 649, 977 P.2d 905, 911 (Ct.App. 1999).
We first address the state's assertion that Coassolo has procedurally waived this issue for the purposes of appeal. The state contends that Coassolo never requested a hearing before the district court and never asserted in the district court that he had a due process right to a hearing prior to the relinquishment of jurisdiction. The state argues, therefore, that Coassolo waived the issue of whether his due process rights were violated at NICI.
Initially, we note that the state has failed to cite a single reported Idaho case wherein the appellate courts have required such actions on the part of a defendant in order to preserve this issue for the purposes of appeal. Moreover, this Court has previously held that in order to challenge a district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction, a defendant must file an appeal within forty-two days of the entry of the court's order. State v. Alvarado, 132 Idaho 248, 249, 970 P.2d 516, 517 (Ct.App. 1998). We hold that, having timely filed a notice of appeal from the entry of the district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction, Coassolo has preserved for our review the issue of whether his due process rights were violated.
B. Due Process Requirements Under the Pre-1995 Version of I.C. § 19-2601
We begin our analysis by reviewing the state and federal courts' interpretations of the pre-1995 version of I.C. § 19-2601. Prior to its amendment in 1995, I.C. § 19-2601 stated, in relevant part:
Whenever any person shall have been convicted, or enter a plea of guilty, in any district court of the state of Idaho, of or to any crime against the laws of the state, except those of treason or murder, the court in its discretion, may:
. . . .
4. Suspend the execution of the judgment at any time during the first one hundred and eighty (180) days of a sentence to the custody of the state board of correction, during which time the court shall retain jurisdiction over the defendant which jurisdiction shall be entered on the order of commitment, and place the defendant on probation under such terms and conditions as it deems necessary and expedient, notwithstanding that the term of the court during which such defendant was convicted or sentenced may have expired.
I.C. § 19-2601 (1994). The nature of the retained jurisdiction procedure authorized by this version of I.C. § 19-2601 was such that it provided, at the outset of the offender's incarceration, a period for evaluation of that offender's potential for rehabilitation and suitability for probation. State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 385, 582 P.2d 728, 731 (1978); Free v. State, 125 Idaho 760, 762, 874 P.2d 571, 573 (Ct.App. 1993). With the benefit of a report from the correctional facility, the sentencing court could, at the end of the retained jurisdiction period, relinquish jurisdiction, or place the defendant on probation or otherwise modify the sentence. Bradford v. State, 124 Idaho 788, 790, 864 P.2d 626, 628 (Ct.App. 1993).
The Idaho Supreme Court specifically held that under the pre-1995 version of the retained jurisdiction program, due process requirements applied to the Department of Corrections' preparation of reports to the sentencing court regarding an inmate's performance during the period of retained jurisdiction. Wolfe, 99 Idaho at 387, 582 P.2d at 733. See also State v. Waite, 107 Idaho 941, 942, 694 P.2d 890, 891 (1985) (noting that Wolfe determined that a prisoner has a sufficient interest in the fairness of the evaluations by NICI to invoke procedural due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution).
The Wolfe court recognized that the retained jurisdiction program is "unique to Idaho." Wolfe, 99 Idaho at 389, 582 P.2d at 735. According to Wolfe, the "importance of a comprehensive report from NICI is best understood given the uses for that report. A good report indicating rehabilitative potential may very well result in a suspended sentence and probation. This information is essential for the sentencing judge to fashion a proper sentence." Id. at 385, 582 P.2d at 731. Likewise, an unfavorable report may very well result in the sentencing court relinquishing jurisdiction.
According to Wolfe, both the state and an inmate have important interests in the procedures used in the retained jurisdiction program. Id. at 385-86, 582 P.2d at 731-32. These dual interests in a fair and accurate report from the jurisdictional review committee led the Wolfe court to conclude that "a prisoner, as well as the state, does have a substantial interest in the fairness of the due process used to determine his [or her] status." Id. at 387, 582 P.2d at 733. The Wolfe court held:
Before a report is sent back to the sentencing judge (pursuant to the retained jurisdiction of I.C. § 19-2601), certain procedures must be followed. The prisoner must be given adequate notice before the hearing, including notice of the substance of all matters that will be considered. The prisoner must be given an opportunity to explain or rebut any testimony or recommendations. In addition, the prisoner must be free to call witnesses in his behalf from among the employees and other prisoners at NICI. This information should be included in the report sent back to the sentencing judge.
Id. at 389, 582 P.2d at 735 (emphasis added). The Wolfe court determined that these "minimal procedures will help ensure the report is as complete as possible and guarantee a basic fairness for both the prisoner and the sentencing judge." Id.
Approximately ten years after the Wolfe decision, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, addressed whether, under the pre-1995 version of I.C. § 19-2601, the jurisdictional review program created a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution. Browning v. Vernon, 44 F.3d 818 (9th Cir. 1995). The Browning court recognized that a right to a fair and accurate rehabilitation report pursuant to the retained jurisdiction program does not derive directly from the United States Constitution and it considered whether Idaho state law gave rise to such a due process right. After conducting an independent analysis of the issue, the Browning court agreed with the Wolfe court's conclusion and held that "the Idaho Rider Program creates a liberty interest, protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, in a fair and accurate rehabilitation evaluation and report." Id. at 821.
A period of retained jurisdiction is commonly referred to as a "rider."
Therefore, prior to its amendment in 1995, the structure of the Idaho retained jurisdiction program was held, by both the state and federal courts, to require that participants in that program be afforded certain due process protections with regard to the preparation of the jurisdictional review committee's report.
C. 1995 Amendment
1. Legislative Purpose
In response to the Wolfe and Browning decisions, in 1995, the Idaho legislature amended I.C. § 19-2601 to include the following language:
4. . . . . In no case shall the board of correction or its agent, the department of correction, be required to hold a hearing of any kind with respect to a recommendation to the court for the grant or denial of probation. Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court. Any recommendation made by the department to the court regarding the prisoner shall be in the nature of an addendum to the presentence report. The board of correction and its agency, the department of correction, and their employees shall not be held financially responsible for damages, injunctive or declaratory relief for any recommendation made to the district court under this section.
The statement of legislative purpose underlying this amendment says:
This bill clarifies that Idaho Code section 19-2601 4. does not create an interest protected by the due process clauses of either the Idaho or federal constitutions. Court decisions in State v. Wolfe, . . . and Browning v. Vernon, . . . require the Department of Correction to hold due process type hearings for prisoners sentenced to retained jurisdiction. The decision and power to place such a prisoner on probation per this section of Idaho Code rests solely in the hands of the district court sentencing the prisoner. The IDOC may provide a recommendation or report to the sentencing court, but is not statutorily required to hold a hearing for the prisoner.
Statement of Purpose S.B. 1228 (1995).
Thus, according to the legislative purpose underlying the 1995 amendment to I.C. § 19-2601, it was not the legislature's intent that a participant in the retained jurisdiction program be afforded due process, irrespective of the courts' prior rulings that the due process clauses of both the state and federal constitutions mandated procedural safeguards in the process utilized to create the jurisdictional review committee's report.
2. Actual effect
The state asserts that the legislature, when it amended I.C. § 19-2601, simply clarified that no liberty interest existed in the decision to relinquish jurisdiction. The state relies on Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979), in support of its assertion that the retained jurisdiction program does not create a liberty interest protectable by due process. In Greenholtz, the Court determined that, generally, due process does not apply when the state affords the possibility of parole. Id. at 11. However, the Greenholtz Court noted that it was without "the benefit of the Nebraska courts' interpretation of the scope of the interest, if any, the statute was intended to afford inmates." Id. at 12. The Court went on to hold that the Nebraska statute, by virtue of its "unique structure and language," provided an expectancy of release and was therefore entitled to "some measure of constitutional protection." Id.
Like the statute in question in Greenholtz, Idaho's retained jurisdiction statutory scheme is unique. See Wolfe, 99 Idaho at 389, 582 P.2d at 735. However, unlike the Greenholtz Court, the Browning court was not, and this Court is not, without the benefit of the Idaho Supreme Court's interpretation of the retained jurisdiction scheme and whether the nature of that program, created by the legislature, necessitates the application of due process. When sentencing a prisoner to the retained jurisdiction program, the district court seeks more information as to how to best deal with the criminal. The Wolfe court also recognized that the district court "is in a position of placing a great deal of trust" in the jurisdictional review committee's report and the recommendation contained therein. Wolfe, 99 Idaho at 387, 582 P.2d at 733. As expressly stated in Wolfe, "a prisoner, as well as the state, does have a substantial interest in the fairness of the due process used" in the retained jurisdiction program. Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the instant case is distinguishable from Greenholtz.
During appellate oral argument, the state asserted that an individual is "afforded all the process that is due" at the time of sentencing. The state argues that the Idaho Supreme Court, in State v. Ditmars, 98 Idaho 472, 567 P.2d 17 (1977), effectively precluded the recognition of a due process interest in the retained jurisdiction program. Wolfe, however, expressly held that such a reading of Ditmars was incorrect. Id. at 389, 582 P.2d at 735.
As stated above, the purpose underlying the 1995 amendment was to clarify that the legislature did not intend for the retained jurisdiction program to create a protectable due process interest. However, the 1995 amendment did not alter the nature of the retained jurisdiction program. In addition, the amendment did not affect the important interests, so thoroughly set forth in Wolfe, which both a prisoner and the state have in the retained jurisdiction program. Therefore, the 1995 amendment did not change the program in such a way as to render the due process clauses of the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution inapplicable. Although we recognize that the legislature has the power to statutorily change the nature of the retained jurisdiction program, we are constrained to hold that it did not do so with this particular amendment clarifying its intent.
D. Due Process in the District Court
Coassolo argues that, in light of the 1995 amendment, which appears to effectively foreclose the application of due process in the jurisdictional review proceedings of the Department of Corrections, the courts must intervene and afford relief to candidates in the retained jurisdiction program. In order to conclude that the 1995 amendment is constitutionally sound, Coassolo urges this Court to hold that a hearing is necessary before the district court to satisfy the due process requirements of the program.
The Idaho Supreme Court addressed this issue in State v. Ditmars, 98 Idaho 472, 567 P.2d 17 (1977). In Ditmars, the court, applying the pre-1995 version of I.C. § 19-2601, held that when a district court relinquishes jurisdiction it need not hold a hearing prior to doing so. Ditmars, 98 Idaho at 474-75, 567 P.2d at 19-20. The Ditmars court determined that because the act of sentencing occurs when the sentence is originally pronounced, a defendant is not entitled to a judicial hearing pursuant to I.C.R. 43 upon a district court's relinquishment of jurisdiction. Id., at 474, 567 P.2d at 19.
Coassolo contends that the 1995 amendment implicitly overruled Ditmars by expressing the legislative desire for a hearing upon the relinquishment of jurisdiction before the district court. Coassolo relies on the following language contained in the statement of legislative purpose:
The decision and power to place such a prisoner [in the retained jurisdiction program] on probation . . . rests solely in the hands of the district court.
Statement of Purpose S.B. 1228 (1995). We recognize that it is certainly within both the power and province of the legislature to alter the retained jurisdiction program in such a manner as to make a hearing before the district court upon the relinquishment of jurisdiction mandatory and, thus, effectively overrule Ditmars. As set forth above, however, the legislature's statement of purpose, although making specific reference to both the Wolfe and Browning decisions, makes no mention of Ditmars. We also note that the legislative purpose underlying the 1995 amendment was to clarify that no interest, protectable by due process, exists in the retained jurisdiction program. Therefore, any argument that the legislature intended to shift the location of where due process is afforded to an inmate — from NICI to the district court — is contrary to the express legislative intent of the amendment.
Additionally, in the past, when the legislature has seen fit to transfer the location of a hearing from an agency of the executive branch to the judiciary, it has expressly so stated. As an example, in 1984, when the legislature amended provisions of the Idaho Code relating to driving while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or intoxicating substances (DUI), it expressly stated, in the text of the session law, that some of the amendments were to "provide that a court has exclusive authority to suspend or revoke driving privileges." 1984 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 22 at 25 (emphasis added). In contrast, when the legislature amended I.C. § 19-2601 in 1995, it desired, in part, to clarify the duties of the Department of Corrections. See 1995 Idaho Sess. Laws Ch. 247 at 817. Moreover, as stated in the "Report of the Joint Subcommittee on Driving While Under the Influence," the purpose of amending the DUI sections of the Idaho Code was to "clarify that suspension of driver's licenses upon conviction of DUI or aggravated DUI is to be done only by a court of competent jurisdiction and not by the Department of Transportation." House Journal, February 22, 1984, at 197 (emphasis added). No such statement of intent exists for the legislature's amendment of I.C. § 19-2601. Therefore, Coassolo's assertion that the 1995 amendment to I.C. § 19-2601 somehow overruled Ditmars must fail.
Being mindful that this Court does not have the power to overrule Ditmars, we are constrained to hold that a defendant is not entitled to a hearing before the district court prior to the relinquishment of jurisdiction. Therefore, as the law stands today, when Wolfe, Browning, Ditmars, and I.C. § 19-2601 are read together, a constitutional right to due process applies to the retained jurisdiction program, but a hearing before the district court is not necessary to satisfy said due process. The legislature, however, without altering the nature of the program through the 1995 amendment, has expressed the intent that due process protections not apply to the retained jurisdiction program, and a jurisdictional review hearing by the Department of Corrections is not required.
E. Constitutionality of 1995 Amendment
As set forth above, and according to Wolfe and its progeny, as well as Browning, a jurisdictional review hearing with certain constitutionally mandated due process safeguards is required in the retained jurisdiction program. According to the Idaho Supreme Court in Ditmars, such need not be afforded in the district court. Pursuant to the legislature's 1995 amendment to I.C. § 19-2601, due process also need not be afforded at NICI. Thus, as we read the current state of the law, there is a right to due process, but no venue for such process to be provided.
Therefore, we are constrained to hold that, based on the Idaho Supreme Court's analysis of the nature of the retained jurisdiction program and the interests affected thereby, a prisoner maintains a due process right in the method utilized to create the report prepared upon completion of a period of retained jurisdiction, notwithstanding the legislature's stated purpose underlying the 1995 amendment of I.C. § 19-2601. Accordingly, we are required to hold that, to the extent that the 1995 amendment to I.C. § 19-2601(4) forecloses all Wolfe-type due process protections upon the relinquishment of jurisdiction, the amendment is unconstitutional.
We recognize that the Idaho Supreme Court, upon its review of this matter, may see fit to reconsider its holdings in the seemingly conflicting decisions of Ditmars and Wolfe, thereby affording due process in the district court prior to a decision regarding a prisoner's sentence at the end of a period of retained jurisdiction. Such reconsideration was first espoused in Wolfe itself. See Wolfe, 99 Idaho at 390, 582 P.2d at 736 (Bistline, J., specially concurring) (agreeing that due process must be afforded under the retained jurisdiction period, but seeing no reason "for not over-ruling Ditmars to the extent that it inconsistent with the court's pronouncements" handed down in Wolfe). Most recently, the inconsistent state of the law and its possible judicial and legislative remedies were recognized by this Court. See State v. Alvarado, 132 Idaho 248, 250, 970 P.2d 516, 518 (Ct.App. 1998) (Schwartzman, J., specially concurring).
The legislature may also alter the law by changing the nature of the retained jurisdiction program, or the legislature may see fit to continue to recognize the importance of due process requirements to Idaho's unique retained jurisdiction program, change the location of where due process is to be afforded to the district courts of this state and, thus, abrogate Ditmars. However, until such action is taken by either the Idaho Supreme Court or the legislature, the procedural due process protections of Wolfe and its progeny must be observed.
F. Coassolo's Remedy
Having found that Coassolo was denied due process and is entitled to relief, we must fashion an adequate remedy. We determined above that, under Ditmars, a district court is not required to hold a hearing prior to the relinquishment of jurisdiction for all participants in the retained jurisdiction program. The district court relinquished jurisdiction over Coassolo on April 27, 1999, and, thus, more than a year has elapsed since Coassolo was an inmate at NICI. Therefore, a hearing conducted now, must consider not only Coassolo's performance at NICI, but also Coassolo's performance during the time after the district court relinquished jurisdiction.
In the past, when this Court has determined that constitutionally flawed procedures preceded a district court's order relinquishing jurisdiction, we have held that the appropriate remedy was a new hearing before the district court. See Free v. State, 125 Idaho 760, 767, 874 P.2d 571, 578 (Ct.App. 1993). See also Thorgaard v. State, 125 Idaho 901, 906, 876 P.2d 599, 604 (Ct.App. 1994). As noted in Free, the pertinent inquiry today is whether Coassolo is now a fit candidate for probation or sentence modification. Accordingly, the appropriate remedy in this case is a new hearing before the district court at which Coassolo's current institutional behavior, rehabilitation progress and potential, and fitness for probation may be examined. Following that hearing, the district court must enter any substitute order that it deems appropriate.
Based on the foregoing, we find it unnecessary to address the district court's denial of Coassolo's Rule 35 motion.
III. CONCLUSION
Having determined that we are bound by both Ditmars and Wolfe, we are constrained to hold that the 1995 amendment to I.C. § 19-2601, insofar as it precludes the application of due process in the form of a jurisdictional review hearing, is unconstitutional. The order of the district court, relinquishing jurisdiction is reversed. This case is remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judge LANSING, CONCURS.
I concur generally in all parts of this opinion with the exception of II(D) and the holding in II(E) that the 1995 Amendment is unconstitutional. I also concur in the result reached in this case.
In Alvarado, 132 Idaho at 250, 970 P.2d at 518, I referred to the "cacophony of litigation" spawned from the Ditmars-Wolfe holdings. It is now time to retire the Ditmars rationale and put it to rest in constitutional never-never land, wherever that may be.
It is axiomatic that an appellate court is obligated to seek an interpretation of a statute that upholds its constitutionality. There is a strong presumption that legislative enactments are constitutional. Moreover, it is incumbent upon a court to give a statute an interpretation which will not render it a nullity. A statute should not be held unconstitutional if any practical interpretation can be given to save it. See, e.g. State v. Cobb, 132 Idaho 195, 197, 969 P.2d 244, 246 (1998); State v. Richards, 127 Idaho 31, 34, 896 P.2d 357, 360 (Ct.App. 1995); and State v. Nelson, 119 Idaho 444, 447, 807 P.2d 1282, 1285 (Ct.App. 1991).
Applying these well-tested rules of statutory interpretation, the 1995 Amendment to I.C. § 19-2601(4) can be upheld if we simply interpret it to effectively abrogate Ditmars and shift the location of where due process is afforded to an inmate — from NICI to the district court. Given the judicial, legislative, and administrative history of this issue, I do no believe that the Idaho Legislature has expressed any specific intent other than this: whatever or wherever such process is due, it is NOT at NICI. Perforce, it must be in the district court, where it rightly belongs anyway. See Dissent of Justice Bakes in Wolfe, 99 Idaho at 390, 582 P.2d at 736.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that portion of the opinion which holds the 1995 Amendment to I.C. § 19-2601(4) unconstitutional and would interpret the statute as discussed above.