¶ 1. JON P. WILCOX, J.

This case is before the court on certification from the court of appeals following an order of the Circuit Court for Waukesha County, Patrick L. Snyder, Judge, which dismissed the appellant State of Wisconsin's (State) environmental enforcement action pursuant to Wis. Admin. Code §§ RD 51.05-.06 (1969) (Solid Waste Law) for failure to commence the action within the applicable statute of limitations. The circuit court also held that the State could not impose liability upon the respondent Chrysler Outboard Corporation (Chrysler) pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) (Spills Law) because Chrysler caused the hazardous substance spill at issue prior to the effective date of the Spills Law. The State appealed.

¶ 2. On certification, we consider two issues: (1) whether the State's Solid Waste Law violation enforcement action is subject to a statute of limitations bar or to the application of the "discovery rule"; and (2) whether Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) is applicable to post-1978 discharges resulting in part from pre-1978 acts when the implicated party does not own or possess the affected property but generated the wastes and failed to remediate their subsequent spillage. We hold that the discovery rule is not applicable to the State's environmental enforcement action under the Solid Waste Law, and that the Spills Law is applicable in actions by the State to compel remediation of, and to impose penalties for, hazardous substance spills which, although initially caused in part by actions preceding the statute's May 21, 1978, effective date, continue to discharge after that date. Therefore, we affirm the order of the circuit court dismissing the State's action pursuant to the Solid Waste Law as time-barred, and reverse the circuit court's order which dismissed the State's action under the Spills Law.

¶ 3. The facts relevant to our decision are not in dispute. Chrysler, a foreign corporation registered to do business in the state of Wisconsin, owned and operated a plant in Hartford, Wisconsin, from 1965 to 1984 where it manufactured outboard marine engines. The manufacturing process generated waste paints, oils, and solvents, some of which contained hazardous substances as defined by Wis. Stat. § 144.30(10) (1977).

¶ 4. For approximately the first six months of 1970, Chrysler contracted with a construction and demolition business known as Keller Transit to remove the waste, contained in 55-gallon drums, from the Hartford plant for disposal. Keller Transit hauled the waste to a site located in the Village of Hartland, then owned by Mr. Lee Hasslinger, president of Keller Transit, and now owned by a real estate partnership named Bark River Properties (Bark River site). Keller Transit dumped the drums together with other rubbish in a low spot at the Bark River site, and covered the area with fill. The drums remained buried there until they were discovered in late 1992.

¶ 5. On August 25, 1992, the State became aware of the drums for the first time. In the ensuing investigation, the State determined that at least some of the drums originated at Chrysler's Hartford plant. Testing at the Bark River site has shown that the hazardous wastes have discharged into the ground, producing a plume of groundwater contamination at least one-half mile long. The plume contains levels of chlorinated solvents as much as ten times the safe drinking water standard.

¶ 6. The subsequent litigation between the State and Chrysler produced a settlement, by which Chrysler agreed to excavate and properly dispose of the drums and to remediate the environmental damage caused by the discharge of the hazardous waste. In August 1993, in consultation with the Department of Natural Resources (DNR), Chrysler submitted a work plan for investigation and interim response activities. Excavation of the site commenced in December 1993, and the DNR has subsequently issued a closure letter to Chrysler which indicates that the site has been satisfactorily remediated with respect to the removal of the buried drums and remediation of the contaminated soil, but not with respect to the groundwater contamination at the site. Of the 401 drums eventually excavated from the Bark River site, 240 contained hazardous wastes.

¶ 7. In 1995, the State commenced this action seeking both injunctive relief and civil penalties under both the Solid Waste Law and the Spills Law. The Solid Waste Law was promulgated pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 144.43 (1967), which provided in pertinent part:

144.43 Solid Waste Disposal Standards. The department shall, no later than January 1, 1969, prepare and adopt minimum standards for the location, design, construction, sanitation, operation and maintenance of solid waste disposal sites and facilities . . . .

The standards developed by the DNR are set forth in the Administrative Code, Wis. Admin. Code §§ RD 51.05-.06 (1969), and provide in relevant part:

RD 51.05 Collection and transportation of solid waste. (1) The owner and occupant of any premises, business establishment or industry shall be responsible for the satisfactory collection and transportation of all solid waste accumulated at that premises, business establishment or to a solid waste disposal site or facility unless arrangements for such purpose have been made with a collecting and transporting service holding a permit from the department.

(2) All persons engaged in the business of collecting and transporting services . . . shall obtain an annual permit from the department as indicated in this chapter.

RD 51.06 Disposal of solid waste. No person shall dispose of any solid waste, including salvageable material, at any site or facility not licensed by the department . . . .

¶ 8. The Spills Law, Wis. Stat. § 144.76 (1977), provides in part:

144.76 Hazardous substance spills. (1) Definitions. As used in this section:

(a) "Discharge" means, but is not limited to, spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying or dumping.

(b) "Hazardous substance" has the meaning given under s. 144.30(10).

. . .

(3) Responsibility. Persons having possession of or control over a hazardous substance being discharged, or who cause a hazardous discharge, shall take the actions necessary to restore the environment to the extent practicable and minimize the harmful effects from any discharge to the air, lands or waters of this state.

¶ 9. Violations of both the Solid Waste Law, effective May 1, 1969, and the Spills Law, effective May 21, 1978, were subject to penalties as provided by Wis. Stat. § 144.57 (1969) or a subsequent version of the same statute. The penalties provision states:

144.57 Penalties. Any person who violates this chapter, or who fails, neglects or refuses to obey any general or special order of the department, shall forfeit not less than $10 nor more than $5,000, for each violation, failure or refusal. Each day of continued violation is a separate offense. . . .

¶ 10. The State seeks penalties for every day of violation of the Solid Waste Law in 1970, and every day of violation of the Spills Law since May 21, 1978. More specifically, the State seeks to impose penalties under the Solid Waste Law for Chrysler's failure to use licensed haulers to remove its solid waste, and for failure to deposit that waste at a licensed facility. The penalties sought for violations of the Spills Law relate to Chrysler's post-1978 failure to remediate the Bark River site. The injunctive relief sought by the State includes both an order requiring that Chrysler continue and complete remediation of the contamination at the Bark River site, and an order requiring Chrysler to determine where the rest of the hazardous wastes it generated prior to 1976 at its Hartford plant were disposed.

¶ 11. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The State asserted: (1) that the discovery rule should apply to its Solid Waste Law claim so as to eliminate any statute of limitations concern; and (2) that its attempt to impose liability under the Spills Law was not a retroactive, ex post facto application of the law since it sought to address only Chrysler's post-1978 failure to remediate the Bark River site — not its pre-1978 dumping activities. Chrysler responded and argued in its own motion for summary judgment that the discovery rule, previously employed in tort actions alone, should not be extended to environmental enforcement actions brought by the State years after the environmental violations occurred. In addition, Chrysler argued that any attempt to impose penalties and forfeitures under the Spills Law, which became effective in 1978, violates the ex post facto provisions of the state and federal constitutions since they would be predicated upon Chrysler's actions in 1970.

¶ 12. Citing the fact that neither the legislature nor this court has extended the discovery rule to an environmental enforcement action of this sort, the circuit court denied the State's motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment for Chrysler on the Solid Waste Law claim. Later, the circuit court denied the State's motion for summary judgment, and granted summary judgment in favor of Chrysler on the Spills Law claim. The circuit court concluded that the Spills Law does not allow the State to seek remediation from Chrysler because the hazardous substance spill was caused prior to the effective date of the Spills Law. Any penalties or forfeitures imposed on Chrysler would, according to the circuit court, violate the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions. The State appealed from the circuit court's final order, and the court of appeals certified the case to this court pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 (1995-96).

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

¶ 13. Before we proceed to the first issue presented in this case, we must decide which statute of limitations applies to the Spills Law claim, commenced on February 16, 1995. The State asserts that Wis. Stat. § 893.87 (1995-96) is the applicable statute of limitations in this action. It provides in pertinent part:

893.87 General limitation of action in favor of the state. Any action in favor of the state, if no other limitation is prescribed in this chapter, shall be commenced within 10 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred. . . .

Chrysler contends that Wis. Stat. § 893.93(2)(a) (1995-96) applies to the State's claim. That statute reads in relevant part:

893.93 Miscellaneous actions.

. . .

(2) The following actions shall be commenced within 2 years after the cause of action accrues or be barred:

(a) An action by a private party upon a statute penalty, or forfeiture when the action is given to the party prosecuting therefor and the state, except when the statute imposing it provides a different limitation.

. . .

¶ 14. We agree with the State that Wis. Stat. § 893.87 (1995-96) is the controlling statute of limitations for the Spills Law claim. Wis. Stat. § 893.93(2)(a), on its face, applies only to actions by a private party for penalties or forfeitures when the action is given to the private party and the state. This is not an action by a private party. There being no other statute of limitations prescribed for the State's action, the general statute of limitations for actions in favor of the State applies to the Spills Law claim. This conclusion is important for the following reason.

¶ 15. In State v. Wisconsin Telephone Co., 91 Wis.2d 702, 717-19, 284 N.W.2d 41 (1979), this court considered a statute of limitations defense in the context of a forfeiture/penalty action. Most notably, the case involved an action controlled by Wis. Stat. § 893.21(1) (1975), the precursor to the statute of limitations which Chrysler proposes to be controlling here, Wis. Stat. § 893.93(2) (a) (1995-96). We held that where every day of violation of a statute constitutes a separate violation of that statute (as is the case with the penalty provision here), a cause of action accrues on each of those days of alleged violation. See id. at 719.

¶ 16. Therefore, a statute of limitations will act as a bar to any forfeiture claims which are based on violations that occurred more than, using this case as an example, 10 years prior to the date the action was commenced. Compare id. at 719 (concluding that Wis. Stat. § 893.21(1) (1975) barred forfeiture claims occurring more than two years prior to commencement of action). Contrary to the State's assertions, then, the State may not collect penalties for violations of the Spills Law beginning on the statute's effective date, but only for those violations which have occurred since February 16, 1985, ten years prior to the commencement of this action.

THE SOLID WASTE LAW

¶ 17. We now turn to the first issue presented on appeal: whether the "discovery rule" should apply to the State's environmental enforcement action under the Solid Waste Law, so as to render it timely under Wis. Stat. § 893.87 (1995-96). Upon review of the application of appropriate law in granting a motion for summary judgment, we exercise a de novo standard of review. Thus, we analyze and apply the law without deference to the circuit court's conclusion of law. See Le Fevre v. Schrieber, 167 Wis.2d 733, 736, 482 N.W.2d 904 (1992).

¶ 18. The discovery rule was first adopted by this court inHansen v. A.H. Robins, Inc., 113 Wis.2d 550, 335 N.W.2d 578 (1983). In that case, the plaintiff (Hansen) had a Dalkon Shield intrauterine device inserted into her uterus by medical personnel. See id. at 552. Approximately four years later, she began to experience various health problems, which eventually prompted her doctor to remove the device. See id. at 552-53. Although the Dalkon Shield was removed, the plaintiff did not escape unharmed: she contracted pelvic inflammatory disease, which left her fallopian tubes blocked and rendered her sterile.See id. at 553.

¶ 19. The applicable statute of limitations in Hansen's subsequent personal injury action stated that actions to recover damages for injuries to the person must be commenced within three years after the cause of action accrues or be barred. See id. at 554. If Hansen's personal injury cause of action had accrued at the time of the negligent act — the insertion of the Dalkon Shield — her claim against A.H. Robins would have been barred. Instead, recognizing "the injustice of commencing the statute of limitations before a claimant is aware of his or her right of action," and that "using the date of injury as the benchmark for accrual of claims can yield extremely harsh results," id. at 556, we adopted the discovery rule for Hansen's action and others like it. See id. at 560-61.

¶ 20. In adopting the discovery rule, we stated:

In the interest of justice and fundamental fairness, we adopt the discovery rule for all tort actions other than those already governed by a legislatively created discovery rule. Such tort claims shall accrue on the date the injury is discovered or with reasonable diligence should be discovered, whichever occurs first. All cases holding that tort claims accrue at the time of the negligent act or injury are hereby overruled.

Id. at 560. Because Hansen could not have discovered her injury any earlier, or could not be expected to personally diagnose her condition, we held that her personal injury claim accrued in 1978, upon discovery of her medical condition. See id. at 561. Thus, her cause of action was timely filed.

¶ 21. The State seeks to have this same rule applied to the present cause of action: an environmental enforcement claim for violations of the Solid Waste Law which occurred in 1970, but which were not discovered until 1992. According to the State, this court has continued, without legislative direction, to expand the discovery rule since our decision in Hansen, and has indicated its intention to make the discovery rule applicable to other types of cases. To support this proposition, the State cites several cases, including Claypool v. Levin, 209 Wis.2d 284, 562 N.W.2d 584 (1997), Spitler v. Dean, 148 Wis.2d 630, 436 N.W.2d 308 (1989), Kohnke v. St. Paul Fire Ins. Co., 144 Wis.2d 352, 424 N.W.2d 191 (1988), and Borello v. U.S. Oil Co., 130 Wis.2d 397, 388 N.W.2d 140 (1986). We disagree with the State's argument and use of authority.

¶ 22. This court has recently declined to extend the discovery rule to causes of action not sounding in tort. See CLL Assocs. Ltd. Partnership v. Arrowhead Pacific Corp., 174 Wis.2d 604, 617, 497 N.W.2d 115 (1993) (holding that causes of action sounding in contract accrue at the time the contract is breached, regardless of whether the injured party knew or should have known that the breach occurred). Moreover, although several of the cases cited by the State arguably represent some "expansion" of the discovery rule, they are all cases in which the plaintiff's cause of action sounded in tort. Stated more precisely, these cases all involved claims for personal injury.See Claypool, 209 Wis.2d at 287-88 (barring claim for medical malpractice); Spitler, 148 Wis.2d at 631-32 (permitting intentional tort claim arising from assault and battery); Kohnke, 144 Wis.2d at 355 (permitting claim for medical malpractice);Borello, 130 Wis.2d at 423-24 (permitting claim for personal injury resulting from defective furnace).

¶ 23. In none of these cases did we indicate our intention to expand the discovery rule to situations arising outside of the tort context. The State brings our attention to a paragraph inKohnke which states: "The plain language of the Hansen case did not limit its discovery rule to certain types of cases, such as medical malpractice or products liability, but was applicable to any case not 'already governed by a legislatively created discovery rule.'" Kohnke, 144 Wis.2d at 361 (quoting Hansen, 113 Wis.2d at 560). The State misinterprets this statement.

¶ 24. Nothing in that paragraph purports to apply the discovery rule to situations arising outside the tort context. This is made evident by the fact that Kohnke involved a personal injury tort claim for damages sustained during the plaintiff, Kohnke's, childhood surgery. See Kohnke, 144 Wis.2d at 356. The statement cited by the State simply reflects our conclusion that the discovery rule should apply to Kohnke's action — a claim controlled not by the medical malpractice statute of limitations, but by a personal injury statute of limitations in effect when Kohnke suffered his injury and which did not contain its own rule of discovery. Kohnke, 144 Wis.2d at 359-61.

¶ 25. Nevertheless, the State attempts to analogize the social purposes underlying environmental enforcement actions to those generally served by tort law. According to the State, environmental enforcement actions are "strikingly similar" to tort claims because the actions shift the losses, in the form of injunctions to remediate the environment or forfeitures, to the party at fault for damaging the environment. Placing this cost with the law-violating party — the one most able to prevent the injury — serves to deter other would-be violators from handling or disposing of their hazardous wastes in an unsafe manner. Finally, just as in tort law, losses are distributed widely since industry considers the cost of compliance as part of the cost of doing business in Wisconsin.

¶ 26. We are not persuaded by the State's analogy. Nor are we persuaded that the State's request in this case comports with our traditional understanding of the discovery rule. We now proceed to expound upon these important distinctions, and to explain our decision to defer to the legislature for adopting the discovery rule in environmental enforcement actions brought pursuant to the Solid Waste Law.

DISCOVERY OF INJURY RULES v. DISCOVERY OF VIOLATION RULES

¶ 27. By clarifying the precise nature of the State's request in this case, we expose the first critical deviation from our traditional use and understanding of the discovery rule. A brief look at a decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit will make our task an easier one.

¶ 28. In 3M Co. v. Browner, 17 F.3d 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1994), the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) sought to assess civil penalties against 3M for violations of the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2601-2629. See id. at 1454. The relevant question faced by the United States Court of Appeals was whether a five-year statute of limitations began running only when EPA reasonably could have expected to detect the violations giving rise to the civil penalties. See id.

¶ 29. Just as the State contends here, the EPA argued that a discovery rule was needed to address the agency's difficulties in enforcing the environmental law. See id. at 1460. After noting the laudable purposes of a discovery of injury rule, the 3M court illustrated that the federal courts had not limited the rule to personal injury actions. However, in those instances where the federal courts had expanded the discovery rule outside the boundaries of tort claims, the court emphasized that "the rule has only been applied to remedial, civil claims." Id. (citations omitted).

¶ 30. In contrast to cases involving remedial claims, the 3M court noted:

[t]he rule EPA sponsors is of an entirely different sort. It is a "discovery of violation" rule having nothing whatever to do with the problem of latent injuries. The rationale underlying the discovery of injury rule — that a claim cannot realistically be said to accrue until the claimant has suffered harm — is completely inapposite. . . . In an action for a civil penalty, the government's burden is to prove the violation; injuries or damages resulting from the violation are not part of the cause of action; the suit may be maintained regardless of damage. Immediately upon the violation, EPA may institute the proceeding to have the penalty imposed. . . . Because liability for the penalty attaches at the moment of the violation, one would expect this to be the time when the claim for the penalty "first accrued."

Id. at 1460-61. As a result, the 3M court declined to adopt the discovery rule for the EPA's environmental enforcement action.See id. at 1462-63.

¶ 31. In the same way, our adoption of the discovery rule in this context would represent a dramatic departure from our previous thinking on the subject: the discovery rule would no longer be designed to offer those with latent, concealed injuries a chance to have their day in court. Were we to adopt the discovery rule in this case, the State would be afforded the opportunity to compel both remediation and the payment of penalties by individuals or entities whose violations of a state law were not discovered within the applicable statute of limitations.

¶ 32. The State could have brought this civil penalty action under the Solid Waste Law even if the drums at the Bark River site had remained intact, without discharging hazardous wastes into the ground. All that need be proved in the Solid Waste Law claim is that a violation of state law occurred, regardless of any damage or injury to the environment. Thus, the State does not seek to apply the "discovery of injury" rule which this court has seen in the past, but rather a "discovery of violation" rule which has never before been employed in this state.

¶ 33. The State argues that it truly seeks to apply a discovery of injury rule to this case, not the discovery of violation rule encountered by the 3M court. The State reasons that the discovery rule would not apply to this case if no leaking or discharge of hazardous substances had occurred. In other words, an "injury" or damage — which in this case, the State concedes, was the discharge of hazardous substances — is required under the State's theory in order to apply the discovery rule. It is this injury requirement that separates the present case from the 3M scenario.

¶ 34. Although the State's theory dictates that a discharge must actually occur in order to impose remedial and punitive liability against Chrysler with help from the discovery rule, we disagree with the State's assertion that it seeks a discovery of injury rule for its Solid Waste Law claim. Neither "leaking" nor "discharge" are elements of a Solid Waste Law violation. A violation of the Solid Waste Law is complete when an entity uses unlicensed haulers or an unlicensed facility to dispose of its waste. The unlawful leaking or discharge of a hazardous substance are subsequent violations which may be prosecuted via the Spills Law of 1978, but not, under any reading of its terms, by using the Solid Waste Law.

¶ 35. Therefore, we find it difficult to conceive how the State can employ the discovery rule to impose penalties for a violation of the Solid Waste Law when an element it concedes is necessary for its claim (discharge or leaking causing damage to the environment) is not an element of the Solid Waste Law to begin with. The only logical — indeed, legally sustainable — interpretation that remains of the State's Solid Waste Law enforcement claim is that it does seek a discovery of violation rule, whereby the failure to use licensed haulers or a licensed dump site is, by itself, enough to impose remedial and punitive liability against Chrysler. This new-found approach to the discovery rule is cause for consideration on several levels.

PENALTIES UNDER THE SOLID WASTE LAW

¶ 36. To adopt the discovery rule in this instance would be to allow the State to punish those who violated a state law, as in this case, nearly 25 years prior to the commencement of any action by the State. As the 3M court noted, "[f]ines, penalties and forfeitures, whether civil or criminal, may be considered a form of punishment." 3M, 17 F.3d at 1460 (citing Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602 (1993)). Although we concede that there is, as the State emphasized at oral argument, no possibility of "jail time" for Chrysler, we conclude that Wis. Stat. § 144.57 (1969)'s authorization of penalties up to $5,000 per day serves, at least in part, to punish offenders of the Solid Waste Law. See, e.g., State v. Peterson, 104 Wis.2d 616, 624, 312 N.W.2d 784 (1981) (noting that "forfeiture actions are of a hybrid nature, i.e. part civil, part criminal"); City of Milwaukee v. Wuky, 26 Wis.2d 555, 561-62, 133 N.W.2d 356 (1965) (same). Thus, the State's attempt to impose penalties against Chrysler for a violation of the Solid Waste Law is more analogous to a criminal action than to the civil tort actions in which we have previously employed the discovery rule.

¶ 37. In criminal actions, the State is ordinarily subject to a statute of limitations bar — it does not have unfettered discretion to prosecute at any time because liability for the offense attaches at the time the offense is committed. See, e.g., Wis. Stat. § 939.74 (1995-96) (providing that prosecutions for felonies must be commenced within 6 years and misdemeanors within 3 years after commission of a crime, except in certain circumstances). As the United States Supreme Court concluded nearly 200 years ago, "[i]n a country where not even treason can be prosecuted after a lapse of three years, it could scarcely be supposed that an individual would remain for ever liable to a pecuniary forfeiture." Adams v. Woods, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 336, 342, 2 L.Ed. 297 (1805) (Marshall, C.J.). Indeed, the inherently punitive nature of the present action increases Chrysler's need to be protected from stale claims brought decades after the violations occurred.

¶ 38. These considerations lead us to the conclusion that the State's need for an expansive period of limitations in this remedial and punitive action is much less critical than that we have seen with the tort victims in our previous discovery rule cases. Under these circumstances, we see no reason to respond with the unilateral imposition of an open-ended, judicially-created discovery rule that for all practical purposes would apply to every environmental enforcement action brought by the State.

¶ 39. The State argues that defendants such as Chrysler will not be prejudiced in situations similar to the one at hand because the discovery rule will commence the statute of limitations when the State discovers or with reasonable diligence should have discovered the violation. According to the State, this standard puts a "heavy burden" on the regulatory agency to discover violations of the Solid Waste Law. We are not persuaded that the discovery standard which would require the State to exercise "reasonable diligence," see Hansen, 113 Wis.2d at 560, in discovering violations of the Solid Waste Law should alter our conclusion. This argument ignores our preeminent concern with the need to protect defendants from stale claims in all cases involving violations of the Solid Waste Law, not just those in which the State should have discovered a violation, but didn't because it failed to exercise "reasonable diligence."

ROLE OF THE LEGISLATURE

¶ 40. We acknowledge that a violation of the Solid Waste Law can be said to affect all citizens of the state of Wisconsin, such that the State commenced this action on behalf of those "injured" citizens. Nevertheless, a request to equate the violation of state law with the concealed, latent injury of a tort victim, so as to expand the statute of limitations in this case, is one better directed to the legislature than to this court. "Wisconsin courts have traditionally held that statutes of limitation are policy considerations within the province of the legislature." Miller v. Kretz, 191 Wis.2d 573, 580, 531 N.W.2d 93 (Ct.App. 1995). See also Tomczak v. Bailey, No. 95-2733, op at 8 (S.Ct. May 22, 1998) ("In short, the decision to close the courthouse doors on litigants with stale claims is a pure question of policy that is better left to the legislative branch of government."). Even in the context of tort actions, this court was extremely reluctant to adopt a common-law discovery rule for this very reason. See Hansen, 113 Wis.2d at 556-557 (illustrating that we adopted the discovery rule for actions sounding in tort at least some 23 years, and one legislative amendment, after the problem of discovery of injury was officially noted in an opinion).

¶ 41. More importantly, the decision to adopt an open-ended discovery rule of this sort is a course of action that should be undertaken only after substantial review by the legislature. This review may reveal that the State's perceived inability to discover violations of its environmental laws and regulations is a serious problem that ought to be dealt with immediately. On the other hand, the legislature may learn that the situation presented here is a relatively uncommon one, so that no discovery rule, or perhaps a very limited one, is needed.

¶ 42. As yet another option, the legislature might conclude that adopting a discovery rule would not cure what it perceives to be the real problem: an ill-designed or inefficient environmental enforcement program or statute to begin with. On this point, the words of the 3M court are once again pertinent to our discussion:

An agency may experience problems in detecting statutory violations because its enforcement effort is not sufficiently funded; or because the agency has not devoted an adequate number of trained personnel to the task; or because the agency's enforcement program is ill-designed or inefficient; or because the nature of the statute makes it difficult to uncover violations; or because of some combination of these factors and others. . . . An agency's failure to detect violations, for whatever reasons, does not avoid the problems of faded memories, lost witnesses and discarded documents in penalty actions brought decades after alleged violations are finally discovered.

3M, 17 F.3d at 1461.

¶ 43. In sum, the legislature is in a better position to adopt the discovery rule for violations of the Solid Waste Law: it has the resources, the time, and the investigatory capability to review and analyze the competing interests at stake in this matter. The words of Justice Day in State v. Mauthe, 123 Wis.2d 288, 302, 366 N.W.2d 871 (1985), may best summarize our reasons for leaving the choice to adopt this discovery of violation rule to the legislature:

The manner in which our air, water and land is to be safeguarded, protected and improved is under the control of the legislature. The various laws passed and the grants of authority to state agencies is the means by which this is done. Wisconsin Environmental Decade v. D.N.R., 115 Wis.2d 381, 414, 340 N.W.2d 222 (1983). The vitally important work of protecting the life sustaining forces around us, collectively referred to as the environment, is basic and fundamental to our survival. The means to achieve these ends are not always agreed upon. Experts often are in disagreement as to how to achieve these results. Under our system it is the legislature and the agencies it empowers to carry out its mandates that bear this tremendous responsibility. It is they who must resolve the conflicting interests and approaches to specific problems. "[T]he D.N.R. is the state agency with the staff, sources and expertise in environmental matters. . . ." Wisconsin's Environmental Decade, 115 Wis.2d at 391.

Id.

¶ 44. For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the discovery rule is inapplicable to the State's remedial and punitive environmental enforcement action under the Solid Waste Law. In this situation, the need to protect defendants from stale claims outweighs any injustice caused by barring environmental enforcement actions under the Solid Waste Law prior to discovery. Because liability for the remediation and penalties imposed by the Solid Waste Law attached at the moment of the violation, the claim also "accrued" at that time, thereby rendering the State's action untimely.

THE 1978 SPILLS LAW

¶ 45. The second issue we consider is whether Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) is applicable to post-1978 discharges of hazardous wastes resulting in part from the pre-1978 dumping of waste drums at the Bark River site, when Chrysler did not own or possess the site, but generated the wastes and failed to remediate their subsequent spillage. Once again, upon review of the circuit court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Chrysler, we exercise a de novo standard of review and apply the law without deference to the circuit court's conclusion of law.See Le Fevre, 167 Wis.2d at 736.

¶ 46. Chrysler makes three primary arguments before this court relating to the Spills Law. First, Chrysler contends that the Spills Law does not allow the State to seek remediation from a party who caused a pre-Spill Law enactment discharge of a hazardous substance, but who does not currently possess or own the property which requires remediation. Second, Chrysler argues that Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) is intended to apply prospectively. Finally, Chrysler asserts that even if the remedial provision of the Spills Law could be applied retroactively, applying its penalty and forfeiture provisions would violate the ex post facto clauses of the United States and Wisconsin constitutions. We address these arguments in turn.

APPLICABILITY OF THE SPILLS LAW

¶ 47. Chrysler's argument regarding the applicability of the Spills Law to its conduct in this case revolves around our decision in Mauthe, 123 Wis.2d 288. In Mauthe, the DNR discovered evidence of hazardous substance spills near a site that had been used by Wisconsin Chromium Corporation for chrome electroplating activities since 1960. See id. at 293. The defendant Mauthe, president of Wisconsin Chromium, had purchased the site in 1966, and leased it to the corporation. Wisconsin Chromium continued to conduct chrome electroplating activities at the location until 1976, at which time the corporation dissolved and all electroplating activities ceased. At approximately the same time, Mauthe formed his own company. See id.

¶ 48. Tests at and adjacent to the site revealed extensive hexavalent chromium contamination of the soil and groundwater — a hazardous substance within the meaning of Chapter 144.See id. at 292-93. The state sought injunctive relief as well as forfeitures from Mauthe under Wis. Stat. § 144.99 (1981-82) for the violations of the Spills Law caused by chromium leakage into the soil coupled with surface water runoff and groundwater flow. See id. at 294.

¶ 49. We first rejected Mauthe's argument that the definition of "discharge" provided in Wis. Stat. § 144.76(1)(a) (1981-82) required some kind of human activity which results in contaminant seepage. See id. at 298. Because "[w]ords such as 'leaking' or 'emitting' have no apparent tie to human activity and often refer to phenomena which occur absent human conduct," id., we concluded that "discharge" encompasses inactive waste sites from which hazardous substances are flowing.

¶ 50. We then concluded that although he did not cause the hazardous substance spill, Mauthe could be held responsible for remediation of the spill because he owned the property in which the contaminated soil was located. In doing so, we rejected Mauthe's assertion that holding him liable under the Spills Law would violate the ex post facto clause of the Wisconsin Constitution since the electroplating activities ceased in 1976, prior to the statute's effective date. See id. at 300-01. We stated:

[t]he action brought by the state relates only to the discharge from the contaminated soil located on his property and . . . does not relate to the activities which took place on his property prior to the statute's enactment. It is the abatement of this current discharge that the state is seeking. Therefore, this is not an ex post facto application of law.

Id. at 301-02.

¶ 51. Chrysler contends that the rationale of Mauthe does not apply to the current situation since Mauthe had actual possession or control of the land. In this case, Chrysler has never owned, possessed or controlled the Bark River site. We agree with this assertion. Nevertheless, Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) imposes liability on "[p]ersons having possession of or control over a hazardous substance being discharged, or who cause a hazardous discharge . . . ." (emphasis added). The situation presented here is different from that inMauthe only to the extent that a different clause of the Spills Law is being used to impose liability. The State does not seek remediation and penalties from Chrysler because it possessed or controlled the hazardous substance after 1978, but only upon the theory that Chrysler caused a hazardous discharge after the Spills Law took effect.

¶ 52. Therefore, to determine whether Chrysler may be held liable in this case, we must examine both the remedial and punitive segments of the Spills Law in the context of a party who is charged for "causing" the spill. As to remediation, we conclude that the legislature intended to apply the Spills Law retroactively. As to penalties and forfeitures, we conclude that the imposition of penalties in this case does not constitute a retroactive application of the Spills Law.

REMEDIATION AND RETROACTIVITY

¶ 53. It is a well-established rule in Wisconsin that legislation is presumed to be prospective in application unless: (1) the statute reveals by express language the legislature's intent to apply the provisions retroactively; or (2) the language reveals such intent by necessary implication. See, e.g., Martin v. Richards, 192 Wis.2d 156, 199-200, 531 N.W.2d 70 (1995);Chappy v. LIRC, 136 Wis.2d 172, 180, 401 N.W.2d 568 (1987);State v. ILHR Dept., 101 Wis.2d 396, 403, 304 N.W.2d 758 (1981). We conclude that Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) reveals the legislature's intent to authorize retroactive remediation under the Spills Law by necessary implication.

¶ 54. Wisconsin Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) requires those in violation of its provisions to "take the actions necessary to restore the environment to the extent practicable and minimize the harmful effects from any discharge to the air, lands or waters of this state." We must presume that the legislature chose its words carefully in drafting this statute. See, e.g., Ball v. District No. 4, Area Bd. of Vocational, Technical and Adult Educ., 117 Wis.2d 529, 539, 345 N.W.2d 389 (1984). Use of the phrase "restore the environment to the extent practicable" by necessary implication reveals an intent to address past conduct. Even those whose conduct in part predated the Spills Law cannot escape liability under this provision: they must perform complete remediation of the spill site to make the environment whole again.

¶ 55. Any other interpretation or construction of this language would produce an absurd result, which this court has a duty to avoid. See, e.g., State ex rel. Reimann v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 214 Wis.2d 604, 621, 571 N.W.2d 385 (1997). If remediation under the Spills Law were to apply in a prospective fashion only, Chrysler would be liable solely for remediation of the hazardous substance spills which occurred after 1978. Even assuming that courts could ascertain the precise date upon which the barrels began discharging their hazardous substances, it would be absurd to allow Chrysler to stop short of complete remediation by focusing on that portion of the spill which represents post-1978 spillage alone.

¶ 56. Were Chrysler to do so, it would not be restoring the environment to the extent practicable. Therefore, we conclude that the language of Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) necessarily implies that violators of the Spills Law are liable for complete and thorough remediation of hazardous substance spills — even those spills which in part occurred prior to the statute's effective date.

¶ 57. Our interpretation of the Spills Law is analogous to the interpretation that federal courts have given to the imminent hazard provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6973 (1994). In United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055 (D. N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982), the United States brought an action for injunctive relief to remedy the hazards posed by chemical dumping that occurred at a landfill in 1971 and 1972. The action was brought pursuant to, among other statutory provisions, section 7003 of RCRA. See id. at 1057. Section 7003 became effective in 1976, several years after the dumping had occurred. See id. at 1070.

¶ 58. In responding to the defendants' argument that the statute should not be applied retroactively to impose liability for acts they performed in 1971 and 1972, the United States District Court stated:

The gravamen of a section 7003 action, as we have construed it, is not defendants' dumping practices, which admittedly ceased with respect to toxic wastes in 1972, but the present imminent hazard posed by the continuing disposal (i.e., leaking) of contaminants into the groundwater. Thus, the statute neither punishes past wrongdoing nor imposes liability for injuries inflicted by past acts. Rather, as defendants themselves argue, its orientation is essentially prospective. When construed in this manner, the statute simply is not retroactive. It merely relates to current and future conditions.

Admittedly, from a practical perspective, defendants may be compelled under our reading of the statute to remedy the continuing effects of acts they performed prior to the statute's adoption. But we do not conceive of this as contrary to the purposes of the RCRA . . . . Because the gravamen of a section 7003 action is the current existence of a hazardous condition, not the past commission of any acts, we see no retroactivity problem with the statute.

Id. at 1071-72 (citation omitted).

¶ 59. In Jones v. Inmont Corp., 584 F. Supp. 1425, 1436 (S.D. Ohio 1984), the district court reached a similar conclusion regarding RCRA. Noting that the word "disposal" is defined by RCRA as "the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that . . . [it] may enter the environment," see 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (emphasis added), theJones court concluded that RCRA "authorizes restraint of further leaking of hazardous wastes [originally disposed of in 1973 and 1974], and that the leaking need not result from any affirmative action by the defendant." Jones, 584 F. Supp. at 1436. See also United States v. Diamond Shamrock Corp., 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 1329, 1334 (N.D. Ohio 1981) ("To hold that remedial environmental statutes could or should not apply to conduct engaged in antecedent to the enactment of such statutes, when the effects of such conduct create a present environmental threat, would constitute an irrational judicial foreclosure of legislative attempts to rectify pre-existing and currently existing environmental abuses.").

FORFEITURES AND RETROACTIVITY

¶ 60. The State' attempt to impose penalties and forfeitures in this case warrants a distinct analysis. Upon review of the language of the Spills Law and supporting material to ascertain the legislature's intent, we conclude that the State does not seek a retroactive, ex post facto application of the Spills Law.

¶ 61. Although Chrysler concedes that a hazardous substance "discharge" occurred after 1978, Chrysler argues that it did not "cause" the hazardous discharge in this case. According to Chrysler, Keller Transit caused the discharge when it dumped the waste drums at the Bark River site in 1970. Even if Chrysler did cause the discharge, it did so prior to the effective date of the Spills Law — again, when the drums were buried at the Bark River site in 1970. Therefore, using the Spills Law to impose liability on Chrysler in this situation would be to retroactively apply the law in violation of the ex post facto provisions of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions.

¶ 62. We might be compelled to agree with Chrysler's argument if we agreed with its definition of the term "cause," as it is used in Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977). Under Chrysler's theory, the only cause of the hazardous substance discharge in this case was the dumping of waste drums at the Bark River site in 1970. We do not agree with this interpretation.

¶ 63. "Cause" is not defined in Chapter 144 of the Wisconsin Statutes, nor has any court in this state defined the term as it is used in this context. Therefore, we must apply the standard principles of statutory construction to determine its meaning. The goal of our examination, as usual, is to discern the intent of the legislature. See State v. Rosenburg, 208 Wis.2d 191, 194, 560 N.W.2d 266 (1997).

¶ 64. To determine the intent of the legislature, a court must first look to the language of the statute. If that language clearly and unambiguously sets forth the legislative intent, it is the court's duty to apply that intent to the case at hand and not look beyond the statute's language to determine its meaning.See N.E.M. v. Strigel, 208 Wis.2d 1, 7, 559 N.W.2d 256 (1997). However, if a statute is ambiguous, a court should examine the scope, history, context, subject matter, and purpose of the statute in order to determine the legislature's intent. See State ex rel. Jacobus v. State, 208 Wis.2d 39, 48, 559 N.W.2d 900 (1997). A statute is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in more than one way. See id.

¶ 65. In this case, we may determine the common and ordinary meaning of a word by examining the definition given by a recognized dictionary. See Mauthe, 123 Wis.2d at 300. "Cause" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary as follows:

Cause, v. To be the cause or occasion of; to effect as an agent; to bring about; to bring into existence; to make to induce; to compel.

Cause, n. . . . Each separate antecedent of an event. Something that precedes and brings about an effect or a result. A reason for an action or condition. . . . An agent that brings something about. That which in some manner is accountable for condition that brings about an effect or that produces a cause for the resultant action or state.

Black's Law Dictionary at 221 (6th ed. 1990).

¶ 66. Using these accepted definitions as a guide, we address Chrysler's arguments that Keller Transit, not Chrysler, caused the discharge at the Bark River site and that if Chrysler indeed caused the discharge, it did so prior to the effective date of the Spills Law. We conclude that "cause" is capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in more than one way. A person or entity can "bring about" an event not only by acting affirmatively to produce that event, but also by failing to act. Stated differently, the failure to act can be a "reason for an action or condition" and can be a necessary "antecedent of an event" in the same way that affirmative action can precede and bring about an effect.

¶ 67. Using the term "cause" in this manner, a reasonably well-informed person may conclude that Chrysler caused hazardous substance discharges after the Spills Law took effect by failing to remediate any and all discharge which occurred after 1978. That is, by failing each day after May 21, 1978, to clean up the hazardous waste at the Bark River site, Chrysler would thereby "cause a hazardous discharge" independent of its, or Keller Transit's, actions in 1970. As we have already held in Mauthe, conscious human conduct is not needed to comport with the definition of "discharge" in Wis. Stat. § 144.76(1)(a) (1977) because "[w]ords such as 'leaking' or 'emitting' have no apparent tie to human activity and often refer to phenomena which occur absent human conduct." Mauthe, 123 Wis.2d at 298. Because the leaking or emitting of hazardous waste is an ongoing process that occurs absent human conduct, one may reasonably conclude that a person can cause that leaking by failing to clean up the hazardous waste it has generated.

¶ 68. Therefore, we examine factors such as the scope, history, context, subject matter and purpose of Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) to determine whether the legislature intended the term "cause" to include both the commission and omission of an act which leads to a hazardous waste spill. In this case, the purpose of the Spills Law alone leads us to the conclusion that the legislature did intend such a result.

¶ 69. The purpose of Wis. Stat. § 144.76 (1977) is, as we have stated:

to prevent, minimize, and, if necessary, abate and remedy contamination of this state's environment and the resultant risks to human health caused by discharges of hazardous substances. The same risks to this state's environment and to human health are present whether or not the seepage of a hazardous substance occurred in relation to some human activity at the time the seepage occurred.

Mauthe, 123 Wis.2d at 299. Thus, it would be inconsistent with legislative purpose to place a limitation upon the term "cause" that would restrict it to the action taken by Chrysler in 1970-action which already forms the basis for liability under the Solid Waste Law. Failing to remediate hazardous waste spills can have the same, or perhaps greater, effect as any affirmative spilling or dumping of that waste: the environment is contaminated and damaged, posing serious risks to human health. It is the legislature's purpose to abate and remedy that contamination regardless of the cause.

¶ 70. Evidence of the legislature's purpose may also be gleaned from the penalties provision of Chapter 144 as reproduced above, Wis. Stat. § 144.57 (1969). That provision, the substantial equivalent of which was in effect in 1978, indicates that "each day of continued violation is a separate offense." This provides clear evidence that the legislature recognized the ongoing nature of hazardous waste spills, and that the failure to remediate, each day, could itself be a cause of a hazardous discharge within the meaning of the Spills Law.

¶ 71. The logical counter-argument to our interpretation of the Spills Law — one that is implicit in Chrysler's argument to this court — is that Chrysler could not know of the hazardous substance spill which occurred after 1978, eight years after the waste had been removed from Chrysler's manufacturing plant. Nevertheless, Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) imposes liability upon persons causing hazardous discharges regardless of whether they knew about the discharge. If the legislature had desired to impose liability only upon those who " knowingly cause a hazardous discharge," it certainly could have done so.

¶ 72. Evidence of the legislature's intent not to require intentional causation is made apparent by looking to the Hazardous Waste Management Act, Wis. Stat. §§ 144.60-144.74 (1977), enacted by the same legislation as the Spills Law. See 1977 Laws ch. 377, §§ 21, 23. Specifically, § 144.74(3) indicates as follows:

Any person who transports any hazardous waste subject to ss. 144.60 to 144.74 to a facility which the transporter knows does not have a license, intentionally disposes of any hazardous waste subject to ss. 144.60 to 144.74 without having obtained a license for disposal of hazardous wastes or intentionally makes any false statement or representation . . . .

(emphasis added). This provision — again, having been enacted by the same legislation as the Spills Law — makes clear that the legislature could have established "intent" as an element of a Spills Law violation if it had so desired.

¶ 73. Therefore, we conclude that Chrysler caused a hazardous discharge in this case after 1978 by failing to clean up the hazardous waste left at the Bark River site. Because the State does not seek penalties for Chrysler's pre-1978 conduct, but rather for Chrysler's post-1978 failure to remediate the spill alone, we are not presented with a retroactive, ex post facto application of the law.

¶ 74. Indeed, "[a] statute does not operate 'retrospectively' merely because it is applied in a case arising from conduct antedating the statute's enactment, or upsets expectations based on prior law. Rather, the court must ask whether the new provision attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment." Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 269-70 (1994). Stated differently, "[a] retroactive law 'takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect to transactions or considerations already past . . . .'" In re Estate of Bilsie, 100 Wis.2d 342, 357, 302 N.W.2d 508 (Ct.App. 1981) (quotingSturges v. Carter, 114 U.S. 511, 519 (1885)).

¶ 75. In this case, the ongoing nature of a hazardous substance spill eliminates any concern that the State seeks to "impose a new duty" or "attach new legal consequences" to events completed before the effective date of the Spills Law. The hazardous discharge at the Bark River site was not a "consideration or transaction already past." Rather, as we have stated, it was an ongoing process which Chrysler continued to cause after the effective date of the Spills Law by failing to remediate the spill.

¶ 76. In sum, we conclude that the remedial portion of Wis. Stat. § 144.76(3) (1977) was intended to have both retroactive and prospective application. Therefore, Chrysler is liable for complete remediation of the hazardous substance spill in this case, even if the leaking had in part occurred before the Spills Law took effect.

¶ 77. We further conclude that Chrysler caused the discharge at issue after the Spills Law took effect in 1978, irrespective of Chrysler's activities prior to that date. Therefore, because Chrysler generated the hazardous substances, and caused their discharge after 1978 by failing to remediate, it is liable for penalties for each day of violation by failure to remediate.

¶ 78. There being no genuine issue of fact that remains for trial, we conclude that summary judgment was properly granted in favor of Chrysler on the Solid Waste Law claim. Accordingly, we affirm the order of the circuit court on this issue. Because we affirm the circuit court's order, we need not address Chrysler's argument that the Solid Waste Law was not intended to apply to Chrysler and that the law exceeded the DNR's rule-making authority. However, we reverse the order of the circuit court granting summary judgment in favor of Chrysler on the Spills Law claim and conclude that summary judgment should be granted in favor of the State on this issue.

¶ 79. Accordingly, Chrysler is compelled to complete remediation of the Bark River site, conduct an investigation to determine the location of any and all other unlicensed sites in Wisconsin at which its solid and hazardous wastes from its Hartford, Wisconsin plant were disposed and to submit both the results of that investigation, and if necessary, a remediation plan, to the DNR.

¶ 80. The cause is remanded to the circuit court in order to assess the penalties authorized by Wis. Stat. § 144.57 (1969) and subsequent versions of that same statute from February 16, 1985 until the date that remediation was commenced by Chrysler in December 1993. As mentioned, § 144.57 (1969) provides a forfeiture range of $10 to $5,000 for each day of violation. "This reflects the legislature's intention to give the trial court a wide range of discretion in fixing the amounts of forfeitures for ch. 144 violations." State v. Schmitt, 145 Wis.2d 724, 734, 429 N.W.2d 518 (Ct.App. 1988) (emphasis added).

¶ 81. There are no statutorily mandated factors which the circuit court must consider. See id. at 730 (discussing Chapter 778 of the Wisconsin statutes, which sets forth the appropriate procedures for the collection of forfeitures). Instead, "the trial court is permitted to use the limits provided by sec. [144.57] to fashion an appropriate forfeiture based on the facts of the individual case." Id. at 735. The following are some of the factors which the circuit court should consider in this case: (1) Chrysler's cooperation with the DNR in remediating the Bark River site thus far, including removal of the buried waste drums and remediation of the contaminated soil; (2) Chrysler's initiation of remedial activities without being compelled to do so by the DNR via judicial or administrative enforcement procedures; (3) the environmental harm caused; and (4) the degree of Chrysler's culpability in this matter — not for its violations of the Solid Waste Law in 1970, but for its violations of the 1978 Spills Law alone.

By the Court. — The order of the circuit court is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The cause is remanded to the circuit court for further fact-finding, if necessary, and for the assessment of penalties against Chrysler Corporation in a manner consistent with this opinion.