Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-4022-13T1
05-23-2016
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. JUAN CASTILLO, Defendant-Appellant.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (William Welaj, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Amanda K. Dalton, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Haas and Manahan. On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 06-05-0485. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (William Welaj, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Grace H. Park, Acting Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Amanda K. Dalton, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Juan Castillo appeals from a February 6, 2014 order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without oral argument or an evidentiary hearing. Predicated upon our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269 (2012), we are constrained to remand.
We briefly recite the underlying procedural history of this matter. On May 25, 2006, defendant was indicted and charged with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) "and/or" (2) (count one); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count two); and third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count three).
The indictment arose from an incident on the evening of September 25, 2006, in which defendant was involved in a physical altercation with another patron outside of a bar in Elizabeth. The victim with whom defendant had been arguing at the bar prior to the incident died from stab wounds during the altercation.
On September 11, 2008, defendant was convicted by a jury on all three counts. On November 21, 2008, the trial judge sentenced defendant on the murder charge to forty-five years imprisonment, subject to eighty-five percent parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a). The judge then merged counts two and three and imposed a concurrent three-year term on that offense, as well as appropriate fines and penalties. Defendant appealed, and we affirmed, but remanded for merger of the remaining weapons offense with the murder conviction. State v. Castillo, No. A-3067-08 (App. Div.) (slip op. at 21-23), certif. denied, 208 N.J. 600 (2011).
Defendant filed a PCR petition on January 20, 2012, which was supplemented by appointed counsel. The PCR judge, who was also the trial and sentencing judge, denied the petition in a written opinion without oral argument or an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed. Among the arguments of defendant is that the judge erred because he denied the PCR petition "without affording [PCR] counsel the opportunity to present oral argument."
In Parker, the Supreme Court explained that a "general reference" to the lack of complexity of the issues in a PCR petition "is not helpful to a reviewing court when a defendant later appeals on the basis that the denial of oral argument was an abuse of the trial judge's discretion." Parker, supra, 212 N.J. at 282-83. The Court also agreed that there are "appropriate factors" that a trial judge should continue to weigh in deciding whether to permit oral argument, including "the apparent merits and complexity of the issues . . ., whether argument of counsel [would] add to the written positions . . ., and in general, whether the goals and purposes of the [PCR] procedure are furthered by oral argument." Id. at 282 (quoting State v. Mayron, 344 N.J. Super. 382, 387 (App. Div. 2001)). Notwithstanding, the Court noted the "strong presumption in favor of oral argument in connection with an initial petition for [PCR,]" id. at 283, and required that a judge eschewing oral argument "provide a statement of reasons that is tailored to the particular application, stating why the judge considers oral argument unnecessary." Id. at 282.
Here, the judge decided defendant's PCR petition on the papers and provided no explanation as to why oral argument was not conducted. Accordingly, in light of the clear directive in Parker, we remand this matter to allow the judge to either hear oral argument and issue a reconsidered decision, or to issue a statement of reasons why oral argument was denied. Given the remand, we need not address the substantive arguments raised on appeal.
Remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION