Opinion
A00A1170.
DECIDED: JUNE 22, 2000
Forfeiture. Floyd Superior Court. Before Judge Matthews.
Tambra P. Colston, District Attorney, Andrew T. Jones, Victoria S. Aronow, for appellant.
Smith, Price Wright, Charles G. Price, Ann T. Shafer, for appellees.
The State initiated this drug forfeiture proceeding under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49. Named claimants to the seized property included Ricky and Myra Carter. In successive orders, the trial court denied the Carters' motion to dismiss the proceeding, granted the State's petition to condemn certain of the property, and authorized distribution of the property which had been forfeited. Upon being apprised ofBlanks v. State of Ga., however, the court later withdrew its earlier orders and dismissed this action because a hearing on the petition had not been conducted in a timely fashion.
240 Ga. App. 175, 176 (1) ( 522 S.E.2d 770) (1999).
The State appeals. In reliance on Miller v. State, the State argues that no hearing was required because the Carters' answers were not verified under penalty of perjury and, therefore, were not legally sufficient. The State also claims that entry of the order of distribution divested the trial court of jurisdiction. Because these arguments were not raised before the trial court they have not been preserved for appellate review. Nor do they appear meritorious. We therefore affirm.
234 Ga. App. 650 ( 507 S.E.2d 521) (1998).
See e.g., Noro-North Plaza c. v. Rare Coins of Ga., 196 Ga. App. 443 (1) ( 395 S.E.2d 918) (1990).
O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49 (o) (5) provides that the hearing on a condemnation petition "must be held within 60 days after service of the complaint unless continued for good cause." Blanks holds that if the hearing is continued for good cause within the statutorily prescribed 60-day time limit, the matter must either be heard or another continuance granted within the next 60 days. The hearing in this case was continued for good cause "until further court order" within the requisite 60-day time frame, but no hearing was held or additional continuance granted within the following 60 days. Therefore, the court correctly dismissed this action under Blanks.
Although the other issues raised by the State are not properly before us, we note that in this case, unlike Miller, verifications of the answers were sworn to under oath. Therefore, the answers were properly verified. And even though the record reflects that an order of distribution was signed by the trial court, it does not show that there has been a levy of execution of the judgment through distribution and disposal of the property. Entry of the order of distribution did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction in the case. Judgment affirmed. Johnson, C. J., and Smith, P.J., concur.
See Dearing v. State of Ga., 243 Ga. App. 198, (201) (1) ( 532 S.E.2d 751) (2000) (holding that a false verification by oath constitutes perjury; disapproving Miller to the extent that it implies that a verification under O.C.G.A. § 16-13-49 (o) (3) must contain mandatory perjury language).
Cf. Bank South, N. A. v. Roswell Jeep Eagle, 200 Ga. App. 489, 490 (3) ( 408 S.E.2d 503) (1991).