Opinion
No. 3-224 / 02-1091.
Filed April 30, 2003.
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, DOUGLAS C. McDONALD, District Associate Judge.
Glen Carson appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his conviction for operating while intoxicated following a bench trial. AFFIRMED.
James Tappa of Spector, Tappa Nathan, Rock Island, Illinois, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, William Davis, County Attorney, and Alan Havercamp and Nathan Russell, Assistant County Attorneys, for appellee.
Considered by HUITINK, P.J., and MAHAN and HECHT, JJ.
Glen Carson appeals from the judgment and sentence entered upon his conviction for operating while intoxicated following a bench trial. He alleges the district court erred in: (1) finding sufficient evidence supports his conviction; (2) allowing testimony regarding his blood alcohol content; and (3) failing to grant him a deferred judgment. We affirm.
Background Facts and Proceedings. On February 23, 2002, at approximately 1 a.m., Doreen Teel was traveling along Interstate 280 when she noticed a pick-up truck about a quarter of a mile ahead of her. The truck drove off the road, went through the median and up into the opposite lane of traffic, and down the ditch on the other side of the road. Teel called 911, turned around at the next exit, and came back to the scene to wait for emergency personnel.
The medic who arrived at the scene observed a male individual, later identified as Glen Carson, with a laceration on his forehead in the driver's seat of the truck. The medic noticed Carson's speech was slurred and his pupils were sluggish. Carson said he was unable to remember what happened but admitted he had been drinking. He was transported to Genesis East Medical Center. At the hospital, Carson was loud and used profane language towards hospital staff and personnel. Officer Kristopher Mayer had to hold him down in order to keep him from falling off the table during a CAT scan. Carson also pulled off a pulse oximeter and tried to remove his IVs. Officer Mayer noticed Carson smelled strongly of alcohol and his eyes were bloodshot. Carson's attending physician concluded there was no brain injury that would account for his appearance and behavior. After being treated, Officer Mayer read the implied consent advisory to Carson. He refused to submit to a blood test, and the officer failed to request an alternate test pursuant to Iowa Code section 321J.6(2). However, medical personnel under the direction of Carson's attending physician drew samples of his blood for diagnostic and treatment purposes. Carson's blood alcohol content was .377.
On March 8, 2002, Carson was charged with operating while intoxicated, first offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (2001). Carson waived a jury trial. After a trial to the court, Carson was found guilty as charged. He was sentenced to a term of one hundred twenty days with all but two days suspended and was ordered to pay a fine of $1000. He was also placed on unsupervised probation for a period of one year. Carson appeals.
Sufficiency of Evidence. We review a verdict rendered in a criminal case tried to the court for sufficiency of evidence to support the verdict. State v. Taft, 506 N.W.2d 757, 762 (Iowa 1993). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and accept as established all reasonable inferences tending to support it. Id. Sufficient or substantial evidence is such evidence as could convince a rational trier of fact that the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. We also inquire into whether the trial court applied erroneous rules of law and the court's determinations of law do not bind us. State v. Gay, 526 N.W.2d 294, 295 (Iowa 1995).
To convict Carson, the State had only to prove he operated his vehicle and did so while under the influence of alcohol. Iowa Code § 321J.2(1). Carson contends the evidence was insufficient to prove either of those elements. As to the first element, Carson argues the medic found him sitting in the driver's seat of the truck with the engine off. He also relies on his testimony that he did not admit to driving and no one testified that he was operating the truck or that the engine was running. Further, he relies on Teel's testimony that she did not actually see the driver of the truck and that she lost sight of the truck for approximately fifteen minutes while she turned around. Finally, Carson claims there was no testimony that he was in possession of any keys with which to operate the truck.
To operate means "the immediate, actual physical control over a motor vehicle that is in motion and/or has its engine running." State v. Hopkins, 576 N.W.2d 374, 377 (Iowa 1998). Although direct evidence may fail to prove that an intoxicated defendant was in the process of operating a motor vehicle when the authorities found him or her, circumstantial evidence may establish that the defendant had operated while intoxicated when driving to the location where the vehicle was parked. State v. Boleyn, 547 N.W.2d 202, 205 (Iowa 1996). Circumstantial evidence is the proof "of one fact, or a set of facts, from which the existence of the fact to be determined may reasonably be inferred." Id. Circumstantial evidence involves two things: (1) "the assertion of witnesses as to what they have observed," and (2) "a process of reasoning, or inference, by which a conclusion is drawn." Id. Circumstantial evidence "must be based upon the evidence given, together with a sufficient background of human experience to justify the conclusion." Id. (citing Brewster v. United States, 542 N.W.2d 524, 528 (Iowa 1996) (citations omitted)). Circumstantial and direct evidence are equally probative. Iowa R.App.P. 6.14(6)( p).
Reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the State, we find there is ample circumstantial evidence that Carson had driven, in an intoxicated condition, to the location where medics found him. Teel testified she observed a truck a quarter of a mile ahead of her drive off the interstate. Although Teel did lose sight of the truck for approximately fifteen minutes she did not observe anyone exit the vehicle. When the medics arrived on the scene they found Carson in the driver's seat of the truck with a laceration on his head. He was the only occupant in the vehicle. Also, the medics noted there was blood on the driver's side but not the passenger side of the truck. For these reasons we agree with the State, substantial evidence supports the district court's conclusion Carson was operating a motor vehicle on the night in question.
Carson also alleges there is insufficient evidence to prove he was intoxicated. He argues his bloodshot eyes, slurred speech, and unsteady balance were attributable to his head injury and not because he was intoxicated. We disagree. The term "under the influence of alcohol" is synonymous with the phrase, "while intoxicated." Benavides v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 539 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 1995). A person is "intoxicated" when one or more of the following is found: (1) the person's reasoning or mental ability has been affected; (2) the person's judgment is impaired; (3) the person's emotions are visibly excited; and (4) the person has, to any extent, lost control of bodily actions or motions. In re S.C.S., 454 N.W.2d 810, 814 (Iowa 1990).
Carson lost control of his vehicle and drove off the interstate. See State v. Dominquez, 482 N.W.2d 390, 392 (Iowa 1992) (noting the court may consider the defendant's manner of driving in determining if he was under the influence of alcohol). He even admitted he had been drinking. Carson argues this admission does not mean he was intoxicated. While we agree that Carson did not state he was drinking alcoholic beverages, we believe common sense supports the conclusion that a person involved in a vehicular accident would know an officer or EMS personnel was referring to alcoholic beverages when asked whether he or she had been drinking. Also, Officer Mayer observed all the classic signs of intoxication. He detected a strong smell of alcohol emanating from Carson, his speech was slurred, his balance was unsteady, his eyes were bloodshot and his pupils sluggish, and he was loud and belligerent towards hospital staff and personnel. Further, Carson's attending physician concluded there was no brain injury that would account for his appearance and behavior. Under the facts presented here, we find there is substantial evidence from which the judge could conclude that Carson was under the influence of alcohol at the time of the accident. Accordingly, we affirm the district court on this issue.
Admission of Evidence. Ordinarily, we review the district court's decision to admit evidence for an abuse of discretion." State v. Kios, 524 N.W.2d 195, 196 (Iowa 1994) (citing State v. Howard, 509 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Iowa 1993)). To the extent admission of certain evidence turns on the interpretation of a statute, however, our review is for errors of law. State v. Rains, 574 N.W.2d 904, 912 (Iowa 1998).
Carson argues the district court erred in allowing testimony regarding the results of his blood alcohol test since the State's foundational showing preliminary to the admission of blood test results was inadequate. Iowa Code section 321J.2(8) provides:
In any prosecution under this section, evidence of the results of analysis of a specimen of the defendant's blood, breath, or urine is admissible upon proof of a proper foundation.
Section 321J.11 provides:
Only a licensed physician, licensed physician assistant as defined in section 148C.1, medical technologist, or registered nurse, acting at the request of a peace officer, may withdraw a specimen of blood for the purpose of determining the alcohol concentration or the presence of a controlled substance or other drugs. . . . Only new equipment kept under strictly sanitary and sterile conditions shall be used for drawing blood.
It is clear the State has the burden of showing compliance with these foundational requirements. State v. DeBerg, 288 N.W.2d 348, 350 (Iowa 1980). Both parties agree the State failed to meet the requisite foundational requirements. However, the State argues the admission of the test results did not prejudice Carson and, thus, a reversal of his conviction is not warranted. We agree. There is overwhelming evidence in the record to conclude Carson was under the influence of alcohol even without the challenged evidence. We also note that since this case was tried to a judge rather than a jury there is less danger of unfair prejudice. State v. Jacobs, 607 N.W.2d 678, 689 (Iowa 2000). The district court stated the test results could not be used to prove Carson's blood alcohol content. The court came to the conclusion Carson was intoxicated based on "the description of his behavior and the medical diagnosis by the EMT, the MD, [and] observations of the police officer" not on the basis of the blood test results. For these reasons, we find Carson was not prejudiced by the admission of the test results.
Sentencing. We will disturb a sentence only upon a showing the district court abused its discretion. State v. Garrow, 480 N.W.2d 256, 259 (Iowa 1992). Sentencing decisions of the district court are cloaked with a strong presumption in their favor, and an abuse of discretion will not be found unless the defendant shows such discretion was exercised on grounds or for reasons clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable. State v. Loyd, 530 N.W.2d 708, 713 (Iowa 1995).
Carson contends the district court abused its discretion when it refused to grant him a deferred judgment. Specifically, he argues the sentencing judge was confused as to whether any accident precluded a deferred judgment. Iowa Code section 907.3(1) lists several circumstances in which the district court may not grant a deferred judgment. The pertinent circumstance in this case is "if the offense under chapter 321J results in bodily injury to a person other than the defendant." Iowa Code § 907.3(g)(5). Although the sentencing judge was initially under the impression Carson was not eligible for a deferred judgment because he was involved in an accident, the judge later acknowledged his authority to grant a deferred judgment since no one else was injured. We find no abuse of discretion in this record. If it could be shown the judge was under the false impression a deferred judgment was not possible, then it is clear Carson would have been deprived of one of the opportunities in the law for resolution of his criminal act. However, this is not the case. Defense counsel explained that a deferred judgment was a possibility. The judge acknowledged that and then in his discretion determined Carson's conduct did not warrant a deferred judgment. Consequently, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the district court on this issue.