Opinion
No. 37095-6-II.
February 24, 2009.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 02-1-05324-8, Serjio Armijo, J., entered November 30, 2007.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Van Deren, C.J., concurred in by Houghton and Hunt, JJ.
Craig Michael Cahill appeals his second conviction for the first degree premeditated murder of his wife, Teresa Cahill. Following his first conviction, we reversed the conviction and remanded for a new trial to correct evidentiary errors that occurred at trial. He now argues that the jury instruction defining premeditation in the second trial incorrectly stated the law and, thus, denied him a fair trial. Finding no error and that his appeal lacks merit, we affirm.
We refer to Teresa Cahill by her first name to avoid confusion with the defendant, Craig Michael Cahill. We mean no disrespect.
FACTS
On November 8, 2002, Teresa had surgery on her arm. For several days after the surgery Teresa rested at home, speaking with family members by phone, but stopped calling or answering her phone on November 14. Worried about her mother, Teresa's daughter, Shauna Cagle, went to Teresa's house on November 15. Teresa's sports utility vehicle was missing, so Cagle called the Tacoma Police Department for a "wellness check." Report of Proceedings (RP) at 102. When the officers arrived, Cagle found that the front door was unlocked and that the house smelled of cleaning solution, like ammonia. Teresa was missing, along with her bedding. This concerned Cagle, so she wrote a note asking her mother to call and left with the police. Later that night, Teresa's husband, the defendant Cahill, found the note and called Cagle. He told Cagle that he had been out of town for two days and did not know where Teresa was. Cahill filed a missing person report on November 16. Cahill told the investigating officer that he last saw Teresa on November 14. He also told police that he worked on November 14 and 15, but Cahill's employer contradicted this claim at trial.
On November 18, three men hunting near North Bend discovered a blue recycling bin off of a remote forest road. When they opened it, they found Teresa's body and called 911. Police recovered several items at the crime scene that were similar to items found at the Cahill house, including the plastic sheeting wrapping Teresa's body.
A forensic scientist found Cahill's deoxyribonucleic acid under Teresa's fingernails. An autopsy revealed that she died from multiple blunt force injuries to the head, consistent with blows from a heavy, black object such as a fireplace poker. Teresa's hands and arms had injuries consistent with defensive wounds. She died late on November 13 or early on November 14.
Police could not locate the fireplace poker from the Cahill house. Forensic specialists found Teresa's blood in her bedroom despite obvious earlier efforts to "clean up" the area. RP at 679. A homicide detective concluded that Teresa was likely murdered in her bedroom.
On November 21, a highway patrol officer pulled Cahill over while he was driving a car with stolen license plates. Cahill admitted that he was wanted on suspicion of murdering his wife. The officer took Cahill into custody. After advising Cahill of his Miranda rights, police interviewed him, and he made several inculpatory remarks.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
The State charged Cahill with first degree premeditated murder. A jury convicted him following his first trial and, on appeal from that conviction, we reversed and remanded for a new trial to correct evidentiary errors. On remand, a second jury also found him guilty. He appeals his second conviction.
ANALYSIS
Cahill argues that the trial court failed to properly instruct the jury regarding premeditation and that the erroneous instruction deprived him of his right to due process of law. He argues that the instructions did not adequately clarify the difference between premeditation and intent.
"Jury instructions are improper if they do not permit the defendant to argue his theories of the case, mislead the jury, or do not properly inform the jury of the applicable law." State v. Vander Houwen, 163 Wn.2d 25, 29, 177 P.3d 93 (2008). A trial court need not give the jury a requested instruction if other instructions adequately convey the law. City of Seattle v. Patu, 108 Wn. App. 364, 376, 30 P.3d 522 (2001). We review de novo whether jury instructions adequately state the applicable law. Vander Houwen, 163 Wn.2d at 29.
Cahill objected to the following jury instruction:
Premeditated means thought over beforehand. When a person, after any deliberation, forms an intent to take human life, the killing may follow immediately after the formation of the settled purpose and it will still be premeditated. Premeditation must involve more than a moment in point of time. The law requires some time, however long or short, in which a design to kill is deliberately formed.
Clerk's Papers (CP) at 126.
Cahill proposed the following instruction:
Premeditation must involve more than a moment in point of time; but mere opportunity to deliberate is not sufficient to support a finding of premeditation.
Rather, premeditation is the deliberate formation of and reflection upon the intent to take a human life and involves the mental process of thinking beforehand, deliberation, reflection, weighing or reasoning for a period of time, however short.
Premeditation may be proved by circumstantial evidence where the inferences drawn are reasonable and the evidence supporting premeditation is substantial.
Cahill cites to several cases which similarly define "premeditation," not for purposes of jury instructions, as Cahill would suggest, but for reviewing whether there is sufficient evidence of premeditation. These cases also properly explain that the evidence must be substantial. See, e.g., State v. Gregory, 158 Wn.2d 759, 817, 147 P.3d 1201 (2006). But Cahill does not argue that there was insufficient evidence of premeditation on appeal and apparently confuses the two issues.
CP at 84.
The trial court's premeditation instruction is identical to 11 Washington Practice: Washington Pattern Jury Instructions: Criminal 26.01.01, at 360 (3d ed. 2008) (WPIC). Cahill contends that his proposed instruction better captures the legal definition of "premeditation" because "[t]hough not an incorrect statement, [the pattern jury instruction] is woefully incomplete and does not fully advise the jury of the requirements of the law." Br. of Appellant at 9.
But the Washington Supreme Court has repeatedly held that WPIC 26.01.01 adequately states the law on premeditation in cases involving virtually identical challenges. State v. Clark, 143 Wn.2d 731, 770, 24 P.3d 1006 (2001); State v. Brown, 132 Wn.2d 529, 604-07, 940 P.2d 546 (1997); In re Pers. Restraint of Lord, 123 Wn.2d 296, 317, 868 P.2d 835, clarified on other issues, 123 Wn.2d 737, 870 P.2d 964 (1994) ( Lord II); State v. Benn, 120 Wn.2d 631, 657-58, 845 P.2d 289 (1993); State v. Rice, 110 Wn.2d 577, 602-04, 757 P.2d 889 (1988).
Most recently, our Supreme Court reviewed the adequacy of WPIC 26.01.01 in Clark. Clark proposed an instruction that added to WPIC 26.01.01 that premeditation "`involves the mental process of thinking beforehand, deliberation, reflection, weighing or reasoning for a period of time, however short.'" Clark, 143 Wn.2d at 770 (quoting Clark RP (Apr. 11, 1997) at 5416 (trial)). The court rejected the necessity of the additional language, explaining that it "has had numerous occasions to invalidate [this pattern] instruction and has not done so — going so far as to state that further challenge to the instruction is frivolous." Clark, 143 Wn.2d at 770. See also Lord II, 123 Wn.2d at 317 ("Lord's challenge to the court's premeditation instruction is patently frivolous.").
Cahill's proposed premeditation instruction shares the language common to the proposed, but unsuccessful, premeditation instructions in Clark, Brown, Lord II, Benn, and Rice. Clark, 143 Wn.2d at 770; Brown, 132 Wn.2d at 605; Benn, 120 Wn.2d at 657 n. 3; Rice, 110 Wn.2d at 603-04. See Lord II, 123 Wn.2d at 317. Thus, we hold that Cahill's appeal on this instruction is lacks merit and that the trial court did not err or deprive Cahill of his due process rights by refusing to give his proposed premeditation instruction.
We affirm.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040, it is so ordered.
HOUGHTON, J. and HUNT, J., concur.